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1 Introduction 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The importance of an effective human resource management is well-documented in the 
economic literature, yet not understood in its entirety (Guest, 2011). Existing research has 
repeatedly found a clear relationship between human resource practices and various 
dimensions of organisational performance, e.g. productivity or financial performance (see e.g. 
Huselid, 1995; Becker, Gerhart, 1996; Guest, 2002; Jiang et al., 2012). Recruitment, that is 
the attraction and selection of qualified employees, is one of the major challenges of firms. As 
part of the human resource management, recruitment is responsible for the procurement of 
human capital and its success “depends in part on the quality and quantity of new employees 
identified and attracted through the recruitment” (Barber, 1998: 1). On the opposite side, 
traditional economic search models (e.g. Stigler, 1962, see chapter 2.1) assume that 
employees search for vacant positions that maximise their utility as a combination of 
monetary and non-monetary aspects of a job offer. An important determinant of the success of 
the recruitment process is the degree to which employer and employee fit together. Caplan 
(1987: 248) defined the organisational need for a sufficiently high employer-employee fit as 
follows:  
Organizations wish to select persons who will best meet the demands of the job, adapt 
to training and changes in job demands, and remain loyal and committed to the 
organization. Prospective employees want to find organizations which make use of their 
particular abilities and meet their specific needs. 
This definition stresses how both employers and employees strive for the best available 
match. In the recruitment literature, the degree of job matching is usually investigated in two 
dimensions, person-job (P-J) fit and person-organisation (P-O) fit (Carless, 2005). While 
person-job fit describes the degree to which an individual’s skills and abilities match the 
respective job requirements (Edwards, 1991), person-organisation fit refers to the degree to 
which an individual fits to a given organisational culture (O'Reilly et al., 1991). When the 
optimal match has been found, firms are able to maximise their profits and employees their 
utility. In a world with perfect information, an all-knowing and entirely rational actor (the so-
called homo oecnomicus) is able to find the perfect match within no time. 
In practice, rationality of economic actors is bounded (Simon, 1955) and both employers and 
employees do not dispose of perfect information on the respective other market side but lack 
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relevant information about each other. Hiring decisions, respectively the decision to accept a 
given job offer, have to be made at the risk of a poor employer-employee fit. On the demand 
side of the labour market, employers cannot observe or foresee the applicants’ abilities and 
motivation (hidden information)
2
 or performance and shirking behaviour (hidden action). 
Applicants, on the supply side, generally lack trustworthy information with regards to 
promotion perspectives, behaviour of supervisors and co-workers, and corporate culture. Ben-
Porath (1980) concluded that “faceless” individuals and firms meet in the market, yet, more 
information on the respective other’s “face” could be helpful to avoid potential mismatch. 
Deficient congruence of characteristics or needs or abilities might result in lower job 
satisfaction, weaker performance (Pervin, 1968), and, consequently, higher voluntary and 
involuntary turnover. As in Akerlof’s “market for lemons” (Akerlof, 1970), mutual 
information asymmetries lead to imperfect labour market equilibria as employers who cannot 
observe applicants’ productivity are disposed to pay average market wages. As a result, on the 
one hand, high performers could profit from higher wages if they conveyed their productivity 
in a reliable manner. On the other hand, firms could generate higher rents if they were able to 
attract and carefully select high performers from the pool of applicants. Thus, search for 
further information is beneficial for both labour market actors. 
To overcome these mutual information asymmetries, labour market participants from both 
market sides could utilise their social capital in the form of personal contacts to fill vacancies 
or find new jobs. In analogy to the concept of human capital as the embodiment of knowledge 
in an individual, Coleman (1988) defined social capital as the “structure of relations between 
actors and among actors”. Social capital – like physical and human capital – is expected to 
improve individual outcomes, in this case job search. Personal contacts could therefore serve 
as a superior means in the job search or recruitment process for both sides of the labour 
market compared to other search channels (e.g. printed or online adverts, employment 
agencies). Recruitment channels are conventionally divided into two main groups: formal and 
informal. Formal recruitment mainly contains government or private employment agencies 
and adverts in newspapers (Rees, 1966) and – with increasing importance – internet 
advertising. Referrals of new employees by friends, relatives, or acquaintances are 
unambiguously categorised as informal. Social capital might be helpful if personal ties are 
more likely to convey reliable information about job or firm characteristics (Wanous, 1978). 
                                                 
2
 An alternative term for this kind of information asymmetry is “hidden characteristics”. However, Kräkel (2015) 
stated that different terms for ex-ante information asymmetries are used in the literature. 
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Furthermore, job incumbents might spread information about job vacancies to selected 
members of their network in order to maintain their reputation at their workplace (Ullman, 
1966). Hence, theory implies that job referrals increase matching quality which is linked to 
post-hire outcomes (Pervin, 1968). 
1.2 Research Focus, Research Questions, and Contribution to the Literature 
Job search can be described as the process of identifying job options, gathering additional 
information on these options, and, thus, selecting the “best” alternative that provides the 
highest level of utility for the individual. Social capital could affect the job search and job 
finding process at different stages, as depicted in Chart 1. The process begins with the current 
employment status, which means that the individual might be employed or unemployed or 
might have recently finished any kind of formal education and considers searching for the 
first job in the working career. The decision to search for a new job could be driven by 
financial needs (e.g. in case of unemployed or job starters), the prospect of earning higher 
wages in another position, dissatisfaction with the current position or other individual reasons 
like relocation. When the individual has decided to search for a job, which may be done either 
actively or passively, job search activities have to be selected. In case of active job search, an 
individual might utilise several channels, formal or informal, in order to increase the job 
finding probability. Passive search, in turn, implies that the individual does not actively utilise 
any of these channels but unintendedly finds an attractive job offer, e.g. because it has been 
proposed by a friend or acquaintance. Once search channels have been selected, finding a job 
can be regarded as the first outcome of job search. The probability of finding a job through a 
certain search channel might differ between channels. Finally, the channel the respective job 
has been found through could affect post-hire outcomes, such as wages, job satisfaction, 
tenure/future turnover, and job security.  
Social capital, in this scenario, is likely to affect how individuals search and find a job. It is 
assumed that individuals who dispose of more and/or more valuable social ties are more likely 
to both search and find a new job through their ties. Social capital, in this sense, determines 
the effectiveness of social ties in the job search process. Since social capital describes how an 
individual interacts with others, individual personality traits are likely to determine the 
amount of social capital accumulated. For example, extraverts or more agreeable individuals 
could dispose of more social ties which could serve helpful in the job search process. 
Furthermore, job search, job finding, and post-hire outcomes are likely to be affected by 
individual demographic, job-specific, and regional characteristics. First, how an individual 
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searches for a new job and through which channel this job is found, is likely to differ between 
individuals. For example, older individuals might dispose of more valuable social ties 
accumulated during their career in comparison to younger job seekers. Second, post-hire 
outcomes are likely to be determined by demographic (age, education), job-specific (firm size, 
branch, occupation), and regional factors (unemployment rate).  
The scope of this thesis is mainly limited to the three last stages of the job finding process: job 
search, job finding, and post-hire outcomes. Most analyses in this thesis focus on the last two 
steps in this model, namely how finding a job through a certain channel affects post-hire 
outcomes, controlling for several demographic, job-related, and regional characteristics. Yet, 
since finding a job through a certain channel can already be interpreted as some kind of search 
success (pre-hire outcome), additional analyses connect job search activities with pre-hire 
outcomes (finding a job) and post-hire outcomes. Moreover, as depicted in Chart 1, the choice 
of job search activities might differ between individuals due to several control variables. If 
finding a job through a certain channel is non-random, estimates of determinants of post-hire 
outcomes might be biased. Hence, a two-stage approach is applied which incorporates both 
steps (determinants of finding a job through a given channel and post-hire outcomes after 
finding a job through a given channel) in one model. Furthermore, personality traits have been 
identified as a source of social capital and, therefore, personality traits are introduced in a 
model investigating both determinants of finding a job through a given channel and 
determinants of post-hire outcomes. Finally, social capital is approximated by activities in 
which social capital, in different forms, might be accumulated and, thus, the relationship 
between social capital and post-hire outcomes is investigated. 
The two first steps of this model are only partially considered in this thesis. While the 
decision to search for a new job is not investigated, it is differentiated whether an individual 
has been searching actively or passively. In addition, the current employment status, i.e. the 
employment status before the newly found job, is at least partially considered by past wages 
and past job satisfaction, a differentiation between job starters and experienced job changers, 
and by interim unemployment between the two jobs.  
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Chart 1: The role of social capital in the job search and job finding process 
(Source: own representation) 
Albeit empirical research has already addressed the relation between post-hire outcomes and 
search channels respectively the channel the job has been found through,
3
 there are certain 
gaps in the literature this dissertation aims to fill. As a contribution to fill these research gaps, 
the following five main research questions are addressed in this thesis:  
1. Which factors determine whether an individual has been searching through social ties or 
why an individual has found the current job through this channel? 
So far, few studies have analysed determinants of source choice or job finding through 
different channels. Thomsen and Wittich (2010) investigated determinants of source usage on 
German job seekers, however, their analyses are limited to unemployed job seekers (off-the-
job search). How an individual is searching for a new job is likely to be determined by factors 
that lie in the individual itself (e.g. demographic characteristics) or by factors of the respective 
job (e.g. branch or firm size). For example, younger individuals might dispose of fewer 
valuable ties while older workers have been able to form ties in their work environment that 
might be helpful in finding a job. However, if selection into sources is non-random, findings 
on post-hire outcomes might be biased, e.g. if demographic characteristics determine the 
amount of social capital. As Mouw (2003) argued, individuals with a larger network should 
be more likely to find a job via social ties, yet, this could be caused by age instead of better 
networking. Therefore, the answer to this research question sets the stage for all following 
                                                 
3
 See chapter 2.5 for a review of theoretical concepts and especially chapter 4.2 for an overview of the empirical 
literature. 
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questions. Furthermore, the knowledge of selection into source usage helps to understand 
whether estimated coefficients display causal or correlational relationships. 
2. Do jobs found via different channels differ in terms of post-hire outcomes? Do the labour 
market legislation and the importance of the collective bargaining mechanism in Germany 
affect this relationship?
4
 
Several studies have investigated whether social ties are related to monetary and non-
monetary post-hire outcomes. In his monograph “Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and 
Careers” (first edition published in 1974) Granovetter (1995) provided ample evidence that 
social ties are beneficial in the job search process. Furthermore, he was able to confirm 
theoretical arguments developed in his seminal paper “The Strength of Weak Ties” 
(Granovetter, 1973) that ties to mere acquaintances, i.e. people to whom one is not closely 
connected, are more helpful than connections to family members or close friends. 
Granovetter’s work laid the cornerstone for a whole stream of the economic and sociological 
literature. More recent studies, though, have found rather mixed findings on the effectiveness 
of social ties as a job search channel (see e.g. Antoninis, 2006; Delattre, Sabatier, 2007; 
Bramoullé, Saint-Paul, 2010; Pellizzari, 2010).  
Most studies suffer from two shortcomings that leave important questions unanswered: First, 
current research is mainly based on small samples of one or few firms, hence focussing on 
hiring strategies of specific firms. However, these studies fail to investigate this topic for the 
whole labour market. Single firms, though, might differ in terms of their hiring strategies. In 
an empirical investigation of the Model of Cultural Fit (Mendonca, Kanungo, 1994), Aycan et 
al. (1999) showed that human resource practices used by firms are shaped by the specific 
corporate culture. Hence, in order to elucidate whether social ties are generally an important 
asset in the search process, a study should utilise data from multiple firms and various kinds 
of employees.  
Second, most studies are conducted in countries with less strict labour legislation. 
Granovetter’s study, for example, investigated the effectiveness of social ties in the U.S. 
labour market, which is commonly perceived as less rigid and more flexible in comparison to 
European labour markets (Nickell, 1997). Kitschelt and Streeck (2003) criticised the lack of 
flexibility in German politics and explicitly mentioned the labour market as a target for 
                                                 
4
 Note that potential selection effects are not considered (see question 3 for potential selection effects). 
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reforms. Although several reforms have been implemented (e.g. the so-called Hartz reforms), 
Kemmerling and Bruttel (2006) still saw institutional inertia and resistance. A study on the 
German labour market is meant to investigate if recruitment sources matter in an environment 
of collective wage agreements and wage posting instead of wage bargaining. If firms are not 
able or not willing to differentiate between employees recruited via different channels, the 
wage effect of finding a job via social ties should be zero. Yet, non-monetary benefits are still 
possible or even more important (in the absence of monetary benefits) when individuals 
decide to accept a job they found via social ties. In addition to this, Korpi (2001) argued that 
social ties might be less important in labour markets with stronger public institutions like 
employment agencies to which a large fraction of job openings is reported. The institutional 
background, especially in comparison to studies of social ties in the U.S. labour market, could 
be an important moderator of the relationship between social capital and post-hire outcomes. 
3. Can differences in personality traits explain both source selection (finding a job through a 
certain channel) and post-hire outcomes? 
There appears to exist a broad consensus that career success does not only depend on 
demographic characteristics or other factors that can be measured objectively but also on non-
cognitive skills, such as motivation or perseverance (Heckman, Rubinstein, 2001). Due to 
restrictions in the available data, most studies interpret personality differences as unobserved 
heterogeneity. Boyce (2010) showed that personality traits account for up to 20 percent of this 
unobserved heterogeneity in well-being regressions which implies that incorporating 
personality traits into econometric analyses can improve regression results. The enigmatic 
nature of personality has been conceptualised by Costa and McCrae (1985) in their well-
known Five Factor Model. They identified five main dimensions of personality, namely 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness to experience, 
which have been confirmed in multiple studies. In the last decade, many representative 
individual and household surveys (e.g. the German SOEP or the Australian HILDA) have 
included personality measures into their questionnaires which made it possible for researchers 
to include personality measures into their analyses. 
Apart from econometric reasons to include personality traits, there are theoretical 
considerations why personality might be an interesting dimension of individual differences in 
the context of job search. As already hypothesised by Pervin (1968), personality could be a 
determinant of employer-employee fit. Individuals are likely to sort into jobs that match their 
character traits, e.g. sales representatives are more likely to be extraverts than introverts (Ham 
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et al., 2009b). Current research has repeatedly found correlations between personality traits 
and post-hire outcomes (Heineck, Anger, 2010; Cobb-Clark, Tan, 2011; Fietze, 2011; 
Heineck, 2011), implying that certain character traits could be beneficial in the labour market. 
However, personality traits could also determine how job seekers search for a new job – in 
this case which channels are utilised in the search process. Individuals who are scoring high in 
dimensions that are important for social interaction could be more likely to search and find a 
job via social ties. In this thesis, a comprehensive model is developed in which personality 
traits are regarded as a determinant of source choice in the recruitment process and as a 
determinant of post-hire outcomes. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
combine personality research with research on job search via social ties. 
4. Do unemployed job seekers use social capital in a different way than employed job 
seekers? Do unemployed job seekers benefit from job search via social ties? 
While early job search models treated all job seekers as homogeneous (Mortensen, 1970), 
other models (e.g. Burdett, 1978) distinguished on- and off-the-job search; job seekers who 
search while they are still employed and job seekers who are unemployed. In the context of 
job search via social ties, this distinction could have important implications since employed 
job seekers could be able to generate valuable ties in their work environment while 
unemployed job seekers (especially in the case long-term unemployment) might lack such ties 
(Bramoullé, Saint-Paul, 2010). On the other hand, unemployed can spend more of their time 
on job search, especially via formal channels. As a result, the relationship between job search 
via social ties and post-hire outcomes might be affected by the employment status. 
Apart from post-hire outcomes, job search channels might differ in terms of pre-hire 
outcomes, namely in the probability of finding a new job. Stigma effects of unemployment 
have been well-documented in the literature (Vishwanath, 1989; Van den Berg, van Ours, 
1994; Biewen, Steffes, 2010), causing prolonged unemployment spells. Information 
asymmetries are more severe in case of unemployed job seekers, in particular if employers 
interpret unemployment duration as a proxy for unobservable characteristics, such as 
motivation or human capital depreciation. Social ties, in turn, could be helpful in the job 
search process to alleviate information asymmetries when referrers are able to provide reliable 
information on the unobserved characteristics of the job seeker. Therefore, information on 
search effort while being unemployed can be used to investigate patterns of off-the-job search 
and to identify which search channels actually utilised by job seekers are helpful in finding a 
job.  
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5. How does social capital, generated in different types of leisure time activities, relate to 
post-hire outcomes? 
Social capital is the aggregate of all social ties that an individual disposes of (Bourdieu, 1986) 
and which can be utilised for different purposes. Due to the complex nature of social networks 
which are object to constant change and almost impossible to measure in their entirety 
(Wuchty, 2009), the empirical literature has to rely on proxies, e.g. a general measure of trust 
(La Porta et al., 1997; Glaeser et al., 2000). Since social ties are formed between individuals 
through mutual exchange and time spent together, leisure time activities appear to be a strong 
indicator for the amount of social capital accessible by the individual. Yet, activities differ in 
their potential to generate beneficial ties. Apparently, exchange with close friends could be 
less fruitful in comparison to other activities that bring together people with different 
backgrounds and access to further networks. Based on this observation that weak social ties, 
in comparison to strong or close ties, are particularly helpful in the labour market, Granovetter 
(1973) has coined the expression of the “strength of weak ties”. Hence, leisure time activities 
can be interpreted as the individual’s potential network and as a proxy for network size and 
network quality. It is assumed that a larger network with more valuable ties from outside the 
circle of close friends or relatives is more helpful in the labour market in terms of monetary 
and non-monetary outcomes.  
 
Chart 2: Thesis structure and investigated relationships 
(Source: own representation) 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
All in all, this dissertation aims at elucidate both the determinants of job search via different 
search channels and the relationship of recruitment channels and post-hire outcomes. First, 
economic theories as well as theories from social and behavioural sciences are analysed in the 
light of job search via different search channels – with a special focus on social capital. 
Utilising data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a large longitudinal survey 
representative for the German adult population, enables a thorough analysis of job search via 
personal ties. Therefore, this dissertation is structured as follows, visualised in Chart 2: 
Chapter 2 positions this study in the economic search and matching model literature. 
Towards this end, models of job search (Stigler, 1962; Mortensen, 1970) and employer-
employee matching (Mortensen, 1988) under incomplete information are presented. 
Furthermore, this chapter draws on social capital theory and network theories to explain the 
relation between social ties and job search effectiveness.  
Chapter 3 analyses the determinants of finding a job through a given channel. It is 
investigated if certain demographic or job-related variables affect job finding. The findings of 
this chapter are essential for the understanding of this field of research. If source choice is 
related to specific individual properties, coefficients are likely to be biased if this selection is 
not considered. Thus, this chapter is meaningful for the interpretation of all further findings. 
Chapter 4 comprises the empirical investigation of post-hire outcomes for employees who 
found their jobs via various channels. Starting wages in the new job, job satisfaction and 
turnover are used as dependent variables in this section. By using both monetary and non-
monetary outcomes as dependent variables it is possible to trace whether personal contacts 
enable individuals to find better paid jobs or to increase job satisfaction (which is likely to be 
related to turnover).  
In chapter 5, the previous analyses are augmented by the inclusion of personality traits. 
Personality is regarded as an important factor in determining individual behaviour and might 
affect job search (in this case source choice) and/or behaviour on the job – which both might 
affect post-hire outcomes. A two-stage approach suggested by Bourguignon et al. (2007) is 
applied here in order to investigate whether personality or other factors could be a driving 
force into non-random source selection. So far, personality traits have not been analysed in 
the context of job search via social capital. 
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Chapter 6 aims at exploiting the more detailed data on unemployed job seekers in the SOEP. 
For unemployed job seekers, the dataset does not only include information on how the current 
job was found, but also on which search channels have been utilised during the 
unemployment spell. Hence, the relevance of the actually utilised search channels on finding a 
job can be analysed. 
Chapter 7 goes beyond job search and investigates how social capital affects career success 
in general. Social capital is measured as leisure time activities, such as voluntary work or 
meeting friends, which are meaningful in creating and maintaining social ties. 
Chapter 8 summarises the main findings of this dissertation and discusses practical 
implications of these findings. Furthermore, limitations of this thesis are discussed and 
recommendations for future research are made. 
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2 Theoretical Considerations and Related Literature 
In economics, as the science of dealing efficiently with limited resources (e.g. time or 
financial resources), decision making is one of the most thoroughly analysed, yet 
controversially discussed aspects of individual behaviour. In general, behaviour can be 
described as “conscious or unconscious selection of particular actions which are all physically 
possible to the actor” (Simon, 1997: 3). Economic actors aim to reach a decision that is 
effective in realising the desired outcome and efficient as regards to resource usage. 
Therefore, the analysis of how economic actors decide on a certain problem and how the 
decision making process can be improved is a key objective of economic research.  
Basically, a decision can be characterised as “a choice between two or more options or acts, 
each of which will produce one of several outcomes” (Resnik, 2008: 6). Such choice usually 
constitutes a trade-off between options, as multiple options cannot be realised due to 
constraints in time and resources or alternatives are mutually exclusive. Hence, problem 
specification by carefully identifying potential options is a crucial prerequisite in decision 
making. Thus, decisions can be separated into two steps: First, alternatives have to be 
identified; second, one of these alternatives has to be selected. 
Theories on how this process works are dependent on the underlying conceptualisation of 
human behaviour. Classic approaches are founded on the traditional economic doctrine which 
draws on the concept of the decision maker as homo oeconomicus who: 
 disposes of complete information at no cost, 
 only maximises his own expected utility, 
 disposes of infinite computing abilities, 
 and, thus, acts fully rational. 
In this world, decision makers possess all relevant information and infinite computing 
capacities to process this information. Decision makers dispose of the full set of alternatives 
among which the best alternative is chosen in no time. In this understanding, economics is 
purely logic which could be best solved in mathematical form (Hayek, 1945). However, this 
concept leaves no space for search activities to enhance information that are subject of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, this approach has limited explanatory power as regards to 
dissatisfaction with a certain decision. If ex-ante all information is available to buyers and 
sellers, bad decisions cannot arise ceteris paribus because unsatisfactory transactions do not 
take place. Hence, theoretical models that attempt to explain the search process should draw 
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on a more realistic image of human behaviour that limits human capacity to act entirely 
efficiently and rationally. All in all, the concept of unlimited individual capacity of collecting 
and processing all information in no time is fairly unrealistic.  
In his collection of essays Models of Man, Simon (1957) proposed a more realistic 
conceptualisation of the economic actor by introducing the term “bounded rationality”. 
Rationality is bounded as “the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving 
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems” (Simon, 1957: 198). 
According to this approach, decision makers intend to act rationally, however, rationality is 
limited due to constraints in cognitive capabilities and resources (Simon, 1997). Later 
research contributed to this concept, yielding three approaches describing the limits of 
rationality: optimisation under constraints, cognitive illusions, and ecological rationality 
(Todd, Gigerenzer, 2003). Models that incorporate the first view of bounded rationality 
assume that individuals do not dispose of complete information and that information search is, 
in fact, costly. Therefore, search is conducted under financial and temporal constraints while 
still sticking to the concept of optimisation. The second type of bounded rationality is based 
on psychological explanations for non-optimising human behaviour which can be called 
irrationalities. This approach interprets systematic errors of individual decision making as the 
main drivers for limits in rationality.
5
 However, Simon (1990) stated that these two directions 
of limited rationality are not mutually exclusive but complementary as a pair of “scissors 
whose blades are the structure of task environments and the computational capabilities of the 
actor” (Simon, 1990: 18). Therefore, Todd and Gigerenzer (2003) interpreted bounded 
rationality as a combination of cognitive limitiations (biases, irrationalities) in a world that 
sets external limitations for the dicision maker (search costs, computing capacity). Simon 
(1959: 272) summarised this concept of incomplete information as follows: 
The decision maker’s information about his environment is much less than 
approximation to the real environment. The term “approximation” implies that the 
subjective world of the decision maker resembles the external environment closely, but 
lacks, perhaps, some fineness of detail. In actual fact the perceived world is 
                                                 
5
 Irrationality might occur in both stages of a decision: in identifying alternatives as well as in choosing the 
utility-maximising alternative. See for instance Payne (1976), Olshavsky (1979), and Potter and Beach (1994) 
for empirical evidence on how individuals ex-ante reduce the number of alternatives, as hypothesised in image 
theory (Beach, Mitchell, 1987). See e.g. Kahneman (2003) for a summary of several decision making biases and 
Camerer (1997) for an overview of biases in game theory. 
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fantastically different from the real world. The differences involve both omissions and 
distortions, and arise in both perception and inference. 
Simon (1955) therefore introduced the concept of “satisficing”, which implies that individuals 
do not strive to maximise their utility or income but to make a decision which generates a 
satisficing level of the targeted outcome. In this decision model, individuals are not able to 
foresee all future options (as in a model with complete information) and options are available 
sequentially. Therefore, individuals have to decide whether to chose a given option or to wait 
for other (potentially better) options while bearing costs of not making a decision, e.g. 
foregone earnings or additional search costs. Hence, individuals do not optimise their 
outcomes under the restrictions of search costs but try to identify an option which generates at 
least a satisficing level of outcome. Yet, this does not exclude that other (unknown) options 
might have provided higher outcomes. 
All theoretical models that are explained in this chapter are explicitly based on considerations 
of bounded rationality, mainly in the sense of optimisation under constraints. However, 
further cognitive biases are discussed as well.  
Recruitment, respectively the acceptance of a certain job offer, constitutes a typical decision 
making process in which alternatives have to be identified and, thereafter, the best applicant 
or job has to be selected. The employer’s decision which applicant to hire comprises two steps 
an organisation takes in order to find and employ new hires. First, applicants have to be 
addressed and the firm generates a pool of potential employees. Afterwards, firms screen this 
pool of applicants to identify the best employee for the respective job (Marsden, Campbell, 
1990). Employees, in turn, have to gather information on vacancies or new positions and 
choose between job offers received from employers. Information asymmetries cause problems 
in this process since firms and job seekers do not dispose of all necessary information which 
makes it difficult to find the best employee or the best job. 
This chapter theoretically investigates why job search as a decision process is a non-trivial 
economic problem and how this problem might be alleviated by social capital. The structure 
of this chapter follows the logic of the decision process by describing economic search 
theories in chapter 2.1 and, sequentially, matching theory in chapter 2.2. The following 
chapters deal with the concept of social capital (2.3) and social networks (2.4) which is 
transferred to the job search process in chapter 2.5, combining search, matching, and social 
capital theories. These concepts provide a general fundament for this dissertation by 
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explaining the search process in the labour market with particular focus on different search 
channels. Theoretical concepts that are relevant in a specific chapter (e.g. personality traits) 
are described within the respective chapter. Chapter 2.6 summarises the main findings of this 
chapter and provides an outlook about the empirical investigations in the following chapters. 
2.1 Search Theory 
The origins of search theory lie in the explanation of search behaviour in commodity markets. 
Neoclassical models of commodity markets are based on the assumption of perfect 
information which leads to the existence of exactly one equilibrium market price for 
homogeneous commodities. In reality, we observe different prices for the same commodity in 
competitive markets. Apart from geographical barriers (i.e. distance to markets), information 
deficits can explain such price dispersions. In his path-breaking work, Stigler (1961) 
emphasised the importance of information search. In commodity markets, customers do not 
dispose of perfect information about prices of every seller. Sellers, themselves, are not able to 
obtain information about every competitor’s price. Ben-Porath (1980) described both market 
participants as “faceless”, which emphasises the aspect that both buyers and sellers belong to 
a pool of firms respectively individuals and that they cannot be distinguished from the 
respective other market side. Thus, lacking information on the supply side of the market 
explains price differences between sellers. 
In Stigler’s (1961) search model, buyers receive a new price offer drawn randomly from a 
given price function f(p) when they decide to invest search effort. Subsequently, the customer 
has to decide whether to accept the price offer or to canvass other sellers in hope for a better 
price. Extended search enables buyers to find a better price; however, it is not without cost. 
First, opportunity costs arise as search is time-consuming and consequently detains 
individuals from engaging in other activities. Second, the absence of a certain commodity can 
expose additional monetary or non-monetary costs respectively disutility. Therefore, buyers 
invest in search activities as long as marginal returns from search exceed marginal costs. The 
optimum amount of search is found when marginal returns equal marginal costs. Due to 
diminishing returns of information and increasing marginal search costs, complete 
information is not desirable. Furthermore, the search for information has both an intensive and 
extensive margin (Rees, 1966). Searching at the intensive margin aims at getting more 
information about an existing quotation from a seller. Extensification is associated with search 
for a quotation from another seller. Intensification is therefore reasonable when products are 
 
16 Theoretical Considerations and Related Literature 
heterogeneous to a large extend to evaluate the specific characteristics of single commodity. 
For homogeneous products extensification is required in order to find a lower price. 
A similar logic can be applied to labour markets, where employers are searching for the best 
job, in this case the highest wage.
6
 In a world of perfect information, all job offers would 
arrive at the same time and the job seeker could simply chose the alternative with the highest 
wage offer. In reality, though, receiving a job offer requires search effort (finding potential 
employers, passing the selection process) which generates search costs (e.g. forgone earnings) 
or psychological costs of unemployment might arise, for instance depression, psychosomatic 
symptoms, or lack of self-esteem (Paul, Moser, 2009; Farré et al., 2015). Furthermore, search 
effort limits the number of job offers the job seeker receives in a given period as time is 
limited and can only be allocated to a finite number of search activities. Based on these 
considerations regarding customers’ behaviour on commodity markets, Stigler (1962) 
transferred the analysis of information search on labour markets. Under the assumption of 
sequential arrival of job offers and positive search costs, individuals try to maximise their own 
discounted lifetime earnings. As a result, individuals do not search until the best job offer is 
found but until the costs of further search overcompensate the gains from finding a better paid 
job. Albeit Stigler’s approach abstains from classic economic theory by introducing search 
cost, he still sticks to the idea of utility maximisation – under the constraint of costly 
information search. However, maximising lifetime earnings is an extremely complex task 
which is likely to outstrip the computing capabilities of individuals. 
Simon (1955) refrained from this concept of utility maximisation and explicitly modelled 
bounded rationality in his search model by introducing the notion of “satisficing”. His basic 
idea was that individuals receive information during the search process sequentially instead of 
simultaneously. As a result, searchers are not able to compare and value all alternatives but 
each period they have to decide whether to accept or to decline a job offer – without knowing 
if a better offer might be received in the next period. Job searchers have to consider a 
satisficing level of utility at which they accept a job offer. Hence, this model abstains from the 
idea of optimising under constraints, because “real-world optimization, with or without 
computers, is impossible [and] the real economic actor is in fact a satisficer, a person who 
                                                 
6
 In reality, job attributes are multi-dimensional. Apart from wages, job seekers have to acquire information on 
several aspects of potential employers such as working conditions, promotion perspectives, and skill 
requirements. For simplicity it is assumed that all these attributes can be measured in monetary equivalents. 
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accepts “good enough” alternatives, not because less is preferred to more but because there is 
no choice” (Simon, 1996: 28-29). 
In a simplified search model, in which all job offers only differ as to wages, job searchers 
only know about the distribution of all job offers. However, they cannot foresee the sequence 
of job offers they receive in the future periods. Consequently, applicants set an ex-ante 
aspiration level, a wage which evokes indifference between accepting and rejecting the job 
offer. If the wage offer is below the aspiration level, the job seeker does not accept the job; if 
the wage is above the aspiration level, the job seeker accepts the job offer. Thus, the sequence 
of incoming job offers determines post-hire outcomes. Furthermore, factors that determine the 
ex-ante aspiration level (market wages, individual characteristics) have to be considered and 
the aspiration level cannot be regarded as constant. When the unemployment spell lasts 
longer, the individual will reduce the minimum wage as human capital has to be depreciated 
and costs of unemployment (foregone earnings, psychological costs) increase. 
Table 1: Abbreviations and descriptions of the Simon (1955) model 
Abbreviation Description 
A Set of all potential behavioural alternatives 
Å Set of behavioural alternatives considered by the individual (Å ⊂ 𝐴) 
S Set of future outcomes 
V(s) Utility function of single outcomes s 
Pa(s) Probability that s will occur if alternative a ∈ A is chosen 
Source: own presentation according to Simon (1955) 
The model (see all abbreviations in Table 1) explicitly incorporates that individuals consider a 
set of behavioural alternatives (Å) smaller than the full set available (A). Omission of 
alternatives might be a result of lacking computing abilities or irrationalities of the individual 
who is not able or willing to assess all available alternatives. Search for further alternatives is 
costly which leads to a conscious omission of alternatives by limiting search effort. 
Furthermore, alternatives might be excluded from consideration due to errors in perception. 
Therefore, individuals are not able to maximise their future outcomes as described in the 
search models above. Apart from these limited capabilities, Simon introduced a dynamic view 
of rational choice. As the individual’s ability to foresee future alternatives (job offers) is 
limited, the sequence and time structure of incoming offers is relevant for the final decision. 
Hence, individuals do not try to maximise their discounted lifetime income by accepting a 
specific job offer but to find the job that offers a satisficing level of income, job satisfaction, 
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and other relevant factors. In comparison to Stigler’s model, individuals are likely to be worse 
off because the satisficing level is usually below the maximum.
7
 
In line with this argumentation, Mortensen (1970) set up a model of job search in which an 
unemployed worker is seeking for a job (visualised in Chart 3).
8
 In the simplest model, job 
seekers do not know about the exact wage which is offered by every firm. Instead, job offers 
are randomly drawn from a known wage distribution (McCall, 1970), in this case the wage 
frequency distribution f(W). E(W) represents the weighted means of all job offers. The 
variable K comprises all attributes and skills inherent in the worker. Employers’ wage offers 
are determined by the minimum skill requirement W(K). The higher the required skill level, 
the higher the wage offers by firms. Since firms do not hire employees that do not meet the 
firm’s skill requirements, the job seeker can only hope to receive a wage offer below W*(K*), 
with K* being the individual skill level. Before entering the labour market, the job seeker has 
to set their reservation wage (WR). This wage is determined by the amount of unemployment 
benefits and foregone earnings, as well as the time-preference (discount factor) of the 
unemployed and can be interpreted as the satisficing level of wage (or utility). With regard to 
Chart 3, job seekers do not accept a wage offer that lies left of WR. 
 
Chart 3: Wage distribution in the search model 
(Source: own presentation according to Ehrenberg, Smith, 2012: 503) 
                                                 
7 
Caplin et al. (2011) found empirical support for the Simon model in an experimental setting. Participants were 
asked to choose the highest results of eight mathematic tasks (additions and subtractions) with and without a 
time limit. Their findings clearly show that most participants search sequentially and act as satisficers. Thus, the 
sequence of given options determines search outcomes. 
8
 The notation follows Ehrenberg and Smith (2012). 
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In this model, searching for further information means to sequentially draw a random sample 
of the population of vacancies. For simplicity it is assumed that workers can only receive one 
offer in each period of time. If the offered wage rate exceeds the reservation wage, the job 
seeker will accept the offer and stop searching. Conversely, if an offer does not exceed the job 
seeker’s minimum expectations, he will reject the offer and continue searching. Hence, a job 
seeker who chooses a high reservation wage is likely to find a better paid job, maybe at the 
cost of longer unemployment spell. Again, the optimal amount of search for each labour 
market participant is found when marginal benefits of search equal marginal search costs. 
Although not originally intended by the authors, a dynamic interpretation of this model can 
explain why employees leave a company. In case the job seekers find a job below their 
maximum skill level W*(K*) or accumulate more human capital (K), given the firm is not 
able to provide other jobs, the employee can only earn higher wages by leaving the firm. 
However, this requires the possibility of on-the-job search which is not implemented in this 
model. 
Later works (e.g. Burdett, 1978; Gottschalk, Maloney, 1985; Simon, 1993) aimed at solving 
this shortcoming by incorporating on-the-job search. Job-to-job changes with no interim 
unemployment could be a relevant factor influencing wages or other labour market outcomes. 
This can only occur if employees search while they are still working in their current job. In 
the basic model, workers dispose of two mutually exclusive options: (1) to look for a job 
without working or (2) to work without searching. Burdett (1978) added a third alternative (3) 
of searching while being employed. Costs of on-the-job search might differ from unemployed 
search due to higher valuation of leisure time or a higher amount of foregone earnings (c1 = 
off-the-job, c2 = on-the-job). All searchers want to maximise net discounted lifetime earnings 
at a given point in time (t) by choosing one of the three options which can be formalised as: 
ψ(w, t) = max{μ1t(w, u, c1),  μ2t(w),  μ3t(w, c2)} (2.1) 
where w denotes the prospected or current wage and u reflects the unemployment benefits. 
Chart 4 shows the utility functions of the three options. For any given wage offer the optimal 
labour market strategy is: 
 Option 1 (searching without working)  if w < z 
 Option 2 (working without searching)  if w ≥ y 
 Option 3 (working and searching)   if z ≤ w < y 
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Chart 4: Decision to search on or off-the-job 
(Source: own presentation according to Burdett, 1978: 215) 
This model cannot be directly connected to job search via different search channels; however, 
the intuition of this model is important for the search via different channels (see chapter 2.5). 
An important aspect of this model is that different search costs are explicitly modelled. In 
practice, search costs might not only differ between on and off-the-job search but also 
between jobs and, especially, between hierarchy levels (which are related to wages). 
Therefore, the model explains differences in search behaviour depending on the wage level 
which can also be applied job search via social capital. 
2.2 Matching Theory 
Matching theory tries to explain the formation of a relationship between a complementary pair 
of individuals. Each relationship (hereafter called match) is attributed a certain value 
according to the quality of the match, for instance individual productivity in a specific job 
(Jovanovic, 1979b). Thus, matching theory explains why some relations are maintained and 
others are separated. This theory focuses on the situation when partners are already matched, 
which places the matching subsequently after the end of the search process. 
Mortensen (1988) regarded two kinds of matching as comparable: marriage and employment. 
Both relationships are entered voluntarily and generate benefits for both agents since they can 
exploit opportunities they would not have separately. The quality of a match is determined by 
the degree both partners fit to each other. Each subject disposes of a bundle of “traits” – 
demography, biography, personality – which determines the matching quality. Since the 
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degree of fit differs for every potential pair of individuals, an assignment problem derives. 
Gale and Shapley (1962) were the first to present a simple matching model for the marriage 
market in which a number of n men and n women are paired. Individuals rank each other in 
accordance to their preferences. Then each individual can decide whether to enter a match or 
to stay single. A relationship is considered stable when both individuals do not want to split 
up in order to realise a better match. Hence, both members of a partnership have to be 
compensated for their forgone utility of remaining single or their outside options. In the 
notation by Mortensen (1988) the total surplus of entering a relationship is defined as: 
𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓𝑖𝑗 + 𝑚𝑖𝑗 − 𝑓𝑖𝑜 − 𝑚𝑖0 (2.2) 
whereas sij stands for the total utility gained by entering the match, fij respectively mij stand 
for the utility of females and males, fi0 and mi0 reflect the opportunity costs. Hence, the model 
implies that every match generates a surplus that would not derive if both partners were 
separated. 
To allow for heterogeneity of both employers and employees, Crawford and Knoer (1981) set 
up a model for a number of m workers and n firms (indexed i = 1, …, m and j = 1, …, n). For 
each potential firm-worker pair there is a vector of work-related outcome variables such as 
job satisfaction (aij), productivity (bij), and salary (sij). Under the assumption of 
substitutionability of job satisfaction and salary, the individually rational decision of job 
seekers is defined as follows: 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑎𝑓(𝑖,𝑗) + 𝑠𝑓(𝑖,𝑗) (𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑖) ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑗 (𝑖)  ≥ 0) (2.3) 
Job seekers accept a job offer (or are not willing to leave the firm) if the monetary and non-
monetary benefits are at least as high as any other salary and satisfaction combinations in the 
market. The firm’s rational decision can be described by:  
𝑏𝑖𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑏𝑔 (𝑗)𝑖 − 𝑠𝑔 (𝑗)𝑖 (𝑏𝑔 (𝑗)𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑔 (𝑗)𝑖  ≥ 0) (2.4) 
which means that employees are employed or kept when the marginal benefit of this 
employee is larger than the benefit of any other employee in this position. Under the 
constraint of imperfect information it becomes obvious that this equilibrium cannot be found 
easily. In their model, Crawford and Knoer (1981) described a salary adjustment process in 
which the market equilibrium is found. 
Although both models differ as regards to the degree of heterogeneity and the adjustment 
process, in both approaches a Pareto efficient allocation exists in which the generated surplus 
is maximised. On entering the new partnership, a bargaining problem accrues as the generated 
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surplus has to be divided between the matching parties. How this surplus is shared between 
the two parties is not part of the model. However, a stable equilibrium requires a division in 
which each party gains more or equal compared to the best alternative match (Mortensen, 
1988). Whereas the division of surplus might be rather difficult in the marriage example, the 
surplus associated to a labour market matching can be shared more easily as employers’ 
(productivity) and employees’ (wage) surpluses can be valued monetarily. Assuming that 
wages are related to individual productivity, an increase in matching quality is likely to 
increase wages. Hence, being able to signalise high matching quality is likely to be beneficial 
for both employers and employees.
9
 
A growing yet already large stream of the literature analyses the relationship between P-O 
fit
10
 and various organisational outcomes. Kristof-Brown et al. (2005) provided a meta-
analysis of 172 studies which investigate the relation between P-O fit and pre-entry (e.g. job 
acceptance) and post-entry (e.g. performance, satisfaction). Their results indicate a strong and 
meaningful correlation between P-O fit and both pre- and post-entry outcomes. These findings 
imply the importance of P-O fit for organisations to maintain a productive workforce and to 
secure their competitiveness. 
Though, finding a mutually beneficial partner to match with is less trivial than described 
above. As both employer and employee do not dispose of complete information, ex-ante 
matching quality cannot be assessed. Hence, unsatisfactory matches are likely to occur which 
lead to turnover. Regardless of the exact distribution of matching quality it is obvious that a 
certain proportion of applications would not lead to the best available match. Hence, expected 
average matching quality is below the matching quality of the best available match. As 
employers adjust their wage setting strategy to this volatility in the expected matching quality, 
offered wages are below the highest possible wage which would be adequate the employee 
fitting best. As a result, procurement of further information to reduce information 
asymmetries could be beneficial for employees and employers in order to find the best 
available matching partner. This rationale connects search models and matching models as 
search effort is likely to increase matching quality. 
                                                 
9
 See Pissarides (1994) for a bargaining model in which the matching surplus is shared between employer and 
employee. 
10
 Kristof (1996: 3) defined supplementary and complementary fit as two related aspects of P-O fit. 
Supplementary fit can be understood as a congruence of individual and organizational characteristics 
(personality, values/norms, corporate culture). Supplementary fit occurs when, on the one hand, “an organization 
satisfies the individuals’ needs, desires, or preferences” and, on the other hand, the “individual has the abilities 
required to meet organizational demands”. 
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2.3 Theory of Social Capital 
Economic theory typically assumes that individuals act totally egoistically in order to 
maximise their own utility. This conceptualisation is most famously referred to as Adam 
Smith’s “invisible hand”, which ensures that purely egoistic behaviour of each participant in 
the market maximises overall welfare. In contrast to this classic economic doctrine, sociology 
is concerned with the interaction between individuals. As we can observe in reality, people do 
not typically act selfishly in every situation. Social ties between individuals are able to explain 
such phenomena as cooperation without utility gains, fairness concerns, or even altruistic 
behaviour.
11
 Personal relationships between individuals which are generally marked by 
mutual trust and a norm of reciprocity constitute an indispensable factor to facilitate economic 
transactions and reduce costs of market activities (Diekmann, 2004). Yet, Esser (2008: 23) 
argued that “social capital is a special case of capital” which is elucidated in this chapter. 
2.3.1 Terminology and Concepts of Social Capital 
The term “social capital” is introduced by Hanifan (1916) and describes a set of contacts to 
people outside the family. Apart from satisfying social needs, Hanifan interpreted social 
capital in the form of social interaction as a source to improve living conditions of all 
members of the respective community. In the article, Hanifan explained how “a rural 
community […] developed social capital and then used this capital in the general 
improvement of its recreational, intellectual, moral and economic conditions” (Hanifan, 1916: 
131). Thus, the article represents the first consideration of a possible connection between 
social capital, formed by social intercourse, and economic outcomes. Although not explicitly 
drawing on “social capital”, Hayek (1945) stressed the importance of social exchange in a 
world of bounded rationality and information asymmetries. In the real world, all information 
is not public to everyone but each economic actor disposes of a unique set of information. 
Cooperation enables actors to share useful information in order to reduce uncertainty in the 
planning and decision process. 
In the 1980ies, Bourdieu and Coleman independently reinvented the concept of social capital 
by introducing the concept systematically making them the founding theorists of social capital 
theory.
12
 Both authors hint explicitly at the individual economic outcomes of social capital 
                                                 
11
 Altruism can be defined as a costly action for the good of someone else, which often, yet not necessarily, 
happens within social relations (Kolm, 2006). Utility functions may include social preferences, i.e. the degree to 
which a decision maker cares “about the material resources allocated to others” (Fehr, Schmidt, 2006: 638). 
However, altruistic behaviour is especially strong towards family members (Curry et al., 2013). 
12
 See Häuberer (2011) for a detailed analysis of social capital concepts since the eighties. 
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which Campbell et al. (1986) termed the “network as resource argument”. Bourdieu (1986: 
248-249) defined the construct as follows: 
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintances and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which 
provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a 
‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. 
This definition states that social capital provides both individual as well as collective benefits, 
which determines the uniqueness of this form of capital. On the one hand, social ties enable 
actors to reach a variety of helpful network members. On the other hand, network 
performance is contingent on the behaviour of all network members and its inherent structure. 
Therefore, Esser (2008) distinguished two kinds of social capital: Relational capital is 
understood as the individual resources of an actor, whereas, system capital draws on the 
importance of social capital on the society level for establishing trust, social control and 
morality.
13
 However, as this dissertation aims at investigating individual outcomes of social 
capital on the disaggregated level, the underlying analyses will focus on relational capital. 
In “Foundations of Social Theory” which is viewed as a “major contribution to sociology” 
(Gibbs, 1990: 625), Coleman (1990) emphasised the importance of social capital as a 
productive asset of an individual, which enables individuals to utilise resources that are in 
control of other individuals. Social capital is mainly formed by mutual obligations and 
expectations to reciprocate in the future, establishing a dense network of obligations which 
the individual can utilise as a resource. As a result, the quality of social capital is highly 
dependent on the degree of trust within the network. If individual A regards the probability of 
a reciprocal action from individual B as rather small (A does not trust B), A will not be 
willing to provide any assistance in advance. Therefore, mutual trust is essential for creating 
social capital. 
                                                 
13
 Trust, which is frequently used as a measure for social capital on the aggregate level, has been identified as an 
essential determinant of political and economic performance of a country. For instance, La Porta et al. (1997) 
reported a positive correlation between an aggregate measure of trust and government efficiency, civic 
participation, and performance of large organisations. Additionally, Knack and Keefer (1997) found a positive 
correlation between an trust and economic performance of 29 countries. See Uslaner (2008) for a critical 
discussion of the meaning of trust on the society level. See Offe and Fuchs (2001) for an overview of the 
development of social capital in Germany. 
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Lin (1999) explicitly based his concept of social capital on the Marxian “capital” terminology. 
Understanding capital as an investment to gain future returns, he defined social capital as an 
“investment in social relations with expected returns” (Lin, 1999: 30). Lin (2001) proposed 
four explanations for the positive impact of social capital on individual outcomes, which are 
systemised in Table 2. First, social capital is likely to facilitate the access of network members 
to information through mutual exchange which reduces information costs (transactions costs; 
see below). Second, social ties are likely to exert influence on other agents to act in favour of 
the individual because non-cooperative behaviour might be sanctioned by other network 
members. This influence might be especially meaningful if the agent is a key actor in a certain 
situation, e.g. a decision maker whose decision significantly impacts the individual. Third, an 
individual’s network serves as a resource not only for himself/herself but also for other 
agents. In the sense of Burt’s structural holes (see chapter 2.4), the individual is bridging the 
gap between an organisation and its individuals and, therefore, represents a meaningful asset 
for that organisation. Fourth, network members are likely to share demographic 
characteristics, common interests, and a mutual understanding (McPherson et al., 2001). 
Hence, similar individuals should be able to provide emotional support which affects mental 
health and well-being of network members. Additionally, being visible as a member of a 
certain network constitutes recognition and, thus, guarantees access to network resources. All 
four arguments are able to explain why individual social capital is beneficial for actors. 
Additionally, it becomes clear that these mechanisms cannot be explained by existing 
concepts of physical or human capital, which highlights the need for the social capital concept 
(Lin, 2001). 
Table 2: Explanations of social capital benefits 
 Information flow Influence on agents Social credential Identity and 
recognition 
Definition Improved access to 
information in 
imperfect markets 
with information costs 
Influence on the 
behaviour of key 
agents (decision 
makers) in favour of 
the network members 
The individual is able 
to provide access to 
this network for the 
organisation and its 
agents 
Emotional support 
(mental health) and 
public 
acknowledgement of 
the individual’s access 
to network resources  
Example Search for transaction 
partner, e.g. employer/ 
employee 
Influencing the 
decision of recruiters 
or supervisors 
Employing a manager 
to have access to other 
network members 
(politicians, other 
managers) 
Social exchange 
between network 
members that share 
similar interests 
 Source: own representation based on Lin (2001: 20) 
Drawing on the idea of social capital as a form of investment, Glaeser et al. (2002) suggested 
a theoretical model in which social capital is an object of rational investment decisions. 
Individuals invest in their social capital – mainly by joining associations with other 
 
26 Theoretical Considerations and Related Literature 
individuals – which creates multiple benefits, but investment is causing opportunity costs in 
the form of forgone earnings or valuation of leisure time. Hence, an optimisation problem 
derives in which an individual has to decide on the efficient amount of social capital 
investment. Moreover, existing relations have to be maintained by further investments in the 
stock of human capital as social capital is object to depreciation. If the individual leaves the 
network or is excluded from it, these ties are cut and the individual is not able to utilise these 
relations any more. Hence, the authors stated that a strong parallel to human capital theory 
(Becker, 1964) exists as individuals lose their firm-specific human capital when they (have to) 
leave the firm. 
Wolleb (2008) drew on Lin’s idea of information flow and transaction cost theory to explain 
economic benefits of social capital. Transaction costs as “costs of using the price mechanism” 
(Coase, 1937: 390) are present in any exchange on the market. As actors on the market do not 
dispose of complete information, they have to face a trade-off between completeness of 
contract and increasing contracting costs. Transaction costs are usually distinguished as ex-
ante and ex-post costs (Williamson, 1985). Ex-ante, transaction partners have to be identified 
and the contract has to be concluded. Ex-post, contracting partners have to monitor each other 
and contracts might need adjustment to unforeseen events. Hence, transaction costs arise due 
to (potentially) opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty. Transaction costs harm economic 
exchange in two ways: First, mutually beneficial transactions do not take place if transaction 
costs exceed transaction benefits. Second, high transaction costs lead to incomplete contracts 
which leave space for opportunistic behaviour (Tirole, 1988). Social capital creates bonds 
between individuals by generating mutual trust (Guiso et al., 2004) through which 
information exchange is possible and reciprocal behaviour is supported. On the contrary, non-
cooperative behaviour is likely to be sanctioned in social networks as all network members 
will be unwilling to cooperate in the future leading to a loss in social capital.
14
 As a result, 
“[s]ocial capital plays a role in this trade-off reducing the costs and risks of transactions, 
increasing the opportunities for trade and leading to greater economic efficiency” (Wolleb, 
2008: 375). 
                                                 
14
 A similar logic is described by the concept of relational contracts (MacLeod, Malcomson, 1989). Such 
contracts are self-enforcing when the future benefits of maintaining a certain relationship are larger than any 
short-term gains from breach of contract (Baker et al., 2002).  
 
27 Theoretical Considerations and Related Literature 
2.3.2 Measuring Social Capital 
A major problem of testing these theoretical arguments empirically is the difficulty of 
measuring social capital as “social capital is rather tacit and relational” (OECD, 2001: 43).15 
However, the empirical literature has suggested multiple measures that aim to conceptualise 
certain aspects of social capital. One frequently used approach is to use a general measure of 
trust which is part of large household and individual datasets, such as the German SOEP or 
the British BHPS survey. Participants are asked to what degree they agree with the statement 
“On the whole one can trust people” (SOEP). As discussed above, this might be a reliable 
measure for macro-economic analyses. Glaeser et al. (2002) heavily criticised the usage of 
this measure for individual social capital. In an earlier study, the authors found that 
participants who reported as higher level general trust did not reveal higher trust in standard 
trust games. Furthermore, they doubted that trust and social capital are conceptually the same 
as one-sided trust does not create any further opportunities but has to be repaid. Hence, trust 
appears more likely to be an aggregate measure of a certain community. 
A membership in organisations (e.g. social, cultural, or political engagement, sport clubs etc.) 
surely establishes social ties and appears to be a more reliable measure for social capital. 
Members of such organisations certainly share common features (homophily) and are likely to 
exchange information that might be helpful in finding a better paid job. However, a 
considerable shortcoming of this approach is that solely the potential amount of ties is 
regarded, not the ties actually used. Members within a group are not equally connected to 
each other so that group membership can only be regarded as a proxy for the available amount 
of social capital. 
Lin (2008) differentiated accessible and mobilised social capital. Accessible capital describes 
the inventory of existing social ties. An individual constantly disposes of a certain stock of 
ties which might be altered by investment into the capital stock and depreciation. Mobilised 
capital is the specific tie or multiple ties which are actually used in favour of a certain activity. 
For example, an individual disposes of a large social network but for job search only a small 
fraction of this network is utilised. Lin argued that processes initiated or facilitated by social 
capital might be better described by mobilised capital, since the mobilised tie can be 
observed. However, this might not work in every case if social capital works in “invisible” 
                                                 
15
 Durlauf (2002: F477) argued that “in the light of the vagueness of the concept, […] the use of observational 
data to identify substantive forms of social capital is unlikely to be successful”. He suggested the utilisation of 
economic experiments to overcome shortcomings of field data. 
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ways (Lin, 2008: 53), which implies that individuals might not mobilise a tie in active job 
search, nevertheless, a certain tie might be responsible for initiating a job change. In this 
dissertation, mobilised social capital will be investigated. Additionally, chapter 7 investigates 
the effect of activities which are able to create or maintain accessible social capital.  
Narayan and Cassidy (2001) applied a multi-dimensional approach to measure social capital 
in rural Ghana und Uganda. Their measures can be systemised as depicted in Chart 5. On the 
community (or group) level, general group characteristics (size, heterogeneity, frequency of 
participation), group norms and a general feeling of togetherness describe social capital. On 
the other hand, important determinants of social capital can be measured on the individual 
level. The degree of socialibility and individual trust in people and organisations are 
meaningful for establishing social ties, whereas neighbourhood connections and volunteering 
are measures for existing social ties.  
 
Chart 5: Measures of social capital  
(Source: own presentation based on Narayan, Cassidy, 2001: 67) 
All these approaches, although distinct in the conceptualisation of social capital and their 
focus on either the society or the individual level, have in common that social capital 
represents a dimension of individual capital which is not adequately described by physical or 
human capital. Social capital, both on the individual and on the community level, is formed 
by members of the respective community. Therefore, in the following chapter network theory 
is used to explain the formation of social capital by focussing on social ties of network 
members. 
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2.4 Theory of Social Networks 
Social capital theory is closely related to another stream of the sociological literature, namely 
network theory. As expressed in Bourdieu’s definition of social capital, social capital is 
constituted by relationships between individuals. Individuals – or nodes – form a social 
network if they are connected by one or more relations (Marin, Wellman, 2011). Network 
theory mainly aims to describe different kinds of networks and to analyse the channels 
through which network members (nodes) are affected. Hence, network approaches are able to 
investigate the black box of social capital by emphasising the importance of each single tie. In 
this chapter, two distinct, yet related approaches to social networks are described: 
Granovetter’s theory of tie strength and Burt’s theory of structural holes. 
In the seventies, the American sociologist Mark Granovetter used network theory to describe 
how network ties are helpful in the job search process. Granovetter (1973) especially 
identified tie strength as a key factor for the value of a relationship as a source of information. 
Intuitively, he defined tie strength as a combination of: 
 amount of time spend together, 
 emotional intensity, 
 intimacy, and 
 reciprocal behaviour.  
Obviously, these dimensions of an interpersonal relation tend to be highly correlated. Thus, a 
high score in these four categories indicates a strong tie between individuals. Close relations 
provide strong incentives to help each other and to spread valuable information among one’s 
peers. Apparently, partners or close friends are much more willing to support the members of 
their network to whom they obtain strong ties. Furthermore, strong interpersonal ties concur 
with a larger amount of time spent together in which information can be exchanged regularly. 
In contrast to this, Granovetter’s “strength of weak ties”-hypothesis postulates that weak ties 
are more likely to provide appropriate information. Individuals that conduct an active 
exchange usually share a large number of their friends and acquaintances. Thence, network 
members have solely access to a very limited pool of information. Redundancies due to a 
large number of strong ties restrict the value social networks. Weak ties are therefore much 
more likely to provide information that are not already known to the other network members. 
In his thorough theoretical analysis, Burt (1992) introduced the term “structural holes” to 
describe the connection between non-redundant contacts. Chart 6 depicts how the idea of 
 
30 Theoretical Considerations and Related Literature 
structural holes and tie strength are related. The individual of interest is represented by the 
“YOU” square. Within his cluster he holds strong ties to the other members indicated by solid 
lines. These individuals all dispose of the same level of information. Moreover, the “YOU” 
individual has a unique pattern of ties to other network clusters. Dashed lines indicate weak 
ties between “YOU” and individuals A respectively B. Structural holes connect members that 
do not belong to the same cluster and therefore do not have any direct relation. As the chart 
visualises, individuals A and C are now indirectly connected through a structural hole. 
According to this logic, even individuals A and B are related to each other by a structural 
hole. The model describes nearly the same as the “strength of weak time”-argument. Most 
valuable information are spread through weak ties. “YOU” are in the best position, cluster 
members C and D in the second best as their knowledge derives from a strong tie to “YOU”. 
However, Burt expressed one relevant distinct difference between the models. In his model, 
the causal reason for the information benefits is not the tie strength itself but the structural 
hole spanned between two individuals. Thus, following Burt, tie strength is a correlate, not the 
cause. Maintaining exclusively strong ties can also be benefiting if they enable to establish 
structural holes. Individuals, therefore, benefit from weak ties of others. Esser (2008) termed 
this kind of social capital ‘positional capital’ which can be increased optimising one’s 
network position by eliminating redundant ties and forming non-redundant ties. 
 
Chart 6: Structural holes in social networks 
(Source: own presentation according to Burt, 1992: 27) 
Nevertheless, both models are able to describe how information is spread within a network. 
These general considerations with regard to social capital suggest that contacts matter in many 
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aspects of life. The following part of the chapter combines both job search and social capital 
theory to investigate the use of personnel contacts in the job search process. 
2.5 Social Capital and Job Search 
Apart from being on or off-the-job, all job search models described in chapter 2.1 described 
that job search is a homogeneous process. This view appears rather simplified as individuals 
might differ in their access to information, meaning that some individuals might receive 
information that is not open to others. Even if all information was accessible for every 
searcher, search costs as well as search outcomes might differ between individuals that utilise 
a certain information source. Holzer (1988) set up a search model that allows for search 
channels to vary both in costs and productivity for any individual.
16
 In the equilibrium, 
discounted marginal returns of each separate search channel equal its marginal costs. From 
this point of view, different strategies in the job search are driven by job seeker’s efficiency 
prospects. A certain search channel is not more efficient due to its nature but due to 
characteristics of the individual searching for a job. This holds particularly true for job search 
via social capital. Not every individual disposes of social ties that are able to provide help in 
finding a job. Furthermore, individual characteristics like human capital or personality traits 
might affect costs and outcomes of using a certain search channel. Productivity of search 
varies by the size and quality of the network through which individuals try to find a new job. 
Differences in the effectiveness of recruitment channels can be measured at two points in 
time: First, the duration and costs of search through one particular channel can be considered. 
For instance, better access to information on vacancies might increase the probability to find a 
job. These effects are called pre-hire outcomes because they arise before the working 
relationship begins. In this context, Breaugh et al. (2003) found that job seekers who applied 
directly or were referred by personal contacts were more likely to find a job and Tazelaar 
(1990) detected that network size had a negative effect on unemployment duration in 
Germany. On the employer’s side, direct search costs (measured hours of searching, 
interviewing, screening) were lower if new hires were referred by unions, relatives or friends 
(Bishop, 1993). Whether job search via social ties (or other channels) is related to 
unemployment duration is investigated in chapter 6. 
                                                 
16
 The model is based on Weitzman (1979), who introduced a general search model in which utility maximising 
individuals have to choose between alternative sources (e.g. a production technology). 
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However, the main focus of this thesis lies on post-hire outcomes which emerge after the 
conclusion of the working contract. Post-hire outcomes can be separated into monetary and 
non-monetary outcomes. The first category comprises wages and all other kinds of work-
income, such as bonuses and fringe benefits as they have a monetary value for the employee. 
Non-monetary outcomes cannot be valued monetarily, for example job satisfaction or 
(subjective) job security. Furthermore, turnover propensity is an appropriate measure to 
evaluate search channel effectiveness, but it cannot be clearly assigned to one of these 
categories. One the one hand, the propensity to leave the company is determined by the 
perceived (dis-)satisfaction, one the other hand, turnover has monetary costs for employers 
and employees.  
The analysis of post-hire outcomes does not include costs of search channels, as these costs 
occur before the contract is concluded. Therefore, this dissertation does not aim at measuring 
the efficiency of search channels – as this would require a complex cost-benefit comparison 
which is rather impossible in the context of job search. Hence, the term effectiveness is 
preferred and applied to describe the comparison of post-hire outcomes. Post-hire outcomes of 
job search, in this thesis, focus on increases in monetary and non-monetary outcomes of job 
search in case of a job change. Therefore, on-the-job search with the purpose to renegotiate 
wages at the current employer are not considered in this thesis.
17
 In their detailed literature 
review, Zottoli and Wanous (2000) named different hypothesis, all of which contribute to 
explain higher effectiveness of informal recruitment channels. These arguments can be 
divided into two major groups: information benefits and self-selection effects, which are 
described in the two following chapters. Further arguments that derive from the search and 
matching models described in the previous chapters are presented in chapter 2.5.3. 
2.5.1 Information Benefits 
Direct source effects, as they are called in this dissertation, are inherent properties of search 
channels that are able to provide job searchers or employers with more or better information 
about a job respectively the applicant. As pointed out in the desciption of search theories, job 
seekers are confronted with heterogeneous firms and are lacking meaningful information on 
non-monetary aspects such as working conditions, fairness of supervisors or co-workers, 
promotion prospects, and matching of personal interests or required qualifications.
18
 Thus, 
search for further information about a job (intensification) might be efficient to reduce 
                                                 
17
 See Cahuc et al. (2006) for a game-theoretic bargaining model of this kind of on-the-job search. 
18
 These aspects determine the degree of P-J respectively P-O fit. 
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uncertainties and costs of resignation or dismissals. However, as noted above, acquisition of 
additional information is costly and – what is even more crucial – difficult to attain. 
Employers who suffer from vacancy costs are presumably not willing to divulge information 
that might discourage possible employees. As a result, information about working conditions 
conveyed by employers is usually not suitable to create a trustworthy image of the 
unobservable characteristics of a firm. Consequently, search costs at the intensive margin are 
high and mismatches are likely to occur. 
Rees (1966) argued that friends or acquaintances are more likely to convey accurate 
information about job or firm characteristics, which Wanous (1978) termed Realistic Job 
Previews (RJP). The person who recommends a new employer is well informed about the 
firm he/she works for and the provided information are much more reliable – especially if he 
is a prospective co-worker. Less specific and trustworthy information can be provided by 
supervisors and, more obvious, by recruiters in the human resources department of a firm 
(Breaugh, Starke, 2000). Simons et al. (1970) argued that the perception of similarity between 
source and receiver of a message – in this case belonging to the same side of the labour 
market – enhances persuasive credibility of the source of information. As information 
provided by prospective co-workers appears more trustworthy for potential applicants, they 
themselves can decide more accurately whether to apply for the job or not. Hence, applicants 
are more likely to self-select into jobs which meet both their skills and abilities better. If, for 
example, job satisfaction is determined by the perceived gap between desired and actual firm 
and job characteristics, more accurate ex-ante information will lead to a higher reported job 
satisfaction. Assuming that workers’ abilities and the matching quality affect wages, one 
could expect higher wages for those who found their jobs through informal sources. Thus, the 
empirical results should reveal a direct positive effect of informal channels on wages and job 
satisfaction. 
Ullman (1966) emphasised the pre-screening effect of job search via social capital. First of 
all, referrers are able to screen potential job candidates at lower costs as incentives to hide 
certain information from a friend or relative are smaller, which reduces information 
asymmetries. Secondly, referrers carefully assess the fit of the potential applicant and the 
organisation as well as the job in order to maintain their own reputation. Frequent 
recommendations of low-quality applicants are likely to harm the reputation of the referrer 
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within the firm.
19
 Consequently, referrers do not spread information about job vacancies 
throughout their whole network but address high-quality workers personally. If this is the 
case, referrals are expected to promote high-quality workers and not just to place friends or 
family members into jobs. Pre-screening of potential applicants could therefore explain higher 
starting wages of new entrants. If employers anticipate the higher quality of applicants 
selected by their employees, higher wages for those hired via referrals are rational. 
Furthermore, new entrants of the firm could be more satisfied with working conditions if the 
referrer considers the preferences and abilities of the particular applicant.  
Further conclusions can be drawn from the search models in chapter 2.1. Especially the 
Burdett (1978) model makes important suggestions for job search via social capital as it 
explains why some individuals search for a new job and if this search is conducted on or off-
the-job – and why others do not search at all. The last aspect might be especially important for 
individuals who find their jobs via social capital. Individuals whose expected gains from 
searching a new job are smaller than their search cost might benefit especially from job search 
via social capital if search costs are reduced. Hence, social capital might be a promising 
means in the job search process for the low wage sector.  
Another argument is based the observation that social ties establish between individuals 
which are somewhat similar to each other (Lazersfeld, Merton, 1954), which is called 
homophily. McPherson et al. (2001) described that similarity with respect to demographic 
characteristics or attitudes
20
 is a core determinant in establishing ties between individuals. 
Furthermore, a higher degree of similarity decreases the probability that a certain tie is 
dissolved. Hence, referred individuals of one’s social network are more likely to dispose of 
similar demographic characteristics, skills, and beliefs. First, such similarity might be 
beneficial for the job searcher as uncertainty regarding the future job might be reduced. 
Knowing that a person similar to oneself is currently working in a certain job and being 
referred by this person reveals a high probability of a good match. Second, similarity might 
affect the probability of getting the respective job. Bagues and Perez-Villadoniga (2012) 
                                                 
19
 Winter (1997) discussed the reputation calculus of the referrer by modelling a trade-off between reputation 
loss and gratitude gains (gratitude expressed by the referred person). In certain cases, maintaining one’s own 
reputation might be valued less than referring a person which generates a huge gratitude gain. For instance, 
parents could gain an enormous gratitude gain if they find a job for their unemployed children. 
20 
Empirical evidence regarding homophilous tendencies in networks has been provided for several dimensions, 
such as race (Mouw, Entwisle, 2006), gender (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, 1986), age (Feld, 1982), and attitudes 
(Huston, Levinger, 1978). Schaefer (2012) developed a dynamic model of network homogeneity and provided 
empirical evidence for a process of homogenisation through non-reciprocity. 
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found that job interviewers prefer applicants who dispose of skills or demographic 
characteristics similar to themselves.
21
 Hence, similarity to a network member who is already 
working in the respective organisation implies that the applicant might be similar to the job 
interviewer. Third, working with a similar person might increase productivity as working 
routines between the referrer and the referred employee are likely to be similar. As a result, 
employers perform better which might be linked to higher wages.
22
 
Montgomery (1991) introduced a theoretical model with heterogeneous workers which 
analyses information benefits from the firm’s point of view. In the initial situation, firms 
realise zero profits as high and low ability employees cannot be distinguished ex-ante due to 
information asymmetries. Under the assumption that social ties between job incumbents and 
job seekers lead to referrals of more high-quality applicants, search for employees via social 
ties is beneficial for firms in the next period. Firms anticipate this higher expected quality of 
applicants and are willing to pay higher wages to attract job seekers via referral hiring. 
Additionally, Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) introduced a model in which homogeneous 
workers benefit from referrals as they receive more job offers. Assuming that employees are 
only willing to change jobs when the future wage is higher than the current, more job offers 
are likely to increase wages. 
2.5.2 Selection Effects 
In contrast to this deliberate selection process, potential unconscious selection into sources 
due to Individual Differences appears plausible as well. Schwab (1982) argued that 
employees recruited by various channels might belong to different populations of applicants. 
According to this hypothesis, recruiting sources will yield applicants that differ systematically 
in job-relevant characteristics. For example, younger workers could be more likely to find 
their jobs via formal channels due to lower levels of social capital accumulated during their 
lifetime (Breaugh, Mann, 1984). If this is the case, lower wages of formal recruitments are not 
a result of source-specific effects, but of age differences as younger employees are generally 
associated with lower wages (e.g. due to seniority wages or a lower level of human capital). 
Furthermore, this age effect can also explain higher turnover rates caused by formal 
                                                 
21
 Similarity between incumbents and new hires can also be explained by the attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) 
framework (Schneider, 1987). New members of an organisation are selected based on preferences of the 
incumbent members of the organisation. 
22
 See Spagnolo (1999) for a game theoretic approach to explain productivity gains through the establishment of 
social ties between co-workers of an organisation. However, this might be reviewed more critically as similarity 
might not be favoured in an organisation. Higher similarity within an organisation might reduce the number of 
different ideas and opinions (Burt, 2004) which counteracts the idea of diversity management. 
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recruitments since younger employees are generally associated to higher turnover, also called 
job shopping (Johnson, 1978). Therefore, the empirical results should convey no significant 
impact of recruitment channel usage on wages, if demographic, firm-, and job-specific 
variables are implemented as controls. The same logic holds true for the source effect on job 
satisfaction. If older job seekers utilise their contacts more frequently, an increase in job 
satisfaction can be explained by age effects (e.g. experience). 
However, empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis is very scarce. Breaugh (1981) 
found no differences concerning demographic factors such as age, sex, years of education, 
and tenure in his case study. Taylor and Schmidt (1983) explicitly investigated the individual 
difference hypothesis including additional variables like weight, height or shift preference. 
The authors only found significant results for workers that were rehired by their former 
employer, whereas differences in demographic factors between other recruitment sources 
were not statistically significant. According to Breaugh and Mann (1984) using a rather small 
sample of 98 social service employees the RJP hypothesis received more support than the 
Individual Differences hypothesis. 
Considering productivity differences, Kirnan et al. (1989) detected that informal recruiting 
sources yielded applicants who were better performers (measured as annual sales) than formal 
sources in a sample of life insurance agents. However, quality differences were most apparent 
within the pool of applicants which the authors interpreted as a support for the pre-screening 
effects of informal means. Besides inflated measures of quality of applicants, differences 
captured by post-hire outcomes diminish between recruitment channels. 
Investigating a sample of 476 applicants for nursing positions of which 234 were finally hired, 
Williams et al. (1993) found out that referrals and rehires attracted applicants with greater 
working experience and pre-hire knowledge. Pre-screening could account for these 
differences. However, these nurses did not perform better than their colleagues hired by other 
sources and had higher turnover rates after one year. Hence, it is concluded that individual 
differences between applicants are more important than conveying realistic information. 
However, as the short summary of these studies implies, these analyses suffer from 
considerable shortcomings. First, most studies focussed only on a small population of 
applicants; hence, inconclusive results might derive from sample size problems. Second, these 
studies solely included a small set of control variables that are likely to be connected to source 
choice, mainly demographic variables. The analyses in this dissertation will comprise 
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additional variables, such as job-related factors and variables that describe search behaviour. 
Third, not all models distinguished formal recruitment channels, which might be misleading 
as not all formal channels might have the same determinants of usage. Thus, a detailed and 
thorough analysis of this field appears to be necessary. 
2.5.3 Search Models and Their Application to Job Search 
In the previous chapter, information benefits have been presented as a convincing argument 
why personal contacts could have a positive effect on post-hire outcomes. In this chapter, 
these arguments are connected to the search and matching models (chapter 2.1 and 2.2). First, 
implications of the Simon (1955), Mortensen (1970), and Burdett (1978) search models are 
discussed. Second, a model proposed by Fontaine (2007) is explained which draws on 
matching theory to explain wage differences that derive from job search via different search 
channels. 
Based on the concept of bounded rationality, Simon (1955) described the job searcher as a 
satisficer rather than a maximiser. A key variable in his approach is the number of alternatives 
considered by the individual. The more alternatives are available to the job searcher, the 
higher is his wage because he can select the highest wage offer among the given alternatives. 
Two opposing arguments are able to explain the effect of social ties on wages. On the one 
hand, individuals might get knowledge about additional job offers through social ties which 
they otherwise would now have considered. Therefore, social capital increases the amount of 
considered alternatives (Å). Based on the assumption that job characteristics (e.g. wages, job 
satisfaction) are drawn randomly one can conclude that more considered alternatives increase 
post-hire outcomes. However, the opposite effect can be considered as well. Disposing of 
well-informed personal contacts could seduce individuals to rely mostly on the job offers 
received through this channel. Search via social ties could lead to a reduction in search effort 
via formal channels. As a result, social capital could reduce the amount of considered 
alternatives leading to lower post-hire outcomes. 
Information procurement in the Simon model does not only include search for job vacancies 
(job alternatives, Å) but also for more knowledge on the relationship between the chosen 
alternative and the future outcomes (S) of a certain alternative. This implies that not all 
outcomes of a job alternative are certain, e.g. promotion perspectives or job satisfaction. 
Hence, extensification increases the number of available alternatives, whereas intensification 
increases the knowledge about a certain job offer. 
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Furthermore, as described above, the Simon model explicitly includes an alternative approach 
towards rationality. As a result of limited rationality, individuals do not maximise their 
expected utility but quit search if they find a satisficing level of utility. With regard to job 
search, the reservation wage and a strived level of job satisfaction are two major satisficing 
levels. However, the level of satisfaction is not a fixed value but a dynamic and individual 
decision of when to stop further search effort. Apart from demographic characteristics (e.g. 
age, gender, work history etc.) and individual personality, social capital might determine the 
satisficing level of wage and prospected job satisfaction. Individuals who use their personal 
contacts in order to find a new job might raise their satisficing level because they believe it is 
easier to find a well-paid job via personal contacts. Empirical evidence for this assumption is 
found by Caliendo et al. (2011) who detect a positive relationship between the size of an 
individual’s social network (which can be interpreted as a proxy for the network value) and 
reservation wages. Thus, it can be assumed that a satisficing level of post-hire outcomes could 
be affected by network characteristics that also determine job search via social capital. 
In search model proposed by Mortensen (1970), insecurity exists mainly in terms of wage 
offers. A firm is willing to employ any job seeker who matches their minimum skill standards 
and is willing to pay the job seeker according to his skill level. Hence, the information 
problem is only relevant for the job seeker who tries to find the best offer according to his 
skill level. In the basic model, job (and wage) offers are random and job seekers are likely to 
find an average wage, implying that they are paid below their actual skill level. However, 
searching for further job offers is costly and success is not guaranteed, therefore, at some 
point job seekers accept a job offer below the best available combination W*(K*). Personal 
contacts could in this context help to increase the likelihood to find a job closer to the 
optimum. At least personal contacts should limit the probability to find a job at the lower end 
of the wage offer distribution. Hence, the expected average wage offer increases and these 
information benefits could result in higher wages. In Chart 7 it is visualised how personal 
contacts could be able to exclude low wage offers (left of WSC) which leads to a higher 
expected average wage offer E(WSC). In average the job seeker is likely to find a better paid 
job as the average (expected) wage offer is higher.  
Another argument addresses the frequency of job offers per period. It is assumed that all job 
seekers are homogeneous regarding their skill level and their search effort via formal 
channels. Per period, job seekers receive one wage offer and accept the offer when the offered 
wage exceeds the reservation wage. Hence, in this world without social ties, all individuals 
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receive job offers at the same rate (one per period) and therefore, earn the same wages. 
However, individuals differ as to the amount of social ties they hold to other individuals. If 
search via social ties is largely for free (as it might occur at occasions of general social 
exchange), these job seekers receive additional wage offers per period. More draws from the 
wage function are likely to result in more wage offers that are above the reservation wage. 
Therefore, the job seeker has more options to choose from which is likely to increase wages in 
average due to social ties.  
 
Chart 7: Wage distribution in the search model 
(Source: own presentation based on Ehrenberg, Smith, 2012: 503) 
In another model, Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) assumed that offers arriving via social 
networks are drawn from a different wage distribution than wage offers found through other 
channels. Hence, search via social ties leads, in average, to higher wages in the employee-
employer equilibrium. 
The Burdett (1978) model is designed to explain differences in on and off-the-job search but 
its intuition can also be applied to job search via different channels. As the model in Chart 3 
implies, finding a higher wage offer requires more search effort. Hence, jobs in higher 
positions are probably more difficult to find. However, one can assume that this increase in 
search costs is under-proportional compared to the respective increase in wage. Furthermore, 
foregone earnings are higher for individuals that earn more which increases search costs off-
the-job in case they quit their jobs for the job search. Hence, ceteris paribus, on-the-job 
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search is most likely efficient for individuals with high income. In line with this, Calvó-
Armengol and Jackson (2004) argued that employed job seekers only accept a new job offer 
when it is better in comparison to the current job while unemployed job seekers might accept 
a job offer at a lower wage (or worse off in terms of other non-monetary factors) to escape 
from unemployment. This selection effect has to be taken into account when post-hire 
outcomes of job search are estimated. 
As described in chapter 2.5.1, information benefits might be able to increase matching quality 
and, thus, employee productivity and wages. Staiger (1990) introduced a matching model in 
which job seekers use formal and informal channels to find a job. Whereas jobs found through 
formal channels are experience goods, jobs found via informal channels are inspection 
goods.
23
 Hence, informal channels provide ex-ante information of matching quality for the job 
seeker. In perfectly competitive markets workers are paid equal to their expected matching 
quality which explains wage differentials between job search channels. 
Fontaine (2008) provided a theoretical framework for employer-employee matching with 
endogenous wages and social ties. In this model, wage dispersion derives from variance in the 
number unemployed network members. Networks are regarded as closed groups which 
provide (information) benefits solely for members of the network (social closure).
24
 Job 
vacancies are more likely to be known to employed network members; therefore, individuals 
in a network with less unemployed members receive more job offers. More job offers create 
outside options of job seekers which lead to higher wages. Hence, wage dispersion can be 
(partially) explained by diverse unemployment rates within networks. Besides, the framework 
allows a dynamic perspective. If network members find a job, they become a valuable source 
of information for the other still unemployed members of the network. Therefore, the 
matching function is increasing convex as matching probability increases for every network 
member when other network members find a job. Thus, this approach can explain both wage 
dispersion and differences in unemployment rates between networks. 
                                                 
23
 The quality of experience goods cannot be estimated ex-ante but only ex-post after the purchase or 
consumption of the good. On the contrary, search increases the knowledge about inspection goods before 
purchase (Nelson, 1970). Matching models treat jobs either as experience goods (Jovanovic, 1979b) or as 
inspection goods (Burdett, 1978). 
24
 The theory of social closure can be traced back to Max Weber’s concept of open and closed relations. Murphy 
(1988: 8) defined social closure as a “a process of subordination whereby one group monopolizes advantages by 
closing off opportunities to another group of outsiders beneath it which it defines as inferior and ineligible”. See 
Coleman (1988: S106) for a visualization of a network with and without social closure. 
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Horváth (2014) drew on the homophily approach to describe positive effect of social ties in a 
matching model with heterogeneous workers and jobs. In this model, job incumbents refer 
network members regardless of the matching quality. If the degree of homophily in a network 
is sufficiently high, incumbents refer job seekers that are likely to be similar to themselves. As 
a result, the matching quality increases under the assumption that incumbents show a better 
matching quality compared to randomly drawn applicants. In this case, pre-screening (see 
chapter 2.5.1) does not take place; yet, similarity between referrer and referred person 
prevents reputation losses due to referrals of non-fitting job seekers. 
2.6 Summary and Outlook 
All theoretical concepts on the relationship between social capital and labour market success 
draw on wages or job satisfaction as direct individual outcomes of job search. In this thesis, 
future turnover is used as an additional measure for matching quality on the individual level. 
If individuals and firms have found a match with an (at least) satisficing quality, it is less 
likely that this match is dissolved. Although turnover does not necessarily mean that an 
individual is worse off, because an even better job might have been found, chaning the 
employer is likely to delay future promotions or might be associated to search costs or costs 
of finding a new apartment. Futhermore, every job involves human capital investsments 
through learning on-the-job which can be intrepereted as firm or job-specific human capital 
which is lost in case of a job change (Jovanovic, 1979a). This loss of human capital should be 
detrimental in terms of wages. Employers, in turn, are interested in keeping qualified staff in 
order to share the surplus generated through firm-specific human capital. Furthermore, by 
keeping employees, search and vacancy costs are avoided. Therfore, a reduction in turnover 
probability should be positive for both employers and employees. 
Wanous (1978) described a simple model of determinants of turnover which can easily be 
related to social capital benefits described above. According to the author, turnover is 
determined by individual performance (which is linked to the employers decision to keep, to 
dismiss or to promote an individual) and individual job satisfaction. Both factors, 
performance and satisfaction, can be affected by social capital and job search via social ties. 
Realisic job previews and pre-screening help to increase matching quality which should 
improve performance and satisfaction.  
This chapter has outlined a large body of the literature that is related to (job) search and the 
matching process. These models describe how a certain job is found and why this working 
relationship is either maintained or dissolved. Furthermore, the literature on job search via 
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social capital has been delinated. Several arguments or theoretical approaches can explain 
why social ties are likely to serve helfpul in the job search process. Apart from information 
benefits which reduce information asymmetries, job seekers might be pre-screened by their 
referrers. However, it has been argued that different search channels attract different job 
seekers but do not provide further benefits. Since these arguments are at least to some degree 
mutually exclusive, this dissertation aims at a careful and capacious analysis of the 
relationship between social capital job search and post-hire outcomes. Inspired by Schwab 
(1982), this dissertation is the first work that focusses on the selection effects in the 
multinomial case. The next chapter solely invetigates the determinants of finding a job 
through the four most important search channels – an important step to introduce models that 
incorporate self-selection. In chapters 4 and 5, the relationship between finding a job through 
a given channel and post-hire outcomes is analysed. While chapter 4 can be regarded as the 
baseline study, chapter 5 introduces personality traits as a further independent variable. 
Chapter 6 focusses on outcomes of actual job search activities for unemployed job seekers. 
The last chapter (7) exploits data on leisure time activities as a proxy for accessible social 
capital as a source for labour market returns. 
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3 Determinants of Job Finding via Social Capital 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first question raised in the introduction and, therefore, investigates 
the determinants of finding a job through a certain search channel.
25
 The literature has 
provided ample yet contradictory evidence on the relation between social capital and labour 
market success. While early studies found positive wage effects of social ties (e.g. Boxman et 
al., 1991; Granovetter, 1995), more recent evidence detected rather negative correlations 
between finding a job via informal means and wages (e.g. Delattre, Sabatier, 2007; Bentollila 
et al., 2010).
26
 However, so far, most studies have ignored potential selection effects as 
suggested by Schwab (1982). Thomsen and Wittich (2010) provided the only existing 
evidence on the determinants of job search via different channels, yet, their analyses focused 
on unemployed job seekers without on-the-job search (see chapter 3.2 for a discussion of their 
article). Obviously, the usage of recruitment channels (and the channel the job has been found 
through) is unlikely to be entirely random but determined by individual characteristics as well 
as external influences, such as the business circle. For example, individuals might direct their 
search effort towards certain channels according to their social capital (Mouw, 2003) which 
might depend on demographic characteristics, such as age or education. Furthermore, job-
related characteristics like branch or occupation might affect channel usage if job 
characteristics determine where and how job adverts are published or how companies or 
workers commonly search for a job in this sector. If demographic or job-related 
characteristics are able to explain job finding through a given source, it is quite likely that 
returns of recruitment channels – with a special focus on social capital – might be biased. 
Learning about this potential bias helps to understand the foundations of individual 
differences and is likely to prove helpful in the interpretation of post-hire outcomes in chapter 
4. Furthermore, if selection into sources matters, it is possible to apply an econometric 
approach to incorporate this selection effect into the estimation strategy. Therefore, this 
chapter sets the basis for the other chapters of this dissertation. 
This chapter is organised as follows: First, theoretical arguments are presented which might 
explain source selection based on individual characteristics. Thus, hypotheses are formulated 
                                                 
25
 The reader should keep in mind, that searching for a job through different (multiple) search activities and 
finding a job through one specific channel are conceptually different. Theoretical arguments, however, can be 
applied to both stages of the job search process. Therefore, source usage and job finding are mainly understood 
as synonyms in this chapter while keeping in mind the distinction made in Chart 1 in the introduction. 
26
 See the literature review in chapter 4.2 for a thorough summary of the empirical literature. 
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that describe the potential relationship between specific socio-demographic or job-related 
aspects and recruitment channel choice (3.2). In chapter 3.3, the underlying data and the 
estimation strategy are described. The empirical evidence is presented in chapter 3.4 and is 
discussed in chapter 3.5. Chapter 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
Search theoretical models (see chapter 2.1) describe how individuals search for additional job 
offers (extensive) and/or more information about existing offers (intensive). Due to bounded 
rationality and costs of search, individuals have to adjust their search effort to gain the desired 
information. Holzer (1988) described job search via different channels as a rational 
optimisation process in which individuals maximise their expected discounted lifetime 
earnings. Individuals select search channels according to their expected profitability which is 
likely to differ between job seekers. Individuals who dispose of a large network with valuable 
ties are more likely to search through their network and, thus, to find a new job through this 
channel. Hence, concepts which describe the formation of social capital are used to explain 
which individuals are more likely to search and find jobs via personal contacts.  
Few studies have empirically investigated differences between individuals who found their 
jobs via different channels. As summarised in chapter 2.5.2, Breaugh (1981), Taylor and 
Schmidt (1983), and Breaugh and Mann (1984) found only weak evidence for selectivity into 
search channels; yet, these early studies suffer from small sample sizes and a small set of 
variables it is controlled for. The only existing
27
 evidence based on a large sample and several 
potential determinants of source choice is presented by Thomsen and Wittich (2010). The 
authors analysed the search behaviour of (mainly unemployed) job seekers in Germany based 
on SOEP data. Estimating a multinomial logit model, the authors found evidence that both 
demographic characteristics as well as job properties were able to explain differences in both 
using a certain channel to find a job (while being unemployed) as well as finding a job 
through a specific channel. Gender and age (three age groups) as well as working hours, 
company size, and occupational autonomy were core determinants for finding a job via a 
certain channel. Immigrant status, years of education, and regional economic data were not 
related to recruitment sources. 
                                                 
27
 Try (2005) investigated the use of search channels by Swedish university graduates between 1995 and 2000 
but not how the respective job was found. Osberg (1993) focussed on the use of employment agencies in Canada 
and found that the usage of employment agencies varied with the business cycle. 
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This study differs from Thomsen and Wittich (2010) in three main point. First, the data 
includes also job-to-jo transitions not only unemployed job seekers. As argued in chapter 2.1, 
employed job seekers might dispose more valuable social ties to colleagues. Second, three 
additional waves of the SOEP data are included. This might be especially relevant for job 
search via internet because the data shows a large increase of internet job search over time. 
Third, some variables are measured differently, especially age (see chapter 3.3.1) and non 
non-linear relations are considered. Thus, this analysis aims at increasing the existing 
knowledge about determinants of job search channel usage. 
Furthermore, Thomsen and Wittich (2010) did not provide any theoretical foundation why 
certain individual, job related, or regional characteristics could affect search channel usage. 
Therefore, this chapter builds on the theoretical models described in chapter 2 in order to 
derive single hypotheses regarding the relationship between the determinants and channel 
choice. Towards this end, this chapter draws on search theory, social capital and network 
theories to explain why certain individuals are more likely to find a job via social ties and 
others not. Hypotheses concerning demographic characteristics (3.2.1), individual labour 
market experience and search behaviour (3.2.2), firm- respectively job-specific characteristics 
(3.2.3), and regional factors (3.2.4) are conducted from social capital theories and existing 
empirical evidence. If possible, detailed source-specific distinctions are made. More general 
hypotheses distinguishing formal and informal means are set up, if no ex-ante considerations 
imply different effects between various formal sources. 
3.2.1 Demographic Characteristics 
Gender differences in recruitment channel usage could derive from differences in the 
quantity and quality of network ties. Based on the homophily concept, Mortensen and 
Vishwanath (1994) argued that lower labour market participation rates of females result in 
fewer contacts to employed network members if networks mainly consist of job seekers of the 
same sex. If networks are largely homogeneous, females might be disadvantaged regarding 
the quality of their ties as female labour force participation is usually lower.
28
 Ties to full-time 
workers are more likely to convey information on job vacancies. Thus, females rely more 
heavily on formal means compared to males. Focussing on gender differences, Huffman and 
Torres (2001) and Straits (1998) found evidence for a significantly lower use of informal 
means by females. This can be summarised to: 
                                                 
28
 In 2011, female labour market participation was lower than male participation (58.5 respectively 70.1, EU-27) 
and females were more likely to work part-time in all EU countries (European Comission, 2013). 
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H1 (gender): Males are more likely to find a job via social ties than females. 
Age is likely to be another important determinant of source choice. Glaeser et al. (2002) 
interpreted the formation of social capital as an optimal individual investment decision. 
During their lifetime, individuals invest in valuable relations and disinvest in relations which 
are not promising any more. Hence, within a longer investment period – measured as age – 
individuals are likely to generate more social capital than younger individuals. In old age, 
however, investments in social capital appear less profitable as the amortisation period 
becomes shorter. Furthermore, according to the homophily idea, networks mainly contain 
members of the same age cohort. As labour force participation decreases with age (European 
Comission, 2013), older job seekers dispose of less valuable ties. This inverted u-shaped 
relation between social capital and age is confirmed by evidence provided by Glaeser et al. 
(2002). On the other hand, younger individuals are more likely to search for a new job on the 
internet. Empirical evidence is presented by Grund (2006) who showed that those who found 
their jobs on the internet are roughly three years younger compared to other job seekers. This 
can be explained by higher access rates to the internet among younger generations and higher 
familiarity and knowledge in dealing with computers (Cutler et al., 2003). This leads to: 
H2 (age): Middle-aged job seekers are more likely to find a job via social ties 
than younger or older job seekers (inverted u–shape). Young job seekers are more 
likely to find a job via internet than older job seekers. 
The level of formal education is one crucial determinant of labour market success such as 
career prospects and wage income (Mincer, 1958, 1974). Two opposing effects of education 
on recruitment channel usage can be considered. On the one hand, education can serve as a 
signal of ability and motivation (Spence, 1973). Applicants with a low level of education or 
even without any education at all are not able to display their motivation and occupational 
skills by reliable formal certificates in the formal application process. Referrals could, 
therefore, serve as a promising strategy to find a job for low-skilled job seekers. The higher 
the level of education the better individuals are able to convey trustworthy information via 
formal channels. On the other hand, the homophily hypothesis suggests that highly educated 
job seekers are more likely to be in networks with more highly educated members. Thus, 
highly educated individuals are more likely to dispose of more effective ties to find a job. 
Furthermore, Glaeser et al. (2002) found evidence that investments in human capital coincide 
with investments in social capital. Therefore, the relationship between these two variables 
could be described as: 
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H3 (level of education): Job seekers with either low or high levels of education 
are more likely to find a job via social ties than job seekers with medium level of 
education (inverted u-shape). 
Marriage appears to be unlikely to affect recruitment channel usage. The social connection 
between married partners can be described as a strong tie in terms of Granovetter (1973). 
Although partners should have a strong interest in providing information about vacancies or to 
refer their partner to their supervisors, such contacts are most likely redundant. Furthermore, 
employers may not believe that referrals by a spouse deliver trustworthy information about 
the applicants’ qualifications. Even though one could assume that the partner could help to 
bridge a structural hole between two distinct networks (Burt, 1992), this bridging function 
does not become stronger through marriage. Both partners are likely to have access to each 
other’s social ties, which is not likely to alter through marriage. Therefore, no testable 
hypothesis can be derived. 
H4 (marital status): No testable hypothesis. 
Children in the household affect everyday life in many ways. Especially young children 
have to be taken care of which means one older household member might have to reduce 
working time or even have to take a break in his/her career. Within this time of childcare, one 
could assume that parents spend less time for maintaining existing ties. However, this effect 
might not be the same for both genders.
29
 With respect to the persisting traditional role model, 
women are widely responsible for childcare. As a consequence, women might have less time 
to invest in valuable relations. Besides, mothers are likely to spend more time with other 
mothers who dispose of less valuable ties themselves. Heinzler and Kimhi (2012) were able to 
confirm the negative networking effect of children for females, whereas, males show higher 
involvement in social networks. Taking these considerations into account one can state: 
H5 (children in household): Fathers are more likely to find jobs via social ties 
than mothers. 
The economic literature has provided ample evidence that immigrants often face 
considerable obstacles in the job search process (see e.g. Kahanec, Zaiceva, 2009). 
Immigrants suffer from a “liability of foreignness” (LOF, Harvey et al., 2005) when they 
                                                 
29
 To account for the assumed heterogeneity in the effect of children in the household, gender and children in 
household are interacted (see chapter 3.4.3). 
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search for a job in their host countries due to a lack of legitimacy (Fang et al., 2013).
30
 Loury 
(1977) argued out that immigrants are less successful in the labour market because of lacking 
social capital. Immigrants have to establish social ties to other individuals in their host 
country which takes time and might be hindered by language and cultural barriers. However, 
immigrants are likely to have difficulties applying via formal means as well because formal 
channels usually require (written) language skills at the level of natives. Furthermore, in a 
correspondence test Kaas and Manger (2012) found that a German-sounding name in the 
application increased the probability of a call-back by 14 percent compared to a Turkish-
sounding name. Disadvantages are more pronounced for immigrants who completed their 
education in their home countries (Aldashev et al., 2012). This implies that employers do not 
trust foreign education certificates. As a result, immigrants might benefit even stronger from 
the information provided through social networks (chapter 2.5.1) to overcome information 
asymmetries. Moreover, Frijters et al. (2005) found evidence that immigrants in the UK 
utilise informal channels more frequently than natives. Overall, it is therefore concluded: 
H6 (immigrant): Immigrants are more likely to find a job via social ties than 
natives. 
3.2.2 Unemployment History and Search Behaviour 
Employment status and history are likely to affect how individuals search for a job. According 
to search theory (see chapter 2.1), unemployment enables job seekers to invest more time in 
gathering useful information and to wait for attractive job offers. As job search is time 
consuming, extensive information procurement about vacancies by visiting public 
employment agencies or online and newspaper retrieval is mainly possible for unemployed. 
As a result of the so-called Hartz reforms
31
, unemployed can be sanctioned if they deny job 
offers provided by the employment offices. The fear of cuts in their unemployment benefits 
might force job seekers to accept jobs suggested by the employment office which increases 
the likelihood of finding a job via employment offices. Employed seekers, in turn, are more 
likely to search via informal means. This search channel is even more promising as current 
workers have better contacts within the working population (Russell, 1999) and, therefore, 
                                                 
30
 LOF is a well-researched concept on the organisational level (Insch, Miller, 2005) which Harvey et al. (2005) 
transferred to individuals with migrant background who are stigmatised, e.g. based on gender, race or ethnicity. 
31
 See Jacobi and Kluve (2006) for a description and discussion of the Hartz reforms. 
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these contacts are better informed about job offers.
32
 Furthermore, search via informal means 
is less time consuming so that it can be hypothesised:  
H7 (unemployed): Unemployed individuals are less likely to find a job via social 
ties than employed job seekers.  
Whereas the previous hypothesis solely dealt with the incidence of unemployment during the 
job search process, the duration of overall unemployment experience might be a relevant 
factor as well. First, longer unemployment spells are likely to aggravate the effects of social 
capital mentioned above. The longer an unemployment spell lasts the more social ties to 
employed network members will be cut and the more homogeneous a network becomes. 
Gallie et al. (2003) found evidence for a “vicious circle” between unemployment, poverty, 
and social isolation which is likely to increase negative effects of unemployment spells over 
time. Hence, it can be concluded: 
H8 (unemployment experience): Individuals with longer overall unemployment 
spells are less likely to find a job via social ties. 
The SOEP data differentiates active from passive job search. If job seekers are actively 
searching for a job, they presumably invest more time and effort in finding a new job. Active 
job seekers are more likely to utilise formal search channels as these channels provide 
information independent from other individuals. Information via social ties is more likely to 
be provided randomly and not necessarily when needed by the job seeker. Therefore, 
individuals who aim to find a job as soon as possible might not wait until they receive 
information from their peers but browse other channels. In turn, individuals who are not 
actively searching are more likely to find a job via social networks (because e.g. reading 
newspaper adverts requires at least some degree of active search). This aspect is probably 
correlated to on-the-job search as current workers are more likely to get informal information 
without active search (see chapter 3.4.3 for an analysis of the interaction between these two 
variables). Thus, for this aspect of search behaviour it is concluded: 
H9 (active search): Individuals searching actively for a new job use are less likely 
to find a job via social ties. 
                                                 
32
 See Bramoullé and Saint-Paul (2010) for a model of employed and unemployed job seekers who try to find a 
job search via social ties. In their model, a social tie is more likely to establish between two employed 
individuals than between two individuals of which one is unemployed. 
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3.2.3 Firm and Job-specific Characteristics 
The third group of determinants of search behaviour are firm-specific characteristics that 
predominantly affect the way firms search for employees. One powerful factor could be the 
branch of the firm. Firms in branches which require a high degree of social competence or 
connections might rely more often on informal means to fill a vacancy. This consideration 
applies to most corporations in the service or trade sector where interaction between staff and 
customers is more likely to happen and such exchange is vital for corporate success. 
Furthermore, fluctuation in branches might be higher than in others so that employees have to 
react quickly and more frequently to fill sudden vacancies. As formal search channels require 
much more time (e.g. insertion of an advert) these firms could decide to search through the 
social ties of their employees. Again, this applies to the service sector – especially to the food 
and restaurant industry. However, six branches under investigation do not fully describe the 
characteristics of a particular job. A firm that originally belongs to the service branch also 
employs non-service workers, for example different types of clerical workers which might 
lead to biased results. For the role of the branch it can be concluded: 
H10 (branch): Individuals who find a job in the trade or service sector are more 
likely to find a job via social ties than individuals who find a job in other sectors. 
Firm size is a determinant of resources available to an organisation and, thus, an important 
factor of corporate hiring strategies. Focussing on the recruitment processes in small firms, 
Carroll et al. (1999) detected that word-of-mouth and rehiring are preferred hiring methods. 
Small firms have no institutionalised human resource department that is able to handle a large 
amount of applications. In line with this, Autor (2001) argued that digitalisation lowers job 
seekers’ costs of applications which makes it easier for job seekers to send out applications. 
However, an increasing number of applications might overstrain small firms with limited 
capacities. Moreover, costs of bad hiring decisions are more severe for smaller companies so 
that small firms have to decide carefully whom to hire. As a result, pre-screening of applicants 
via referrals which reduces both search costs as well as insecurity in hiring decisions is a 
promising hiring strategy for small companies. Within large companies, hiring decisions are 
more formalised and a large number of vacancies has to be filled which makes it more 
unlikely that large firms fill their vacancies via informal channels. Additionally, large firms 
are more visible due to media coverage or word-of-mouth. Job seekers, therefore, might 
actively search for a job in this specific firm via internet or newspaper adverts. This leads to: 
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H11 (firm size): Individuals who find a job in a small firm are more likely to find 
this job via social ties than job seekers who found a job in a large firm. 
The next hypothesis considers the role of the job seeker’s profession on finding a job via 
certain search channels.
33
 As stated above, referrals might be especially helpful in occupations 
in which formal education certificates do not adequately describe a job seeker’s skills and 
potential. This is likely to be the case in lower level occupations, such as elementary 
occupations, plant and machine workers, or service and sales workers. On the other hand, 
certificates of higher educational institutions serve as trustworthy signals of applicants’ 
abilities and motivation. Referral hiring is therefore expected to be less important for higher 
positions. Thus, it can be concluded:  
H12 (profession): Job seekers in lower level professions are more likely to find a 
job via social ties than job seekers in higher level professions. 
The next hypothesis considers how public respectively private employers differ with respect 
to their hiring strategies. In search for employees, public institutions are forced to launch a 
public tender procedure. As a consequence, formal means are more likely to be used by 
applicants in the public sector. However, even in public organisations, social ties might be 
helpful to receive job-related information before the application. Nonetheless, the selection 
process in public organisations is less likely to be affected by social relations. Information 
benefits might, therefore, mainly occur on the employee side but not on the employer side. 
Overall, it is can be assumed: 
H13 (public sector): Job seekers who find a job as civil servants are less likely to 
find this job via social ties than job seekers in the private sector. 
3.2.4 Regional Determinants 
Germany consists of 16 federal states
34
 which differ in terms of economic development and 
cultural traditions. Such differences are likely to influence job search as they reflect economic 
opportunities that are available to job seekers in this region. Differences can be measured on 
                                                 
33
 One should keep in mind that professions do not only describe occupational activities but also comprise 
differences in hierarchy and social status (Greenwood, 1957) and gender differences (European Comission, 
2009). 
34
 The 16 states are (in alphabetical order) Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, 
Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, 
Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, and Thuringia. 
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the state level, e.g. as regional unemployment rates, regional GDP, and by region dummies. 
How these measures might affect finding a job via social ties is discussed in this chapter. 
Job search might be considerably affected by regional unemployment as most job seekers try 
to find a job in the region they are living in. In regions with higher unemployment rates, job 
seekers need, in average, more search effort to find a job. This is mostly prevalent for 
individuals with lower levels of formal education as the supply of low-skilled labour is 
commonly higher. In this case, search via social ties might be a promising means to find a job 
in regional labour markets with high unemployment rates. In regions with low unemployment 
rates, a larger number of job vacancies which can be found via formal search channels is 
available to job seekers. Furthermore, Clark (2003) found evidence that unemployment 
becomes a social norm in high unemployment surroundings. Unemployed suffer less from an 
unemployment spell (in terms of life satisfaction) when more members of the reference group 
(regardless if measured at the regional, partner, or household level) are unemployed. In 
addition, unemployed who are most dissatisfied by being unemployed are more likely to exit 
unemployment. A social norm of unemployment reduces active search effort which is likely 
to be conducted by formal channels. Therefore, it can be said: 
H14 (regional unemployment rate): Job seekers in regions with high 
unemployment rates are more likely to find a job via social ties than job seekers in 
regions with low unemployment rates. 
Differences in the economic development of regions might be best explained by regional 
GDP per capita. This measure serves as a proxy for economic and social wellbeing of a 
region. The level of economic development provides information about the structure and 
quality of jobs and the productivity of the companies in this region. Therefore, the regional 
GDP could be related to how individuals find their jobs. In states with lower GDP, social ties 
might be more effective to find a job than in states with higher GDP. Less developed regions 
might offer less well-paid jobs so that social ties might be helpful in finding a job. 
Furthermore, changes in the GDP express economic up- or downturns which might be a 
leading indicator for unemployment. Hence, changes in the GDP are likely to have a similar 
impact on the usage and success of hiring channels like the unemployment rate (see above). 
The following hypothesis summarises these considerations: 
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H15 (regional GDP per capita): Job seekers in regions with higher GDP per 
capita are less likely to find a job via social ties than job seekers in regions with 
higher GDP per capita. 
Apart from economic disparities between regions which are covered by the two previous 
measures, further regional differences might be still caused by the German division during the 
cold war and the reunification in 1990. Although a considerable catch-up process took place 
since the 1990’s, the eastern part of Germany has not fully recovered from 40 years of 
communist regime. Eastern Germany is still marked by a lower standard of living and higher 
unemployment rates (Schnabel, 2015). The author reviewed ample statistics on East-West 
differences and concluded that – apart from observable factors – norms, behaviour and 
attitudes of individuals in Eastern Germany might differ from Western German individuals. 
Such persistent differences are likely to affect job search behaviour and employer search 
strategies. For example, public employment offices are much more successful in placing 
workers into jobs in East Germany compared to West Germany (IAB, 2011). However, it is 
not clear whether this effect is driven by higher unemployment rates in Eastern Germany or 
by other factors. Moreover, one could assume that social ties could play a more important role 
in Eastern Germany as part of the communist legacy.
35
 Thus, it is concluded that: 
H16 (East Germany): Job seekers in Eastern Germany are more likely to find jobs 
via employment offices and social ties than job seekers in Western Germany. 
Table 3 contains a summary of all hypotheses postulated above. The sign indicates whether 
the respective determinant is positively (+) or negatively (-) related to finding a job via social 
ties. For some determinants, a u-shaped or inverted u-shaped relationship has been 
hypothesised. For children in the household, the assumed correlation has been divided 
between males and females which will be investigated by a gender*child in household 
interaction. 
  
                                                 
35
 Lichter et al. (2015) provided evidence for a countervailing effect. They argue that mass surveillance in the 
GDR has a long-lasting detrimental effect on social capital (measured as trust). However, general trust might be 
less important in the job search process than in other types of trust-based exchange. 
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Table 3: Summary of hypotheses 
 Individual characteristics Finding a job via social ties 
H1: Gender (female) (-) 
H2: Age (inverted u-shaped) 
H3: Level of education (-) or (u-shaped) 
H4: Married no testable hypothesis 
H5: Children in HH 
(+) for males 
(-) for females 
H6: Immigrant (+) 
   
 Unemployment history and search behaviour   
H7: Unemployed (off-the-job search) (-) 
H8: Years of unemployment (-) 
H9: Active search (-) 
   
 Firm- and job-specific characteristics  
H10: Branch (here: trade, service) (+) 
H11: Firm size (-) 
H12: Job/hierarchy level (-) 
H13: Public sector (-) 
   
 Regional determinants  
H14: Regional unemployment rate (+) 
H15: Regional GDP per capita (-) 
H16: East Germany (+) 
 
3.3 Dataset and Methodology 
The dataset used for this study is derived from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
36
, 
a longitudinal survey conducted annually by the German Institute of Economic Research 
(DIW) since 1984 in West Germany. After the German reunification the sample was enlarged 
by East German adults. Meanwhile, the survey includes a sample of 11,000 households and 
20,000 randomly selected representative individuals covering a wealth of retrospective 
information on topics such as household composition, occupational biographies, employment 
status, and demographic characteristics.
37
 In this chapter, data from the years 1999 to 2011 are 
used to investigate the use of recruitment sources over the last twelve years. For the years 
before 1999, there are only few observations on job search on the internet so that these years 
have not been considered in the analysis. The next part of this chapter presents some general 
statistics that describe the structure of the data and the dependent and independent variables. 
Hereafter, the methodology applied in this chapter is described. 
                                                 
36
 The data used for this dissertation is taken from the 28
th
 version from 2013. 
37
 All necessary information about the Socio-Economic Panel can be found on the website of the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW): http://www.diw.de/en/soep. See Wagner et al. (2007) for an overview of 
the evolution of the SOEP. 
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3.3.1 Dataset 
Dependent Variable 
Most empirical studies on the use of recruitment sources distinguish between formal and 
informal search. However, formal channels might be rather imperfect substitutes as they 
might attract different kinds of job seekers (Schwab, 1982). For example, public employment 
agencies serve a distinct segment of the labour market characterised by low wage jobs and 
less educated job seekers (Osberg, 1993). Additionally, search via other sources requires a 
higher amount of initiative of the job seeker (Blaschke, 1987), which could lead to differences 
in the effectiveness of formal sources. Furthermore, differences between newspaper and 
internet adverts might derive from the nature of these channels. Whereas newspapers might 
contain mainly local or regional job offers, internet adverts are available to a virtually 
everyone who reads the advert. As a result, the distinction between formal and informal 
channels is considered as too broad, so that different kinds of formal channels are investigated 
in this dissertation (see below). 
As this chapter deals with determinants of finding a job via a certain search channel, the 
information source serves as the dependent variable. In each wave of the SOEP data, 
respondents who answered that they changed their job in the last year were asked: “How did 
you find out about this job?”38 Participants of the survey could choose between various kinds 
of public employment agencies,
39
 private recruitment agencies, newspaper advertisements, 
internet advertisements, friends or relatives, returning to a former employer, and “other”. 
Respondents are asked to check only one of the given answers, naming the option that was 
responsible for finding out about the current job. 
Chart 8 gives an overview of the relative importance of information sources between 1999 
and 2011.
40
 Finding a job via social ties is a widespread phenomenon in Germany. About one 
third of the employees found their new jobs via referrals.
41
 Newspaper adverts became less 
relevant over the years as the share of job seekers who found a job via newspaper adverts 
                                                 
38
 The questions were initially asked in German. The English translation is taken from the official translation 
which is available on the website http://www.diw.de/de/soep. 
39
 Since these public employment institutions were reorganised in several reforms, all these agencies are 
summarised under the label “public employment agencies” and can be further divided into employment offices 
(“Agentur für Arbeit”), public personnel service agencies (PSA, which has the character of a temporary 
employment agency), and job-centres (“Jobcenter”, for those receiving welfare benefits). As the latter two only 
play a minor role in placing people into jobs, all three categories are summarised into one group. 
40
 Chart 8 contains observations of the whole SOEP data, not only the observations used in this analysis. 
41
 This is merely in line with Bachmann and Baumgarten (2013) who compared the use of recruitment channels 
in Europe. For Germany, they found that 39 percent of unemployed job seekers used friends, relatives or trade 
unions in order to find a job in the years 2006-2008. Note that multiple answers were possible. 
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decreased from above 20 percent to 12 percent. Public employment offices are responsible for 
placing about 10 percent of the sample into new jobs. A notable development is the sharp 
increase of employees who found their jobs on the internet from less than 1 percent in 1999 to 
12 percent in 2011. Private employment agencies play a minor role in retaining people into 
employment and are therefore not further considered. Between 10 and 15 percent answered 
that they were rehired by their former employer (e.g. seasonal workers working for the same 
employer). Other sources like job fairs, temporary work agencies, headhunting, and 
unsolicited walk-ins are sampled in one category (“others or does not apply”). As these 
information channels are largely heterogeneous, they are not under investigation. Thus, this 
dissertation focusses on the four most important information sources: social ties (to friends, 
relatives or acquaintances), internet and newspaper adverts, and employment agencies. 
 
Chart 8: Use of selected recruitment sources from 1999 to 2011 (in percent) 
(Source: own calculations based on SOEP data) 
 
The data has been limited to the working population aged 18-65; self-employed workers and 
the agricultural sector have been excluded due to their low economic relevance. Job seekers 
who have found a job through a job creation scheme (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahme, 1-Euro-
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Job) are not considered in this sample. Further observations had to be deleted due to missing 
data. This reduced the sample size to 2,798 individuals who changed their jobs and account 
for a total sum of 3,818 job changes (see Table 4). Hence, in average, each individual changed 
his or her job about 1.36 times. About 11 percent of the individuals appear just once in the 
data; about 10 percent changed their jobs more than five times. This indicates that job changes 
are rather infrequent in Germany. Individuals with more than 8 changes in the observation 
period have been deleted from the dataset because individuals which change their jobs that 
often might differ from the other job seekers in the sample. Since observations are deleted in 
case of missing variables or if the job change occurred through another than the sources under 
investigation, not every change of each individual is in the dataset. Furthermore, in order to 
provide conclusive results throughout this dissertation, observations have been deleted if 
information on earnings and job satisfaction is missing or if data on earnings and job 
satisfaction of the previous year is missing (see chapter 4.3 for details). As a result, the data 
contains only observations of job seekers who were unemployed for less than a year. 
Table 4: Number of observations and job change frequency 
Job changes Observations Individuals 
 Absolute Percent Absolute Percent 
1 420 11.00 420 15.01 
2 1,009 26.43 859 30.70 
3 916 23.99 671 23.98 
4 641 16.79 421 15.05 
5 418 10.95 234 8.36 
6 253 6.63 123 4.40 
7 109 2.85 51 1.82 
8 52 1.36 19 0.68 
Total 3,818 100 2,798 100 
 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in this analysis are – like the hypotheses in the previous 
chapter – divided into four categories: demographics, search behaviour, job-related variables, 
and regional variables. Demographics include variables typically used in multivariate analyses 
on the individual level, such as gender (dummy), age (in years), years of formal education, 
marital status (dummy), if children are living in the household (dummy), and immigrant 
status (not born in Germany, dummy).  
Three variables describe the conditions under which job seekers searched for the current job. 
First, a dummy variable (unemployed before) indicates if the individual directly changed from 
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one job to another or if the individual entered the job from unemployment.
42
 Hence, this 
variable can be interpreted as on respectively off-the-job-search. Culminated years of 
unemployment experience is a generated variable provided in the SOEP data which 
summarises all unemployment spells of an individual. The third variable describes if an 
individual was actively searching for a job or if the new position “just came up”. 
The position the job seeker found is described by six variables: branch, firm size, occupation, 
public sector, working hours, and fixed term (limited) contract. Branch includes five 
categories, such as industry, manufacturing, trade, finance, and service. The size of the firm 
the new job is found in is measured by the number of employees which is divided into four 
categories. An individual’s occupation is coded according to the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) provided by the International Labour Organization of 
the United Nations Organization. Apart from the respective tasks and the necessary education, 
the ICSO code contains information on hierarchy levels. For this analysis, the first digit of the 
code is used as a broad measure for an individual’s occupation and hierarchy. A dummy 
variable reflects if the new job is found in the public sector. The number of working hours is 
measured on a weekly basis, including potential overtime hours. Last, a variable comprises 
whether the new employment contract has a limited or unlimited duration. 
On the regional level, the regional unemployment rate, the regional gross domestic product 
(per capita), and the region (East/West) are included as variables. The regional unemployment 
rate and the regional GDP are given as the yearly average in each federal state. The GDP is 
used as a per capita measure in order to account for the number of inhabitants in the 
respective state. The last dummy indicates whether an individual is residing in Eastern or 
Western Germany, while Berlin is classified as “East”. 
An overview about the variables used in the investigation can be found in Table 5. As 
mentioned above, the four most commonly used recruitment sources are left in this sample. 
Therefore, half (54 percent) of the job changes occurred after referrals. Newspaper adverts 
were responsible for 26 percent of all job changes, employment offices and internet adverts 
were used less often (9 respectively 12 percent). The dataset comprises an equal number of 
male and female job changers with an average age of 37 years of which around 12 years are 
spent in education. 51 percent of the respondents are married and 30 percent have at least one 
                                                 
42
 This dummy variable takes the value zero when the job was found without interim unemployment and 1 if the 
job was found after a period of unemployment. Interim unemployment has been identified by an increase in the 
variable measuring overall unemployment experience. 
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child living in their household. One fourth of the job changers were unemployed before 
finding a job. In average, each individual experienced 0.9 years of unemployment in their 
working life and more than 60 percent were actively searching for a new job.  
Table 5: Dataset overview 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Recruitment source 
   
Referrals (1=yes) 3,818 0.539 0.499 
Newspaper (1=yes) 3,818 0.262 0.440 
Employment office (1=yes) 3,818 0.085 0.278 
Internet (1=yes) 3,818 0.114 0.318 
    
Gender (1=female) 3,818 0.505 0.500 
Age 3,818 36.588 9.585 
Years of education A 3,818 12.463 2.575 
Married (1=yes) 3,818 0.512 0.500 
Children in household (1=yes) 3,818 0.295 0.456 
Immigrant (1=yes) 3,818 0.089 0.284 
    
Unemployed before (1=yes) 3,818 0.230 0.421 
Total years of unemployment 3,818 0.888 1.719 
Actively sought (1=yes) 3,818 0.623 0.485 
    
Branch 
   
Industry (1=yes) 3,818 0.235 0.424 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 3,818 0.072 0.259 
Trade (1=yes) 3,818 0.259 0.438 
Finance (1=yes) 3,818 0.166 0.372 
Services (1=yes) 3,818 0.268 0.443 
    
Firm size 
   
less than 20 (1=yes) 3,818 0.379 0.485 
20 to 199 (1=yes) 3,818 0.313 0.464 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 3,818 0.165 0.371 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 3,818 0.143 0.350 
    
ISCO job classification 
   
Legislators, senior officials and managers (1=yes) 3,818 0.047 0.212 
Professionals (1=yes) 3,818 0.136 0.342 
Technicians and associate professionals (1=yes) 3,818 0.232 0.422 
Clerks (1=yes) 3,818 0.117 0.321 
Service workers (1=yes) 3,818 0.153 0.360 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 3,818 0.150 0.357 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 3,818 0.077 0.267 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 3,818 0.088 0.283 
    
Public sector (1=yes) 3,818 0.138 0.345 
Working hours per week 3,818 37.635 13.362 
Limited contract (1=yes) 3,818 0.180 0.385 
    
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 3,818 9.60 4.10 
Regional GPD per capita (in 1,000 €) 3,818 27.070 5.988 
East Germany (1=yes) 3,818 0.223 0.417 
Note: A = Years of education is variable provided in the SOEP sample. 13 years of schooling reflect a high school degree, whereas no degree 
is interpreted as 7 years of education. 18 years refer to a university degree. For a detailed description of the generation of this variable see 
SOEP Group (2015). 
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Regarding different branches, service (27 percent), trade (26 percent), and industry (24 
percent) account for most of the job changes. Less jobs are found in the finance (17 percent) 
and manufacturing (7 percent) sector. With reference to firm size, most job changes occurred 
in small firms with less than 20 employees (38 percent). Only one third of the job seekers 
found their jobs in companies with more than 200 employees. Less job changes happen on the 
highest level (5 percent), most changes are reported for technicians and associate 
professionals (23 percent). All other job categories account for 9 to 16 percent of the job 
changes. 14 Percent of the job changers are working in the public sector. In average, 
employees of the dataset work 38 hours per week and 18 percent of job seekers found jobs 
with fixed term contracts. The average (unweighted) regional unemployment rate is 9.60 
percent and the average (unweighted) GDP per capita is 27,000 euros. 22 percent of the job 
changers are residing in East Germany.
43
 
3.3.2 Methodology 
The analysis of the determinants of search channels is conducted in two steps. First, 
employment offices, newspaper and internet adverts are summarised as formal channels. On 
the contrary, friends and relatives used as an information source are interpreted as informal. 
Thus, the binary variable FORMAL is created which allows analysing general differences 
between individuals who find a job via formal (1) respectively informal (0) search channels. 
A logistic regression approach is utilised to estimate the relationship between individual and 
job characteristics as well as regional differences. The full model is specified as:  
𝑃𝑟(𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘) =  𝛼 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜆 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 +  𝜃,      (k = 0, 1) (3.1) 
    
with k =  
0 no (informal; friends/relatives) 
1 yes (formal; (public) employment agencies, newspaper/internet adverts) 
 
where vector Dem includes demographic characteristics and vector Lab contains information 
about the individual labour market biography and search behaviour. Job stands for a variety of 
job characteristics, whereas, Reg comprises the three regional variables mentioned above. α is 
the intercept and θ is the error term. Year dummies are included. 
Although this specification provides first evidence on the determinants of finding a job via 
formal or informal means, the aggregation of newspaper and internet adverts and employment 
agencies might cover meaningful differences between sources. Therefore, a multinomial 
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 About 21 percent of the working population live in East Germany (Destatis, 2010). 
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logistic regression approach is used to estimate the determinants of finding a job through one 
of the formal channels compared to finding a job via friends or relatives. This regression 
model can be described as: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘) =  𝛼 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜆 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 +  𝜃,  (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) (3.2) 
  1 friends/relatives 
with k =  
2 newspaper adverts 
3 (public) employment agencies 
  4 internet adverts 
 
where SOURCE serves as the dependent variable which takes the value 1 if the job was found 
via social ties and 2-4 if the job was found via one of the formal channels. The vectors of the 
regression contain the same variables as in the binomial case described above. In all 
regressions standard errors are estimated as robust and clustered on the federal state level.
44
 
As described above, the dataset contains both branch and job classification dummies. 
Hypothetically, these two measures appear to be strongly related as for example service 
workers are expected to work mainly in the service sector. However, the ISCO job 
classification does not primarily focus on task specific distinctions between jobs but on skill
45
 
differences. As a consequence, the job categories can be interpreted to some extend as job 
complexity and hierarchy level. Nevertheless, in order to detect potential multicollinearity, 
pairwise correlations between branch and job classification dummies are shown in Table 6. 
All correlations are clearly below a critical value of 0.8 (Gujarati, Porter, 2009) – for only one 
correlation exceeds 0.41 (craft workers in the manufacturing branch). 
Table 6: Pairwise correlations between job and branch dummies 
 
Industry Manufacturing Trade Finance Service 
Legislators 0.048 -0.058 0.050 0.014 -0.070 
Professionals -0.028 -0.058 -0.202 0.071 0.199 
Technicians -0.063 -0.118 -0.083 0.071 0.154 
Clerks -0.073 -0.034 0.080 0.143 -0.103 
Service workers -0.186 -0.121 0.302 -0.148 0.077 
Craft workers 0.260 0.410 -0.162 -0.124 -0.238 
Plant operators 0.089 0.007 0.116 -0.104 -0.116 
Elementary occupations -0.003 -0.045 -0.016 0.067 -0.008 
 
                                                 
44
 Since only virtually no individual in the sample moved between federal states, this approach comprises also 
clustering on the individual level. 
45
 The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines skill as “the ability to carry out the tasks and duties of a 
given job”. Two dimensions of skills are considered: skill level and skill specialisation. 
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Regional variables, however, appear to be highly correlated which could be a reasons for 
concern. The correlation between the dummy for Eastern Germany and the regional 
unemployment rate exceeds 0.80 and the other variables are correlated with an index of more 
than 0.60. As a result, the region dummy will be excluded from the regressions if the other 
two variables are included in the regressions. 
Finally, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is calculated in order to control if one 
independent variable is a linear combination of multiple other independent variables. As 
expected, the VIF of the East/West dummy and the regional unemployment rate are relatively 
high (5.09 and 5.39 respectively). The literature claims a VIF above 10 as critical, though, a 
value above 5 might be a reason for concern (Menard, 2001). However, O'Brien (2007) 
argues that the VIF has to be interpreted within its context and that, despite of relatively high 
VIFs, regression results might be still reliable. The VIFs of the other variables are below 5.  
3.4 Empirical Evidence 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7 delivers a first glance on socio-demographic and search behavioural differences of 
employees with respect to recruitment channels. The table contains arithmetic means of the 
respective determinants and a t-test is conducted to reveal whether mean values are 
significantly different from the base category “finding a job via friends or relatives”. As the 
results indicate, women are more likely to find a job via newspaper adverts than via informal 
means. Individuals who found a job via internet adverts are younger and less likely to be 
married in comparison to the reference group. Those who found their jobs with the aid of 
employment agencies are less educated than the reference group; whereas, job seekers who 
were successful via newspaper or internet adverts are more educated. Individuals who found a 
job via newspaper adverts are less likely to live with children under 18 in the household. 
Immigrants are less likely to find a job via newspaper or internet adverts.  
Only 20 percent of the individuals who found a job through friends or relatives were 
unemployed before the new job. This share is significantly higher for employees who found 
their jobs via employment offices (0.486) and internet adverts (0.259). The overall 
unemployment experience of those who found their job via internet adverts is significantly 
lower compared to the reference group. On the contrary, individuals who were successful 
through employment agencies have been, in average, twice as long unemployed in their lives. 
Active search is strongly related to finding a job via formal channels. Whereas 44 percent of 
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those who found their job via friends or relatives were actively searching for a new job, more 
than 80 percent of those who were successful via formal means sought actively. 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics on socio-demographic and job search characteristics by search channel 
  Friends/relatives Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
Gender (1=Female) 0.484 0.558*** 0.502 0.485 
  (0.500) (0.497) (0.501) (0.500) 
Age 36.722 37.267 35.687 35.066*** 
  (9.783) (9.177) (10.302) (8.799) 
Years of Education 12.169 12.632*** 11.844* 13.915*** 
  (2.485) (2.514) (2.210) (2.816) 
Married (1=yes) 0.531 0.555 0.424*** 0.387*** 
  (0.499) (0.497) (0.495) (0.488) 
Children in HH (1=yes) 0.313 0.256*** 0.303 0.293 
  (0.464) (0.436) (0.460) (0.456) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 0.099 0.073* 0.102 0.066* 
  (0.299) (0.260) (0.303) (0.249) 
  
    
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 0.197 0.203 0.486*** 0.259** 
  (0.398) (0.402) (0.501) (0.438) 
Total years of unemployment 0.889 0.772 1.641*** 0.592*** 
  (1.693) (1.614) (2.528) (1.059) 
Actively sought (1=yes) 0.436 0.819*** 0.858*** 0.876*** 
  (0.496) (0.385) (0.350) (0.329) 
Observations 2,057 1,001 323 437 
Notes: Arithmetic means, standard deviations in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively, 
of t-tests for differences in means compared to friends/relatives. 
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics on job characteristics and regional determinants by 
search channel. The results indicate that, in average, individuals who found their job via 
newspaper or internet adverts are more likely to work in larger firms compared to the 
reference group. Newspaper adverts are positively related to finding a job in the finance 
sector, yet, negatively to finding a job in the industry. Via internet adverts, job seekers are 
more likely to find a job in the finance and service sector; whereas, they are less likely to find 
a job in the industry or manufacturing branch. Regarding job categories, the results indicate 
that individuals are more likely to find higher positions via newspaper and internet adverts. In 
addition, Pearson’s χ²-tests were conducted and indicate statistically significant differences 
between sources regarding firm size, branch, and occupation.  
Employment agencies are negatively related to placing job seekers into higher positions. 
Individuals working in the public sector are more likely to have found their job via internet 
adverts. Both employment offices and internet adverts are positively related to longer working 
hours. Jobs found via newspaper adverts are more likely to coincide with permanent contracts, 
whereas, jobs found via employment agencies and internet adverts are likely to be temporary 
employment jobs. 
 
64 Determinants of Job Finding via Social Capital 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics on job characteristics and regional variables by search channel 
  Friends/relatives Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
Firm size 
    
less than 20 (1=yes) 0.425 0.333*** 0.440 0.222*** 
  (0.494) (0.471) (0.497) (0.416) 
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.318 0.312 0.297 0.304 
  (0.466) (0.463) (0.458) (0.461) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 0.139 0.215*** 0.133 0.199*** 
  (0.346) (0.411) (0.340) (0.400) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 0.118 0.141 0.130 0.275*** 
  (0.323) (0.348) (0.337) (0.447) 
χ²-test 139.912***    
     
Branch 
    
Trade (1=yes) 0.228 0.244 0.251 0.243 
  (0.419) (0.430) (0.434) (0.429) 
Industry (1=yes) 0.091 0.035*** 0.108 0.039*** 
  (0.288) (0.184) (0.311) (0.194) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 0.279 0.262 0.226* 0.183*** 
  (0.448) (0.440) (0.419) (0.387) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.147 0.188** 0.164 0.208*** 
  (0.354) (0.391) (0.371) (0.407) 
Services (1=yes) 0.256 0.272 0.251 0.327** 
  (0.436) (0.445) (0.434) (0.470) 
χ²-test 77.230***    
     
ISCO job classification 
    
Legislators, senior officials, managers (1=yes) 0.044 0.058 0.012** 0.064 
  (0.205) (0.234) (0.111) (0.245) 
Professionals (1=yes) 0.115 0.138 0.056*** 0.286*** 
  (0.319) (0.345) (0.230) (0.452) 
Technicians, associate professionals (1=yes) 0.204 0.276*** 0.217 0.277*** 
  (0.403) (0.447) (0.413) (0.448) 
Clerks (1=yes) 0.108 0.131 0.146* 0.105 
  (0.310) (0.337) (0.353) (0.307) 
Service workers (1=yes) 0.161 0.159 0.130 0.117* 
  (0.368) (0.366) (0.337) (0.321) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 0.175 0.102*** 0.251*** 0.069*** 
  (0.380) (0.303) (0.434) (0.253) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 0.087 0.056** 0.108 0.059 
  (0.281) (0.230) (0.311) (0.237) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 0.106 0.081* 0.080 0.023*** 
  (0.309) (0.273) (0.272) (0.150) 
χ²-test 248.775***    
  
    
Public sector (1=yes) 0.124 0.142 0.146 0.190*** 
  (0.330) (0.349) (0.353) (0.393) 
Working hours per week 36.761 37.177 39.256** 41.606*** 
  (14.238) (12.854) (11.810) (10.165) 
Limited contract (1=yes) 0.179 0.134** 0.229* 0.259*** 
  (0.383) (0.341) (0.421) (0.438) 
  
    
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 9.822 9.081*** 10.165 9.308* 
  (4.187) (3.824) (4.429) (3.940) 
Regional GPD per capita 26.880 27.299 26.095* 28.156*** 
  (6.132) (5.627) (5.716) (6.137) 
East Germany (1=yes) 0.245 0.158*** 0.266 0.243 
  (0.430) (0.365) (0.443) (0.429) 
Observations 2,057 1,001 323 437 
Notes: Arithmetic means, standard deviations in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively, 
of t-tests for differences in means compared to friends/relatives. 
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The regional variables show that individuals have a higher probability to find a job via 
newspaper or internet adverts in regions with lower unemployment rates and a higher gross 
domestic product per capita. In East Germany, job seekers are less likely to find a job via 
newspaper adverts.  
It can reasonably be concluded that employees who found their jobs via referrals differ in 
most of their demographic characteristics from those who were successful by other 
recruitment sources. This central observation might support the individual difference 
hypotheses. Moreover, this cannot be interpreted as a clear evidence for the individual 
difference hypothesis as these results do not take correlations between these measures into 
account. This aspect will be considered in the multivariate regressions below. 
3.4.2 Multivariate Results 
In this chapter, multivariate regression results are presented. First, results of the binomial 
logistic regression are shown; second, multinomial results are displayed.  
Table 9 contains binomial regression results and marginal effects with FORMAL as the 
dependent variable, which takes the value 1 if the job was found by a formal search channel 
and 0 if it was found via friends or relatives. With reference to demographic characteristics, 
the results show that individuals who found their job via formal channels are, in average, 
more likely to be female, older and more educated compared to the reference group. No 
significant correlation could be found for marital status and children in the household. 
Immigrants are more likely to find a job via informal means. Finding a job via formal 
channels appears to be linked to off-the-job search and active search behaviour. Both 
categories of search channels do not differ concerning branch variables; however, larger 
companies seem to be more frequently found via formal channels. Apart from elementary 
occupations, all job class coefficients and the public sector coefficient are insignificant. 
Finding a job via formal channels is related to longer working hours. Of the regional dummies 
only the regional unemployment rate appears to be related to information sources. Individuals 
in regions with higher unemployment rates are less likely to find a job via formal channels. 
As described in chapter 3.3.2, multicollinearity might be a reason for concern because of the 
high pairwise correlation between the regional variables and the East/West dummy. However, 
dropping the East/West dummy does neither change the regression results nor affect the 
Pseudo-R² significantly. 
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Table 9: Binomial regression results on determinants of finding a job 
Dep. var.: Formal (1=yes) Logistic Regression Marginal Effects 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Gender (1=female) 0.327* (0.142) 0.081* (0.035) 
Age 0.071* (0.029) 0.018* (0.007) 
Age squared/100 -0.084* (0.038) -0.021* (0.009) 
Years of education 0.048*** (0.013) 0.012*** (0.003) 
Married (1=yes) -0.025 (0.090) -0.006 (0.022) 
Children in household (1=yes) -0.045 (0.166) -0.011 (0.041) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.225*** (0.097) -0.056* (0.024) 
  
  
  
Unemployed before (1=yes) 0.243* (0.097) 0.060* (0.024) 
Total years of unemployment 0.013 (0.019) 0.003 (0.005) 
Actively sought (1=yes) 1.911*** (0.109) 0.471*** (0.027) 
  
  
  
Branch (ref.: trade) 
  
  
Industry (1=yes) 0.079 (0.114) 0.019 (0.028) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) -0.324 (0.170) -0.077* (0.038) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.227 (0.154) 0.056 (0.038) 
Services (1=yes) 0.126 (0.174) 0.031 (0.043) 
  
  
  
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
  
  
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.096 (0.082) 0.023 (0.020) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 0.409** (0.151) 0.101** (0.038) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 0.406** (0.132) 0.100** (0.033) 
  
  
  
ISCO job classification (ref.: Legislators, senior officials, managers) 
  
  
Professionals (1=yes) -0.081 (0.194) -0.020 (0.047) 
Technicians and associate professionals (1=yes) 0.163 (0.090) 0.041 (0.022) 
Clerks (1=yes) 0.081 (0.180) 0.020 (0.045) 
Service workers (1=yes) 0.108 (0.159) 0.027 (0.039) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) -0.114 (0.146) -0.028 (0.036) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) -0.061 (0.152) -0.015 (0.037) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.412** (0.150) -0.098** (0.035) 
  
  
  
Public sector (1=yes) 0.105 (0.154) 0.026 (0.038) 
Working hours per week 0.012*** (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Limited contract (1=yes) -0.222 (0.125) -0.055 (0.031) 
  
  
  
Regional unemployment rate (in %) -0.044* (0.018) -0.011* (0.004) 
Regional GPD per capita (in 1,000 €) -0.012 (0.009) -0.003 (0.002) 
East Germany (1=yes) -0.152 (0.173) -0.037 (0.043) 
   
  
Year dummies yes Yes 
Constant -3.330*** (0.738) - - 
Observations 3,818 
McFadden Pseudo-R² 0.167 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Marginal effects are given in order to compare effect sizes. The strongest determinant of 
finding a job via formal ties appears to be active search. Switching from active to passive 
search increases the probability of being successful via formal ties by .471. In comparison to 
this, the probability for females to find a job via formal channels is only .081 higher than for 
men. Moreover, the two largest company classes increase the probability to find a job via 
formal channels by .100. 
The results described above provide first empirical evidence on the determinants of finding a 
job via social ties. Nevertheless, more detailed analyses are essential in order to detect 
differences between the three formal recruitment channels investigated in this dissertation. 
Therefore, multinomial regression results are displayed in Table 10. The coefficients show 
how the given determinants are related to finding a job via the respective source in 
comparison to the reference group (finding a job via social ties). 
The results mainly confirm the findings of the previous regression. Females find jobs more 
frequently via formal channels than via social ties, statistically significant for newspaper 
adverts and employment agencies. An inverted u-shaped relation could be detected for the 
factor age when a job was found via newspaper and internet adverts. The maximum of the age 
function lies at 46 years for newspaper adverts and at 38 years for internet adverts. As these 
two maxima are around the middle of the working life, a u-shaped relation between age and 
finding a job via social ties can be assumed. Marital status and children in the household are 
not related to finding a job through a certain channel. Immigrants are less likely to find a job 
via newspaper adverts; the coefficient related to internet adverts is negative but insignificant. 
Those who found their job via employment offices were more likely to be unemployed before 
and have been unemployed for longer (age kept constant). Individuals who found their job on 
the internet were also more likely to be unemployed; though, they have shorter accumulated 
unemployment spells. The active search coefficient is highly significant and positively related 
to finding a job via formal channels. 
Branch differences seem to be of minor relevance. Individuals who work in the manufacturing 
branch are less likely to have found their job via newspaper adverts. Newspaper and internet 
adverts are strongly related to finding a job in larger companies, whereas employment offices 
are negatively (but insignificantly) related to firm size. Jobs on lower hierarchy levels or 
requiring fewer skills are more commonly found via employment offices. Elementary 
occupations are less likely to be found via internet adverts. Longer working hours are 
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positively related to finding a job via all three formal channels. Newspaper and internet 
adverts are negatively related to finding a fixed-term contract. In regions with higher 
unemployment rates individuals are less likely to find a job via internet adverts. Year 
dummies are not displayed in the table, yet, indicating a negative time trend in job finding via 
newspaper adverts and a positive time trend in finding a job through internet adverts, which is 
consistent with descriptive finding displayed in Chart 8. 
In Table 11, marginal effects of the regression above are given. The strongest relation has 
been detected for active search. Relative to the reference category, active search increases the 
probability to find a job via newspaper adverts by .293. For the other two search channels 
active search increases the probability to find a job through this channel by .077 respectively 
.089. The gender effect is mainly driven by newspaper adverts. Females have a .055 higher 
probability to find a job via newspaper adverts than via social ties. The probability of finding 
a job via internet search is .079 higher for jobs in firms with more than 2,000 employees. 
The previous regression mainly confirmed the hypothesis that females are more likely to find 
a new job via formal channels. In order to control for gender differences regarding the 
influence of other determinants, separate regressions for males and females are performed. 
The results show that male job seekers are mainly responsible for the inverted u-shaped 
relation between age and finding a job via formal channels. Females with higher levels of 
education are less likely to find a job via employment agencies. Highly educated male job 
seekers are more likely to find a job via internet adverts than via social ties. The negative 
correlation between being an immigrant and finding a job via newspaper adverts is mainly 
driven by male immigrants. No gender difference can be observed for the active search 
dummy. 
Females who found their jobs via internet adverts are more likely to work in the industry, 
finance, or service sector compared to the reference category. A positive relation between 
firm size and formal channels is mainly prevalent for male job seekers. Middle and lower 
level jobs according to the ISCO classification are more frequently found by male job seekers 
who found their jobs via employment agencies. Compared to the reference category, females 
who found their jobs via newspaper and internet adverts are less likely to work in jobs with 
fixed-term contracts. Females are less likely to find a job via internet and newspaper adverts 
in regions with higher unemployment rates. 
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Table 10: Multinomial logit results on determinants of finding a job 
DV: Channel job was found through Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
Ref.: Friends/relatives Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Gender (1=female) 0.341* (0.159) 0.409* (0.192) 0.209 (0.230) 
Age 0.095** (0.037) -0.019 (0.040) 0.097* (0.042) 
Age squared/100 -0.103* (0.050) 0.016 (0.049) -0.129* (0.058) 
Years of education 0.036* (0.017) -0.020 (0.032) 0.113*** (0.019) 
Married (1=yes) 0.104 (0.091) -0.260 (0.174) -0.199 (0.151) 
Children in HH (1=yes) 0.053 (0.188) 0.220 (0.259) -0.290 (0.190) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.340** (0.113) 0.014 (0.133) -0.189 (0.149) 
       
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) -0.035 (0.109) 0.881*** (0.133) 0.267* (0.126) 
Total years of unemployment -0.019 (0.035) 0.111*** (0.030) -0.106* (0.050) 
Actively sought (1=yes) 1.885*** (0.122) 1.915*** (0.206) 2.083*** (0.150) 
       
Branch dummies (ref.: trade) 
      
Industry (1=yes) -0.003 (0.120) 0.129 (0.204) 0.171 (0.168) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) -0.628* (0.299) -0.151 (0.257) -0.064 (0.407) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.129 (0.170) 0.484 (0.300) 0.317 (0.222) 
Services (1=yes) 0.012 (0.153) 0.339 (0.207) 0.344 (0.320) 
       
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
      
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.130 (0.113) -0.229 (0.122) 0.400 (0.211) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 0.563*** (0.167) -0.255 (0.274) 0.656*** (0.154) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 0.247 (0.134) -0.068 (0.290) 1.120*** (0.308) 
     
ISCO job classification (ref.: legislators, senior officials, managers) 
    
Professionals (1=yes) -0.274 (0.200) 0.210 (0.384) 0.168 (0.327) 
Technicians, associate prof. (1=yes) 0.100 (0.081) 0.995** (0.350) 0.165 (0.301) 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.039 (0.167) 1.120*** (0.358) 0.001 (0.357) 
Service workers (1=yes) 0.034 (0.150) 0.789* (0.389) 0.210 (0.274) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) -0.351* (0.147) 1.492*** (0.405) -0.511 (0.412) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) -0.321 (0.189) 1.341*** (0.354) -0.046 (0.290) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.417* (0.186) 0.560 (0.573) -1.098*** (0.313) 
    
Public sector (1=yes) 0.066 (0.210) 0.397* (0.185) -0.079 (0.215) 
Work hours per week 0.005 (0.003) 0.019* (0.008) 0.027*** (0.007) 
Limited contract (1=yes) -0.348*** (0.103) 0.184 (0.192) -0.294 (0.159) 
    
Regional unemployment rate (in %) -0.040 (0.026) 0.001 (0.039) -0.078** (0.028) 
Regional GPD per capita (in 1,000 €) -0.006 (0.012) -0.022 (0.013) -0.017 (0.013) 
East Germany (1=yes) -0.281 (0.290) -0.479 (0.373) 0.363 (0.300) 
    
Year dummies yes yes Yes 
Constant -3.783*** (1.007) -3.807*** (0.885) -8.243*** (0.769) 
Observations 3,818 
McFadden Pseudo-R² 0.176 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 11: Multinomial marginal effects on determinants of finding a job 
DV: Channel job was found through Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
Ref.: Friends/relatives Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Gender (1=female) 0.055 (0.029) 0.019 (0.011) 0.005 (0.012) 
Age 0.017** (0.006) -0.003 (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) 
Age squared/100 -0.018* (0.009) 0.003 (0.003) -0.006 (0.003) 
Years of education 0.005 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Married (1=yes) 0.028 (0.016) -0.017 (0.010) -0.013 (0.009) 
Children in HH (1=yes) 0.012 (0.032) 0.014 (0.014) -0.020 (0.012) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.062** (0.021) 0.008 (0.008) -0.006 (0.009) 
       
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) -0.027 (0.019) 0.054*** (0.009) 0.014 (0.008) 
Total years of unemployment -0.004 (0.007) 0.008*** (0.002) -0.007* (0.003) 
Actively sought (1=yes) 0.293*** (0.022) 0.077*** (0.013) 0.089*** (0.010) 
       
Branch dummies (ref.: trade) 
      
Industry (1=yes) -0.006 (0.021) 0.007 (0.011) 0.010 (0.009) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) -0.103* (0.045) 0.000 (0.013) 0.005 (0.025) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.011 (0.029) 0.027 (0.018) 0.015 (0.014) 
Services (1=yes) -0.010 (0.025) 0.019 (0.011) 0.020 (0.019) 
       
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
      
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.022 (0.021) -0.019* (0.008) 0.021 (0.011) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 0.107*** (0.029) -0.028* (0.013) 0.029*** (0.008) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 0.024 (0.029) -0.015 (0.017) 0.079** (0.027) 
     
ISCO job classification (ref.: legislators, senior officials, managers) 
    
Professionals (1=yes) -0.059 (0.035) 0.008 (0.011) 0.018 (0.021) 
Technicians, associate prof. (1=yes) 0.004 (0.021) 0.040** (0.013) 0.006 (0.021) 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.025 (0.030) 0.058*** (0.016) -0.004 (0.021) 
Service workers (1=yes) -0.007 (0.028) 0.029 (0.017) 0.012 (0.018) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) -0.082** (0.026) 0.096*** (0.020) -0.028 (0.024) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) -0.079* (0.032) 0.077*** (0.014) -0.003 (0.019) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.072 (0.037) 0.027 (0.025) -0.045* (0.018) 
    
Public sector (1=yes) 0.007 (0.039) 0.024** (0.009) -0.008 (0.014) 
Work hours per week 0.000 (0.001) 0.001* (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
Limited contract (1=yes) -0.065*** (0.016) 0.019 (0.010) -0.013 (0.009) 
    
Regional unemployment rate (in %) -0.006 (0.005) 0.001 (0.002) -0.004* (0.002) 
Regional GPD per capita (in 1,000 €) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
East Germany (1=yes) -0.052 (0.058) -0.026 (0.025) 0.030 (0.020) 
    
Year dummies yes yes yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 12: Multinomial logit results on determinants of finding a job by gender 
DV: Channel job was found through Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
Ref.: Friends/relatives Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Age 0.174** 0.015 -0.005 -0.068 0.108 0.037 
Age squared/100 -0.195** -0.001 -0.037 0.115 -0.156 0.000 
Years of education 0.046 0.021 0.070 -0.010** 0.167*** 0.074 
Married (1=yes) -0.193 0.354** -0.218 -0.163 -0.136 -0.245 
Children in HH (1=yes) -0.070 0.190 0.190 0.308 -0.229 -0.301 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.668*** 0.133 -0.156 0.255 -0.439 0.201 
       
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 0.032 -0.091 0.799*** 1.002*** 0.137 0.405 
Total years of unemployment -0.104 0.028 0.159*** 0.063 -0.114 -0.095 
Actively sought (1=yes) 1.904*** 1.969*** 1.768*** 2.223*** 2.261*** 1.970*** 
       
Branch dummies (ref.: trade) 
      
Industry (1=yes) -0.006 -0.045 -0.234 0.728 -0.153 0.467* 
Manufacturing (1=yes) -0.432 -1.512* -0.232 -1.702 -0.497 0.580 
Finance (1=yes) 0.181 0.006 0.254 0.739** -0.127 0.721** 
Services (1=yes) -0.319 0.094 0.273 0.459 -0.068 0.661* 
       
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
      
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.288* 0.052 -0.032 -0.465 0.285 0.532 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 1.064*** 0.165 0.071 -0.592 0.672* 0.644** 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 0.661*** -0.041 0.111 -0.337 1.289*** 1.013* 
       
ISCO job classification (ref.: legislators, senior officials, managers) 
    
Professionals (1=yes) -0.430 0.046 -0.256 1.208 0.237 0.102 
Technicians, associate prof. (1=yes) 0.199 0.190 0.370 1.664 0.378 -0.069 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.096 0.144 1.328** 1.700 0.484 -0.409 
Service workers (1=yes) 0.142 0.022 0.726 1.258 0.253 0.109 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) -0.420 0.277 1.544* 1.749 -0.190 -1.695 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) -0.333 0.178 1.329* 1.709 0.121 0.333 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.050 -0.573 0.971 0.374 -0.754 -1.441*** 
       
Public sectors (1=yes) 0.065 0.132 -0.166 0.719* -0.395 0.075 
Work hours per week (1=yes) 0.010** 0.009 0.021* 0.022*** 0.016 0.036*** 
Limited contract (1=yes) -0.251 -0.436* 0.027 0.370 -0.106 -0.445* 
       
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 0.014 -0.083** 0.025 -0.018 -0.071 -0.079* 
Regional GPD per capita -0.019 0.002 0.008 -0.039 -0.047 0.000 
East Germany (1=yes) -0.589 -0.189 -0.091 -0.836 0.330 0.174 
       
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -6.198*** -1.598 -5.642*** -2.320 -7.560*** -20.429*** 
Observations 1,889 1,929 1,889 1,929 1,889 1,929 
McFadden Pseudo-R² 0.199 0.195 0.199 0.195 0.199 0.195 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Standard errors are not provided due to reasons of 
simplicity. 
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3.4.3 Robustness Analyses 
Additional analyses were conducted to estimate the robustness of these findings. The previous 
analyses revealed that individuals who found their jobs through public employment agencies 
systematically differ from job seekers who found their job through one of the other formal 
channels. Hence, the regressions were performed once again without individuals who found 
their jobs via employment agencies. The results are nearly identical to the regression given in 
Table 10, which emphasises the robustness of the findings and of the specification. 
Furthermore, the potential problem of multicollinearity has been discussed in chapter 3.3.2. In 
order to control whether branch dummies and ISCO job classifications measure the same or 
distinct aspects of jobs, the multivariate regression has been conducted with ISCO dummies. 
The results remain qualitatively similar which can be interpreted as a sign for the 
independence of these two measures. 
ISCO job classifications are based on the required skills and formal education which are 
prerequisite to work in a specific job. Hence, the simultaneous inclusion of education and job 
description dummies might distort the result. If the education variable is excluded, regression 
results for higher job categories remain stable. For lower categories, the coefficients become 
larger in size and more significant. This finding supports previous evidence that jobs which 
require more formal education are more likely to be found via social ties than via newspaper 
or internet adverts. 
An even stronger pairwise correlation has been detected between the regional variables. 
Hence, the East/West dummy has been excluded from the regression. As a result, the negative 
coefficient describing the relation between the regional unemployment rate and the 
probability of finding a job via newspaper adverts becomes significant. 
As mentioned in chapter 3.2.1, an interaction term was introduced in order to model the joint 
effect of females and having a child younger than 18 in the household. Under the assumption 
that females are more likely to be responsible for childcare, the interaction term was expected 
to show that females are more likely to find a job via formal channels if they have a child in 
the household. However, the interaction term is highly insignificant for all search channels. 
An interaction effect might also constitute between active search and off-the-job search as 
unemployed job seekers might be forced to search actively via formal channels. Therefore, the 
active search and unemployed dummies are interacted. The interaction coefficients are 
insignificant for newspaper and internet adverts. For employment agencies, a negative 
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interaction coefficient is estimated. Unemployed job seekers are more likely to find a job via 
employment agencies, though, this effect is smaller if the unemployed is searching for a new 
job actively. 
Additional analyses investigated potential non-linear relationships. For example, the 
relationship between the regional unemployment rate and finding a job via formal sources 
might be u-shaped. This would be the case if social ties would be helpful both in regions with 
high unemployment rates as well as in tight labour markets with a large number of vacancies 
that have to be filled and fewer applicants. However, after the introduction of a squared 
measure of the regional unemployment, both coefficients are insignificant. The result remains 
stable even if all other regional variables are excluded. 
The multinomial regressions showed that individuals with higher education are more likely to 
find a job via newspaper or internet adverts. In order to model a potential non-linear 
relationship between education and information sources, a squared measure of education is 
introduced into the model. For both newspaper and internet adverts, the relationship between 
education level and finding a job through these channels is inverted u-shaped. The respective 
maxima are at around 17 years for newspaper adverts and 14 years for internet adverts. Thus, 
the negative component is only relevant for internet adverts since the maximum years of 
education (master degree) are 18 years. 
So far, the distance to the newly found job has been neglected in these estimations, although 
this factor might be important to characterise the new job. Via newspaper or internet adverts, 
employees are able to attract applicants virtually everywhere (only limited by the 
dissemination area of newspapers). Social ties are more likely to be established between two 
individuals who live within certain proximity. In line with this, Bayer et al. (2008) found 
empirical evidence on the importance of neighbourhood networks on labour market outcomes. 
The authors concluded that employee residing on the same block have a 33 percent higher 
probability of working together. This relationship is even stronger for individuals with similar 
socio-demographic characteristics as their social interaction is likely to be stronger. Finding 
employees close to the workplace is beneficial for employers because of higher flexibility and 
better performance. Empirical evidence of van Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau (2011) 
revealed a strong positive correlation between of distance of work and absenteeism. 
Additionally, shirking at the workplace could serve as a substitute for reduced leisure time 
due to longer commutes (Ross, Zenou, 2008). Unfortunately, the data on the commuting 
distance contains around 500 missing values; therefore, it has not been considered for the 
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general analysis. However, an additional regression is run to estimate the relationship between 
job distance and job search channels. The results show no difference between finding a job 
via social ties and newspaper adverts or employment offices. Internet adverts are positively 
related to finding a job further away from the place of residence. In an additional regression, 
job distance and firm size are interacted because one could assume that especially local small 
firms are more likely to find a job via social ties. The findings are in line with this hypothesis, 
revealing that job distance is still positively related to finding a job on the internet; yet, the 
effect is considerably smaller for larger firms. 
In previous studies, house ownership has proven to be a considerable obstacle for job mobility 
(see e.g. Caliendo et al., 2015 and the references therein). Job seekers owning houses are 
searching for a new job closer to their place of residence which might be positively related to 
finding a job via social ties. Additional regressions have been performed including a house 
ownership dummy. The results show that house ownership may determine where individuals 
search for a new job but does not affect if a job was found via newspaper or internet adverts. 
Solely finding a job via employment agencies is negatively related to house ownership. 
3.5 Discussion 
The empirical results above reveal considerable differences between individuals who found a 
job through one of the search channels under investigation. Some of the hypotheses postulated 
in chapter 3.2 have been confirmed by the empirical results, others not. In this chapter, the 
findings are interpreted and limitations of this study are discussed. Finally, practical 
implications of the findings are debated. 
3.5.1 Discussion of the Empirical Findings 
The empirical findings confirm gender differences in job finding as hypothesised. Females are 
less likely to find a job via social ties which can be interpreted as evidence for the homophily 
hypothesis. Females seem to be less involved in valuable networks helpful in finding a job. 
The relationship between age and the two formal channels newspaper and internet adverts can 
be described as inverted u-shaped. Especially young and older job seekers are more likely to 
find a job via social ties. Younger job seekers dispose of less work experience and branch or 
job specific human capital. Additionally, employers might have difficulties estimating the 
work motivation and other characteristics which are unobservable at the beginning of a career. 
Thus, younger job seekers benefit from their social ties because asymmetric information is 
particularly high in this case. Plug et al. (2015) explained this finding by the use of parental 
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networks. In order to help their children finding a good job at the beginning of the career, 
parents make use of their social ties in order to overcome the lack of social capital of their 
children. Older job seekers, in turn, dispose of a large network of ties established during their 
working life. Through their ties they are able to find a job although empirical evidence shows 
that employers refrain from hiring older workers because they fear higher labour costs, lower 
productivity, or more or longer periods of sickness absence (Boockmann, Zwick, 2004). 
The level of education is positively related to finding a job via formal ties (newspaper and 
internet adverts). Especially individuals with lower levels of education seem to benefit from 
social ties in the job search process. As explained earlier, asymmetric information between 
employer and employee might be especially prevalent for individuals with lower levels of 
formal education. For individuals with a university degree, social ties become again more 
important to find a job. Those job seekers are more likely to dispose of valuable ties 
established during their studies. Furthermore, parents, relatives, and friends of individuals 
with university degrees are more likely to dispose of university degrees themselves 
(homophily) and, thus, dispose of more valuable ties.
46
 
No significant effects were found for being married and living with children below 18 in the 
household. The results remain stable if gender and child in household dummies are interacted. 
This shows that family composition does not affect how individuals search for jobs. It can be 
assumed that both families with children and without as well as married and unmarried job 
seekers dispose of similarly valuable social ties. As hypothesised, individuals who are not 
born in Germany are less likely to find a job via newspaper adverts.  
Search behaviour respectively the conditions under which the new job was found are closely 
related to the source the search was successful through. The strongest determinant in all 
regressions is the active search dummy. Individuals who are actively searching for a new job 
(while it is controlled for being unemployed) are by far more likely to find this job via formal 
channels. Conversely, finding a job via friends or relatives seems to be a rather unintended 
process. This can be understood as a proof for Lin’s hypothesis that social capital can work in 
“invisible” ways (Lin, 2008: 53), i.e. passive search. Via social ties, individuals are provided 
with job offers they did not expect coming up or they did not search for initially. This finding 
is of great importance for the understanding of social ties as a search instrument. In addition 
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 See Eccles (2005) for an overview of the literature on links between parental education and children’s 
educational achievements. 
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to this, job seekers who are successful via formal ties (apart from newspaper adverts) are 
more likely to be unemployed before finding the new job. 
Only few statistically significant results have been found for the branch dummies. This may 
be the case because branch categories used in this dataset do not describe the qualification or 
abilities required in the respective job. The given sectors provide positions for generally all 
kinds of professions so that few differences can be measured. Solely the manufacturing sector 
and the finance sector partially fulfil the expectations formulated in chapter 3.2.3. This may 
be the case because these two sectors – more than the others – are related to a relatively clear 
job model. This interpretation is supported by the relatively high correlation between branch 
and occupation dummies in this sector. Employees in the finance or manufacturing sector 
might be more homogeneous than in other branches.  
As ex-ante assumed, firm size is positively related to find a job via formal channels, which 
has been confirmed for newspaper and internet adverts. This may be explained by greater 
financial and personnel resources of larger firms. Small firms without institutionalised human 
resource departments are more likely to find a job via informal means. Furthermore, a job 
seeker presumably has less ex-ante information about small firms compared to larger firms. 
Hence, social ties are helpful to bridge the information gap and make small firms more 
attractive for job seekers. 
The results with reference to the job classification show that job categories which involve less 
formal education and skills are more likely to be found via informal means. This finding has 
been confirmed by additional estimates described in chapter 3.4.3. Job seekers who work in 
positions for employees with lower levels of education appear to benefit most from personal 
contacts to find a job. Social ties, therefore, are less likely to be responsible for placing well-
educated and skilled employees into well-paid positions but to help disadvantaged job seekers 
to find a job. 
Job seekers who were successful finding a job via newspaper or internet adverts are more 
likely to find an unlimited position. Although this factor also could be understood as an 
outcome of job search (as a measure for job stability), jobs with limited and unlimited 
contracts might differ in other regards. Fixed-term working contracts more frequently offered 
to females, unmarried and, younger employees (Beckmann et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
Portugal and Varejao (2010) argued that employers use fixed-term contracts as a screening 
device. They found that firms who employed more workers under fixed-term conditions were 
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more likely to offer permanent contracts after a certain screening period. In relation to finding 
a job via social ties – which is more likely for disadvantaged job seekers – the results indicate 
that limited contracts are used as a means to screen those job seekers who cannot prove their 
abilities by formal means. 
Measures at the regional level showed that the regional labour market influences how 
individuals find their jobs. The results indicate that job seekers in regions with higher 
unemployment rates are more likely to find a new job via informal means. This implies that 
social ties are especially helpful in order to find a job in regions with higher unemployment 
rates. In conjunction with the results discussed above that mainly disadvantaged job seekers 
benefit from social ties, this effect might be even more severe because less educated 
individuals suffer relatively more from high unemployment rates (OECD, 2014). 
Interestingly, the overall welfare, measured as the GDP per capita, does not affect job finding. 
Presumably, job search does not depend on the general living conditions in a region but on the 
amount of jobless individuals and vacancies. 
3.5.2 Limitations 
The findings of this analysis are robust in the light of various robustness checks and 
alternative specifications. However, two aspects limit the interpretation of the results: 
measurement problems in the dependent variable and room for interpretation of job-specific 
variables. 
First, the data solely contains information on how the respective job was found, not how 
individuals were searching for a respective job. Job seekers who are actively searching for a 
new job might utilise more than one channel during the search process. As a result, the 
findings have to be understood as the determinants of finding a respective job not how these 
determinants influence job search in general. This conceptual difference is important for 
understanding the relationship between determinants and finding a job via a certain channel. 
Finding a job through a certain channel already includes a certain measure of success. Job 
seekers might use multiple search channels, yet, they accept the most attractive job offer. If 
jobs which are advertised by different channels differ regarding their attractiveness (monetary 
and non-monetary benefits), the results do not only show how job seekers are searching for 
jobs but also who gets better jobs. Therefore, additional analyses are required to estimate if 
sources differ regarding their outcomes (see chapter 4). How actual search through multiple 
channels affects pre- and post-hire outcomes is investigated in chapter 6 based on a sample of 
unemployed job seekers. 
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Another problem might be the interpretation of the determinants. Whereas the interpretation 
of the demographic characteristics as factors determining search behaviour is rather straight 
forward, this is less clear for job-specific factors. On the one hand, job seekers might have 
certain preferences regarding the sector, the firm size or the position of the new job. On the 
other hand, though, employers are actively searching for new employees and the way these 
two actors meet is determined by the behaviour of both actors. For example, larger firms 
dispose of more resources which enable them to utilise more search channels to advertise job 
offers. Therefore, the findings regarding the job-specific determinants cannot be interpreted as 
purely preference-based but affected by the job search effort of firms.  
3.5.3 Practical Implications 
The findings imply practical implications for both job seekers and organisations searching for 
new employees. In general, disadvantaged job seekers strongly benefit from social ties in the 
job search process. Younger, less educated individuals and also immigrants are more likely to 
bridge the information gap towards employers by being recommended by others. This implies 
that especially individuals from these disadvantaged groups should invest in their social 
capital in order to establish valuable ties.
47
  
Employers, in turn, can benefit if they adjust their search strategy to address the desired 
employee population. Organisations can utilise internet adverts in order to find young and 
well-educated job seekers. Newspaper adverts address usually older people with higher levels 
of literacy. Firms might be able to reduce recruitment costs by carefully addressing the 
desired population of job seekers. Although the number of applications might decrease, the 
received applications are more likely to fit to vacancy which should be filled.  
Moreover, firms which aim to fill lower positions generally have problems estimating the 
skills and motivation of job seekers. Applicants recommended by social ties are more likely to 
meet the employers’ expectation because the referrer disposes of better information about the 
motivation and abilities of the applicant. Thus, firms should encourage their employees to 
recommend friends or relatives in order to increase matching quality and employee 
performance. Addressing the desired population of job seekers adequately is likely to reduce 
search costs or costs of selection errors (Fernandez et al., 2000). However, this implication 
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 However, such investment might be limited due to a lack of ties, especially for immigrants compared to 
natives. For the Swedish labour market, Behtoui (2008) detected that immigrants who found a job via social ties 
received significantly lower wages than natives. Hence, finding a job via social ties might be helpful in finding a 
job at all but detrimental in relation to post-hire outcomes. For a single Swedish firm, Behtoui and Neergaard 
(2010) showed that part of the immigrant-native wage gap could be explained by social capital variables. 
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has to be considered carefully in the light of the limitation mentioned above that finding a job 
not seeking through a certain channel has been investigated. How individuals find a job is not 
solely determined by individual search decisions but also by the way firms search for 
employees. As a result, this implication is only reliable under the assumption that job seekers 
anticipate employers’ search behaviour and adjust their search effort according to their 
preferences. Individuals who wish to work for larger firms anticipate that these firms offer a 
career portal on their website and, thus, search on the internet. Preferences for which firm to 
work (e.g. for a smaller or larger firm) might be determined by demographic or job specific 
characteristics. Therefore, it may be concluded that firms should adjust their employee search 
behaviour towards the search behaviour of competitors with similar properties (firm size, 
branch etc.) in order to react to anticipated search behaviour. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been analysed if job seekers who have found their job through different 
search channels differ with regards to their socio-demographic characteristics or regarding 
job-specific or regional differences. The results show that especially disadvantaged job 
seekers – young/old, less educated, immigrants – are more likely to find a job via social ties. 
Furthermore, formal channels attract different job seekers, which is particularly important for 
employment offices. Newspaper and internet adverts appear to be a promising job search 
instrument for well-educated and medium-aged job seekers. Estimated coefficients are vastly 
robust towards alternative specifications and potential non-linearities. The findings have 
practical relevance for both employers and employees in the job search process. Employers 
should adjust their search strategy towards the desired target group by using the channels used 
by the targeted job seekers or by using channels commonly used by competitors in order to 
adjust to job seekers’ anticipations. Disadvantaged job seekers benefit from investments into 
their social capital. 
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4 Effectiveness of Informal Recruitment Channels – Post-hire Outcomes 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2.5, theoretical arguments have been discussed how social ties could affect 
monetary and non-monetary outcomes of job search. On the one hand, pre-screening of 
applicants or realistic job previews could be responsible for increasing matching quality and, 
hence, performance. Individuals who fit better to the respective job and are performing better 
are likely to be earn higher wages and to be more satisfied with the current job. Altogether, 
these factors might increase the probability of staying at the current employer, reducing 
turnover probability. On the other hand, Schwab (1982) argued that different search channels 
might be used by different individuals and, therefore, search channels might not be associated 
with higher income or satisfaction. 
The previous chapter has provided first evidence that individuals who are successful finding a 
job via social ties substantially differ from job seekers who found a job via formal means. 
Informal means help especially disadvantaged job seekers in finding a job, whereas highly 
educated and middle-aged job seekers are more likely to find a job via formal means. This can 
be interpreted as first evidence for the individual difference hypothesis. However, keeping 
everything else constant, this does not rule out potential monetary and non-monetary benefits 
of social ties. Apart from finding a job at all, disadvantaged job seekers might find a better 
paid job or a position that generates higher job satisfaction. 
This section empirically investigates whether individuals hired through different recruitment 
channels also differ in terms of post-hire outcomes, such as wage, job satisfaction, and future 
turnover (see chapter 2.6). These results will provide further evidence on the appropriateness 
of the two different hypotheses described above. If differences in post-hire outcomes still 
exist even though it is controlled for various demographic, firm and job-specific variables, 
this could be interpreted as supporting evidence that social ties are a superior means in finding 
a job. Conversely, if differences in post-hire outcomes vanish when a set of control variables 
is inserted, individual differences could be responsible for self-selection into the recruitment 
channels under investigation. This chapter, therefore, answers the second research question of 
the introduction, which emphasised the role of the German labour market regulations and 
traditions in determining post-hire outcomes of job search. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it investigates in how far 
the usage of a specific recruitment channel affects labour market outcomes for employees. 
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Especially, this chapter is (to the best of my knowledge) the first which considers reduced 
turnover as an outcome of job search channels in a large data set. Second, this chapter 
investigates wage and job satisfaction differentials, i.e. the wage (job satisfaction) difference 
between the current and the past job. This way it is investigated whether individuals already 
earned higher wages or were more satisfied before the job change. Furthermore, it is analysed 
whether sources generate a so-called “honeymoon effect” (Boswell et al., 2005), an increase 
in the job satisfaction after the job change. Finally, particular attention will be paid to the 
evaluation of the appropriateness of the two the alternative hypotheses (information benefits 
and self-selection) mentioned above. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In chapter 4.2 the existing empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of recruitment channels is summarised. Subsequently, the 
research methodology is described in chapter 4.3. Empirical evidence, both descriptive and 
multivariate is provided in 4.4. The findings are discussed in chapter 4.5. Chapter 4.6 
concludes. 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
The empirical literature on post-hire outcomes of recruitment channels has provided ample 
yet controversial evidence on the effectiveness of formal and informal means. In this chapter, 
selected studies are summarised and hypotheses regarding post-hire outcomes are formulated. 
First, the literature on monetary outcomes is reviewed; second, literature on non-monetary 
outcomes is summarised. 
4.2.1 Monetary Post-hire Outcomes of Social Capital 
So far, only one study has explicitly investigated the explanatory power of the two alternative 
hypotheses. According to Breaugh and Mann (1984), who used a rather small sample of 98 
social service employees, the RJP hypothesis received more support than the Individual 
Difference hypothesis. Participants were asked about the quality of ex-ante information on job 
characteristics and requirements. Those who found their job through informal means reported 
that they disposed of significantly better information compared to newspaper adverts or direct 
applications. However, the Individual Differences hypothesis has been investigated on a small 
set of demographic variables (gender, race, education, age) and two constructs (ease of 
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movement, applicant’s abilities). Thus, a more detailed analysis of individual differences as a 
potential source of self-selection – which is part of this chapter – deems to be necessary.48 
Most studies in this field of research build on the RJP or pre-screening hypotheses and 
investigate if social ties yield employees who perform better or realise higher post-hire 
outcomes. Performance as an outcome of job channels is investigated by Pesek and McGee 
(1988), Kirnan et al. (1989), and Williams et al. (1993). 
Pesek and McGee (1988) investigated the effectiveness of informal recruitment channels from 
an organisation’s point of view. Based on data from three U.S. hospitals in Western 
Pennsylvania, they analysed quit rates and performance of new-hires (from maintenance 
mechanics to medical staff) recruited via different channels (e.g. education institutes, direct 
applications, or employee referrals). Although providing solely bivariate results, the authors 
found statistically significant differences in quit rates and performance. Those hired via 
employee referrals were the best performers and less likely to quit. 
Measuring performance differentials in a sample of life insurance agents, Kirnan et al. (1989) 
detected that informal recruiting sources yielded applicants who were better performers 
(measured as annual sales) than formal sources. The pool of applicants found via informal 
means was better in comparison to applications received through other channels. Yet, after the 
hiring decision, only little performance differences could be identified. 
Investigating a sample of 476 applicants for nursing positions of which 234 were finally hired, 
Williams et al. (1993) found out that referrals and rehires attracted applicants with greater 
working experience and pre-hire knowledge. However, these nurses did not perform better 
than their colleagues hired by other sources and had higher turnover rates after one year. 
Hence, it is concluded that Individual Differences between applicants were more important 
than conveying realistic information concerning jobs. 
As this summary indicates, early research mainly finds positive effects of informal search 
channels on performance, at least in the applicants’ pool. In contrast to this, later studies find 
mixed results regarding wages and provide different explanations for their findings. 
                                                 
48
 Breaugh (1981) and Taylor and Schmidt (1983) did not find evidence on source differences. Thomsen and 
Wittich (2010) provided recent evidence on the determinants of job search via formal and informal means. The 
results indicate that job seekers who found their jobs via different channels differ in numerous demographic and 
job-specific characteristics (e.g. age, gender, job autonomy). The literature investigating determinants of source 
choice is described in detail in chapter 3.2. In addition, chapter 3.4 provides new evidence on determinants of 
finding a job via three formal means and social ties. 
 
83 Effectiveness of Informal Recruitment Channels – Post-hire Outcomes 
Boxman et al. (1991) analysed a set of 1,359 Dutch managers and found a positive 
relationship between social capital and earnings. They detected that human capital and social 
capital can serve as substitutes and that social capital is helpful at any level of human capital.  
Based on 209 observations of male employees of a manufacturing firm in Egypt, Antoninis 
(2006) found that social ties are not per se helpful in finding a better paid jobs. Whereas, a 
referral by an individual with a valid estimate of a job seeker’s skills was associated with 
higher earnings, referrals from friends or family members were negatively related to wages.  
Bentollila et al. (2010) found a negative relationship between finding a job via social ties and 
wages with both US and European data. The authors assumed that job seekers who find a job 
via social ties do not work in the jobs in which they have a competitive advantage but in jobs 
their ties would like them to work. They interpreted social ties as a source of social pressure 
which makes job seekers accept jobs they would not accept without. 
Pellizzari (2010) provided cross-country evidence on the wage effect of finding a job via 
informal means for 15 countries based on the European Community Household Panel. Both 
wage premiums and wage penalties were equally observable across countries which can be 
explained by differences in the effectiveness of formal search channels. For Germany, the 
author detected a wage penalty of -.086 without job characteristics and -.043 with job 
characteristics (OLS). In an additional fixed-effects regression, this wage penalty shrank and 
became statistically insignificant.  
The study which is most closely related to the investigation in this chapter has been conducted 
by Delattre and Sabatier (2007) who analysed the wage effects of finding a job via one’s 
social network or without in France. The authors applied switching regression models in order 
to account for endogeneity in finding a job via formal/informal means and the wage 
determination. They detected a meaningful selection effect for finding a job via social ties and 
after correcting for this selection bias the relationship between social networks and wages 
became negative. The most recent study is provided by Plug et al. (2015), who analysed the 
relationship between parental networks and children’s labour market outcomes. The authors 
did not find significant wage effect. Parental networks, though, had a weak impact on 
occupational choice of children entering the labour market. 
This review of the related literature shows that results are largely heterogeneous in terms of 
monetary outcomes. While early studies (mainly for the US labour market) report a positive 
correlation between finding a job via social ties and performance, other studies were not able 
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to show that this is compensated by firms. Even more, recent studies in European countries 
have revealed that the wage effect diminished or even turned negative. Korpi (2001) 
explained this by stronger labour market institutions compared to the U.S. This is in contrast 
to theoretical considerations of chapter 2.5 that social capital might overcome information 
asymmetries and that matching bonuses are shared between employer and employee. In the 
introduction it has been argued that the German labour market differs in many aspects from 
the US labour market and is commonly regarded as rather inert (Kemmerling, Bruttel, 2006). 
Furthermore, it appears questionable that employers are able or willing to differentiate 
between employees hired through different channels, particularly in Germany where wage 
postings and collective bargaining are important factors of wage determination (Brenzel et al., 
2014). Thus, positive wage effects of finding a job via social ties are, according to the existing 
empirical evidence, rather unlikely and it is hypothesised: 
H1 (Wage): Employees who found their jobs via social ties do not earn higher wages or even 
lower wages compared to those who found their job via formal means. 
4.2.2 Non-monetary Post-hire Outcomes of Social Capital 
Few studies investigate the relationship between recruitment channels and non-monetary 
outcomes. As an example of early evidence, Latham and Leddy (1987) analysed a sample 68 
car dealers recruited via newspaper adverts, unsolicited applications, and social ties. They 
found that social ties yielded employees which showed higher job involvement, organisational 
commitment, and job satisfaction compared to those recruited via newspaper adverts. Moser 
(2005) analysed a set of 767 new employees of a large German electronic company to 
investigate the relationship between formal/informal channels and non-pecuniary outcomes 
(job satisfaction, organisational commitment). Special emphasis was laid upon the role of 
unmet expectations (as the inverse of realistic job previews) as a mediator between social ties 
and post-hire outcomes. The results indicated that finding a job via informal means was 
negatively related to the number of unmet expectations (measured as 48 dummies of pre-hire 
expectations) and that unmet expectations mediated the relationship between informal search 
and non-pecuniary outcomes. Franzen and Hangartner (2006) showed that finding a job via 
social ties was positively related to non-monetary outcomes. Based on a sample of 8,000 
Swiss university graduates, the authors provided evidence that social networks help finding a 
job related to the job seeker’s educational degree and better career chances. 
Using a sample of 1,100 German low-skilled or long-term unemployed who re-entered the 
labour market, Krug and Rebien (2012) found  no evidence for a wage premium of finding a 
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job via informal means and only little evidence for a positive relation between social ties and 
non-monetary outcomes (job and task satisfaction, employment stability) utilising a 
propensity score matching approach. 
To capture potential non-monetary benefits, the correlation between source of information 
and job satisfaction is investigated. If the use of informal means improves the matching 
quality employees are likely to be more satisfied with working conditions. Furthermore, an 
adequate preview of the contemplated job offer protects applicants against major 
disappointments yielding to an ex-post higher job satisfaction. Thus, it can be assumed that: 
H2 (Job satisfaction): Employees who found their jobs via social ties report higher job satisfaction 
compared to those who found their job via formal means (wages kept constant). 
Whereas job satisfaction describes the feelings or attitudes an employee has towards his/her 
job, turnover describes the actual decision to leave the current job (voluntary turnover) or the 
fact of being dismissed by the employer (involuntary turnover). Mobley et al. (1979) 
categorised determinants of turnover as individual demographics, job satisfaction, 
organisational and work environment factors, job content, and external environment factors. 
Differences in turnover can be explained by two theoretical approaches described in chapter 2 
– matching theory and realistic job previews. It has been argued that finding a job via social 
ties is likely to provide more valuable information on job characteristics. Such information 
benefits are likely to increase P-O and P-J fit, which results in better performance and higher 
job satisfaction. Employees who are performing better than their co-workers are less likely to 
be fired, even in economic downturns. Furthermore, more satisfied employees are less likely 
to quit the current job voluntarily. 
The RJP hypothesis postulates that individuals, who found a job via social ties, dispose of 
more realistic expectations towards the job. Moreover, Porter and Steers (1973) found that 
unmet expectations, which is the perceived mismatch between expectations and work reality, 
are a potential source of dissatisfaction and, thus, turnover. Finding a job via social ties is 
likely to reduce the degree of unmet expectations and, therefore, turnover probability of new 
hires. Williams et al. (1993) investigated whether job search channels affected the turnover 
probability (after one year) of nurses. Their findings indicated that turnover was positively 
related to employee referrals. However, the authors argued that due to few control variables, a 
large number of variables that are likely to affect turnover have been omitted.  
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In this chapter, turnover is used as an additional measure of source effectiveness. In contrast 
to starting wages (which might not reflect individual performance since performance is not 
observed) and job satisfaction (which might be biased upwards shortly after a job change due 
to the "honeymoon effect", see Boswell et al., 2005), turnover might be a more reliable 
measure for matching quality. The better the matching quality, the less likely an employee is 
dismissed or quits the job voluntarily. As it is assumed that finding a job via social ties is 
likely to result in a better match, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H3 (turnover): The turnover ratio of employees who found their jobs via social ties is lower 
compared to those who found their job via formal means. 
In the next chapter, these three hypotheses are investigated empirically to find out if social 
networks serve as beneficial in the job search process. Furthermore, the analysis is able to 
show which of the two alternative theories – namely Individual Differences and Realistic Job 
Previews – is able to explain recruitment source differences. 
4.3 Methodology 
For reasons of comparison, the dataset in this chapter is identical to the dataset used in the 
previous chapter. As described in chapter 3.3.1, three major formal channels of information 
(newspaper or internet adverts and public employment offices) and one informal channel 
(finding a job via friends/relatives) are taken into account (see chapter 3.3.1 for a detailed 
description of the dataset and the four search channels). The dataset contains 3,825 
observations of job changes. Three measures of effectiveness of job search means – wages, 
job satisfaction, and turnover – are investigated and described below.  
Wage 
To measure wage income, the generated variable LABGRO$$
49
 provided in the SOEP is used 
which contains all types of gross labour income per month. It is assumed that the 
determination of wage income follows the logic of the Mincerean earnings regression where 
logarithmised wage acts as the dependent variable. The whole model can be described by 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜁 + 𝜃 (4.1) 
where α stands for the intercept. SOURCE stands for a set of recruitment channel dummies 
(newspaper adverts, public employment agencies, internet adverts) which take the value “1” if 
the job was found through that particular source and “0” if not. If all dummies simultaneously 
                                                 
49
 See SOEP Group (2015) for a description of generated variables provided in the SOEP data. 
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take the value “0”, the job seeker has been successful via friends/relatives. Dem is a vector of 
demographic control variables, Lab comprises variables which describe search and labour 
market experience. Job stands for a set of job- and firm-specific indicators (firm size, branch, 
occupation). Regional differences like an East/West dummy and regional unemployment rate 
and GDP are part of the Reg vector. θ is the error term. 
The regression model above describes the relationship between the recruitment channel the 
job was found through and the current monthly wage. Since unobservable factors, such as 
motivation or ability, are likely to affect wages (and also search effort), the difference 
between the current and the previous salary is of interest. Wage differentials between 
individuals who earned less in their previous jobs (e.g. due to unobservable individual 
characteristics) are likely to earn less in their current jobs as well. If less able or less 
motivated individuals are more likely to find their jobs through a certain channel, wage 
differentials between channels are likely to be overestimated. In order to control for the 
possibility that job seekers who used a specific search channel systematically gained higher 
wages in their former job, another regression approach is applied. In the following model 
Δ𝑊𝑖𝑡 =  𝑊𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊𝑖;𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜁 + 𝜃 (4.2) 
ΔW represents wage income changes computed as the difference between the current wage 
after the job change and the wage paid in the former job. All independent variables on the 
right side remain the same as in Equation (3).  
Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction (JS) is measured by a single question (“How satisfied are you are with your 
job?”) on a 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (lowest satisfaction) to 10 (highest 
satisfaction).
50
 Hamermesh (1978: 54) defined job satisfaction as an “individual’s response to 
a specific question designed to elicit his feelings about the job as a whole”. This definition 
implies that individuals are able to express a general feeling towards their current job which is 
affected by various aspects of the job.
51
 The estimated model can be describe by 
𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑡 =   𝛼 + 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜁 + 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜂 + 𝜃 (4.3) 
                                                 
50
 Albeit single-item measures in contrast to multi-item constructs show weaker validity and reliability, Wanous 
et al. (1997) as well as Dolbier et al. (2005) supported the applicability of a single single-item measures of job 
satisfaction. The authors, furthermore, stressed the advantages of single-time measures such as easier 
understanding of participants and a more convenient interpretation of score changes. 
51
 Locke (1976) mentioned the job dimensions work, pay, promotions, recognition, benefits, working conditions, 
supervision, co-workers, company and management as determinants of overall job satisfaction. 
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which is largely similar to equation (3). Here, coefficient matrix β contains the effect of the 
source the applicant was recruited through on the employee`s wage. Sat contains additional 
variables that are likely to affect job satisfaction, such as health status (five categories), 
perceived job insecurity (three categories), and wage income. 
Like wages, job satisfaction is likely to be determined by unobserved job characteristics and 
by external effects from the private domain which spill-over on job satisfaction (Judge, 
Watanabe, 1994; Rode, 2004). In addition, in contrast to wages, job satisfaction resembles a 
subjective measure of job quality. Most likely, different individuals evaluate identical jobs 
differently because each individual associates a certain standard with a certain value on the 
Likert scale. If job seekers who find a job through a certain channel systematically rate jobs 
lower than other employees, this might affect the results of the study. Hence, estimating the 
relationship between recruitment channels and the difference in job satisfaction is likely to 
reduce such bias because ratings are more likely to be consistent within individuals than 
between individuals. Therefore, the satisfaction differential ΔJS between the current and the 
previous job is estimated by 
∆𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑡 =   𝛼 + 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜁 + 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜂 + 𝜃 (4.4) 
where there independent variables are the same as in equation (5). 
Since both wages and job satisfaction are outcome variables of the job domain and are mainly 
influenced by similar factors, error terms of the two separate regressions might be correlated. 
In this case, a seemingly unrelated regression approach (Zellner, 1962; Zellner, Huang, 1962; 
Zellner, 1963) might yield more robust results. In order to estimate the model, both 
regressions are calculated simultaneously and both regressions contain the same variables 
described in the job satisfaction regression. 
Turnover 
Turnover (TO), which comprises voluntary job leave and dismissals, is measured on a yearly 
base for the five following years after a job change. A dummy variable is created which takes 
the value “1” if the individual changed its job again or became unemployed in the respective 
year (or in the previous year(s)). Due to the unbalanced nature of the SOEP, each year more 
observations are getting lost by increasing the time horizon of measurement. As turnover is 
measured as a simple dummy variable, five binomial logit models are estimated. The model 
estimates the probability that an individual i has changed the job or has become unemployed 
(summarised as turnover) in a particular year x after finding the job. The regression contains 
 
89 Effectiveness of Informal Recruitment Channels – Post-hire Outcomes 
the same variables as the job satisfaction regression above. In an robustness check, job 
satisfaction and wages are included in this regression. 
𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑂𝑖;𝑡+𝑥 = 𝑘) =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜁 +
                                      𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜂 + 𝜃,                   (𝑥 ∈ 1,2,3,4,5)  
(4.5) 
    
With k =  
0 no (job change and not unemployed) 
1 yes (job change or unemployed) 
 
This study provides different regression models to detect the causal relation between the 
successful recruitment source and labour market outcomes as well as factors that determine 
the use of particular recruitment sources. First standard pooled OLS models are applied to 
calculate cross-sectional effects. An additional median regression, which is more robust 
regarding outliers, is applied to evaluate relative wage increases. To cover the ordinal nature 
of the job satisfaction variable, ordered logit or probit models are suggested by the literature. 
However, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) argued that the assumption of cardinality or 
ordinality of general satisfaction does not lead to meaningful differences of the results. 
Therefore, and as OLS results are more convenient to be interpreted, linear regression models 
are used in this study. Additionally, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) stated that 
controlling for time-invariant unobserved factors affects the results most. By implementing 
fixed- and random effects panel estimators the longitudinal character of the data is exploited. 
4.4 Empirical Evidence 
This chapter presents empirical evidence on the post-hire outcomes of job search via social 
ties. First, descriptive statistics on the three measures of labour market success are 
presented.
52
 Second, multivariate results are shown. 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 13 contains descriptive results on wages and job satisfaction as a result of finding a job 
via one of the four channels. Regarding gross income, the table shows that finding a job via 
social ties is linked to lower wages compared to finding a job via newspaper or internet 
adverts. The difference is meaningful in size (239 respectively 608 euros per month) as well 
as highly significant. However, those who found their job with the aid of employment 
agencies earn significantly lower wages. In contrast to this, the results regarding job 
                                                 
52
 Descriptive findings on the independent variables can be found in chapter 3.4.1. 
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satisfaction show that individuals who were successful via social ties are more satisfied with 
their jobs, statistically significant for employment offices and internet adverts. Although 
empirical studies do not deliver clear evidence on the correlation between pay and job 
satisfaction (see Judge et al., 2010 for a meta-analysis), it is quite astonishing that higher 
wages seem to coincide with lower degrees of job satisfaction. This could be an indication 
that seekers face a trade-off between wages and job satisfaction and that individuals who 
search for a job via social ties lay more emphasis on satisfaction than on wages. 
Table 13: Descriptive results of job satisfaction, income, and wages of different recruitment channels 
  
Friends/relatives Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
Gross income AM 1,982.95 2,219.65*** 1,808.44* 2,590.52*** 
 
Std. Dev. (1,298.83) (1,379.35) (924.14) (1,358.86) 
Job satisfaction AM 7.300 7.185 6.923** 7.126 
 
Std. Dev. (1.983) (2.059) (1.985) (2.171) 
Change gross income (€) AM 128.40 116.24 111.28 274.56** 
 Std. Dev. (859.670) (749.405) (711.753) (900.800) 
% change in gross income AM 0.417 0.248* 0.478 0.483 
 
Std. Dev. (2.119) (0.909) (1.973) (1.416) 
 
Med. 0.039 0.042 0.020 0.065 
Change job satisfaction AM 0.711 0.676 0.152*** 0.874 
 
Std. Dev. (2.670) (2.694) (2.637) (2.985) 
Observations 
 
2,057 1,001 323 437 
Notes: Arithmetic means, standard deviations in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively, 
of t-tests for differences in means compared to friends/relatives. Income and wage are in prices of 2010. 
The results on wage and job satisfaction changes compared to the former job are less 
significant than the previous findings. The increase in monthly wages is higher for job seekers 
who were successful via internet adverts. The increase in job satisfaction is much lower for 
those who found a job via employment agencies. All other findings are insignificant. 
Table 14: Turnover ratios by recruitment source 
  Friends/relatives Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
Turnover after one year 0.336 0.329 0.353 0.350 
  (0.473) (0.470) (0.479) (0.478) 
Observations 1,914 952 303 380 
  
    
Turnover after two years 0.495 0.447* 0.542 0.544 
  (0.500) (0.497) (0.499) (0.499) 
Observations 1,799 902 286 327 
  
    
Turnover after three years 0.536 0.482** 0.579 0.623** 
  (0.499) (0.500) (0.495) (0.485) 
Observations 1,679 868 
 
297 
     
Turnover after four years 0.598 0.532** 0.615 0.691** 
  (0.490) (0.499) (0.488) (0.463) 
Observations 1,572 827 262 285 
     
Turnover after five years 0.652 0.580*** 0.679 0.774*** 
  (0.476) (0.494) (0.468) (0.419) 
Observations 1,484 797 246 261 
Notes: Arithmetic means, standard deviations in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively, 
of t-tests for differences in means compared to friends/relatives. 
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Additionally, Table 14 contains information about turnover after one to five years after the job 
was found. The findings reveal that turnover ratios are similar between individuals who found 
their job via social ties and via employment agencies. Compared to the reference group, 
finding a job via newspaper adverts is related to lower turnover ratios in all years apart from 
the first year after the job change. Those who found their jobs on the internet are more likely 
to change jobs in all years after the second year. 
4.4.2 Multivariate Analyses 
4.4.2.1 Wage Income 
Albeit descriptive evidence above indicates differences in post-hire outcomes, those findings 
might be explained by the considerable differences in demographics (age, gender, education) 
or occupational choices of job seekers who found their jobs via different channels (see chapter 
3.4.1). Table 15 contains three models of pooled cross-sectional OLS regressions on monthly 
wage income.
53
 Model (1) provides a first impression of how the choice of recruitment 
channels affects wages. Results indicate that finding a job via newspaper or internet adverts 
yields a wage premium whereas job search through the public employment office does not 
affect wages. However, these coefficients should not be interpreted further because other 
factors that determine wages are ignored. Therefore, model (2) includes demographic 
characteristics such as years of education, gender, and age and, consequently, the source-
related coefficients become smaller. Model (3) comprises additional branch- and job-specific 
as well as regional control variables. These controls reflect differences in jobs found via 
different search channels and regional factors, such as the unemployment rate. The results 
show that no significant wage differences occur between social ties, newspaper adverts, and 
employment offices. A wage premium, though, seems to be related to finding a job via 
internet adverts. Finding a job via internet adverts increases monthly wages by 5.34 percent.
54
 
Both demographic and job-specific variables explain about 30 percent of the variance in 
wages resulting in a model fit of 66.6 percent in model (3). 
Panel estimators can be applied to consider the time structure of the data (Model (4) and 
Model (5)). A fixed-effects estimator is applied to exclude time-invariant unobserved 
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 As the dependent variable is logarithmised, coefficients have to be transformed by the exponential function to 
get the exact effects respectively differences. The table contains the estimated coefficients, whereas transformed 
figures are given in the text. 
54
 For comparisons: One additional working hour per week increases monthly wages by 3.46 percent. 
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individual heterogeneity. Performing a Hausman test
55
 indicates significant differences 
between fixed and random-effects (GLS) estimators. Hence, fixed-effects models are 
preferred despite its lower efficiency. However, results of the random-effects estimators are 
displayed in Table 15 for the sake of completeness (Model (5)). Whereas the fixed-effects 
model yields no statistically significant source coefficient, the GLS model mainly replicates 
the previous findings. 
However, panel estimators have to be interpreted carefully since fixed-effects estimators 
presume an adequate degree of variation. The coefficients are influenced by those employees 
who change their job at least twice and make use of different information channels in the 
observed time span. Multiple job changers might differ systematically from those who take 
just one job in the 13 year period. As the internet has become a frequently utilized search 
channel just recently, more changes can be observed for newspaper adverts. Hence, the 
insignificant internet coefficient might be caused by too few data for fixed-effects regressions. 
In order to control for wage persistence, Table 16 contains empirical evidence on the impact 
of recruitment sources on wage increases (or decreases) compared to the previous job. Thus, 
regression results can be interpreted as a positive or negative wage increase in percent 
compared to the increase of the reference group (in prices of 2010). In the first three models, 
the relative wage increase (in percent) serves as the dependent variable. Compared to the base 
category, finding a job via newspaper adverts is associated with a 0.14 lower wage increase. 
Model (4) uses a median regression which is more robust with respect to outliers, which are 
quite frequent in the case of percentage wage increases (see descriptive evidence). In this 
regression, all job channel coefficients are statistically insignificant. This finding is robust if 
other quantiles than the median (e.g. .25 and .75) are defined. The last model (5) focusses on 
absolute wage changes (in euros) relative to the base category. Like in the previous 
regression, job channels are not related to wage differentials. 
All in all, these findings imply that individuals who found a new job via newspaper adverts 
experience lower wage increases compared to the reference category. However, this 
difference disappears when the absolute increase is investigated. This could be explained by 
the fact that those who found a job via newspaper adverts already earned higher wages before 
the job change and that, therefore, relative changes are smaller. The total wage differential, 
however, is not affected by this. 
                                                 
55
 chi²=124.86***, H0 (difference in coefficients is not systematic) has to be rejected. 
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Table 15: Mincer wage regression 
 DV: Monthly Income (log) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
  OLS Base OLS Demographics OLS Full Model Fixed Effects Random Effects 
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Recruitment Source (ref. social ties)           
Newspaper (1=yes) 0.110*** (0.033) 0.110*** (0.027) 0.020 (0.019) 0.060 (0.031) 0.012 (0.019) 
Employment office (1=yes) 0.026 (0.040) 0.069 (0.038) 0.014 (0.027) 0.027 (0.049) 0.013 (0.027) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.425*** (0.038) 0.239*** (0.034) 0.052* (0.026) 0.062 (0.041) 0.046* (0.023) 
  
          
Gender (1=female) 
  
-0.628*** (0.025) -0.155*** (0.023) 
    
Years of education 
  
0.081*** (0.005) 0.035*** (0.004) 0.082* (0.041) 0.040*** (0.004) 
Age  
  
0.061*** (0.009) 0.044*** (0.007) 0.048 (0.030) 0.047*** (0.007) 
Age squared/100 
  
-0.077*** (0.012) -0.047*** (0.009) -0.058 (0.036) -0.051*** (0.008) 
Married (1=yes) 
  
-0.068* (0.027) -0.002 (0.018) 0.078 (0.057) 0.012 (0.019) 
Child in HH (1=yes) 
  
-0.156*** (0.033) -0.028 (0.024) 0.019 (0.046) -0.037 (0.022) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 
  
-0.056 (0.045) 0.005 (0.030) 
    
  
          
Actively sought for new job (1=yes) 
    
0.004 (0.018) -0.038 (0.028) 0.005 (0.017) 
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 
    
-0.042* (0.019) -0.051 (0.031) -0.033 (0.018) 
Total years of unemployment 
    
-0.033*** (0.007) 0.006 (0.037) -0.037*** (0.007) 
  
          
Branch (reference: trade) 
          
Industry (1=yes) 
    
0.150*** (0.025) 0.063 (0.045) 0.153*** (0.024) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 
    
0.173*** (0.033) 0.053 (0.066) 0.184*** (0.032) 
Finance (1=yes) 
    
0.100*** (0.027) 0.029 (0.043) 0.077** (0.026) 
Services (1=yes) 
    
0.083*** (0.025) 0.050 (0.059) 0.057* (0.026) 
  
          
Firm size (reference: less than 20) 
          
20 to 199 (1=yes) 
    
0.081*** (0.018) 0.067* (0.030) 0.087*** (0.018) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 
    
0.177*** (0.023) 0.135*** (0.041) 0.184*** (0.022) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 
    
0.143*** (0.027) 0.173*** (0.042) 0.171*** (0.026) 
  
          
Limited contract (1=yes) 
    
-0.073*** (0.022) -0.091* (0.036) -0.088*** (0.022) 
Working hours per week 
    
0.034*** (0.001) 0.024*** (0.002) 0.035*** (0.001) 
Public sector (1=yes) 
    
0.055* (0.026) -0.037 (0.042) 0.046 (0.025) 
  
          
ISCO job class. (ref.: legislators, senior officials and managers) 
        
Professionals (1=yes) 
    
0.026 (0.071) 0.026 (0.053) 0.003 (0.045) 
Technicians &  associate prof. (1=yes) 
    
-0.041 (0.067) -0.021 (0.052) -0.087* (0.043) 
Clerks (1=yes) 
    
-0.115 (0.070) -0.050 (0.062) -0.169*** (0.048) 
Service workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.270*** (0.070) -0.101 (0.069) -0.303*** (0.050) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.161* (0.072) -0.049 (0.068) -0.138** (0.048) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 
    
-0.308*** (0.074) 0.040 (0.085) -0.236*** (0.051) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 
    
-0.383*** (0.074) -0.125 (0.092) -0.356*** (0.055) 
  
          
East Germany (1=yes) 
    
-0.058 (0.042) 
    
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 
    
-0.019*** (0.004) 0.003 (0.012) -0.024*** (0.002) 
Year dummies Yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 7.478*** (0.046) 5.683*** (0.175) 5.171*** (0.165) 4.621*** (0.783) 5.013*** (0.149) 
(Adjusted) R² overall 0.051 0.327 0.666 0.554 0.658 
 within 
   
0.299 0.268 
 between 
   
0.572 0.6848 
Notes: Estimations based on 3,818 observations. Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of 
significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 16: Wage difference regressions 
 DV: Difference in Monthly Income  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
  OLS Base OLS Demographics OLS Full Model Median Regression Absolute Increase 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Recruitment Source (ref. social ties) 
          
Newspaper (1=yes) -0.150** (0.051) -0.160** (0.053) -0.140* (0.057) 0.000 (0.013) -41.31 (30.65) 
Employment office (1=yes) 0.064 (0.118) 0.044 (0.115) -0.016 (0.123) -0.007 (0.019) -46.31 (42.94) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.014 (0.090) -0.026 (0.099) -0.028 (0.095) 0.020 (0.017) 57.69 (49.14) 
  
          
Gender (1=female) 
  
0.168** (0.059) 0.294*** (0.073) 0.070*** (0.013) 186.13** (34.93) 
Years of education 
  
0.037 (0.021) 0.039* (0.016) 0.000 (0.003) 8.96 (7.41) 
Age  
  
-0.075*** (0.020) -0.084*** (0.021) -0.018*** (0.004) -49.58*** (9.90) 
Age squared/100 
  
0.086*** (0.025) 0.096*** (0.027) 0.019*** (0.005) 5.27*** (1.30) 
Married (1=yes) 
  
-0.063 (0.051) -0.018 (0.056) -0.004 (0.012) -3.86 (32.19) 
Child in HH (1=yes) 
  
0.193* (0.089) 0.222* (0.093) 0.041** (0.014) 122.51*** (35.22) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 
  
0.190 (0.201) 0.173 (0.205) 0.014 (0.018) 6.63 (48.39) 
  
          
Actively sought for new job (1=yes) 
    
-0.101 (0.074) -0.016 (0.011) -13.38 (29.77) 
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 
    
0.152* (0.066) -0.026* (0.013) -42.87 (31.52) 
Total years of unemployment 
    
0.058* (0.026) 0.007* (0.003) 20.62** (6.98) 
  
          
Branch (reference: trade) 
          
Industry (1=yes) 
    
0.126 (0.093) 0.030 (0.016) 121.02*** (38.07) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 
    
-0.073 (0.084) 0.010 (0.024) 48.85 (60.10) 
Finance (1=yes) 
    
-0.075 (0.068) -0.001 (0.017) 37.29 (44.04) 
Services (1=yes) 
    
0.009 (0.072) 0.011 (0.016) 57.19 (36.89) 
  
          
Firm size (reference: less than 20) 
          
20 to 199 (1=yes) 
    
-0.045 (0.065) 0.024 (0.012) 41.24 (32.54) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 
    
0.018 (0.127) 0.021 (0.016) 75.19 (44.03) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 
    
-0.065 (0.085) 0.035* (0.016) 83.38* (41.29) 
  
          
Limited contract (1=yes) 
    
0.088 (0.102) -0.006 (0.014) -65.582 (35.82) 
Working hours per week 
    
0.009*** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.000) 10.34*** (1.39) 
Public sector (1=yes) 
    
0.055 (0.108) 0.020 (0.017) 44.369 (46.80) 
  
          
ISCO job class. (ref.: legislators, senior officials and managers) 
        
Professionals (1=yes) 
    
0.060 (0.176) -0.017 (0.027) -31.79 (104.52) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 
    
-0.054 (0.116) -0.034 (0.026) -153.91 (96.75) 
Clerks (1=yes) 
    
-0.135 (0.117) -0.027 (0.028) -182.43 (94.08) 
Service workers (1=yes) 
    
0.005 (0.136) -0.006 (0.028) -129.90 (95.80) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.055 (0.106) -0.011 (0.028) -128.75 (94.54) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 
    
-0.017 (0.116) -0.007 (0.030) -170.85 (101.50) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 
    
-0.015 (0.142) -0.045 (0.030) -167.80 (99.03) 
  
          
East Germany (1=yes) 
    
-0.058 (0.198) 0.016 (0.025) 23.24 (61.87) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 
    
-0.002 (0.021) -0.002 (0.003) -11.97 (6.80) 
  
          
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.219*** (0.051) 1.208** (0.389) 0.991* (0.472) 0.233** (0.087) 743.66** (234.31) 
(Adjusted) R² 0.008 0.019 0.030 0.014 0.064 
Notes: Estimations based on 3,818 observations. Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of 
significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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4.4.2.2 Job Satisfaction 
Table 17 again comprises three cross-sectional regression models and two models with panel 
estimators to assess the influence of recruitment source on job satisfaction. The first model 
contains only recruitment channel and year dummies. Although only the employment office 
coefficient is statistically significant, all coefficients indicate a negative relationship between 
formal information sources and job satisfaction. Controlling for individual demographics in 
Model (2) does not affect the results much. Including further job-related variables and a 
measure of health and perceived job security provide a detailed picture on the factors that 
influence job satisfaction. Results of Model (3) reveal that all three formal sources are 
associated with lower job satisfaction compared to social contacts; statistically significant for 
employment agencies and newspaper adverts. The overall model fit of roughly 14 percent for 
the third model indicates that there are unobserved characteristics that influence job 
satisfaction but have not been measured in the dataset.
56
 
Exploiting the panel structure of the data by using fixed and random-effects estimators 
confirms these results in the broadest sense (see Model (4) and (5)). As the result of the 
Hausman specification test (chi²=85.11***) indicates, the fixed-effects estimator is efficient 
and should be preferred compared to the random-effects estimator. However, the use of fixed-
effects estimators must be criticised for the reasons stated above. The results show that all 
formal sources are negatively correlated with job satisfaction – in Model (4) statistically 
significant for employment agencies. Model (5) confirms the previous OLS regressions. 
Table 18 comprises regression results for the job satisfaction differential before and after the 
job change. Coefficients measure the absolute change in job satisfaction after the job change 
relative to the reference category. Model (1), containing only recruitment source variables and 
year dummies, reveals a strong negative effect for the use of employment offices. The effect 
for newspaper adverts is also negative but insignificant, whereas internet recruitment is 
associated with a positive but insignificant differential of job satisfaction. If demographic 
variables are included (Model (2)), the newspaper coefficient becomes insignificant. In the 
fully specified model, newspaper adverts and employment offices are negatively related to 
changes in job satisfaction. This finding remains relatively stable in the median regression in 
Model (4), although the newspaper coefficient is statistically insignificant on the 5%-level. 
                                                 
56
 See Fietze (2011) for an analysis of the relationship between job satisfaction and personality variables based 
on the SOEP data. 
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Table 17: Job satisfaction regression 
 DV: Job Satisfaction Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
  OLS Base OLS Demographics OLS Full Fixed Effects Random Effects 
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Recruitment source (ref. social ties) 
          
Newspaper (1=yes) -0.138 (0.083) -0.153 (0.083) -0.202* (0.084) -0.116 (0.194) -0.197* (0.084) 
Employment office (1=yes) -0.388** (0.123) -0.377** (0.123) -0.273* (0.125) -0.785** (0.297) -0.294* (0.126) 
Internet (1=yes) -0.141 (0.117) -0.184 (0.119) -0.197 (0.114) -0.386 (0.273) -0.219 (0.115) 
  
          
Gender (1=female) 
  
0.092 (0.071) 0.071 (0.091) 
    
Years of education 
  
0.022 (0.013) -0.040* (0.018) -0.176 (0.117) -0.043* (0.017) 
Age  
  
-0.010 (0.029) -0.015 (0.028) -0.138 (0.127) -0.016 (0.028) 
Age squared/100 
  
-0.014 (0.037) 0.008 (0.035) 0.318* (0.002) 0.009 (0.035) 
Married (1=yes) 
  
0.222** (0.084) 0.189* (0.081) 0.388 (0.302) 0.172* (0.081) 
Children in HH (1=yes) 
  
0.110 (0.097) 0.097 (0.091) -0.546* (0.269) 0.074 (0.092) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 
  
-0.184 (0.132) -0.122 (0.118) 
    
  
          
Health (ref.: very good) 
          
Good (1=yes) 
    
-0.383*** (0.091) -0.392* (0.178) -0.388*** (0.091) 
satisfactory (1=yes) 
    
-1.072*** (0.105) -0.697** (0.235) -1.040*** (0.105) 
Poor (1=yes) 
    
-1.633*** (0.165) -1.876*** (0.344) -1.653*** (0.164) 
Bad (1=yes) 
    
-2.194*** (0.485) -5.443*** (1.016) -2.284*** (0.495) 
  
          
Actively sought for new job (1=yes) 
    
-0.031 (0.075) 0.152 (0.153) -0.014 (0.075) 
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 
    
0.029 (0.086) 0.092 (0.166) 0.024 (0.086) 
Total years of unemployment 
    
-0.008 (0.025) 0.033 (0.189) -0.013 (0.025) 
  
          
Gross Income (in 1,000 €) 
    
0.086* (0.041) 0.130 (0.116) 0.091* (0.038) 
Limited contract (1=yes) 
    
0.029 (0.094) -0.144 (0.197) 0.007 (0.093) 
Working hours per week 
    
-0.004 (0.004) -0.016 (0.009) -0.006 (0.004) 
Public sector (1=yes) 
    
0.331** (0.113) 0.276 (0.240) 0.305** (0.113) 
  
          
Perceived job security (ref.: not concerned at all) 
        
Very concerned (1=yes) 
    
-1.106*** (0.111) -1.080*** (0.236) -1.101*** (0.111) 
Somewhat concerned (1=yes) 
    
-0.454*** (0.068) -0.319* (0.141) -0.456*** (0.068) 
  
          
Branch (ref.: trade) 
          
Industry (1=yes) 
    
0.248* (0.104) 0.447 (0.277) 0.223* (0.105) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 
    
0.427** (0.153) 0.855* (0.364) 0.415** (0.152) 
Finance (1=yes) 
    
0.055 (0.114) 0.093 (0.274) 0.047 (0.113) 
Services (1=yes) 
    
0.211 (0.115) 0.202 (0.332) 0.227* (0.114) 
  
          
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
          
20 to 199 (1=yes) 
    
0.067 (0.080) 0.107 (0.172) 0.076 (0.081) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 
    
0.182 (0.104) 0.196 (0.225) 0.177 (0.104) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 
    
0.074 (0.109) -0.040 (0.243) 0.073 (0.108) 
  
          
ISCO job class. (ref.: legislators, senior officials and managers) 
        
Professionals (1=yes) 
    
-0.260 (0.159) 0.232 (0.326) -0.204 (0.157) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 
    
-0.050 (0.157) -0.254 (0.304) -0.013 (0.152) 
Clerks (1=yes) 
    
-0.311 (0.185) -0.221 (0.406) -0.265 (0.180) 
Service workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.062 (0.178) -0.185 (0.416) -0.022 (0.173) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.371* (0.178) -0.584 (0.468) -0.362* (0.177) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 
    
-0.228 (0.195) -0.332 (0.516) -0.247 (0.192) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 
    
-0.295 (0.196) -0.478 (0.482) -0.287 (0.195) 
  
          
East Germany (1=yes) 
    
-0.475** (0.170) 
    
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 
    
0.041* (0.018) -0.031 (0.048) -0.002 (0.009) 
  
          
Year dummies yes yes yes yes Yes 
Constant 7.467*** (0.127) 7.600*** (0.532) 8.849*** (0.621) 
11.484**
* 
(2.762) 9.294*** (0.592) 
(Adjusted) R² overall 0.010 0.021 0.139 0.016 0.136 
 within 
   
0.151 0.089 
 between 
   
0.011 0.142 
Notes: Estimations based on 3,818 observations. Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of 
significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 18: Change in job satisfaction regressions 
 DV: Difference in Job Satisfaction Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  OLS Base OLS Demographics OLS Full Median Regression 
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Recruitment source (ref.: social ties) 
        
Newspaper (1=yes) -0.040 (0.099) -0.064 (0.100) -0.211* (0.107) -0.173 (0.110) 
Employment office (1=yes) -0.575*** (0.152) -0.538*** (0.152) -0.658*** (0.163) -0.509** (0.165) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.163 (0.156) 0.141 (0.160) -0.009 (0.164) -0.111 (0.151) 
  
        
Gender (1=female) 
  
-0.082 (0.083) 0.116 (0.110) 0.123 (0.112) 
Years of education 
  
0.017 (0.016) -0.011 (0.021) -0.003 (0.023) 
Age  
  
0.055 (0.034) 0.060 (0.035) 0.014 (0.035) 
Age squared/100 
  
-0.001 (0.000) -0.061 (0.044) 0.004 (0.044) 
Married (1=yes) 
  
0.121 (0.100) 0.117 (0.102) 0.025 (0.102) 
Children in HH (1=yes) 
  
-0.042 (0.113) -0.010 (0.115) -0.132 (0.118) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 
  
-0.274* (0.138) -0.202 (0.146) -0.030 (0.154) 
  
        
Health (ref.: very good) 
        
Good (1=yes) 
    
0.197 (0.128) 0.114 (0.132) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) 
    
-0.024 (0.143) -0.044 (0.146) 
Poor (1=yes) 
    
-0.636** (0.211) -0.443* (0.203) 
Bad (1=yes) 
    
-1.290* (0.519) -0.571 (0.461) 
  
        
Actively sought for new job (1=yes) 
    
0.213* (0.102) 0.169 (0.100) 
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 
    
0.197 (0.116) 0.066 (0.111) 
Total years of unemployment 
    
-0.046 (0.039) -0.035 (0.028) 
  
        
Gross Income (in 1,000 €) 
    
0.010 (0.053) 0.032 (0.052) 
Limited contract (1=yes) 
    
-0.001 (0.125) 0.124 (0.126) 
Working hours per week 
    
0.009 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 
Public sector (1=yes) 
    
0.192 (0.152) 0.077 (0.151) 
  
        
Perceived job security (ref.: not concerned at all) 
      
Very concerned (1=yes) 
    
-0.698*** (0.140) -0.459*** (0.135) 
Somewhat concerned (1=yes) 
    
-0.094 (0.095) -0.098 (0.096) 
  
        
Branch (ref.: trade) 
        
Industry (1=yes) 
    
0.107 (0.136) 0.067 (0.137) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 
    
0.350 (0.194) 0.455* (0.205) 
Finance (1=yes) 
    
-0.162 (0.150) -0.083 (0.145) 
Services (1=yes) 
    
0.066 (0.148) 0.061 (0.139) 
  
        
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
        
20 to 199 (1=yes) 
    
0.117 (0.106) 0.008 (0.108) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 
    
0.444*** (0.139) 0.574*** (0.136) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 
    
0.167 (0.144) 0.299* (0.144) 
  
        
ISCO job class. (ref.: legislators, senior officials and managers) 
      
Professionals (1=yes) 
    
-0.022 (0.210) -0.093 (0.234) 
Technicians &  associate prof (1=yes). 
    
0.189 (0.202) 0.147 (0.222) 
Clerks (1=yes) 
    
-0.089 (0.234) -0.148 (0.244) 
Service workers (1=yes) 
    
0.001 (0.230) -0.053 (0.244) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.073 (0.229) -0.106 (0.249) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 
    
0.214 (0.247) 0.122 (0.264) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 
    
-0.018 (0.254) -0.161 (0.266) 
  
        
East Germany (1=yes) 
    
-0.100 (0.214) 0.137 (0.220) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 
    
0.004 (0.023) -0.003 (0.023) 
  
        
Year dummies yes Yes yes yes 
Constant 0.923*** (0.175) -0.391 (0.647) -0.935 (0.781) -0.503 (0.760) 
(Adjusted) R² 0.010 0.014 0.042 0.019 
Notes: Estimations based on 3,818 observations. Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of 
significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Overall, employees who found their jobs through social ties report higher job satisfaction 
compared to formal recruitment channels, even if controlling for a variety of demographic and 
job-related factors. This finding can be interpreted as evidence for the relevance of Realistic 
Job Previews. These results are discussed more detailed in chapter 4. 
Table 19 displays results of two seemingly unrelated regressions. In the first model, 
logarithmised monthly earnings and the absolute value in job satisfaction are used as the 
dependent variables. Changes in wage and job satisfaction serve as the dependent variable in 
in Model (2). Since seemingly unrelated regressions require the same variables in both related 
regressions, health and perceived job security are also used as control variables in the wage 
regressions. The findings show that coefficients do not systematically differ from previous 
regressions above. Furthermore, the residuals of both regressions are weakly correlated (lower 
than .05) so that the efficiency gains through this approach are small compared to the 
regressions above (Cameron, Trivedi, 2010). 
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Table 19: Seemingly unrelated regression results of post-hire outcomes 
  Model (1) Model (2) 
DV: Ln(Wage) Job Satisfaction Δ Wage Δ Job Satisfaction 
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Recruitment source 
        
Newspaper (1=yes) 0.017 (0.018) -0.202* (0.080) -0.145 (0.075) -0.211 (0.113) 
Employment office (1=yes) 0.010 (0.028) -0.279* (0.119) -0.011 (0.111) -0.659*** (0.168) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.052* (0.025) -0.191 (0.109) -0.029 (0.102) -0.009 (0.154) 
  
        
Gender (1=female) -0.152*** (0.018) 0.033 (0.079) 0.293*** (0.074) 0.112 (0.112) 
Years of education 0.034*** (0.004) -0.032* (0.016) 0.036* (0.015) -0.010 (0.023) 
Age  0.045*** (0.006) -0.009 (0.025) -0.081*** (0.023) 0.061 (0.035) 
Age squared/100 -0.047*** (0.007) 0.001 (0.032) 0.094** (0.030) -0.062 (0.045) 
Married (1=yes) -0.003 (0.017) 0.192** (0.074) -0.013 (0.069) 0.118 (0.104) 
Children in HH (1=yes) -0.029 (0.020) 0.101 (0.085) 0.227** (0.079) -0.010 (0.120) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 0.007 (0.026) -0.122 (0.111) 0.171 (0.104) -0.202 (0.157) 
  
        
Health (ref.: very good) 
        
Good (1=yes) 0.017 (0.022) -0.380*** (0.096) -0.168 (0.089) 0.198 (0.135) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) -0.044 (0.024) -1.076*** (0.106) -0.216* (0.099) -0.025 (0.149) 
Poor (1=yes) -0.062 (0.034) -1.636*** (0.147) -0.315* (0.137) -0.636** (0.207) 
Bad (1=yes) -0.153* (0.077) -2.206*** (0.333) -0.280 (0.311) -1.291** (0.470) 
  
        
Actively sought for new job (1=yes) 0.009 (0.017) -0.034 (0.072) -0.098 (0.067) 0.212* (0.102) 
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) -0.035 (0.018) 0.021 (0.080) 0.165* (0.075) 0.196 (0.113) 
Total years of unemployment -0.032*** (0.005) -0.011 (0.020) 0.059** (0.019) -0.046 (0.028) 
  
        
Limited contract (1=yes) -0.064** (0.021) 0.007 (0.091) 0.090 (0.085) -0.003 (0.128) 
Working hours per week 0.034*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.003) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.009* (0.004) 
Public sector (1=yes) 0.055* (0.025) 0.329** (0.109) 0.051 (0.102) 0.192 (0.154) 
  
        
Perceived job security (ref.: not concerned at all) 
      
Very concerned (1=yes) -0.052* (0.023) -1.112*** (0.098) -0.014 (0.091) -0.699*** (0.138) 
Somewhat concerned (1=yes) -0.030 (0.016) -0.458*** (0.069) -0.049 (0.065) -0.094 (0.097) 
  
        
Branch (reference: trade) 
        
Industry (1=yes) 0.149*** (0.023) 0.274** (0.099) 0.125 (0.092) 0.110 (0.139) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 0.171*** (0.034) 0.452** (0.148) -0.081 (0.138) 0.353 (0.209) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.100*** (0.024) 0.081 (0.104) -0.077 (0.097) -0.159 (0.147) 
Services (1=yes) 0.081*** (0.023) 0.221* (0.100) 0.010 (0.094) 0.067 (0.142) 
  
        
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
        
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.081*** (0.018) 0.083 (0.078) -0.043 (0.073) 0.119 (0.110) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 0.173*** (0.023) 0.215* (0.098) 0.011 (0.091) 0.448*** (0.138) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 0.139*** (0.024) 0.106 (0.103) -0.068 (0.096) 0.170 (0.145) 
  
        
ISCO job class. (ref.: legislators, senior officials, managers) 
      
Professionals (1=yes) 0.033 (0.039) -0.267 (0.169) 0.061 (0.158) -0.023 (0.239) 
Technicians and associate prof. (1=yes) -0.035 (0.037) -0.087 (0.160) -0.049 (0.149) 0.185 (0.225) 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.110*** (0.040) -0.364* (0.175) -0.131 (0.163) -0.095 (0.246) 
Service workers (1=yes) -0.264*** (0.040) -0.125 (0.174) 0.013 (0.163) -0.006 (0.246) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) -0.149*** (0.041) -0.436* (0.178) -0.049 (0.166) -0.080 (0.251) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) -0.297*** (0.043) -0.309 (0.188) -0.011 (0.176) 0.205 (0.265) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.379*** (0.044) -0.371* (0.189) -0.007 (0.177) -0.027 (0.267) 
  
        
East Germany (1=yes) -0.063 (0.037) -0.496** (0.159) -0.060 (0.149) -0.102 (0.224) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) -0.019*** (0.004) 0.038* (0.017) -0.001 (0.016) 0.003 (0.024) 
  
        
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 5.167*** (0.131) 8.736*** (0.567) 1.114* (0.530) -0.948 (0.800) 
Correlation residuals 0.049 0.027 
R² 0.669 0.137 0.032 0.042 
Notes: Estimations based on 3,818 observations. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 
percent, respectively. 
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4.4.2.3 Turnover 
The first descriptive results prefigured that job search through the internet might be related to 
higher turnover rates, whereas newspaper adverts appear to be linked to lower turnover rates. 
However, it was not clear if this finding could be a result of demographic differences such as 
age and education. Therefore, cross-sectional regressions are performed to control for 
potential correlations between these variables. Table 20 contains multivariate results on the 
determinants of turnover. The dependent variable indicates whether the individual has 
changed the previously found job after the given period of time. Therefore, over time, the 
number of job changers increases because it is only of interest if the individual left the 
initially found job at time t, not if other jobs found later (t+x) were changed or not. 
With respect to recruitment channels, the results show that no difference in turnover is found 
between social ties and employment agencies. The newspaper coefficient, though statistically 
insignificant on the 5%-level, is negative between two to five years after the job change. 
Finding a job on the internet is linked to a higher turnover probability which is significant 
four and five years after the change. Table 21 comprises marginal effects of the logarithmic 
regressions. The results show that finding a job via internet increases turnover probability 
after four (respectively five) years by 8 (10) percentage points. For comparison, 1,000 euros 
higher monthly income decreases turnover probability by 4 percentage points. Thus, the 
higher probability of turnover for those who found their job via internet adverts appears 
economically relevant.  
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Table 20: Turnover regressions 
 DV: Job change (1=yes) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
  After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years After 4 years After 5 years 
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Recruitment source (ref.: social ties) 
          
Newspaper (1=yes) 0.020 (0.091) -0.132 (0.094) -0.120 (0.099) -0.157 (0.105) -0.168 (0.113) 
Employment office (1=yes) -0.074 (0.132) -0.061 (0.141) 0.008 (0.145) -0.132 (0.157) -0.095 (0.174) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.118 (0.126) 0.264 (0.136) 0.285 (0.147) 0.338* (0.160) 0.405* (0.186) 
  
          
Gender (1=female) -0.175 (0.094) -0.146 (0.098) -0.062 (0.104) 0.025 (0.111) -0.090 (0.122) 
Years of education -0.014 (0.019) -0.024 (0.019) -0.011 (0.020) -0.017 (0.022) 0.000 (0.024) 
Age  0.006 (0.028) -0.006 (0.030) -0.024 (0.032) -0.030 (0.035) -0.019 (0.039) 
Age squared/100 -0.007 (0.036) 0.014 (0.039) 0.027 (0.042) 0.034 (0.045) 0.016 (0.049) 
Married (1=yes) -0.178* (0.084) -0.188* (0.087) -0.113 (0.092) -0.066 (0.098) -0.039 (0.107) 
Children in HH (1=yes) -0.121 (0.100) -0.212* (0.105) -0.149 (0.117) -0.293* (0.136) -0.239 (0.169) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 0.049 (0.126) 0.139 (0.137) 0.045 (0.144) 0.056 (0.159) 0.130 (0.175) 
  
          
Health (ref.: very good) 
          
Good (1=yes) -0.227* (0.109) -0.224* (0.113) -0.253* (0.118) -0.253* (0.128) -0.211 (0.141) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) -0.302* (0.123) -0.173 (0.127) -0.121 (0.133) -0.089 (0.144) -0.103 (0.158) 
Poor (1=yes) -0.149 (0.173) 0.066 (0.179) -0.118 (0.189) -0.065 (0.204) 0.017 (0.221) 
Bad (1=yes) -0.585 (0.406) -0.833* (0.405) -0.560 (0.429) -0.939 (0.518) -0.697 (0.579) 
  
          
Actively sought for new job (1=yes) 0.069 (0.084) 0.088 (0.085) 0.028 (0.090) 0.059 (0.097) 0.119 (0.107) 
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 0.101 (0.091) 0.232* (0.095) 0.191 (0.100) 0.225* (0.109) 0.251* (0.118) 
Total years of unemployment 0.023 (0.020) 0.034 (0.023) 0.029 (0.028) 0.022 (0.031) 0.014 (0.034) 
  
          
Gross Income (in 1,000 €) -0.127* (0.051) -0.149** (0.005) -0.147** (0.050) -0.161** (0.054) -0.158** (0.057) 
Limited contract (1=yes) 0.389*** (0.107) 0.326** (0.117) 0.245 (0.133) 0.368* (0.164) 0.283 (0.213) 
Working hours per week 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.005) 
Public sector (1=yes) -0.344** (0.126) -0.414** (0.133) -0.389** (0.141) -0.329* (0.154) -0.359* (0.168) 
  
          
Perceived job security (ref.: not concerned at all) 
        
Very concerned (1=yes) 0.421*** (0.111) 0.388*** (0.115) 0.369** (0.124) 0.236 (0.132) 0.140 (0.146) 
Somewhat concerned (1=yes) 0.186* (0.084) 0.191* (0.084) 0.173* (0.088) 0.077 (0.094) 0.079 (0.101) 
  
          
Branch (ref.: trade) 
          
Industry (1=yes) -0.077 (0.112) -0.148 (0.113) -0.247* (0.118) -0.342** (0.127) -0.453*** (0.137) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 0.027 (0.166) 0.054 (0.162) 0.002 (0.178) 0.042 (0.196) -0.076 (0.217) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.112 (0.116) 0.036 (0.119) 0.094 (0.127) 0.080 (0.138) 0.036 (0.151) 
Services (1=yes) -0.082 (0.116) -0.113 (0.120) -0.059 (0.128) -0.147 (0.137) -0.183 (0.147) 
  
          
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
          
20 to 199 (1=yes) -0.169 (0.089) -0.183* (0.091) -0.195* (0.097) -0.182 (0.104) -0.189 (0.114) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) -0.114 (0.114) -0.193 (0.116) -0.163 (0.122) -0.129 (0.133) -0.238 (0.146) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) -0.214 (0.121) -0.465*** (0.121) -0.437*** (0.127) -0.416** (0.139) -0.549*** (0.150) 
  
          
ISCO job class. (ref.: legislators, senior officials and managers) 
        
Professionals (1=yes) 0.164 (0.209) 0.107 (0.199) 0.215 (0.215) 0.251 (0.231) 0.202 (0.248) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 0.024 (0.196) -0.131 (0.190) -0.098 (0.206) -0.182 (0.224) -0.193 (0.237) 
Clerks (1=yes) 0.163 (0.213) 0.063 (0.209) -0.096 (0.225) -0.361 (0.244) -0.555* (0.261) 
Service workers (1=yes) 0.029 (0.219) -0.229 (0.211) -0.240 (0.227) -0.402 (0.246) -0.442 (0.260) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 0.044 (0.221) 0.072 (0.211) 0.160 (0.227) 0.139 (0.248) 0.18566 (0.265) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) -0.071 (0.232) -0.237 (0.226) -0.095 (0.248) -0.085 (0.267) -0.096 (0.282) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.040 (0.234) -0.448* (0.229) -0.467 (0.246) -0.698** (0.267) -0.646* (0.284) 
  
          
East Germany (1=yes) -0.430* (0.183) -0.520** (0.199) -0.530* (0.215) -0.846*** (0.240) -0.905*** (0.271) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 0.030 (0.019) 0.046* (0.020) 0.042 (0.022) 0.066** (0.023) 0.067** (0.026) 
  
          
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.364 (0.658) 0.629 (0.690) 0.947 (0.732) 1.265 (0.781) 1.132 (0.850) 
Observations 3,549 3,210 2,852 2,501 2,159 
McFadden Pseudo-R² 0.029 0.047 0.042 0.049 0.051 
Notes: Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 21: Marginal effects of turnover 
 DV: Turnover Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
  After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years After 4 years After 5 years 
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Recruitment source (ref.: social ties) 
          
Newspaper (1=yes) 0.004 (0.020) -0.033 (0.023) -0.030 (0.025) -0.039 (0.026) -0.042 (0.028) 
Employment office (1=yes) -0.016 (0.028) -0.015 (0.035) 0.002 (0.036) -0.033 (0.039) -0.024 (0.043) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.026 (0.029) 0.066* (0.034) 0.071* (0.036) 0.083* (0.038) 0.097* (0.043) 
  
          
Gender (1=female) -0.039 (0.021) -0.036 (0.025) -0.016 (0.026) 0.006 (0.028) -0.022 (0.030) 
Years of education -0.003 (0.004) -0.006 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005) -0.004 (0.006) 0.000 (0.006) 
Age  0.001 (0.006) -0.002 (0.008) -0.006 (0.008) -0.008 (0.009) -0.005 (0.010) 
Age squared/100 -0.002 (0.008) 0.004 (0.010) 0.007 (0.010) 0.008 (0.011) 0.004 (0.012) 
Married (1=yes) -0.040* (0.019) -0.047* (0.022) -0.028 (0.023) -0.016 (0.024) -0.010 (0.027) 
Children in HH (1=yes) -0.027 (0.022) -0.053* (0.026) -0.037 (0.029) -0.073* (0.034) -0.059 (0.042) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 0.011 (0.028) 0.035 (0.034) 0.011 (0.036) 0.014 (0.040) 0.032 (0.043) 
  
          
Health (ref.: very good) 
          
Good (1=yes) -0.052* (0.025) -0.056* (0.028) -0.063* (0.029) -0.063* (0.032) -0.052 (0.034) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) -0.068* (0.028) -0.043 (0.032) -0.030 (0.033) -0.022 (0.036) -0.025 (0.039) 
Poor (1=yes) -0.034 (0.040) 0.016 (0.045) -0.030 (0.047) -0.016 (0.051) 0.004 (0.054) 
Bad (1=yes) -0.125 (0.078) -0.199* (0.088) -0.138 (0.103) -0.228* (0.115) -0.172 (0.140) 
  
          
Actively sought for new job (1=yes) 0.015 (0.019) 0.022 (0.021) 0.007 (0.023) 0.015 (0.024) 0.029 (0.027) 
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 0.022 (0.020) 0.058* (0.024) 0.048 (0.025) 0.056* (0.027) 0.062* (0.029) 
Total years of unemployment 0.005 (0.005) 0.008 (0.006) 0.007 (0.007) 0.005 (0.008) 0.003 (0.008) 
  
          
Gross Income (in 1,000 €) -0.028* (0.011) -0.037** (0.012) -0.037** (0.013) -0.040** (0.013) -0.039** (0.014) 
Limited contract (1=yes) 0.086*** (0.024) 0.081** (0.029) 0.061 (0.033) 0.092* (0.041) 0.070 (0.053) 
Working hours per week 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Public sector (1=yes) -0.076** (0.028) -0.103** (0.033) -0.097** (0.035) -0.082** (0.038) -0.089* (0.042) 
  
          
Perceived job security (ref.: not concerned at all) 
        
Very concerned (1=yes) 0.095*** (0.025) 0.097*** (0.029) 0.092** (0.031) 0.059 (0.033) 0.035 (0.036) 
Somewhat concerned (1=yes) 0.040* (0.018) 0.047* (0.021) 0.043* (0.022) 0.019 (0.024) 0.020 (0.025) 
  
          
Branch (ref.: trade) 
          
Industry (1=yes) -0.017 (0.025) -0.037 (0.028) -0.061* (0.029) -0.085** (0.032) -0.112*** (0.034) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 0.006 (0.037) 0.013 (0.041) 0.000 (0.044) 0.010 (0.048) -0.019 (0.053) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.025 (0.026) 0.009 (0.030) 0.023 (0.032) 0.020 (0.034) 0.009 (0.037) 
Services (1=yes) -0.018 (0.025) -0.028 (0.030) -0.015 (0.032) -0.037 (0.034) -0.045 (0.036) 
  
          
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
          
20 to 199 (1=yes) -0.038 (0.020) -0.046* (0.023) -0.049* (0.024) -0.045 (0.026) -0.047 (0.028) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) -0.026 (0.025) -0.048 (0.029) -0.041 (0.030) -0.032 (0.033) -0.059 (0.036) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) -0.047 (0.026) -0.115*** (0.029) -0.108*** (0.031) -0.104** (0.034) -0.136*** (0.037) 
  
          
ISCO job class. (ref.: legislators, senior officials and managers) 
        
Professionals (1=yes) 0.037 (0.046) 0.027 (0.050) 0.053 (0.053) 0.061 (0.056) 0.048 (0.059) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 0.005 (0.043) -0.033 (0.047) -0.024 (0.051) -0.045 (0.055) -0.047 (0.058) 
Clerks (1=yes) 0.037 (0.047) 0.016 (0.052) -0.024 (0.056) -0.090 (0.060) -0.138* (0.063) 
Service workers (1=yes) 0.006 (0.048) -0.057 (0.053) -0.060 (0.057) -0.100 (0.061) -0.109 (0.063) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 0.010 (0.048) 0.018 (0.053) 0.040 (0.057) 0.034 (0.061) 0.044 (0.063) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) -0.015 (0.050) -0.059 (0.056) -0.024 (0.062) -0.021 (0.066) -0.023 (0.069) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.009 (0.051) -0.110* (0.056) -0.115 (0.060) -0.172** (0.065) -0.160* (0.069) 
  
          
East Germany (1=yes) -0.095* (0.040) -0.130** (0.050) -0.133* (0.054) -0.211*** (0.060) -0.224*** (0.067) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 0.007 (0.004) 0.0114* (0.005) 0.010 (0.005) 0.016** (0.006) 0.017** (0.006) 
  
          
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,549 3,210 2,852 2,501 2,159 
Notes: Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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4.4.3 Results from Sup-group Analyses 
The population of job seekers is much more heterogeneous than assumed until now. As the 
large number of control variables indicates, certain demographic or job characteristics are able 
to explain differences in wages and job satisfaction to a large amount. However, the analyses 
above do not implement possible interaction effects for reasons of simplicity. Therefore, 
additional sensitivity analyses are conducted to allow for different source effects for employee 
subgroups. Although not shown in detail, all regressions contain the same set of control 
variables as the calculations above. Subgroup results on turnover are not provided since too 
many observations are lost in each year in the turnover regressions. 
4.4.3.1 Gender Differences 
As already shown in Table 7, gender differences in source usage are prevalent as females are 
more likely to find a new job via newspaper adverts. As discussed in chapter 3, females might 
dispose of less valuable social ties than men due to traditional family roles or gender based 
segregation of the labour market. Table 22 shows regression results of the effectiveness 
measures separated by gender. In both wage regressions, source coefficients are similar to the 
regressions above, though, statistically insignificant. Furthermore, regression results unveil 
that job seekers of both genders report lower satisfaction if they found their jobs via formal 
means. However, the effect is solely significant for females who were successful via 
newspaper adverts. Regarding the satisfaction differential, both males and females report 
significantly lower levels of job satisfaction when they found their job with the aid of 
employment offices. For females, the newspaper coefficient is negative and significant. 
Table 22: Regression results of recruitment channel effectiveness, separated by gender 
Dependent variable Log(Wage) Δ Wage (in %) Job Satisfaction Δ Job Satisfaction 
Gender Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Newspaper (1=yes) 0.043 0.014 -0.082 -0.184 -0.119 -0.295* -0.116 -0.306* 
 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.065) (0.096) (0.122) (0.118) (0.159) (0.151) 
Employment office (1=yes) 0.017 0.025 0.093 -0.182 -0.304 -0.313 -0.690** -0.705** 
 
(0.033) (0.043) (0.172) (0.177) (0.175) (0.179) (0.230) (0.239) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.057 0.061 -0.043 -0.011 -0.190 -0.210 0.232 -0.295 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.113) (0.146) (0.163) (0.158) (0.231) (0.232) 
Observations 1,889 1,929 1,889 1,929 1,889 1,929 1,889 1,929 
R² 0.502 0.692 0.034 0.042 0.179 0.130 0.062 0.050 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Also controlled 
for demographic and job-specific characteristics.  
Thus, one can conclude that gender differences partially account for the negative effect of 
newspaper adverts on job satisfaction. With respect to wages, neither females nor males 
benefit from finding a job via informal means. 
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4.4.3.2 Regional Differences 
The German division after the Second World War and more than 40 years of Communist 
regime still has a considerable long-term impact on living conditions, ethical values, and 
behaviour in East Germany. Until now, employees in East Germany earn less than their 
colleagues in West Germany (Gernandt, Pfeiffer, 2008; Brück, Peters, 2009). Furthermore, 
Vatter (2012) found support for an east-west disparity in terms of subjective well-being. 
Additionally, recruitment channel usage differs between East and West Germany. East 
Germans find their jobs more frequently via personal contacts or public employment offices 
than West Germans. West Germans rely more heavily on newspaper adverts.
57
 Thus, it can be 
assumed that recruitment sources differ in their efficiency due to regional disparities. 
Table 23 depicts regression results separated for West and East Germany. Wages of West 
German employees do not differ with regard to the source they found their jobs through. 
However, East Germans who were successful via internet search gain a wage premium of 15 
percent. This finding is not supported when the relative wage differential acts as the 
dependent variable. Similar to the regressions for the whole sample, in West Germany 
newspaper adverts are associated to a lower wage increase of 14 percent. This lower wage 
increase is comparable in size in East Germany but insignificant. Regarding the effects on job 
satisfaction, West German employees report significantly lower job satisfaction when they 
found their jobs via one of the formal means. In East Germany, this negative effect is 
considerably smaller and insignificant. With respect to changes in job satisfaction, both East 
and West German employees report a significantly lower change in job satisfaction compared 
to the reference group when the job was found via employment agencies. 
Table 23: Regression results of recruitment channel effectiveness, separated by region 
Dependent Variable Log(Wage) Δ Wage (in %) Job Satisfaction Δ Job Satisfaction 
Region West East West East West East West East 
Newspaper (1=yes) 0.016 0.012 -0.142* -0.118 -0.228* -0.118 -0.208 -0.124 
 
(0.022) (0.040) (0.062) (0.159) (0.095) (0.191) (0.122) (0.250) 
Employment office (1=yes) -0.006 0.077 0.032 -0.174 -0.382** -0.058 -0.648*** -0.693* 
 
(0.033) (0.043) (0.115) (0.351) (0.146) (0.243) (0.186) (0.347) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.025 0.148*** -0.021 -0.048 -0.312* 0.124 0.000 -0.008 
 
(0.031) (0.044) (0.121) (0.141) (0.132) (0.243) (0.196) (0.312) 
Observations 2,965 853 2,965 853 2,965 853 2,965 853 
R² 0.692 0.581 0.029 0.088 0.143 0.161 0.042 0.088 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Also controlled 
for demographic and job-specific characteristics. 
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 These results are widely confirmed by a study of the German Institute for Employment Research, IAB (2011). 
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Two arguments are able to explain the efficiency differential of internet adverts in East and 
West Germany. First, the dissemination of high speed internet has unfolded less rapidly in 
East than in West Germany (TÜV Rheinland, 2015). Thus, internet recruitment is more likely 
in urban metropolitan areas than in rural regions. Furthermore, high speed internet might first 
be disseminated to more developed regions where people are higher educated. Thus, a 
different population of job seekers is attracted by internet adverts. The second argument 
stresses the supra-regional view of internet job search. In contrast to newspaper adverts who 
address local or regional labour markets, internet adverts are more likely to reach people 
nationwide. As a consequence, job offers reflect a tendency of harmonisation of wages, which 
means that firms pay higher wages than usual in East Germany and employees report higher 
job satisfaction. Overall, there is only weak evidence for differences in efficiency – except 
internet advertising – between East and West German job seekers.  
4.4.3.3 Differences in Education 
Regression results in chapter 4.4.2.1 indicate that the employees’ level of education is an 
important factor for the determination of wages (positive) and job satisfaction (negative).
58
 
However, efficiency of job channels could differ between levels of education. For example, 
highly educated job seekers could dispose of more personal contacts that are useful in finding 
a job than job seekers with solely elementary education.
59
 Therefore, an analysis of two 
distinct labour market groups – high-skilled and low-skilled – appears to be worthwhile. 
Regression results for more and less
60
 educated employees are shown in Table 24. For highly 
educated job seekers there seems to be no correlation between source usage and wages. 
However, highly educated employees who found their jobs via newspaper adverts report 
lower levels of job satisfaction. For less educated job searchers, a considerably smaller wage 
increase is estimated when the job was found via internet adverts. No differences have been 
detected regarding job satisfaction. 
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 See e.g. Gordon and Arvey (1975) or Arvey et al. (1991) for empirical evidence on this relation. 
59
 See chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of the relation between job search and education, especially the robustness 
analyses in chapter 3.4.3 (non-linear relation between education and job search channels). 
60
 The category ‘low education’ comprises both inadequate (1) and elementary education (2) according the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97) framework (UNESCO, 2006). 
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Table 24: Regression results of recruitment channel effectiveness, separated by level of education 
 Dependent Variable Log(Wage) Δ Wage (in %) Job Satisfaction Δ Job Satisfaction 
 Level of Education High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Newspaper (1=yes) -0.019 -0.086 -0.213 -0.320 -0.427* -0.274 -0.274 -0.234 
  (0.041) (0.065) (0.185) (0.234) (0.179) (0.257) (0.239) (0.343) 
Employment office (1=yes) -0.031 -0.079 -0.171 -0.092 0.061 -0.306 -0.047 -0.553 
  (0.070) (0.070) (0.544) (0.390) (0.310) (0.361) (0.521) (0.483) 
Internet (1=yes) -0.030 0.012 -0.100 -0.780* -0.224 0.247 -0.253 1.250 
  (0.041) (0.104) (0.219) (0.344) (0.179) (0.675) (0.276) (1.034) 
Observations 752 383 752 383 752 383 752 383 
R² 0.647 0.725 0.063 0.133 0.231 0.218 0.087 0.153 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Also controlled 
for demographic and job-specific characteristics. 
 
4.4.3.4 Difference in Origin 
Surprisingly, regression results in chapter 4.4.2.1 do not reveal any wage differences between 
natives and immigrants in the fully specified model with branch and job controls. However, 
this does not necessarily contradict empirical results which detect an immigrant-native wage 
gap in Germany.
61
 Findings in chapter 3 revealed that immigrants tend to use informal means 
more frequently than natives. In reverse, natives rely more heavily on all three kinds of formal 
recruitment channels. As a result, an immigrant-native wage gap might be explained by an 
immigrant-native difference in source usage.  
Table 25 contains separate regression results for natives and immigrants. First of all, only 
natives who found their job on the internet report a wage increase of 6 percent, however, 
wage increases after finding a job via newspaper adverts are lower for them. Furthermore, 
natives are affected by significantly lower job satisfaction by the use of formal means, for 
immigrants the job satisfaction coefficients are negative but insignificant. Regarding 
satisfaction differentials, natives and immigrants report smaller changes when the job was 
found with the aid of employment agencies. Additionally, immigrants report a lower increase 
in job satisfaction if the job was found via newspaper adverts. To summarise, differences 
between natives and immigrants are rather small, only the negative relationship between 
finding a job via formal channels and job satisfaction appears to be more robust concerning 
natives. 
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 See e.g. Bartolucci (2010) or Aldashev et al. (2012) for an empirical analysis of the immigrants’ wage gap. 
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Table 25: Regression results of recruitment channel effectiveness, separated by origin 
 Dependent Variable Log(Wage) Δ Wage Job Satisfaction Δ Job Satisfaction 
 Origin Native Immigrant Native Immigrant Native Immigrant Native Immigrant 
Newspaper (1=yes) -0.059 0.028 -0.449 -0.111* -0.326 -0.184* -0.791* -0.171 
  0.078 0.020 0.426 0.056 0.295 0.088 0.373 0.112 
Employment office (1=yes) 0.071 0.009 0.124 -0.029 -0.484 -0.262* -1.232* -0.595*** 
  0.078 0.029 0.502 0.130 0.394 0.132 0.510 0.173 
Internet (1=yes) -0.003 0.057* -0.793 0.017 -0.032 -0.200 0.166 -0.008 
  0.091 0.027 0.924 0.086 0.467 0.118 0.731 0.168 
Observations 339 3,479 339 3,479 339 3,479 339 3,479 
R² 0.757 0.661 0.113 0.039 0.296 0.137 0.203 0.045 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Also controlled 
for demographic and job-specific characteristics. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
As shown in the previous chapter, the efficiency of recruitment channels is a complex 
question and effects differ substantially across subgroups. Thus, the results have to be 
interpreted carefully. In general, personal contacts do not result in higher wages; in fact, those 
who were successful via internet adverts earn even higher wages. Regarding non-monetary 
outcomes, though, the results indicate that job search via social ties is associated with higher 
job satisfaction. Furthermore, weak evidence has been provided for a positive correlation 
between informal channels and turnover. In this chapter, these mixed findings are interpreted 
and potential shortcomings of this study are given. First, arguments are given why wages are 
not or negatively related to finding a job via social ties. Second, the – at least partial – positive 
relationship between social ties and non-monetary outcomes is discussed. Special emphasis is 
laid upon the two alternative hypotheses described in chapter 2. Third, limitations of this 
study are described. Finally, practical implications of the findings are elaborated. 
4.5.1 Explanation of the Empirical Findings 
With respect to wages, Individual Differences seem to be able to explain most of the variation 
in the dependent variable. According to Table 15, income differences between sources of 
information can be explained by individual demographic and job-related characteristics. Only 
those who found a job via internet adverts earn higher wages. 
Two further arguments could explain the absence of wage effects of recruitment sources. One 
reason might be high rigidity of the German labour market(Kemmerling, Bruttel, 2006). 
Employers and employees bargain collective wage agreements on branch level and additional 
agreements are reached on company or plant level. As a result, high wage dispersion in a 
single firm for comparable jobs is quite unlikely in Germany. Therefore, employers are not 
 
108 Effectiveness of Informal Recruitment Channels – Post-hire Outcomes 
able to pay higher wages for those who were hired through a particular recruitment channel. 
Such wage dispersion is more likely to occur in case of high potentials, for which no 
collectively bargained wages exist. However, empirical evidence in this study does not 
support this argument in case of highly educated employees. In line with this argument, 
Brenzel et al. (2014) found that 62 percent of the job offers in Germany can be characterised 
as wage-postings, meaning that there is a simple take-it-or-leave-it decision regarding these 
kind of job offers. Wage-postings can be found frequently in the public sector, in larger firms 
and in firms that are covered by collective wage agreements. On the contrary, 38 percent of 
the job offers can be described as wage-bargaining situations in which job seekers negotiate 
their future wage. According to the authors, this phenomenon mainly can be found for higher 
educated job searchers or in tight regional labour markets. 
Another explanation for the convergence of wages between search channels is based on the 
behavioural model of rational choice (Simon, 1955). Bounded rationality disables total 
information procurement of all job offers in the market. Furthermore, job seekers do not 
obtain all offers at the same point in time but sequentially. In a simplified search model, in 
which all job offers only differ as to wages, job searchers only know about the distribution of 
all job offers. However, they cannot foresee the sequence of job offers they receive in future 
periods. Consequently, applicants set an ex-ante aspiration level, a wage which evokes 
indifference between accepting and rejecting the job offer. One could assume that this aspired 
wage is first of all determined by market wages, demographic factors, and personality traits 
and not by the channels applicants use when searching for a new job. Hence, employees’ 
wages do not differ as a function of the respective recruiting channel used. This implies that 
job seekers do not receive better or more information on vacancies that lead to more or better 
draws from the wage distribution.  
The quality of information – which tends to be more precise in case of referrals (Simons et al., 
1970) – does not result in higher starting wages. With regard to non-monetary benefits of 
social capital, realistic expectations (Rees, 1966; Wanous, 1978) seem to affect job 
satisfaction positively. Personal contacts to insiders provide outside job applicants with 
valuable information on internal structures and working conditions that are not disclosed to 
other job seekers. As working conditions are crucial for the satisfaction of employees, the 
disclosure of trustworthy job-related information makes it more likely for job seekers to apply 
to the job. For those employees, faceless firms become transparent and get a distinct image. 
Thus, from the perspective of post-hire outcomes, referrals are a promising means in order to 
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select motivated employees that match both job and company requirements. Another 
explanation for the observed increase in job satisfaction could be pre-screening of the person 
that recommends the job seeker. With the underlying data no distinction of these two different 
effects can be made. However, for the interpretation of the results, it is not necessary to know 
if referrers are responsible for a positive selection of employees or if employees select 
themselves due to a wider base of information. The results indicate a meaningful positive 
effect on job satisfaction which must be interpreted as a source effect as it is controlled for 
many demographic and job-related aspects. 
Changes in job satisfaction after a job change are commonly described by a honeymoon-
hangover relationship (Boswell et al., 2005), which implies that job seekers commonly report 
an increase in job satisfaction after a change which decreases over time. However, individuals 
who found a job via social ties still report a higher job satisfaction, although they disposed of 
more realistic ex-ante information about a certain job. Satisfaction measures could also be 
biased due to the reasons for the job change, i.e. voluntary or voluntary quit. Especially 
voluntary job changes could be associated with higher job satisfaction, while involuntary quits 
could be related to lower job satisfaction because jobs are accepted to escape or to avoid 
unemployment. In the search models described in chapter 2.1, this could mean that voluntary 
job changers have a higher satisficing level of utility. Although variables on the reasons of job 
changes are not included because of too many missing values, other variables like off-the-job 
search (being unemployed before the job change) and the active search dummy should cover 
at least part of this aspect. 
Interestingly, the positive satisfaction effect does not result in a lower turnover ratio of those 
recruited after referrals. This can be interpreted as a short-term effect on satisfaction, as (dis-) 
satisfaction is most likely to be a core determinant of turnover. In the long-run, better pre-hire 
information are not able to reduce the turnover probability significantly. Practical implications 
of this finding are discussed in chapter 4.5.3. 
4.5.2 Limitations 
Six major problems of the data limit the analysis and henceforth the degree of detail of the 
results. First, job search is only investigated from a retrospective view. Unfortunately the data 
does not contain information on all channels job searchers used during their job search 
process but only on the source employees actually found their current job through. However, 
job seekers generally exploit a broad variety of search channels and do not only concentrate 
on the most promising channel. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish between job seekers that 
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invested much time into job search via multiple channels and those who once talked to a peer 
and then switched jobs. Outcomes are likely to depend on the scope of recruitment channel 
usage which remains unexplored in this study. 
The second and maybe more serious shortcoming is that the data does not distinguish between 
different kinds of referrals. According to Granovetter’s strength-of-weak-ties argument, 
acquaintances are more helpful in the job search process than close friends or relatives as 
there are less information redundancies among weakly tied individuals. Individuals with a 
large network of weak ties dispose of more valuable information and thus are likely to find 
better paid jobs. Referrals by close friends or relatives might be less useful in terms of 
monetary outcomes as the probability to find a highly paid job is lower.  
An empirical investigation by Antoninis (2006) supports this theoretical argument. For 
workers of a manufacturing firm the author detected higher starting wages for those who were 
recommended by someone who is able to assess their productivity. In contrast to this, referrals 
by close friends or relatives did not increase starting wages. This finding is surprising since 
productivity might be more easily assessed in manufacturing jobs in comparison to jobs in 
other branches (service, finance). For employees who work in jobs that require a broad set of 
cognitive abilities which cannot be directly observed, social ties might be even more helpful. 
Referrers might be able to reduce information asymmetries due to their knowledge about 
matching quality especially in jobs where information asymmetries are severe. 
Likewise, from the employee’s perspective, the quality of information also depends on the 
position of the referrer. Applicants regard information by potential co-workers concerning job 
characteristics or organizational routines as more trustworthy compared to supervisors or 
members of the HR department. Employees who work at the same hierarchy level and have 
similar tasks are able to evaluate job characteristics from their own experience. Supervisors or 
HR managers have less insight into working routines. Furthermore, they might be forced to 
find new employees very quickly to minimize vacancy costs. In their survey on the credibility 
of sources of information, Fisher et al. (1979) found that business school seniors trust 
incumbents and friends more than interviewers. Participants were less likely to accept the job 
if their source of information was a corporate interviewer. Therefore, one can expect larger 
increases post-hire outcomes for those referred by employees of the same hierarchy level. 
Apart from the role of the particular person that recommends the job seeker, another 
interesting aspect is mentioned by Caliendo et al. (2011). The authors analysed how the 
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overall network size affects search behaviour and found evidence that network size, measured 
as the number of close friends outside the family, was positively correlated with the likelihood 
of informal search channel usage. Furthermore, an increase in applicants’ network size was 
perceived as an increase in search productivity and therefore led to higher reservation wages 
of around 1 percent. Thus, the authors assumed that higher reservation wages should result in 
higher wages. On the contrary, one could predict that the perception of a highly valuable 
network makes job seekers overconfident. Higher reservation wages could cause longer 
search periods associated to costs of search and forgone earnings. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether the confidence effect compensates the increase in reservation wages. As a result, a 
detailed analysis of the role of the referrer should implement measures of reservation wages 
and overall network size. 
Another problem occurs as it is not absolutely possible to assess increases in wages or job 
satisfaction due to a job change. First, it is not possible to observe the counter-factual wage an 
employee would have earned if he had stayed in the company. It is possible that employees 
were close to promotion in their former job and then did not accomplish this wage increase 
due to their job change. As a consequence, wage increases could be overestimated. However, 
this seems to be a minor problem as employees are likely to anticipate promotions (e.g. due to 
comments of supervisors) and are not willing to leave the job then. Additionally, changes in 
wages and job satisfaction are not only determined by factors measured after the job change 
(t), but also by wage determinants in t-1. Especially changes in determinants, e.g. branch or 
occupation, are likely to explain post-hire outcome differentials. Due to lack of available data 
(the number of observations would have shrunk considerably), lagged variables of post-hire 
determinants have not been included in the regressions. Furthermore, doubling the number of 
variables does not seem to be helpful in order to gain robust estimates. 
Fourth, a considerably more serious problem pertains to the points of time the data is 
collected. Employees participate in the survey once when they are close to leave the company 
and again when they just have changed the job. Hence, they maybe worked several years for 
their past employer but only some months in their new jobs which is likely to affect wage and 
job satisfaction differentials. If firms pay seniority wages, which increase with tenure, 
individuals are likely to receive lower wages in their new occupation. In this case job 
changers anticipate future wage increases which are not contained in the data. However, it is 
assumed that such wage effects are equally distributed among job changers independent from 
the source of information. The reversed problem accrues in terms of job satisfaction. 
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Employees often change their job when they are dissatisfied with working conditions, 
supervisors, or co-workers. Job satisfaction is likely to decrease over time as one gets to know 
more and more negative aspects of the current employers. Hence, changing to a new employer 
necessarily increases job satisfaction as kind of “gift of ignorance” or honeymoon effect 
(Boswell et al., 2005). Once again, there are no indicators that this effect differs between 
recruitment channels, but job satisfaction increases after job changes have to be interpreted 
carefully. This problem cannot be solved calculating the job satisfaction differential after a 
certain period of acclimatisation (e.g. after two or three years). Job satisfaction is likely to be 
correlated to turnover as dissatisfied employees are expected quit the current job. However, 
referrals affect job satisfaction positively by a better quality of ex-ante information. 
Therefore, employees who found their jobs through formal means are more likely to quit the 
job which biases the measure of lagged job satisfaction. 
To mitigate this potential shortcoming, the relationship between job search channels and 
turnover has been investigated. Although panel mortality problems arise if a span of up to five 
years after the job change is investigated, there is no indicator for a considerable variation in 
the panel mortality between individuals who found their job via different channels.  
Fifth, in Chart 1 in the introduction it has been highlighted that the employment status and the 
reason(s) for searching for a new job could be related to both the way individuals search for a 
job and which job is accepted by individuals. Unemployed individuals, for example, might set 
a lower aspiration level in the sense of the Simon (1955) model and, thus, accept lower wages 
than employed job seekers. Additional regressions, though, interacting recruitment sources 
with the off-the-job dummy did not provide evidence that this effect differs between 
recruitment channels. However, particularly job satisfaction could be affected by voluntary or 
involuntary job search. Even if individuals were not unemployed between job changes, it 
might be important to know whether individuals changed the job voluntarily or involuntarily. 
In case of voluntary changes, individuals might have more time to find a better job while 
involuntary changes – either because of single dismissals or due to company closings – are 
likely to set the individual under pressure to find a new job. This effect, however, should be at 
least partially covered in the unemployed dummy, since individuals with valuable ties should 
be more likely to find a new job without interim unemployment, even in case of dismissals. 
Finally, this chapter has not analysed potential selection effects into source usage respectively 
finding a job through a specific channel. As chapter 3 has pointed out, finding a job through a 
channel is non-random but determined by demographic and job-related factors. Therefore, the 
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probability of finding a job through a given channel depends on the search behaviour of 
employers and job seekers. If this source selectivity is considerably large, source coefficients 
could be biased. This aspect is further investigated in the following chapter by incorporating a 
two-stage estimator which explicitly allows for source selection while correcting for it. 
Albeit all these shortcomings leave space for a more detailed investigation of the topic, the 
key findings and the propositions as to the relevance of the two hypotheses remain unaffected. 
Future research should focus in more detail on the search process itself – to be precise – to 
investigate not only the source through which the job was finally found but the use of all 
information sources during the search. Additional in-depth analyses of role of the referrer and 
the relationship towards the job seeker should be conducted. 
4.5.3 Practical Implications 
The results have revealed that individuals who found their jobs via social ties do not earn 
higher wages but are more satisfied with their new jobs compared to those hired via other 
channels. Organisations could benefit from satisfied job seekers since job satisfaction is 
positively related to firm performance in general (Bryson et al., 2015) and soft indicators, e.g. 
creativity, problem solving, pro-social behaviour, and work engagement (Lyubomirsky et al., 
2005).  
Empirical findings imply that positive effect on satisfaction might be especially important 
shortly after the job change, since turnover (interpreted as a clear sign of dissatisfaction) is 
only weakly related to search channels. Firms, therefore, could benefit from employing job 
seekers who were suggested by their incumbent employees by gaining more satisfied 
employees, particularly right after the job change. Hence, this finding appears to be related to 
the literature on organisational socialisation which describes the adjustment and learning 
process after entering a new organisation.
62
 Newcomers who enter an organisation for the first 
time are confronted with unknown routines, norms, and tasks which creates a feeling of 
surprise (Louis, 1980) or stress (Nelson, 1987). In order to adjust to the new corporate culture, 
new entrants are subject to a socialisation process through which they learn their 
organizational roles (van Maanen, Schein, 1979). Successful socialisation is assumed to have 
a positive effect on employee (and thus firm) productivity and organisational commitment 
(Bauer et al., 1998). In addition, employees who socialise quickly and manage to learn all 
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 See Bauer et al. (1998) for a thorough summary view of the literature on organisational socialisation. 
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necessary processes might gain a higher level of autonomy (or receive this autonomy quicker) 
which is linked to job satisfaction (Langfred, Moye, 2004). 
Existing research has shown that newcomers rely on peers and direct supervisors in the 
socialisation process (see e.g. Feldman, Brett, 1983; Louis et al., 1983). Fang et al. (2011) 
developed a theoretical model in which they connect socialisation theory with social capital 
theory. The authors argued that newcomers socialise by establishing (particularly weak) social 
ties to incumbents. This socialisation process can be strengthened by organisational 
socialisation tactics and is positively affected by newcomer proactivity. Social ties to 
incumbents could serve helpful in improving and accelerating this process.
63
 Apart from 
learning the new organisational role, socialisation and the establishment of new social ties is 
indispensable in order to improve knowledge diffusion and information sharing within 
organisations (Levin, Cross, 2004).
64
 
Firms can, therefore, benefit from hiring employees via social ties through a shorter 
integration and learning period of new hires. Moreover, this positive impact on socialisation 
comes at no costs for firms, since wages of those hired via social ties are not higher than those 
hired through other channels. Future research could investigate the relationship between 
finding a job via social ties and organisational socialisation.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the efficiency of formal and informal recruitment channels as 
regards wage income, jobs satisfaction, and turnover. First, descriptive statistics depict a 
negative correlation between starting wages and the use of social capital. This finding is 
contrary to previous theoretical argumentations which imply a positive impact of informal 
recruitment channels due to better information or pre-screening of the referrer. However, a 
positive relation between recruitment via personal contacts and job satisfaction is found by 
descriptive results. Multiple regression analyses, both cross-sectional and longitudinal, 
indicate that for the complete sample there are no wage differences due to source choice. 
Individual Differences between the selected persons are able to explain the wage gap between 
formal and informal channels. Thus, considerable self-selection of source choice plays a 
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 Fukuyama (2002: 27) defined social capital as “shared norms or values that promote social cooperation, 
instantiated in actual social relationships”. If socialisation is understood as learning of social norms, existing ties 
(social capital) between co-workers is likely to improve the socialisation process. 
64
 Social ties between employees are not always used in favour of the employer. In a sample of 82 nurses, Blau 
(1985) found that individuals who were more connected to other co-workers were more likely to show 
withdrawal behaviour defined as unexcused tardiness.  
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major role. With regard to job satisfaction, results support the positive effect of 
recommendations. It is assumed that friends or acquaintances are more likely to present a 
realistic and trustworthy image of the corporation and thus job seekers apply on a well-
informed basis. Post-hire job satisfaction increases as the information asymmetries and the 
gap between expectations and reality is smaller. Only weak evidence for a relationship 
between social ties and lower turnover rates has been detected. This is interpreted as a 
positive short term effect of social ties on satisfaction, however, in the long-term, this effect is 
less relevant. Further sensitivity analyses reveal a more complex relationship between 
recruitment channels and post-hire outcomes. For example, employees in East Germany gain 
a significant wage premium of about 12 percent when they found their job on the internet. 
As regards the two alternative hypotheses, the results are not easy to interpret. Both 
considerable self-selection and the higher quality of job-related information seem to play a 
role. However, branch specific collective wage agreements and company agreements limit 
employers to pay selected employees above tariff. Thus, in the highly regulated German 
labour market wage differences for employees recruited via different channels are less likely 
to occur. Hence, the information function of referrals only affects job satisfaction. 
Unfortunately the data do not allow controlling for different kinds of referrals, e.g. family 
members, friends, or acquaintances. Therefore, future research should focus on the role of the 
referrer in the job search process. Additional research should be conducted in the field of job 
search through multiple sources of information. 
All in all, the results reveal a positive impact of referrals on job satisfaction. As companies are 
interested in attracting motivated employees, referrals could act as a means to select workers 
that fit both job requirements and firm structures. Thus, search through personal contacts 
enables firms to hire applicants that match the firm’s needs out of the faceless mass of job 
seekers. 
Future research could investigate the role of finding a job via social ties on the socialisation 
process of new hires. Furthermore, the lack of wage differences could either imply that 
employee matching quality, and thus performance, is not affected by the recruitment source. 
If those hired via informal means are more performing better, this would imply that the gained 
surplus is not shared between employer and employee as assumed by Pissarides (1994). This 
would mean that firms, in contrast to employees, benefit from hiring through informal means 
via productivity gains without costs. 
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5 Determinants and Effectiveness of Recruitment Channels – The Role of Personality 
5.1 Introduction 
In the two previous chapters, empirical evidence on the determinants of recruitment channel 
choice and the relationship between channel usage and post-hire outcomes has been 
presented. According to social capital theory, job search via social contacts should result in 
higher wages and job satisfaction, which could not be fully supported by the underlying data. 
However, social capital does not only represent a sociologic or economic construct to describe 
valuable relations, but comprises interpersonal relationships that have to be formed, 
strengthened, maintained or dissolved. Hence, an analysis of this construct should include 
measures that describe the foundations of individual interaction – both during the job search 
process and when entering a job. In this context, psychological measures of personality are 
used to describe differences between individuals and to explain their behaviour. 
Personality sets a frame for individual behaviour by determining how an individual acts or 
reacts in general. Although individuals are able to act against their general personality in a 
particular situation, personality provides the frame for long-term behaviour.  “Personality 
dimensions are behavioural dispositions in the sense that they correlate with determination 
and drive, to affect social behaviour” (Furnham, Heaven, 1999: 10). Personality traits, 
therefore, set a framework for an individual’s social behaviour and any kind of interaction 
with network members is shaped by an individual’s non-cognitive skills. Therefore, the 
quality and quantity of social ties is likely to depend on the individual’s personality. 
Already Simon (1959: 253) mused: “How have psychology and economics gotten along with 
little relation in the past?” Yet, in recent years a growing stream of the economic literature 
incorporates psychological measures of personality to explain labour market outcomes, such 
as wages (e.g. Nyhus, Pons, 2005) or job satisfaction (e.g. Judge et al., 2002a). So far, this 
research has not been related to job search through different channels. Personality traits might 
be relevant for two reasons: Generally, certain character traits could determine individual 
capabilities or preferences to search via a specific channel. More precisely, certain character 
traits (e.g. extraversion, reciprocity) might determine the amount of social capital and, hence, 
the probability to use the informal search channel. Secondly, personality is likely to play an 
important role in determining the person-job or person-organisation fit (Pervin, 1968) which 
could affect wages and job satisfaction. High scoring in certain personality dimensions might, 
therefore, increase search success regardless of the utilised search channel. However, it is so 
far unclear if personality affects post-hire outcomes directly or through source choice. 
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Furthermore, personality traits are included to account for a major shortcoming of the 
previous analyses. A large concern for any kind of empirical research is to find a way to 
eliminate or at least to reduce the impact of unobserved heterogeneity, meaning certain 
characteristics of survey participants that cannot be observed. Therefore, fixed or random-
effects estimators have been utilised in chapter 4 to reduce unobserved heterogeneity in order 
to get more reliable estimators of the coefficients. However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, fixed-effects estimators are likely to be biased in the case of job search as the 
coefficients are solely driven by multiple job changers. Therefore, a better way to reduce 
unobserved heterogeneity should be applied to find unbiased coefficients. Several researchers 
mention different aspects of personality
65
 as a core element of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. For instance, analysing the statistical relevance of measures of personality 
based on SOEP data, Boyce (2010) found that personality traits were able to explain about 20 
percent of the unobserved heterogeneity in life satisfaction regressions. Thus, including 
reliable measures of personality increases the validity of the main coefficients of the pooled 
OLS regressions of chapter 4. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by combining two distinct streams of 
research, namely economic outcomes of certain personality traits and job finding via social 
capital. First, it is analysed how personality traits and source choice are related. Second, post-
hire outcomes (wages, job satisfaction) of job search via different information channels are 
analysed while controlling for differences in personality. Furthermore, these two analyses are 
combined by using an approach proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007) to implement the 
selectivity bias in the estimation of wage and job satisfaction regressions. Thus, this chapter 
addresses question 3 of the introduction. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: The following subchapter (5.2) contains 
a description of personality measures and a brief summary of the related literature. At the end 
of this subchapter, hypotheses regarding the relationship between personality traits and post-
hire outcomes are formulated. In subchapter 5.3.1 the measurement of personality traits in the 
SOEP sample is described in detail. The model specification and the econometric approach 
are delineated in chapter 0. Descriptive results are presented in chapter 5.3.3, whereas chapter 
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 Factors that are usually considered as being unobserved: e.g. career ambition (Montgomery, Powell, 2003) and 
motivation (Polachek, Kim, 1994) as determinants of wage gaps. See Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) and 
Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) for examples of unobserved factors in the field of subjective well-being research. 
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5.3.4 contains multivariate analyses. The results of these analyses are discussed in chapter 5.4. 
Chapter 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Theoretical Background and Literature Overview 
5.2.1 Models of Personality 
First of all, it appears necessary to distinguish personality – often referred to as “non-
cognitive traits” – and cognitive abilities or simply intelligence. A taskforce, initiated by the 
American Psychological Association (APA) and headed by Ulric Neisser, defined intelligence 
as the “ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn 
from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking 
through” (Neisser et al., 1996: 77). Based on this narrow definition of intelligence as an act of 
reasoning and decision making, Borghans et al. (2008) emphasised that cognition and 
personality are two distinct concepts. Albeit certain aspects of personality require or include 
cognitive processes (e.g. sociability, empathy, humour), they can be “separated from raw 
problem solving abilities for abstract problems” (Borghans et al., 2008: 1035). Thus, 
personality can be understood as “tendencies to think, feel, and act in consistent ways” 
(McCrae, 2004b: 469). Each personality trait reflects a continuum of individual characteristics 
and behavioural responses that are broadly consistent over time and across situations 
(Matthews, 2004). In this chapter, three conceptually unrelated measures of non-cognitive 
traits are presented. 
5.2.1.1 The Five-Factor Model of Personality (FFM) 
First attempts to find a simple structure of personality can be traced back to the Swiss 
psychologist Franziska Baumgarten (1933) who assembled 1,093 German adjectives and 
nouns related to descriptions of human behaviour. Furthermore, she raised the question of the 
number of separable character traits that aggregate the collected words. Inspired by 
Baumgarten’s findings, Allport and Odbert (1936) started their own examinations of 17,953 
English terms which influenced later researchers. One decade later, Raymond Cattell 
investigated in how far adjectives, that describe personality patterns, were related to each 
other. Based on factor analyses, his research resulted in in a complex taxonomy of 12 (Cattell, 
1945), 13 (Cattell, 1947), respectively 11 (Cattell, 1948) distinct character traits. Attempting 
to find a simplified and more robust structure of personality, Tupes and Christal (1961) re-
examined the data of Cattell (1947, 1948) and Fiske (1949) and, additionally, conducted four 
own surveys. Careful analyses of the data revealed five major traits of personality – consistent 
over all datasets – which they called surgency, agreeableness, dependability, emotional 
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stability, and culture. However, their results had little impact on personality research as they 
were published in an obscure Air Force technical report (Digman, 1990). Yet, later studies 
were able to replicate the five-factor structure in independent studies (see e.g. Norman, 1963; 
Borgatta, 1964; Smith, 1967).  
The so-called “Big Five” personality traits, formalised in its most common way by Costa and 
McCrae (1985), include openness to new experiences (O), conscientiousness (C), extraversion 
(E), agreeableness (A), and neuroticism (N), referred to as the acronym OCEAN. This model 
allows a parsimonious description of individual characteristics and is well researched by 
psychologists and sociologists. Each of the traits represents a “large number of distinct, more 
specific, personality characteristics” (Borghans et al., 2008: 984) which are frequently called 
facets. Conceptually, all five traits are orthogonal within a person (McCrae, 2004b). 
Individuals who score high in one dimension can both score high or low in another 
dimension. Table 26 presents a comprehensive overview of the five major dimensions of 
personality and their respective facets as they are empirically supported by Costa et al. (1991). 
The next two columns provide adjectives that characterize individuals that score high 
respectively low in the given dimension. 
Table 26: Big Five personality traits and descriptions 
Personality Traits Facetsa High scoresb Low scoresb 
Openness to experience 
Fantasy 
aesthetics 
feelings 
actions 
ideas 
values 
creative 
unconventional 
sensitive to art and beauty 
conservative 
conventional 
narrow interest 
Conscientiousness 
Competence 
Order 
dutifulness 
achievement striving 
self-discipline 
deliberation 
thorough 
neat 
well-organised 
diligent 
achievement-oriented 
disorganised 
lazy 
hasty 
Extraversion 
Warmth 
gregariousness 
assertiveness 
activity 
excitement seeking 
positive emotions 
cheerful 
enthusiastic 
optimistic 
talkative 
sociable 
quiet 
reserved 
retiring 
shy 
silent 
Agreeableness 
Trust 
straightforwardness 
altruism 
compliance 
modesty 
tender-mindedness 
warm 
caring 
emotionally supporting 
nurturing 
polite 
trustful 
hostile 
indifferent to others 
self-centred 
spiteful 
jealous 
Neuroticism 
Anxiety 
hostility 
depression 
self-consciousness  
impulsiveness vulnerability 
nervous 
depressed, 
irrational thinking 
insecure 
calm 
relaxed 
even-tempered 
unflappable 
Notes: a: facets defined by Costa et al. (1991); b: high and low scores defined by McCrae and John (1992),  Sheese and Graziano (2004), and 
McCrae (2004b). 
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The first factor – openness to experience – represents the least well understood dimension of 
personality which reflects an “intrinsic interest in experience in a variety of areas” and the 
willingness to try new activities and being unconventional (McCrae, 2004a: 707). On the 
contrary, closed people can be characterized as conservative and conventional, feeling more 
comfortable within familiar surroundings. 
Conscientiousness, forming the second factor, describes the individual’s ability to work 
methodically, being diligent and self-disciplined. Persons who score low in this dimension are 
rather disorganised, lazy, and hasty (McCrae, 2004b).  
Extraversion and its counterpart introversion represent a bipolar continuum of individual 
differences. Whereas extraversion is generally associated with characteristics like sociability, 
assertiveness, and enthusiasm, introversion is usually described as being socially reserved, 
quiet, and thoughtful (Matthews, 2004). In addition, Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) mentioned 
potential negative aspects of extraversion, namely being impulsive or unreliable. 
Agreeableness, as the fourth factor of personality, is suited to define the degree to which an 
individual acts mostly either pro-socially or self-oriented. Related adjectives for high scorers 
in this dimension are warm, caring, and trustful. Low levels of agreeableness are associated to 
indifference or even hostility towards others and selfishness (Sheese, Graziano, 2004). 
The last factor is commonly referred to as neuroticism or emotional stability as the inverse. 
Neurotic individuals appear rather insecure, nervous, and depressed, whereas emotionally 
stable persons are calm and even-tempered. Hence, this dimension reflects how individuals 
are able to cope with stressful situations (Bolger, Schilling, 1991). 
However, the model has been heavily criticised by researchers who argued that either more or 
less factors determine individual differences in personality. For example, Brand claimed that 
general intelligence does not exists in “separate, noetic, cognitive domain” but represents a 
dimension of personality, which leads to a model with six personality traits (Brand, 1994: 
299). Mershon and Gorsuch (1988) compared how an increase in personality factors affects 
the explained variation (R²) and proposed to utilise a 16-factor models instead of a 6-factor 
model. On the contrary, Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) argued that only three factors can be 
found on the highest level of abstraction. 
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In their article published in “Personality and Individual Differences”, Costa and McCrae 
(1992) defended their taxonomy based on four criteria which they regarded as being met by 
the Big Five model: 
(i) cross-observer validity, 
(ii) temporal stability (see chapter 5.2.2 for a detailed discussion), 
(iii) cultural stability, and 
(iv) biological basis. 
Eysenck replied to their article in the same journal and formulated four criticisms which – in 
his view – suggested “that the postulation of the 5-factor model is a premature crystallization 
of spurious orthodoxy” (Eysenck, 1992: 667). According to his arguments, only 3 of the 5 
factors can be considered as primaries that emerge on the highest level of personality 
assessment.  
However, for the analysis in this chapter the discussion about the number of primary and 
secondary level traits is irrelevant and should be left for of psychological scientists. In other 
words, it is not important if the five traits are actually major personality dimensions but if 
these aspects of personality affect source choice or post-hire outcomes. Albeit all critique, the 
Five Factor Model of Personality (FFM) has emerged as the predominant means to measure 
differences in personality in a reliable and parsimonious way. Therefore, the usage of this 
taxonomy allows for comparisons between different settings or datasets. 
5.2.1.2 Locus of Control (LoC) 
Internal versus external control of reinforcement (Rotter, 1966), commonly referred to as 
locus of control (LOC), is a personality construct that has been under investigation by 
psychologists and social scientists for decades. Internal locus of control comprises the belief 
that one’s own behaviour determines outcomes such as success or failure whereas external 
locus of control refers to the degree to which one believes that outcomes are determined by 
fate, luck, powerful others, or capricious surroundings (Rotter, 1990). Hence, the construct of 
locus of control sets up a bipolar continuum spanning from internal to external. Reviewing the 
existing evidence, Cobb-Clark (2015) stated that locus of control is a psychological construct 
which might be related to labour market success via human capital investments, hiring 
decisions, and incentive contracts. 
According to Crandall (1978), LOC is conceptually related to self-esteem. Coopersmith 
defined self-esteem as a “personal judgement of worthiness that is expressed in the attitudes 
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the individual holds toward himself” (Coopersmith, 1967: 5). Thus, internally oriented 
individuals believe to be responsible for their outcomes and are likely to be high in self-
esteem. Conversely, low self-esteem and therefore internal orientation are associated to social 
introversion (Berger, 1955). 
5.2.1.3 Reciprocity 
Another aspect of personality is the construct of reciprocity which is defined as the 
“behavioural response to perceived kindness or unkindness” (Falk, Fischbacher, 2006: 294). 
Positive reciprocity refers to the degree in which people respond a positive action with a 
corresponding positive reaction and vice versa for negative reciprocity. Reciprocity does not 
include altruistic behaviour, as altruism is defined as an action without any prior or future 
advantages. Reciprocal behaviour can help to maintain beneficial relationships and reciprocal 
agents act like in an iterated prisoners’ dilemma. Hence, this construct does not automatically 
contradict the economic concept of homo oeconomicus. Negative reciprocity includes acts of 
retaliation which means that evil behaviour of others is resisted. Consequently, reciprocal 
actions appeal to fairness concerns that someone is treated the way he/she deserves it.
66
 
However, the three constructs of personality might not be free from overlap. For example, 
conscientious employees could also dispose of an internal locus of control because they can 
observe how their effort translates into the desired outcomes. In order to account for potential 
overlap, all regressions are run separately including only one of these constructs. Personality 
traits, though, can be separated from traditional economic measures of individual behaviour. 
Becker et al. (2012) found that preferences and personality measures were rather 
complementary than substitutive in explaining labour market outcomes and life satisfaction. 
However, personality traits are likely to serve better in explaining outcomes of events 
including interpersonal exchange like job search. 
5.2.2 Stability of Personality Traits 
As previously mentioned, the temporal stability of individual character traits is an important 
concern when personality measures are included into an empirical model. There is little doubt 
that personality is changing, or better developing, during childhood and adolescence 
(Dahmann, Anger, 2014). However, the debate on the consistency of adult personality is still 
ongoing. McCrae and Costa (1999) postulated that personality traits develop through 
childhood and are stable in adulthood – which Srivastava et al. (2003) termed plaster 
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 See Becker (1986) for a more detailed analysis of the concept of reciprocity. 
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hypothesis.
67
 The economic literature often assumes that personality traits are constant over 
time and can be treated as exogenous variables (see e.g. Nyhus, Pons, 2005; Mueller, Plug, 
2006; Heineck, 2011). This implies that the estimated coefficients are not biased by 
simultaneity or reversed causality. It is therefore of utmost importance to assure that 
personality measures are not affected by aging or certain life-events.  
Two interpretations of trait consistency can be found in the literature: mean-level consistency 
and rank-order consistency (Specht et al., 2011). The first definition focusses on mean-level 
changes in personality trait scores of a group of individuals. Inconsistency arises if average 
scores of personality traits change during the life-cycle. On the contrary, the latter considers 
the rank-order-stability of individuals of a population. Hence, personality traits are even 
consistent when increases in the average scores do not change the rank-order of individuals 
within the group. On the other hand, the average score can remain stable but the rank-order of 
individuals changes when increases and decreases in certain dimensions offset each other. 
Costa and McCrae (1988) analysed self-reports and spouse ratings on the NEO Personality 
Inventory and found little evidence on the relation between personality and maturation in 
cross-sectional regressions. Furthermore, they detected a high retest stability of both self-
reports and spouse ratings six years after the first interview. Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012) 
investigated the stableness of Big Five personality traits measured by a 28-item inventory in 
the Australian HILDA survey. The authors concluded that personality measures were constant 
over time and found only little evidence that serious employment-related events influenced 
personality measures. 
However, there exists evidence of the effect of ageing on personality. Evaluating a large 
North-American internet survey, Srivastava et al. (2003) detected considerable increases of 
conscientiousness and agreeableness of adults aged 31-60. Using data from the GSOEP and 
the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), Donnellan and Lucas (2008) observed age trends 
in Big-Five traits. Extraversion and openness were negatively correlated to age, agreeableness 
increased in older ages. In a more thorough study based on the GSOEP data, Specht et al. 
(2011) found a significant impact of age on Big-Five personality traits of participants above 
the age of 30. Furthermore, they investigated in how far major life events influenced 
personality. According to their findings, personality even predicted the occurrence of life 
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 See Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) for a summary of environmental, genetic, psychological, and person-
environment factors that could contribute to the increased stability of personality in adulthood. 
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events which, in return, triggered changes in personality. This is related to another largely 
untangled problem that could derive from reserved or backward causality measuring the 
impact of personality on wages. Lee (2006) argued that new employees adapt to the firm 
culture when entering a new job. Absorbing certain memes and behavioural patterns could 
increase promotion perspectives and thus wages. Higher initial wages or large wage gains 
prospects could foster internalisation of firm values. However, it is rather questionable if 
behaviour in work relationships and main character traits are intertwined.  
Examining the mechanisms of personality maturation of SOEP participants aged 16-82, 
Specht et al. (2012) detected a positive correlation between life satisfaction and positive 
changes in personality. Individuals reporting higher life satisfaction were less neurotic and 
more agreeable and conscientious. As there is strong empirical support that overall life 
satisfaction and job satisfaction are closely related through spill-over effects
68
 from one 
domain to the other (for empirical evidence see e.g. Tait et al., 1989; Judge, Watanabe, 1994; 
Rode, 2004), there presumably exists a relationship between personality and job satisfaction. 
However, the direction of causality is hitherto opaque. Roberts et al. (2006) conducted a meta-
analysis of 113 samples. They demonstrated that personality traits were object to constant 
change, mainly in traits related to interpersonal interaction, such as socialibility and 
agreeableness. Yet, the changes were more robust in studies that observed individuals over a 
long period. Similarly, Schurer et al. (2015) found that university students became less 
extravert and male students from disadvantaged backgrounds became more agreeable. Yet, 
they did not find changes in traits related to work ethics or intellect. 
Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) analysed the rank order stability of personality traits. They 
found that trait consistency increased from early childhood through college age until the age 
of 30. However, the consistency even increased to a plateau between 50 and 70. Their results 
support the plaster hypothesis although it contradicts the assumption that personality rarely 
changes above the age of 30. 
With reference to the construct of locus of control, Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2011) found no 
meaningful changes in a four-year-period for most participants. Changes in the subjective 
believe of control only occurred among young and old participants. Therefore the authors 
suggested for both measures of personality to limit the analysis to individuals in working age. 
So far no study has analysed the stability of reciprocity. However, as this measure only 
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reflects the reaction to good or bad behaviour of others and not the degree of altruism, it can 
be assumed that reciprocity should be time invariant to a large extend. 
To sum up, the stability of personality is rather questionable which must be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the results. However, the discussed results show that 
personality remains rather stable for a limited period of time. Thus, despite these potential 
limitations, personality measures are nevertheless utilised for the following waves as the data 
only contains personality variables in two waves (see chapter 5.3.1 for details). Therefore, the 
stability of personality traits over the whole life cycle is rather irrelevant for this study. 
Furthermore, the sample is restricted to the working age population which eliminates potential 
maturation effects in retirement age. 
5.2.3 Personality and Job Search 
Job search represents an important aspect at the beginning of the working career as well as for 
job changes during the career. Finding a job that matches both abilities and individual 
preferences can been seen as an important determinant for later career success and job 
satisfaction. However, asymmetric information between job searchers and employers are a 
considerable obstacle in finding the best available person-job fit. One the one hand, job 
seekers are not able or willing to reveal all information about their productivity in a reliable 
manner. On the other hand, employees do not dispose of information about job characteristics, 
such as supervisors or promotion perspectives. Hence, these frictions lead to imperfect 
allocations on the labour market, which result in poor performance, dissatisfaction and, in the 
end, the decision to separate which causes costs for both employers and employees. 
In this context, job search via personal contacts is regarded as a superior means to find a job. 
At the very latest since Granovetter (1973) presented his “strength of weak ties”-hypothesis, 
job search via different search channels has received wider interest by economists. Increasing 
theoretical and empirical knowledge on search channels, Wanous (1978) stressed the aspect of 
information accuracy on job-related descriptions. In contrast to supervisors or HR managers, 
incumbents are more likely to deliver accurate and trustworthy information on job 
characteristics. As a result, job matches are found on well-informed basis because they 
dispose of realistic job previews (Wanous, 1978), which are likely to increase the person-job 
and person-organisation fit resulting in better performance and a reduction in turnover 
probability (Pervin, 1968). Questioning such information benefits, Schwab (1982) mentioned 
potential self-selection into source usage for the first time. He argued that different 
recruitment channels might be used by different populations of job seekers. Hence, 
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information advantages of job search via social capital are likely to be over- or 
underestimated due to individual differences. 
So far, research of the relationship between source usage and search outcomes has neglected 
the impact of personality. First, personality can be understood as an element of individual 
differences which might explain behavioural differences in the job search process, e.g. the 
selection of search channels in the sense of the “Individual Difference”-hypothesis (Schwab, 
1982). Second, researchers repeatedly found significant correlations between certain 
dimensions of personality and post-hire outcomes. However, these findings on the 
relationship between personality and post-hire outcomes – as well as source choice and post-
hire outcomes – might be biased, if personality affects job search. For instance, psychologists 
like Buss (1997), who stress the evolutionary foundations of personality, interpret character 
traits as a result of adaption to hostile forces of the environment. Certain representations of 
character traits facilitate living together in a community and to defend against external 
pressures and threats. Thus, Buss (1997) argued that “personality, from this perspective, 
consists centrally of the psychological mechanisms and behavioural strategies that humans 
have evolved for solving these problems.” As a result, personality is likely to play an 
important role in the labour market where adaption to organisational standards, common 
values among employees, and behavioural expectations of supervisors is relevant for the 
individual career success. During the job search process, interviewers of the HR department 
and direct supervisors must not only be convinced of the job searcher’s human capital but also 
of the job seeker’s organisational fit which depends vastly on personality issues. High scoring 
in certain personality dimensions might, therefore, increase success in the search process.  
Albeit personality traits are originally a domain of psychological or sociological researchers, 
Borghans et al. (2008) described three ways, personality measures can be applied in 
economics: (i) as a constraint, (ii) as a public good, or (iii) as a private good (see Chart 9). 
Personality as a constraint means that personality dimensions can be interpreted as a binding 
condition. This means, if an individual scores above a threshold level in one personality trait 
further options become available. Speaking in the sense of the Simon (1955) model of 
sequential search, high scores in certain personality dimensions enlarge the set of available 
alternatives (A).
69
 In contrast to this understanding of personality, one can assume that 
character traits do not restrict alternatives but facilitate or impede actions. For example, less 
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conscientious individuals are able to gather relevant information on job search but at higher 
costs as search can be regarded as a rather boring activity that requires endurance and 
patience. Hence, different personality manifestations between individuals affect the costs of 
search, both in time and money. Assuming that higher search costs decrease the amount of 
considered alternatives (Å) in the sense of the Simon model, this can be interpreted as a shift 
of the considered alternative function to the left.  
 
Chart 9: Personality in economic research  
(Source: own representation based on Borghans et al., 2008) 
The view of personality as a facilitating means can be further divided by inherent properties 
that Borghans et al. (2008) described as public or private goods.
70
 As a public good, 
personality traits are available for multiple activities at the same time. In contrast to this, the 
view of personality as a private good includes rivalry in the use of certain personality traits. 
Rivalry in this case means that if personality attributes are exploited to facilitate a certain 
action or to improve a specific outcome, these personality properties are not available to be 
used for other alternatives at the same time. However, this does not have to be similar for all 
dimensions of personality. According to this view, high levels of conscientious can solely be 
directed to one task at a time as conducting several tasks simultaneously leads automatically 
to a less conscientious behaviour. On the contrary, extraversion, agreeableness, or emotional 
stability cannot be assigned to any specific task but rather reflects a general non-cognitive 
ability with no rivalry in consumption. With regard to job search, the latter distinction is not 
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 However, this distinction is not completely correct in the classic economic sense. A public good is marked by 
the properties of non-rivalry in the consumption and non-exclusiveness (other individuals can be legally 
excluded from the consumption of the good). The latter characteristic cannot be transferred to the issue of 
personality traits as there is no – conscious or unconscious – mechanism to exclude certain actions from the 
exploitation of character traits. 
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relevant as it is very likely that job search is a meaningful aspect of individual life. Therefore, 
most individuals would assign their (positive) personality resources in order to increase job 
finding possibilities. 
Chart 10, which is based on the O'Brien (1986) model of job search, shows the theoretical 
background of this article. Apart from biological origins, personality is influenced by family 
and other contacts as well as the level of education and training. Personality affects the way 
(i.e. the intensity and frequency) an individual interacts with others, which determines the 
accumulation of social capital. Furthermore, personality and formal education shape the ideal 
job for an individual. These job characteristics and the amount of social capital affect the way 
an individual searches for a new job. The job seeker’s socio-economic status (e.g. the current 
employment situation) might affect search behaviour like on or off-the-job search. Along with 
further influences, such as labour market conditions and the socio-economic status, the source 
choice determines which job the individual actually finds. Finally, labour market conditions 
as well as one’s personality finally determine post-hire outcomes of job search. 
 
 
Chart 10: Personality in the job search process 
(Source: own representation based on O'Brien, 1986) 
According to this model, personality has mainly two ways to influence post-hire outcomes: by 
determining the source selection and the behaviour on the job. So far, several researchers have 
analysed separate aspects within one of the mechanisms. In the next subchapter, the existing 
literature that provides empirical evidence on these relationships is presented. 
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5.2.4 Literature Review of Empirical Analyses of Personality 
Personality research has gained increasing importance during the last decades in various 
scientific disciplines. Whereas psychologists aim to explain individual behaviour, such as 
responses to stressors or drug abuse, economists analyse the role of personality traits in the 
determination of individual and organizational economic success. As it is impossible to give a 
concise overview on the entire field of personality research in this thesis, Chart 11 displays 
the literature related to the research question. Like effects of social ties, effects of personality 
can be measured at two stages of the job search process: before (pre-hire) and after (post-hire) 
a new job has been found. Pre-hire effects describe how personality affects job search while 
post-hire effects comprise all outcomes after the new job has been found. First, a strand of the 
literature directly attempts to measure the returns of personality traits in the labour market, 
e.g. measured as wages (5.2.4.1) or job satisfaction (5.2.4.2). Other researchers in this field 
focus on behaviour that is closely related to the earnings (e.g. performance, the level of 
education, and leadership abilities) or job satisfaction (e.g. team or individual work, level of 
autonomy). Furthermore, few researchers examine the role of personality during job search 
(5.2.4.3), e.g. search channel usage, search intensity, or the duration of unemployment spells. 
Moreover, this chapter also considers the psychological literature on individual behaviour, 
which includes stress responses or the ability to process information. These behavioural 
determinants might be related to the performance of job search or at work and, thus, to post-
hire outcomes. Due to this relation to post-hire outcomes, these aspects are described in the 
post-hire outcomes chapter. 
 
Chart 11: Personality research overview 
(Source: own representation) 
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5.2.4.1 Personality and Earnings 
The empirical literature has investigated several channels through which personality could 
affect wages. Personnel economists tried to explain earnings differentials by individual 
behaviour based on personality traits. Hence, authors such as Nyhus and Pons (2005), Mueller 
and Plug (2006),  Heineck and Anger (2010), as well as Heineck (2011) used large samples 
that comprised a variety of socio-economic data to measure a direct relation between 
personality and earnings.  
Nyhus and Pons (2005) found that emotional stability (the obverse of neuroticism) was 
positively related to wages of Dutch employees, whereas agreeableness was correlated with 
lower female wages. At the beginning of a work-relationship, conscientiousness was 
associated with higher wages for men while openness to experience (here called autonomy) 
was related to a higher wage for men with longer tenure. Mueller and Plug (2006) analysed 
data on the 1957 cohort of high schools graduates in Wisconsin who were re-interviewed in 
1992. Fore males, they found a significant positive relation between antagonism (as the 
reversed measure for agreeableness), emotional stability and openness to experience. Women 
benefited from high degrees of conscientiousness and openness to experience. Heineck and 
Anger (2010) were the first who used SOEP data to measure the relationship between 
personality and earnings. While controlling for cognitive abilities, the authors found a 
negative correlation between agreeableness and wages. Furthermore, they detected clear 
gender differences for openness and extraversion. Whereas extraverted males earned higher 
wages, extraverted females earned significantly less. On the contrary, women were rewarded 
for openness, while open males received a wage penalty. Positive reciprocity was rewarded 
for both genders, negative reciprocity only for males. The strongest correlation was detected 
for locus of control. An external orientation was strongly related to lower earnings. In another 
article, Heineck (2011) analysed the relationship between personality and earnings in the 
United Kingdom. He found a substantial positive relationship between openness to experience 
and wages and a negative relationship between agreeableness and wages. Women, 
additionally, received a wage penalty for high degrees of neuroticism. 
The summary of these studies shows that the relationship between Big Five measures and 
earnings is largely stable across countries. Conscientiousness appears to be positively related 
to income, whereas agreeableness and neuroticism are negatively related to wages. 
However, already Mueser (1979) questioned that personality directly affects earnings or 
indirectly determines occupational choice. Albeit his analyses do not contain a convincing 
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measure of orthogonal personality traits, he found a strong indication that adolescent 
personality affects their later occupational status largely by affecting the degree of education. 
In a survey of American eighth graders, Coleman and DeLeire (2003) found that locus of 
control affected investments into human capital by determining the expected returns of 
education. Students with an internal belief invested more into their human capital as they were 
convinced that their own effort was related to their later income. Heckman et al. (2006) 
argued along similar lines and showed significant correlations between personality
71
 and 
wages as well as personality and other measures of labour market outcomes or behaviour, 
such as schooling abilities, occupational choice, risky behaviour like smoking, drug use, or 
illegal activities. 
Furthermore, performance could represent another potential channel through which 
personality could affect wages. Barrick and Mount (1991) analysed the relation of the Big 
Five personality traits and three measures of job performance (job proficiency, training 
proficiency, and personnel data) respectively five occupational groups (professionals, police, 
managers, sales, and skilled/semi-skilled). Results of this meta-study indicated that 
extraversion was related to performance of managers and sales staff (.18 and .15). 
Coefficients for emotional stability range from -.13 to .12, whereas conscientiousness was 
equally positively related to all occupations (.21 to .23). Regarding job success criteria, 
extraversion and openness to experience had a strong influence on training proficiency (.26 
and .25). Conscientiousness was positively correlated to all three measures of job 
performance. Surprisingly, emotional stability and agreeableness were both weakly but 
positively correlated to all kinds of job performance. 
Analysing employees’ responses to external incentives, Bowles et al. (2001) found that a high 
degree of internal locus of control could be interpreted as an incentive-enhancing effect. 
Individuals with a strong belief that their working effort actually affected the production 
increased their effort. Henceforth, higher wages are likely to be paid to those who score high 
on the internal dimension of locus of control. Analysing the role of environmental influences, 
Mount et al. (1998) showed that agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability 
were correlated with performance in jobs with social interaction. This relation was stronger in 
                                                 
71
 The authors used an aggregated measure for personality computed as the average of the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale and the Rotter scale of Locus of Control. Hence, this measure cannot be compared to the more 
detailed trait models presented in the remainder of this chapter. 
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jobs that require frequent team interaction compared to jobs that involve dyadic interaction 
with customers.  
Apart from performance on the job, earnings increases could be a result of a vertical climbing 
of the hierarchy ladder into leadership positions. Employees in leadership positions have to 
show abilities to be promoted into and to remain in this position. These required abilities are 
not only high levels of human capital but also social (non-cognitive) skills that enable leaders 
to guide and motivate their subordinates. In their meta-analysis, Judge et al. (2002b) analysed 
the correlation between Big Five personality traits and both leadership emergence (a person 
could serve as a good leader) and leadership effectiveness (evaluated mostly by subordinate or 
supervisor ratings). The results revealed that extraversion (ρ = .31) was the strongest 
correlate. Further character traits, such as conscientiousness (ρ = .28), neuroticism (ρ = -.24), 
and openness to experience (ρ = .24), showed significant correlations with leadership. 
Agreeableness (ρ = .08) was rather weakly correlated with leadership. The 95% confidence 
interval excluded zero for all traits. These findings indicate that certain personality traits 
might be helpful in being promoted into leadership positions in which higher wages are paid. 
Related to this, Gunthert et al. (1999) investigated the role of neuroticism in daily stress 
occurrence and coping behaviour. Neurotic persons were more likely to be exposed to 
situations they regarded as severely stressful. Additionally, highly neurotic individuals reacted 
more frequently with less adaptive coping strategies (e.g. hostility, self-blaming, or 
withdrawal) to stressors. Leading positions are associated with a high degree of responsibility 
for subordinates and, therefore, it is less likely that neurotic individuals are performing 
successfully in these positions which results in lower wages. 
In other studies, Booth-Kewley and Vickers (1994), Trobst et al. (2002), and Turiano et al. 
(2012) analysed, if self-damaging behaviour (lack of health care, risky behaviour, substance 
abuse) is related to personality. In general, conscientiousness was negatively related to self-
damaging behaviour, whereas extraversion and openness were positively related. Hence, these 
studies indicate that certain character traits are associated to risky or unhealthy behaviour 
which is likely to have a negative effect on labour market success. 
Evidence from the domain of sports economics is provided by Deutscher et al. (2013). The 
authors analysed how ‘mental strength’ (measured as the performance differential in free-
throws at the end of tight matches in comparison to performance during the rest of the match) 
of professional basketball players of the National Basketball Association (NBA) is related to 
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wages. They found that one players whose ‘mental strength’ was one standard deviation 
above the average earned 50% higher wages. Companies could benefit from employees who 
score high in mental strength (i.e. the inverse of neuroticism) by gaining employees who react 
appropriately to stressors and do not “choke under pressure” (Baumeister, 1984). 
All in all, the empirical literature suggests several channels through which personality traits 
might affect wages, e.g. by job performance, leadership abilities, and responses to stressors. 
5.2.4.2 Personality and Job Satisfaction 
Job Satisfaction is a thoroughly investigated element of economics and social science, as 
satisfaction with working conditions and compensation is an import determinant of employee 
motivation and commitment. A growing literature aims at elucidating the determinants and 
moderators of job satisfaction and an excerpt of this literature is presented here. Furthermore, 
studies that focus on general life satisfaction are presented as life and job satisfaction are 
naturally related.
72
 
Analysing the relationship between Big Five personality traits and three measures of extrinsic 
and intrinsic job satisfaction, Furnham et al. (2002) solely found a significant correlation 
between job satisfaction and conscientiousness. However, the study suffered from the small 
sample size (n = 82) and a small set of control variables (gender, age). In their meta-analysis 
of 334 correlations from 163 independent samples, Judge et al. (2002a) found strong 
correlations between Big Five personality traits and job satisfaction. Neuroticism (-.29) and 
extraversion (.25) were the strongest predictors for job satisfaction. The whole set of 
personality traits had a multiple correlation of .41 with job satisfaction, which stresses the 
validity of the Big Five taxonomy in measuring determinants of job satisfaction. In another 
study of approximately 500 university employees, Judge et al. (2008) analysed the correlation 
between three measures of personality (FFM, core-self evaluations, and positive/negative 
affectivity). Emotional stability, extraversion and conscientiousness showed positive 
(univariate) correlations with job satisfaction. Inadequate stress coping and unhealthy 
behaviour (see chapter 5.2.4.1) might explain this relation. The whole set of Big Five traits 
explained 23 percent of the variation of job satisfaction. 
However, similar working conditions might not only be perceived differently by employees 
with differences in personality traits. A growing literature deals with the complex relationship 
                                                 
72
 See e.g. Tait et al. (1989) or Rode (2004) for a discussion of the relationship between life and job satisfaction. 
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between pay and life or job satisfaction. For example, Boyce and Wood (2011) analysed how 
differences in personality mediate differences in the happiness response to household income 
increases. Based on SOEP data, the authors detected that more conscientious individuals 
obtained higher increases in satisfaction compared to less conscientious participants. For 
women, high degrees of neuroticism and openness and low degrees of extraversion reduced 
the increase of satisfaction caused by an increase in household income. Moreover, it has 
become common sense, that relative income comparisons between related persons are more 
important for one’s own happiness than absolute increases in income. For instance, Brown et 
al. (2008) – as well as Clark et al. (2009) and Boyce et al. (2010) – found that not the absolute 
amount of income affects satisfaction but employees’ relative income rank. Stepping higher in 
the income ladder of a given population (e.g. neighbourhood or company) had a positive 
effect on satisfaction. Based on this literature, Budria and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2012) examined 
if non-cognitive skills (FFM, LoC, reciprocity) affect the relationship between an individual’s 
relative income rank and self-reported life satisfaction. Their results indicated that especially 
highly extraverted and neurotic individuals are rank-sensitive. Surprisingly, the authors found 
that individuals that scored low on external LoC were sensitive to their relative position in the 
income distribution. The authors argued that internally-oriented individuals are probably 
“more prone to blame and credit themselves for their economic status” (Budria, Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2012: 17). 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann (2008) analysed the mediating role of personality on the 
relationship between occupation and life respectively job satisfaction. Their results indicated 
that certain personality traits increased the likelihood to choose a specific job – which, 
henceforth, affected job satisfaction. Unfortunately, the authors only distinguished very few 
kinds of jobs which limits the validity of their study. 
Hence, these results indicate that job satisfaction (and life satisfaction) might be related to 
personality traits directly. However, the existing evidence shows that personality could 
mediate the relationship between work-related events (such as wage increases) and 
satisfaction. This means that work-related events are perceived differently by individuals. If 
search channel usage is also affected by personality, this could explain differences in job 
satisfaction. 
5.2.4.3 Personality and Job Search 
So far, it is only rarely investigated if personality affects the job search process. Most 
researchers focus on locus of control, a measure that is most likely to be related to active 
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search behaviour and search success. Early research focussed on the relevance of the locus of 
control construct on learning and information processing. In an experimental setting, Davis 
and Phares (1967) found that participants were actively searching for more information when 
they scored high on the internal dimension of locus of control. Additionally, Seeman and 
Evans (1962), Seeman (1963), and Phares (1968) delivered empirical support that internally-
oriented individuals were more able to recall and utilise information that had been open to 
participants. In line with this argument, Andrisani (1977) interpreted locus of control as a 
measure of personal initiative in the search for a new job that expresses individual motivation. 
An internal orientation had a positive impact on subsequent labour market experiences, when 
differences in abilities, skills and demographic characteristics are controlled for. Participants 
with an internal belief were in better occupations and earned higher hourly wages. 
Only two current studies examined the meaning of locus of control in the job search process. 
In a more general analysis, Caliendo et al. (2010) observed a positive impact of internal locus 
of control on search intensity and on reservation wages. Unfortunately, the authors could not 
investigate if higher reservation wages affected actual wages (or job satisfaction) or simply 
increased search time, or both. In a second study, Caliendo et al. (2011) investigated the 
relationship between personality and the search behaviour of recently unemployed and they 
did not find significant effects on the choice of informal search methods. 
5.2.5 Hypotheses Regarding Source Choice and Post-hire Outcomes 
Based on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence, hypotheses describing the 
potential relationship between personality and both source choice and post-hire outcomes are 
formulated.  
Openness to Experience 
Openness to experience describes the degree of open-mindedness regarding new situations in 
contrast to the feeling of comfort from conventional or well-known situations. Hence, 
openness could improve the possibilities to create social capital which increases the 
probability to search via this channel. 
H1a: Openness to experience is positively correlated with finding a job via social capital. 
Openness might be related to career success as this dimension comprises flexibility and 
creativity. However, creativity requires the possibility to work autonomously. Only if this is 
supported by working environment, openness could result in poorer performance and 
dissatisfaction. Hence, a clear statement regarding the two post-hire outcomes is not possible. 
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Conscientiousness 
Conscientiousness comprises the ability to search methodically and actively for a new job, 
which is most likely done via formal channels. Individuals with a lack of conscientiousness 
are more likely to find their jobs via social capital which might include spontaneous 
information of referrers. 
H2a: Conscientiousness is negatively correlated with finding a job via social capital. 
The relation between conscientiousness and wages is probably the most stable in the 
economic research on personality outcomes. Employees who rate themselves as hard working 
and diligent should receive higher wages compared to individuals who score low in this 
dimension. Based on models of motivation (Herzberg et al., 2010), Furnham et al. (2009) 
stated that factors that motivate the employee to work might be the same factors that 
determine job satisfaction. As conscientiousness can be interpreted as a major determinant of 
intrinsic motivation, being enabled to work successfully should increase satisfaction. 
H2b: Conscientiousness is positively correlated with wages. 
H2c: Conscientiousness is positively correlated with job satisfaction. 
Extraversion 
Extraversion appears to be obviously related to the frequency and intensity of social 
interaction and the creation of social capital. Introverts, however, are rather quiet and reserved 
and, therefore, they are less likely to dispose of a large social network. As a result, introverts 
are more likely to search via formal channels. 
H3a: Extraversion is positively correlated with finding a job via social capital. 
Apart from social interaction, Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) mentioned negative aspects of 
extraversion, such as impulsiveness and unreliability. Watson and Clark (1997), however, 
stressed the positive aspects such as optimism and sociability which could serve helpful on 
the job. Furnham and Zacherl (1986) as well as Tokar and Subich (1997) found evidence that 
extraverts are more satisfied with their job which hints at the positive aspects of extraversion. 
These findings lead to the following hypotheses: 
H3b: Extraversion is positively correlated with wages. 
H3c: Extraversion is positively correlated with job satisfaction. 
 
 
 
137 Determinants and Effectiveness of Recruitment Channels – The Role of Personality 
Agreeableness 
Agreeableness is an essential determinant of the quality and also the quantity of personal 
contacts. Agreeable persons are more likely to dispose of a large network whose members are 
willing to support their associates during job search. 
H4a: Agreeableness is positively correlated with finding a job via social capital. 
Regarding post-hire outcomes, agreeableness is usually seen as a two-sided sword. On the one 
hand, agreeableness might be advantageous in socialising with people – especially in settings 
that require teamwork and communication (Graziano et al., 1997). On the other hand, Judge et 
al. (1999) assumed that highly agreeable individuals could be too focused on pleasing others 
that they sacrifice their own career, when opportunistic behaviour towards colleagues might 
be more successful. The opposite relation could be expected for job satisfaction. Agreeable 
persons are less likely to be in conflict with their co-workers or supervisors, which leads to 
higher job satisfaction. 
H4b: Agreeableness is negatively correlated with wages. 
H4c: Agreeableness is positively correlated with job satisfaction. 
Neuroticism 
An important aspect of this dimension is the way how individuals cope with stress as job 
search exposes individuals to stressful and unfamiliar situations. Under the assumption that 
better information about the prospected job reduces the amount of stress, neurotic individuals 
are more likely to find their jobs via social capital. However, neuroticism could also represent 
an obstacle in creating social ties. Referrals might also increase stress, especially if the 
referral originates from a close friend or relative, who set the job searcher under pressure. 
Therefore, no ex-ante hypothesis can be formulated. 
Empirical studies repeatedly found a negative correlation between neuroticism and post-hire 
outcomes. Highly neurotic persons are performing worse in their jobs which results in fewer 
career chances because of problems coping with stressful situations. The incapacity of coping 
with stress also causes dissatisfaction as stress is answered by inadequate behaviour. 
H5b: Neuroticism is negatively correlated with wages. 
H5c: Neuroticism negatively correlated with job satisfaction. 
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Locus of Control 
Locus of control is likely to be related to source choice. Individuals with an internal belief are 
convinced that their search effort will pay off in finding a job. Therefore, they invest more 
effort in job search via formal channels (Caliendo et al., 2010). On the contrary, externally 
oriented individuals do not search actively but find a job randomly, which is much more 
probable through social contacts that spread information about a vacancy. 
H6a: Internal LOC is negatively correlated with finding a job via social capital. 
Apart from search effort, an internal locus of control is likely to increase individual work 
motivation. As Bowles et al. (2001) stated, employees with an internal orientation are more 
sensitive to monetary incentives or promotion perspectives. Moreover, believing in one’s own 
strengths should be positively related to job satisfaction. Being convinced that powerful others 
determine career outcomes is likely to be dissatisfying. 
H6b: Internal LOC is positively correlated with wages. 
H6c: Internal LOC is positively correlated with job satisfaction. 
Positive Reciprocity 
Positive reciprocity is expected to be a predictor for social capital because returning favours 
appears to be a determinant of tie stability. One-sided relationships are not likely to pertain for 
long. Hence, reciprocal individuals are more likely to dispose of a large and useful network to 
find a job. 
H7a: Positive reciprocity is positively correlated with finding a job via social capital. 
Being highly reciprocal might have a positive effect on wages. Returning favours of others 
ensures that both individuals are willing to exchange favours again. Hence, a mutually 
beneficial relationship remains intact. Additionally, returning favours could be positively 
related to job satisfaction, because the ability to exchange favours is likely to have a positive 
effect on the working relationships and the general working atmosphere. 
H7b: Positive reciprocity is positively correlated with wages. 
H7c: Positive reciprocity is positively correlated with job satisfaction. 
Negative Reciprocity 
Strong reactions to negative experiences are likely to destroy interpersonal ties in contrast to 
calm and thoughtful reactions. Therefore, persons who tend to react strongly and to get angry 
quickly might dispose of smaller networks. 
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H8a: Negative reciprocity is negatively correlated with finding a job via social capital. 
However, it is questionable if negative reciprocity is related to job search outcomes. With 
increasing tenure, aggressive and hostile reactions towards others might be regarded as a lack 
of self-control, which could be an obstacle in one’s career. Inappropriate reactions cause 
similar responses from others, which might lead to dissatisfaction and the decision to quit the 
job. However, it is not important at the beginning of the employment. Therefore, no relation 
between negative reciprocity and post-hire outcomes are expected. All hypotheses describing 
the expected correlation between job search via social capital and personality traits with post-
hire outcomes are summarised in Table 27. 
Table 27: Summary of hypotheses regarding personality traits 
  (a) (b) (c) 
 Character Trait Channel choice (SC) Wages Job satisfaction 
H1: Openness to Experience (+) no effect no effect 
H2: Conscientiousness (-) (+) (+) 
H3: Extraversion (+) (+) (+) 
H4: Agreeableness (+) (-) (+) 
H5: Neuroticism no effect (-) (-) 
H6: Locus of Control (-) (+) (+) 
H7: Positive Reciprocity (+) (+) (+) 
H8: Negative Reciprocity (-) no effect no effect 
5.3 Empirical Evidence 
5.3.1 Dataset and Personality Measures 
The data for this study are drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and 
comprises data of 1,432 individuals who changed their jobs 1,880 times in the years 2005 to 
2011. The data has been limited to the working population aged 18-65; self-employed 
workers and the agricultural sector have been excluded. In 2005, a set of questions measuring 
three distinct measures of personality – the Big Five, locus of control, and reciprocity – were 
included in the SOEP for the first time. As shown in Chart 12, the Big Five questions are 
asked again in 2009, whereas questions for locus of control and reciprocity are repeated in 
2010. Personality measures are regarded as stable enough to assume similar values in the 
years after the measurement. Therefore, the results of the 2005 and the 2009/2010 waves are 
used as a proxy for the personality measures in the following years (see the discussion of the 
consistency of personality traits in chapter 5.2.2). 
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Survey year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Measure 
       
Big Five 1
st
 wave 2
nd
 wave 
        
Locus of Control 1
st
 wave 2
nd
 wave 
        
Reciprocity 1
st
 wave 2
nd
 wave 
   
Chart 12: Personality questionnaires on the Socio-Economic Panel 
 
The SOEP questionnaires in 2005 and 2009/2010 contain 31 questions to assess the three 
personality measures. 15 of these items – three for each dimension – measure the Big Five by 
a short inventory (BFI-S) that has been invented to take the limited time and space of a large 
multi-topic survey into account. In extensive pre-tests, the inventory has shown a satisfactory 
relation to long personality questionnaires.
73
 Respondents had to rate themselves on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 – “does not apply to me at all” to 7 – “does apply to me perfectly”). Questions 
were asked in the form of “I see myself as someone who …” followed by a characteristic 
description referring to one personality dimension (see Table 57 in the Appendix). As Boyce 
et al. (2013) suggested, scores of each dimension were added and normalised (μ=0, σ²=1).  
Locus of control is estimated by ten items, six of which refer to an external, four to an internal 
orientation (see Appendix: Table 58). The initial question was posted: “To what degree do 
you personally agree with the following statements?” Scores for the external belief were 
inverted to get a one-dimensional bipolar measure, followed by normalisation. The last six 
items (three each) pertain to the two distinct measures of positive and negative reciprocity. 
Participants were asked to what degree the six statements apply to them (see Appendix: Table 
59). In contrast to locus of control, positive and negative reciprocity are not a single bipolar 
measure as reactions to positive or negative actions of others might differ (Heineck, Anger, 
2010). Chart 13 shows the distribution of the personality variables with the assumed normal 
distribution. Only few measures fit the normal distribution well, most are skewed. 
  
                                                 
73
 See Gerlitz and Schupp (2005) for a detailed description of the implementation and the validity of the BFI-S. 
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Chart 13: Distribution of answers to the personality questions 
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Table 28 provides an overview of the variables used in this chapter. Apart from personality 
variables, all measures are the same as in chapter 3 (see Table 5). A comparison of the 
reduced dataset with the original dataset in chapter 3 shows that there are little differences 
between the two datasets. The use of social ties and employment agencies is nearly identical. 
Internet adverts have become slightly more important in the reduced dataset while newspaper 
adverts have been used less frequently. This can be explained by an underlying time trend in 
the data. Since the years 1999 until 2004 are excluded in this sample, the dataset contains 
observations of the years in which internet adverts became more and more important (see 
Chart 8 in chapter 3). Normalised personality measures, in average, fluctuate rather sharply 
around zero. Negative reciprocity, a measure which is most likely skewed, accounts for the 
larges distance from zero. Dependent variables are monthly earnings and job satisfaction. In 
average, respondents earned around 2,000 euros (in prices of 2010) and reported a level of job 
satisfaction of 7.1. 
With regard to demographic characteristics, only few differences can be observed between the 
two datasets. Around half of the job changers are female. Job changers in this sample are 
slightly older (37.2 compared to 36.6) and report a slightly higher level of education (12.7 
compared to 12.5). This difference is likely to be caused by demographic changes (e.g. older 
employees, more educated employees) and not by selection effects. All other demographics 
are nearly the same.  
Little differences can be found for job related characteristics. Regarding branch differences, 
an increase in the importance of the service sector is remarkable. Little changes can be found 
in terms of firm size and job classifications. The most striking difference is detected for 
finding a job with limited duration, which is considerably higher in the reduced dataset (.32 
compared to .18) which might indicate a time trend the emergence of temporary contracts. All 
in all, this overview shows that few differences can be found when years without personality 
variables are excluded. Missing values in the personality variables are, therefore, random. 
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Table 28: Dataset overview (reduced dataset with personality traits) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variable    
Monthly wage income 1,880 1,965.40 1303.76 
Job satisfaction 1,880 7.137 2.062 
    
Recruitment source 
   
Referrals (1=yes) 1,880 0.539 0.499 
Newspaper (1=yes) 1,880 0.212 0.409 
Employment office (1=yes) 1,880 0.086 0.281 
Internet (1=yes) 1,880 0.162 0.369 
  
   
Five Factor Model 
   
Agreeableness 1,880 -0.012 0.978 
Conscientiousness 1,880 -0.017 1.026 
Extraversion 1,880 0.007 1.000 
Neuroticism 1,880 0.005 1.004 
Openness to experience 1,880 -0.012 0.971 
  
   
Locus of control 1,880 -0.027 0.997 
Positive reciprocity 1,880 0.025 0.986 
Negative reciprocity 1,880 0.050 1.010 
  
   
Gender (1=female) 1,880 0.521 0.500 
Age 1,880 37.220 9.963 
Years of education 1,880 12.688 2.598 
Married (1=yes) 1,880 0.494 0.500 
Children in household (1=yes) 1,880 0.474 0.499 
Immigrant (1=yes) 1,880 0.090 0.286 
East Germany (1=yes) 1,880 0.244 0.429 
  
   
Unemployed before (1=yes) 1,880 0.259 0.438 
Total years of unemployment 1,880 1.034 1.881 
Actively sought (1=yes) 1,880 0.651 0.477 
  
   
Branch 
   
Industry (1=yes) 1,880 0.219 0.414 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 1,880 0.061 0.240 
Trade (1=yes) 1,880 0.245 0.430 
Finance (1=yes) 1,880 0.159 0.365 
Services (1=yes) 1,880 0.316 0.465 
  
   
Firm size  
   
less than 20 (1=yes) 1,880 0.363 0.481 
20 to 199 (1=yes) 1,880 0.310 0.462 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 1,880 0.172 0.378 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 1,880 0.155 0.362 
  
   
ISCO job classification 
   
Legislators, senior officials & managers (1=yes) 1,880 0.049 0.217 
Professionals (1=yes) 1,880 0.143 0.350 
Technicians and associate professionals (1=yes) 1,880 0.245 0.430 
Clerks (1=yes) 1,880 0.116 0.321 
Service workers (1=yes) 1,880 0.154 0.361 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 1,880 0.131 0.337 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 1,880 0.077 0.267 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 1,880 0.085 0.279 
  
   
Civil servant (1=yes) 1,880 0.158 0.365 
Working hours per week 1,880 37.008 13.621 
Limited contract (1=yes) 1,880 0.316 0.465 
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5.3.2 Methodology 
As already shown in chapter 3 of this dissertation, source choice is non-random. Individuals 
self-select into sources according to certain demographic or job-related characteristics. As a 
result, estimated coefficients are likely to be biased. Furthermore, as this chapter concentrates 
on the role of personality traits in the job search process, it is not clear if personality traits 
affect source choice, source outcomes or both. Therefore, a two-stage estimator is chosen to 
reduce potential biases. 
The most common method to reduce the selectivity bias is the two-stage Heckman approach 
which corrects for self-selection in the binomial case (Heckman, 1979). In order to avoid 
biased source estimators by grouping search channels into formal and informal, four 
recruitment channels are separated in this paper. It is quite likely that both determinants and 
post-hire outcomes differ between these formal channels which would result in biased 
coefficients when formal channels are simply pooled together. Two early methods that can be 
applied to the multivariate selection case were introduced by Lee (1983) and Dubbin and 
McFadden (1984), more recently, a semi-parametric approach has been presented by Dahl 
(2002). Bourguignon et al. (2007) compared these three approaches in a set of Monte Carlo 
experiments. They showed that the Dubbin-McFadden model performs well under the 
restriction that all correlation coefficients between selection channels sum-up to zero. 
However, if this assumption is violated, the estimator performs poorly. Therefore, they 
introduced a variant of Dubin-McFadden estimator (called DMF2) that relaxes this restriction. 
The DMF2 estimator consists of a multinomial logistic regression on the first level that 
estimates four correction terms for each observation (one for each source) to take the selection 
effect into account. On the second level, an OLS model including the correction term is 
estimated. In order to increase the validity of the estimations, an exclusionary restriction is 
required – a variable which is solely in the selection equation and not in the second stage 
regression. It is assumed that active search is highly correlated with job search via formal 
channels but being unrelated to post-hire outcomes. Active search is likely to be driven by 
dissatisfaction with the current job or job loss because individuals search actively in order to 
find a new job in this situation. Furthermore, previous analyses in chapter 3 have shown that 
active search is a key determinant of finding a job via formal means. On the contrary, job 
search via social ties appears to be related to passive search. Moreover, in the regression 
analyses in chapter 4, the active search dummy is not statistically related to post-hire 
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outcomes. Thus, it is assumed that active search fulfils all requirements of an exclusionary 
restriction.
74
 The full theoretical model is given by 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙  𝛾 + 𝑃𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝜌 + 𝐴𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 +  𝜖 (5.1) 
with  
 Pr (𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘) =  𝜃 + 𝑃𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝜅 + 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜆 + 𝐴𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ μ +  𝜂,         (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) (5.2) 
  1 friends/relatives 
and k =  
2 newspaper adverts 
3 (public) employment agencies 
  4 internet adverts 
 
where equation (1) represents the second level equation including log(wage) as the dependent 
variable of individual i in period t and equation (2) which accounts for the endogeneity of 
source choice. α and 𝜃 represent the intercepts. In both regressions, SOURCE stands for a set 
of dummy variables for the recruitment channel the job was finally found through. P 
represents the vector of the personality variables described above. Corr contains correction 
terms which derive from the first stage regression. Vector A contains a set of demographic 
and job-related control variables that are likely to determine the respective wage respectively 
the selection into job finding channels. Actsought represents a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the job was found after active search and 0 if not. ϵ and η are error terms. 
The model to estimate the relationship between source usage and job satisfaction is given by: 
 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑆𝑎𝑡 (𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛾 +  𝑃𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝜌 + 𝐵𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 +  𝜖 (5.3) 
with 
 Pr (𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘) =  𝜃 + 𝑃𝑖𝑡
′  ∙ 𝜅 + 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜆 + 𝐴𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ μ +  𝜂,         (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) (5.4) 
where equation (3) is the second-stage regression and equation (4) equals equation (2) of the 
wage estimation. Apart from demographic and job related measures, the control vector B 
contains variables related to satisfaction, such as health, perceived job security, and wages. 
Vector A is the same as in the regression above. The latter approach is chosen to eliminate 
potential income effects in job satisfaction. In a further regression, it is not controlled for 
income in order to be able to compare the findings. 
Moreover, ignoring the two-stage nature of the model leads to inconsistent standard errors 
(Newey, McFadden, 1994). Therefore, Bourguignon et al. (2007) strongly suggested 
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 Huber and Mellace (2014) proposed tests for the violation of the assumptions of exclusion restrictions (the 
variable is related to the selection but not to the second stage outcome), however, this approach has not been 
applied to a model with a multivariate selection regression. 
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resampling methods to correct the variances of the estimators. The jackknife estimator with 
1,432 repetitions (sample size) is applied to calculate individually clustered standard errors. 
The jackknife estimator is preferred to the bootstrap estimator because jackknife calculates 
solely one value for the standard error, whereas bootstrapping leads to different estimators 
when it is repeated. Furthermore, Efron (1979) showed that both estimators are related as the 
jackknife can be regarded as a linear expansion for approximating the bootstrap. 
5.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 29 provides a first impression on how employees differ in personality traits across 
recruiting sources. Arithmetic means in “Big Five” character traits reveal some significant 
differences. Workers hired through public employment offices are less conscientious; those 
who used the internet are more open to new experiences and less extraverted. Other “Big 
Five” personality dimensions show no significant differences between sources. Furthermore, 
as assumed, an internal locus of control is related to job search via newspaper and internet 
adverts. Both positive and negative reciprocity show now difference between sources. 
Table 29: Big Five personality traits, locus of control, and reciprocity by recruitment source 
  Friends/relatives Newspaper Emp. Office Internet 
Openness -0.037 -0.055 0.031 0.105* 
  (0.987) (0.922) (0.951) (0.981) 
Conscientiousness 0.005 0.057 -0.210** -0.085 
  (1.031) (0.998) (1.072) (1.011) 
Extraversion 0.038 0.028 -0.076 0.080* 
  (0.977) (0.984) (1.052) (1.062) 
Agreeableness 0.001 0.026 -0.116 -0.047 
  (0.972) (0.934) (1.075) (0.998) 
Neuroticism 0.028 -0.037 -0.015 -0.004 
  (0.996) (1.016) (1.038) (0.998) 
Locus of Control -0.096 0.068** -0.105 0.117** 
  (1.015) (0.932) (1.010) (0.995) 
Positive Reciprocity 0.044 -0.015 0.005 0.025 
  (1.001) (1.012) (0.878) (0.958) 
Negative Reciprocity 0.059 0.034 0.179 -0.028 
  (0.994) (0.962) (1.163) (1.032) 
Observations 1,014 399 162 305 
Notes: Arithmetic means, standard deviations in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively, 
of t-tests for differences in means compared to friends/relatives. 
Apart from personality differences, job searchers could also differ with regard to demographic 
characteristics (see Table 30). Participants who found their job via newspaper adverts are 
more likely to be female compared to those who found jobs via friends or relatives. Both job 
searchers via employment offices and internet adverts are younger than the reference group. 
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More years of education can be observed for those who found their jobs via internet adverts. 
Further source differences can be found for highly correlated characteristics such as marital 
status and children in the household. Immigrants search less on the internet. Those who have 
been unemployed before the new job are more likely to have found their job via employment 
agencies or internet adverts. The total sum of years unemployed is higher for those who found 
their jobs with help of employment agencies and lower for internet job searchers. Job search 
via social capital is less likely to be related to active search but by unintended receipt of 
information by contacts, which underlines the reliability of the exclusionary restriction. 
Source differences are qualitatively similar in comparison with the larger dataset utilised in 
chapters 3 and 4, displayed in Table 7. 
Table 30: Demographic and search related individual differences 
  Friends/relatives Newspaper Emp. Office Internet 
Sex (1=Female) 0.497 0.582** 0.516 0.510 
  (0.500) (0.494) (0.501) (0.501) 
Age 38.017 38.653 35.841** 35.428*** 
  (10.001) (9.719) (10.605) (8.915) 
Years of Education 12.381 12.644* 12.089 13.699*** 
  (2.488) (2.437) (2.375) (2.732) 
Married (1=yes) 0.525 0.579* 0.420** 0.390*** 
  (0.500) (0.494) (0.495) (0.489) 
Children in HH (1=yes) 0.499 0.510 0.497 0.363*** 
  (0.500) (0.501) (0.502) (0.482) 
East Germany (1=yes) 0.258 0.153*** 0.338* 0.260 
  (0.438) (0.361) (0.474) (0.440) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 0.097 0.082 0.108 0.065* 
  (0.297) (0.274) (0.312) (0.247) 
Unempl. before new job (1=yes) 0.213 0.250 0.548*** 0.274* 
  (0.410) (0.434) (0.499) (0.447) 
Unempl. experience (in years) 1.088 0.992 1.657*** 0.644*** 
  (1.967) (1.921) (2.390) (1.045) 
Actively sought (1=yes) 0.478 0.824*** 0.879*** 0.873*** 
  (0.500) (0.381) (0.327) (0.333) 
Observations 966 392 157 292 
Notes: Arithmetic means, standard deviations in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively, 
of t-tests for differences in means compared to friends/relatives. 
The descriptive analyses provided a first impression of differences between job seekers who 
were successful via one of the four channels. However, multivariate analyses have to reveal if 
personality traits and demographic characteristics are able to explain source selection and/or 
differences in post-hire outcomes. 
5.3.4 Multivariate Analysis 
The analyses in the previous chapter have revealed differences between individuals who 
search for a new job via different search channels. However, it is not clear if these factors – 
both personality traits and demographics – actually determine source choice or if they (also) 
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determine post-hire outcomes. Thus, multivariate analysis has to reveal (5.3.4.1) determinants 
of source choice, (5.3.4.2) determinants of wage and job satisfaction, and (5.3.4.3) to correct 
for self-selection into source usage. 
5.3.4.1 Determinants of Job Finding 
As hypothesised in chapter 5.2.5, personality is likely to affect source choice and job finding 
in various ways. Table 31 shows the results of the multinomial logistic regression with the 
recruitment source as the dependent variable, the mentioned measures of personality as 
independent variables, and a large set of control variables. Compared to the reference group 
of job search via social capital, more open individuals are more likely to find a job via internet 
adverts or employment offices. Those who found their job with the aid of public employment 
agencies are less conscientious. The coefficient for extraversion is negative for all formal 
channels but statistically significant only for internet job searchers. Job search via newspaper 
adverts and employment offices seems to be associated with a higher degree of locus of 
control. This holds true for the other two channels as well, however, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant different from zero. Therefore, one can conclude that personality 
differences affect source choice in the expected direction. 
Regarding the other control variables, most demographic coefficients are insignificant. 
Females tend to search more frequently via newspaper adverts, whereas this channel is less 
frequently used in eastern Germany. The largest coefficient can be found for active job 
search, indicating that finding a job via social capital is rather unintended and random. 
Unemployment increases the likelihood of finding a job via employment agencies and internet 
adverts, whereas those who found their job via internet adverts were unemployed for fewer 
years in total. Jobs in the industry sector are often found via employment agencies, in the 
service sector via employment agencies and internet adverts. Job search behaviour is not 
related to the type of job change, meaning search for the first job, search after a break, or job-
to-job change. Firm size is also positively related to finding a job on the internet. The ISCO 
job classifications are vastly unrelated to search channels, except for elementary occupations 
which are less likely to be found on the internet. 
As this analysis mainly aimed at identifying determinants of source choice (and not at 
measuring the size of the correlation), marginal effects are not further discussed but can be 
found in Table 32. 
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Table 31: Multinomial logarithmic regression results of the determinants of source choice 
 DV: Channel the job was found through Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
 Ref: Friends/relatives Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Five-Factor Model 
      
Openness 0.010 (0.079) 0.213* (0.108) 0.199* (0.096) 
Conscientiousness -0.001 (0.078) -0.243* (0.098) -0.021 (0.087) 
Extraversion -0.051 (0.078) -0.210 (0.113) -0.217* (0.089) 
Agreeableness -0.026 (0.079) -0.185 (0.113) -0.045 (0.092) 
Neuroticism -0.098 (0.081) -0.105 (0.109) 0.041 (0.092) 
       
Locus of Control 0.201** (0.075) 0.219* (0.109) 0.161 (0.093) 
Positive Reciprocity -0.069 (0.077) 0.000 (0.099) -0.024 (0.087) 
Negative Reciprocity 0.059 (0.073) 0.018 (0.110) -0.035 (0.097) 
  
      
Gender (1=female) 0.654*** (0.196) 0.423 (0.267) 0.369 (0.204) 
Years of education 0.025 (0.038) -0.032 (0.059) 0.081* (0.041) 
Age 0.010 (0.060) -0.121 (0.078) 0.050 (0.071) 
Age squared/100 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Married (1=yes) 0.310 (0.166) -0.045 (0.243) -0.037 (0.200) 
Children in HH (1=yes) 0.173 (0.163) 0.371 (0.213) -0.149 (0.190) 
East Germany (1=yes) -0.801*** (0.198) 0.021 (0.235) -0.043 (0.193) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.101 (0.259) 0.410 (0.330) 0.103 (0.295) 
Actively sought (1=yes) 1.738*** (0.161) 1.918*** (0.291) 2.053*** (0.210) 
       
Type of job change (ref.: new employer) 
      
First job (1=yes) -0.699 (0.432) -0.624 (0.586) -0.550 (0.381) 
Job after break (1=yes) -0.115 (0.197) 0.358 (0.251) 0.245 (0.243) 
       
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 0.183 (0.166) 1.007*** (0.221) 0.420* (0.196) 
Years of unemployment 0.012 (0.048) 0.087 (0.049) -0.131* (0.061) 
       
Branch dummies (ref.: trade) 
      
Industry (1=yes) -0.007 (0.217) 1.013** (0.371) 0.420 (0.260) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) -0.674 (0.381) 0.601 (0.478) -0.438 (0.530) 
Finance (1=yes) -0.012 (0.241) 0.614 (0.401) 0.248 (0.282) 
Services (1=yes) 0.085 (0.218) 0.991** (0.347) 0.591* (0.257) 
       
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
      
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.186 (0.175) -0.346 (0.265) 0.239 (0.220) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 0.618** (0.204) -0.204 (0.314) 0.728** (0.247) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 0.152 (0.241) 0.118 (0.324) 1.152*** (0.245) 
       
Limited contract (1=yes) -0.253 (0.160) 0.288 (0.208) -0.226 (0.188) 
Working hours per week 0.011 (0.006) 0.020* (0.008) 0.033*** (0.008) 
Public sector (1=yes) -0.355 (0.244) 0.115 (0.336) -0.388 (0.262) 
  
      
ISCO job classification (ref.: legislators, senior officials and managers) 
    
Professionals (1=yes) -0.100 (0.375) 1.137 (1.138) 0.038 (0.373) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 0.423 (0.351) 1.814 (1.083) 0.387 (0.368) 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.311 (0.394) 2.132 (1.111) -0.265 (0.424) 
Service workers (1=yes) 0.010 (0.391) 1.965 (1.133) 0.321 (0.414) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 0.152 (0.401) 2.128 (1.104) -0.401 (0.474) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 0.151 (0.414) 2.108 (1.137) 0.052 (0.449) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.399 (0.423) 1.261 (1.139) -1.300* (0.578) 
    
Year dummies yes yes Yes 
Constant -3.596** (1.295) -5.040* (2.049) -7.082*** (1.382) 
Observations 1,880 
McFadden Pseudo-R² 0.176 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 32: Marginal effects of the determinants of source choice 
 DV: Channel the job was found through Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
 Ref: Friends/relatives Mar. Eff. SE Mar. Eff. SE Mar. Eff. SE 
Five-Factor Model 
      
Openness -0.005 (0.012) 0.009 (0.006) 0.019* (0.009) 
Conscientiousness 0.002 (0.012) -0.013* (0.005) -0.001 (0.008) 
Extraversion -0.002 (0.012) -0.009 (0.006) -0.020* (0.009) 
Agreeableness -0.002 (0.013) -0.009 (0.006) -0.003 (0.009) 
Neuroticism -0.019 (0.013) -0.005 (0.006) 0.007 (0.009) 
       
Locus of Control 0.026* (0.012) 0.009 (0.006) 0.009 (0.009) 
Positive Reciprocity -0.011 (0.012) 0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.008) 
Negative Reciprocity 0.009 (0.012) 0.001 (0.006) -0.005 (0.009) 
  
      
Gender (1=female) 0.099*** (0.031) 0.013 (0.014) 0.020 (0.020) 
Years of education 0.002 (0.006) -0.003 (0.003) 0.008 (0.004) 
Age 0.001 (0.010) -0.006 (0.004) 0.006 (0.007) 
Age squared/100 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Married (1=yes) 0.057* (0.027) -0.006 (0.013) -0.011 (0.020) 
Children in HH (1=yes) 0.025 (0.026) 0.019 (0.011) -0.023 (0.018) 
East Germany (1=yes) -0.134*** (0.031) 0.013 (0.012) 0.017 (0.019) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.026 (0.042) 0.023 (0.017) 0.006 (0.030) 
Actively sought (1=yes) 0.218*** (0.025) 0.072*** (0.015) 0.156*** (0.020) 
       
Type of job change (ref.: new employer) 
      
First job (1=yes) -0.088 (0.051) -0.020 (0.020) -0.040 (0.027) 
Job after break (1=yes) -0.034 (0.029) 0.020 (0.016) 0.026 (0.027) 
       
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) 0.005 (0.027) 0.050*** (0.013) 0.032 (0.019) 
Total years of unemployment 0.005 (0.008) 0.005* (0.003) -0.015* (0.006) 
       
Branch dummies (reference: trade) 
      
Industry (1=yes) -0.017 (0.036) 0.048* (0.020) 0.036 (0.025) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) -0.096* (0.047) 0.035 (0.025) -0.025 (0.034) 
Finance (1=yes) -0.017 (0.039) 0.023 (0.017) 0.020 (0.025) 
Services (1=yes) -0.012 (0.036) 0.040* (0.017) 0.053* (0.025) 
       
Firm size (reference: less than 20) 
      
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.030 (0.027) -0.021 (0.014) 0.019 (0.018) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 0.097** (0.036) -0.023 (0.015) 0.054* (0.024) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) -0.009 (0.034) -0.004 (0.019) 0.139*** (0.033) 
       
Limited contract (1=yes) -0.042 (0.025) 0.021 (0.011) -0.020 (0.018) 
Working hours per week 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Public sector (1=yes) -0.053 (0.039) 0.014 (0.018) -0.031 (0.025) 
     
ISCO job classification (ref.: legislators, senior officials and managers) 
    
Professionals (1=yes) -0.022 (0.058) 0.023 (0.017) 0.004 (0.039) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 0.055 (0.057) 0.045** (0.016) 0.025 (0.039) 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.054 (0.059) 0.079*** (0.024) -0.030 (0.041) 
Service workers (1=yes) -0.018 (0.061) 0.062** (0.024) 0.029 (0.046) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 0.019 (0.065) 0.076** (0.026) -0.048 (0.043) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 0.012 (0.067) 0.072* (0.029) -0.007 (0.047) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.037 (0.064) 0.036 (0.020) -0.086* (0.040) 
    
Year dummies yes yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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5.3.4.2 Post-hire Outcomes without Endogeneity Correction 
The following two tables summarise the multivariate results assessing the relationship 
between search channels and personality as independent variables and either wages (Table 33) 
or job satisfaction (Table 34) as the dependent variable. In both tables, personality factors and 
sources are included stepwise to observe potential changes in the coefficients. 
The first wage regression model does not include source or personality variables. As 
expected, several demographic variables are significantly related to wages, such as gender  
(-.150) or years of education (.032). Furthermore, working in different branches (compared to 
working in the trade branch) and working in large companies is related to higher earnings. 
Employees on lower occupational levels (measured by the ISCO job classification) receive 
lower wages compared to higher levels. 
Including recruitment source variables into the regression in Model (2) does not change these 
findings. All source coefficients are insignificant, whereas the other coefficients remain 
broadly the same. The results change slightly after adding personality variables, but 
significant coefficients remain significant. Moreover, only (internal) locus of control is 
positively related to wages, all other personality coefficients are insignificant. However, as 
expected, conscientiousness is positively, agreeableness and neuroticism are negatively 
related to wages. Furthermore, both openness and extraversion are negatively correlated to 
wages. 
Similar stepwise regressions are conducted with job satisfaction as the dependent variable 
(Table 34). As the results indicate, job satisfaction is not affected by demographic factors. 
However, individual health and perceived job insecurity are strong determinants of job 
satisfaction. Furthermore, the gross income coefficient shows a positive correlation to job 
satisfaction. In Model (2), all three source variables have a negative sign, statistically 
significant for newspaper adverts. The other coefficients are unaffected, only the gender 
coefficient becomes significant. This significance vanishes, when personality traits are 
included. Source coefficients remain stable. Openness to experience and agreeableness, as 
well as locus of control, are positively related to job satisfaction. Conscientiousness and 
extraversion estimators have at least a positive sign. Neuroticism does not affect job 
satisfaction at all. 
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Table 33: Wage regressions with source choice and personality 
 DV: Log(Monthly Wage) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Source             
Newspaper (1=yes)     0.017 (0.031) 0.009 (0.031) 
Employment office (1=yes)     0.051 (0.036) 0.049 (0.037) 
Internet (1=yes)     0.054 (0.035) 0.051 (0.035) 
       
Five-Factor Model             
Openness         -0.019 (0.014) 
Conscientiousness         0.023 (0.013) 
Extraversion         -0.014 (0.015) 
Agreeableness         -0.024 (0.013) 
Neuroticism         -0.016 (0.014) 
       
Locus of Control         0.027* (0.013) 
Positive Reciprocity         -0.006 (0.012) 
Negative Reciprocity         -0.008 (0.013) 
       
Gender (1=female) -0.150*** (0.034) -0.152*** (0.034) -0.147*** (0.034) 
Years of education 0.032*** (0.006) 0.032*** (0.006) 0.031*** (0.006) 
Age  0.041*** (0.010) 0.041*** (0.010) 0.040*** (0.010) 
Age squared / 1,000 -0.044*** (0.013) -0.044*** (0.013) -0.041*** (0.012) 
Married (1=yes) 0.036 (0.028) 0.037 (0.028) 0.032 (0.028) 
Child in HH (1=yes) -0.003 (0.029) -0.003 (0.029) 0.002 (0.029) 
East Germany (1=yes) -0.199*** (0.029) -0.199*** (0.029) -0.199*** (0.029) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.052 (0.043) -0.053 (0.043) -0.039 (0.044) 
       
Actively sought for new job (1=yes) 0.000 (0.025) -0.013 (0.026) -0.011 (0.026) 
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) -0.045 (0.027) -0.050 (0.026) -0.043 (0.026) 
Total years of unemployment -0.038*** (0.010) -0.038*** (0.010) -0.035*** (0.010) 
       
Branch (reference: trade)             
Industry (1=yes) 0.162*** (0.041) 0.158*** (0.041) 0.159*** (0.041) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 0.173*** (0.054) 0.173*** (0.054) 0.165** (0.054) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.144*** (0.037) 0.142*** (0.037) 0.142*** (0.038) 
Services (1=yes) 0.090** (0.035) 0.085* (0.034) 0.088* (0.035) 
       
Firm size (reference: less than 20)             
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.043 (0.028) 0.043 (0.028) 0.039 (0.028) 
200 to 1,999 (1=yes) 0.157*** (0.033) 0.155*** (0.033) 0.148*** (0.034) 
more than 2,000 (1=yes) 0.152*** (0.038) 0.146*** (0.037) 0.139*** (0.038) 
       
Limited contract (1=yes) -0.092*** (0.025) -0.092*** (0.025) -0.086*** (0.025) 
Working hours per week 0.037*** (0.002) 0.036*** (0.002) 0.036*** (0.002) 
Public sector (1=yes) 0.073 (0.039) 0.074 (0.039) 0.068 (0.039) 
     
ISCO job classification (rf.: legislators, senior officials and managers)         
Professionals (1=yes) 0.049 (0.097) 0.047 (0.098) 0.041 (0.097) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) -0.012 (0.092) -0.014 (0.092) -0.017 (0.092) 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.109 (0.096) -0.109 (0.096) -0.112 (0.096) 
Service workers (1=yes) -0.249** (0.094) -0.250** (0.094) -0.254** (0.094) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) -0.197 (0.105) -0.198 (0.104) -0.202 (0.104) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) -0.313** (0.102) -0.314** (0.102) -0.316** (0.103) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.320** (0.104) -0.317** (0.103) -0.326** (0.103) 
    
Year dummies yes yes Yes 
Constant 4.852*** (0.219) 4.860*** (0.220) 4.914*** (0.215) 
Observations 1,807 1,807 1,807 
(Adjusted) R² 0.668 0.668 0.672 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 34: Job satisfaction regression with source and personality 
 DV: Job satisfaction Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Source             
Newspaper (1=yes)     -0.264* (0.131) -0.287* (0.131) 
Employment office (1=yes)     -0.156 (0.180) -0.132 (0.182) 
Internet (1=yes)     -0.260 (0.146) -0.281 (0.145) 
       
Five-Factor Model             
Openness         0.117* (0.053) 
Conscientiousness         0.082 (0.051) 
Extraversion         0.048 (0.054) 
Agreeableness         0.149** (0.055) 
Neuroticism         -0.004 (0.054) 
       
Locus of Control         0.214*** (0.057) 
Positive Reciprocity         -0.016 (0.052) 
Negative Reciprocity         0.006 (0.053) 
       
Gender (1=female) 0.238 (0.128) 0.261* (0.128) 0.153 (0.128) 
Years of education -0.041 (0.027) -0.039 (0.027) -0.043 (0.026) 
Age  -0.035 (0.042) -0.035 (0.042) -0.036 (0.042) 
Age squared / 1,000 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Married (1=yes) 0.155 (0.121) 0.162 (0.120) 0.159 (0.118) 
Child in HH (1=yes) 0.163 (0.111) 0.162 (0.110) 0.146 (0.107) 
East Germany (1=yes) -0.172 (0.122) -0.189 (0.122) -0.203 (0.120) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.166 (0.165) -0.170 (0.165) -0.122 (0.166) 
       
Actively sought for new job (1=yes) 0.065 (0.106) 0.157 (0.113) 0.171 (0.114) 
Unemployed before new job (1=yes) -0.237 (0.122) -0.224 (0.123) -0.205 (0.122) 
Years of unemployment 0.017 (0.034) 0.016 (0.033) 0.019 (0.033) 
       
Health (reference: very good)             
Good (1=yes) -0.332* (0.140) -0.333* (0.141) -0.315* (0.138) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) -0.961*** (0.160) -0.969*** (0.160) -0.887*** (0.159) 
Poor (1=yes) -1.535*** (0.241) -1.534*** (0.242) -1.370*** (0.240) 
Bad (1=yes) -1.717** (0.578) -1.720** (0.574) -1.604** (0.574) 
              
Perceived job security (reference: not concerned at all)      
Very concerned (1=yes) -1.171*** (0.166) -1.172*** (0.166) -1.062*** (0.167) 
Somewhat concerned (1=yes) -0.384*** (0.102) -0.391*** (0.103) -0.314** (0.103) 
       
Branch (reference: trade) 
   
      
Industry (1=yes) 0.118 (0.156) 0.126 (0.158) 0.085 (0.156) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 0.625** (0.226) 0.604** (0.224) 0.539* (0.219) 
Finance (1=yes) -0.207 (0.171) -0.203 (0.171) -0.227 (0.168) 
Services (1=yes) 0.139 (0.157) 0.155 (0.157) 0.102 (0.156) 
       
Firm size (reference: less than 20)       
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.029 (0.124) 0.038 (0.124) 0.036 (0.122) 
200 to 1,999 (1=yes) 0.029 (0.155) 0.056 (0.156) 0.087 (0.151) 
more than 2,000 (1=yes) 0.052 (0.161) 0.079 (0.161) 0.090 (0.159) 
       
Limited contract (1=yes) 0.081 (0.110) 0.071 (0.110) 0.056 (0.108) 
Working hours per week -0.003 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006) 
Public sector (1=yes) 0.266 (0.160) 0.250 (0.160) 0.244 (0.161) 
Gross Income (in 1,000 Euros) 0.151** (0.058) 0.154** (0.058) 0.157** (0.000) 
     
ISCO job classification (rf.: legislators, senior officials and managers)         
Professionals (1=yes) -0.454 (0.234) -0.448 (0.235) -0.401 (0.228) 
Technicians and associate professionals (1=yes) -0.044 (0.219) -0.023 (0.220) 0.002 (0.209) 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.379 (0.267) -0.392 (0.267) -0.330 (0.256) 
Service workers (1=yes) -0.085 (0.252) -0.080 (0.252) -0.010 (0.243) 
Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) -0.360 (0.251) -0.360 (0.250) -0.278 (0.244) 
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) -0.177 (0.283) -0.171 (0.281) -0.057 (0.277) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.350 (0.290) -0.372 (0.289) -0.228 (0.283) 
    
Year dummies yes yes Yes 
Constant 8.776*** (0.882) 8.741*** (0.881) 8.819*** (0.871) 
Observations 1,807 1,807 1,807 
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.140 0.143 0.166 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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5.3.4.3 Post-hire Outcomes with Endogeneity Correction 
The two previous analyses showed that personality variables are – at least partially – able to 
explain both selection into source usage and post-hire outcomes. In this chapter, both analyses 
are combined in a two-stage approach to investigate how post-hire outcomes are affected by 
source choice and personality variables. The following tables contain solely source and 
personality variables, albeit the other variables of the previous regressions (see Table 33 and 
Table 34) are included as controls as well. 
Table 35: Wage regressions with selectivity bias correction 
DV: Log(wage) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Correction terms included no yes no Yes no yes yes yes 
Personality on the 1st step - yes - Yes - yes no no 
  
        
Source 
        
Newspaper (1=yes) 0.016 0.299** 0.008 0.233* 0.006 0.233* 0.195 0.187 
  (0.030) (0.112) (0.030) (0.117) (0.030) (0.113) (0.122) (0.121) 
Employment office (1=yes) 0.058 -0.059 0.054 -0.083 - - 0.069 0.090 
  (0.036) (0.152) (0.037) (0.164) 
  
(0.176) (0.181) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.055 -0.187 0.052 -0.204 0.046 -0.233 -0.199 -0.206 
  (0.034) (0.116) (0.035) (0.127) (0.035) (0.127) (0.135) (0.136) 
         
Five-Factor Model 
        
Openness - - -0.019 -0.011 -0.019 -0.012 - -0.020 
  
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
(0.014) 
Conscientiousness - - 0.020 0.018 0.022 0.022 - 0.022 
  
  
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.013) 
Extraversion - - -0.014 -0.021 -0.020 -0.026 - -0.014 
  
  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
 
(0.015) 
Agreeableness - - -0.022 -0.025 -0.028* -0.030* - -0.023 
  
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.013) 
Neuroticism - - -0.018 -0.013 -0.019 -0.012 - -0.018 
  
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
         
Locus of Control - - 0.030* 0.029* 0.037** 0.036* - 0.030* 
  
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.013) 
Positive Reciprocity - - -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 - -0.003 
  
  
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
(0.012) 
Negative Reciprocity - - -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.007 - -0.002 
  
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
 
(0.013) 
         
Correction terms 
        
λ1 - social capital - -0.008 - -0.026 - -0.041 0.007 0.013 
  
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.075) (0.078) (0.078) 
λ2 – newspapers - -0.218* - -0.184 - -0.199* -0.125 -0.121 
  
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.098) (0.105) (0.104) 
λ3 - employment office - 0.068 - 0.071 - - -0.002 -0.014 
  
 
0.088 
 
0.095 
  
0.101 0.105 
λ4 – internet - 0.169* - 0.167 - 0.171 0.190* 0.197* 
  
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.090) (0.094) (0.094) 
Observations 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,718 1,718 1,880 1,880 
(Adjusted) R-squared 0.662 0.663 0.664 0.665 0.672 0.673 0.663 0.665 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 35 shows the regression results for wage as the dependent variable. For reasons of 
comparability, all models are estimated with and without the correction terms. Furthermore, 
personality variables are introduced stepwise in both the selection correction and the second-
stage model. Model (1) can be regarded as the base case without any personality variables. In 
this model, all source coefficients are insignificant. Introducing the correction reveals a 
positive and significant wage effect of finding a job via newspaper adverts and a significant 
correction term for this channel. In Model (2), personality variables are included in the second 
stage regression. The source coefficients remain similar compared to the previous model. In 
both regressions locus of control is a significant and positive correlate of wage. In order to get 
more robust results, job seekers who found their job with the aid of unemployment agencies 
and who might differ from all other job seekers are excluded in Model (3). Regarding source 
coefficients and locus of control, the results remain stable. An additional negative wage effect 
can be found for agreeableness. In the last model (4), personality variables are excluded from 
the first-stage estimation. This specification leads to insignificant source coefficients and a 
positive correlation of wages with locus of control. In general, these estimates show that wage 
effects of newspaper and internet adverts are biased by selectivity into source usage. 
The table below presents multivariate results on the relationship between source/personality 
and job satisfaction. Corresponding to the previous table, Table 36 shows regressions with 
and without the correction terms and with or without personality in both steps. In Model (1) 
all source coefficients, with and without the correction terms, are insignificant. After 
introducing personality variables in Model (2), the newspaper coefficient becomes 
significantly negative, although it becomes insignificant when the correction terms are added. 
Among the personality variables, openness, agreeableness and locus of control are positively 
related to job satisfaction. In the third model individuals are excluded who found their job 
through employment agencies. The results remain rather unchanged, only the openness 
coefficient becomes insignificant. Similar findings are suggested by the last specification 
(Model 4) where personality variables are not included in the first stage regression. 
The regression results reveal that self-selection into sources is also an issue regarding job 
satisfaction. However, wages kept constant, certain personality traits are related to higher job 
satisfaction. Including a squared measure to allow for a non-linear relationship between wages 
and job satisfaction did not change the results either. 
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Table 36: Job satisfaction regressions with selectivity bias correction 
DV: Job satisfaction Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Correction terms included no yes no yes no yes yes yes 
Personality on the 1st step - yes - yes - yes no no 
Source 
        
Newspaper (1=yes) -0.227 0.380 -0.248* 0.072 -0.243 0.195 -0.027 0.005 
  (0.126) (0.482) (0.125) (0.514) (0.126) (0.512) (0.537) (0.540) 
Employment office (1=yes) -0.231 0.242 -0.198 0.702 - - 1.133 1.041 
  (0.181) (0.649) (0.183) (0.689) 
  
(0.744) (0.753) 
Internet (1=yes) -0.238 -0.014 -0.255 -0.054 -0.231 0.080 -0.156 -0.106 
  (0.140) (0.487) (0.139) (0.511) (0.139) (0.518) (0.522) (0.524) 
         
Five-Factor Model 
        
Openness - - 0.120* 0.110* 0.093 0.094 - 0.121* 
  
  
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) 
 
(0.053) 
Conscientiousness - - 0.085 0.097 0.073 0.065 - 0.082 
  
  
(0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
 
(0.051) 
Extraversion - - 0.042 0.054 0.022 0.028 - 0.039 
  
  
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) 
 
(0.054) 
Agreeableness - - 0.149** 0.161** 0.165** 0.165** - 0.149** 
  
  
(0.054) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) 
 
(0.054) 
Neuroticism - - -0.005 0.008 -0.030 -0.025 - 0.001 
  
  
(0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) 
 
(0.055) 
         
Locus of Control - - 0.201*** 0.184** 0.228*** 0.219*** - 0.204*** 
  
  
(0.058) (0.059) (0.061) (0.062) 
 
(0.058) 
Positive Reciprocity - - 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.000 - -0.006 
  
  
(0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) 
 
(0.053) 
Negative Reciprocity - - 0.019 0.015 0.017 0.014 - 0.019 
  
  
(0.053) (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) 
 
(0.054) 
         
Correction terms 
        
λ1 - social capital - -0.348 - -0.372 - -0.208 -0.424 -0.388 
  
 
(0.302) 
 
(0.304) 
 
(0.298) (0.316) (0.316) 
λ2 – newspapers - -0.763 - -0.564 - -0.507 -0.513 -0.526 
  
 
(0.401) 
 
(0.429) 
 
(0.439) (0.450) (0.457) 
λ3 - employment office - -0.581 - -0.863* - - -1.177** -1.076* 
  
 
0.411 
 
0.430 
  
0.458 0.472 
λ4 – internet - -0.471 - -0.466 - -0.408 -0.415 -0.439 
  
 
(0.363) 
 
(0.373) 
 
(0.374) (0.373) (0.373) 
Observations 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,718 1,718 1,880 1,880 
(Adjusted) R² 0.123 0.125 0.141 0.144 0.147 0.148 0.126 0.144 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
In their analysis of the relationship between personality and wages, Heineck and Anger 
(2010) found significant gender differences in separate regressions for males and females. 
Similar degrees in certain personality traits appear to be perceived differently if the respective 
person is male or female. For instance, an extraverted woman might be perceived differently 
than an extraverted man, which might have a different effect on wages. Hence, it appears 
useful to separate regressions by gender (Table 37).  
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Table 37: Gender differences in wages and job satisfaction with endogeneity correction 
 DV Wages Job Satisfaction 
 Gender Male Female Male Female 
Correction term included no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Source                 
Newspaper (1=yes) 0.045 0.153 0.001 0.308* -0.176 0.285 -0.263 -0.075 
  (0.043) (0.194) (0.040) (0.141) (0.180) (0.755) (0.183) (0.713) 
Employment office (1=yes) 0.101* 0.056 0.042 -0.170 -0.538 -0.450 0.128 2.142* 
  (0.051) (0.204) (0.059) (0.273) (0.281) (0.981) (0.243) (1.002) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.011 -0.171 0.010* -0.177 -0.269 0.127 -0.251 -0.523 
  (0.057) (0.187) (0.044) (0.155) (0.207) (0.730) (0.194) (0.737) 
         
Five-Factor Model                 
Openness 0.002 0.008 -0.039* -0.030 0.182* 0.177* 0.093 0.075 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.074) (0.072) (0.079) (0.080) 
Conscientiousness 0.046* 0.045* 0.012 0.008 0.059 0.055 0.109 0.145 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.070) (0.073) (0.078) (0.080) 
Extraversion -0.005 -0.010 -0.014 -0.021 0.076 0.086 0.028 0.042 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.073) (0.075) (0.080) (0.083) 
Agreeableness -0.029 -0.031 -0.016 -0.021 0.100 0.103 0.172* 0.189* 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.079) (0.080) (0.083) (0.084) 
Neuroticism -0.001 0.002 -0.024 -0.017 -0.054 -0.046 0.026 0.046 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.081) (0.083) (0.077) (0.078) 
         
Locus of Control 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.006 0.002 0.206* 0.194* 0.193* 0.172* 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.088) (0.090) (0.083) (0.085) 
Positive Reciprocity 0.010 0.013 -0.013 -0.011 0.036 0.035 -0.033 -0.039 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.074) (0.076) (0.078) (0.079) 
Negative Reciprocity 0.018 0.016 -0.010 -0.015 0.046 0.042 -0.025 -0.036 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
         
Correction terms                 
λ1 - social capital -  0.015  - -0.043 -  -0.067  - -0.551 
    (0.115)   (0.098)   (0.461)   (0.432) 
λ2 – newspapers  - -0.064  - -0.267*  - -0.407  - -0.629 
    (0.175)   (0.114)   (0.606)   (0.638) 
λ3 - employment office  - 0.042  - 0.105  - -0.131  - -1.681** 
    0.109   (0.170)   0.594   0.644 
λ4 – internet  - 0.147 -  0.166  - -0.366 -  -0.261 
    (0.125)   (0.103)   (0.576)   (0.510) 
Observations 900 900 980 980 900 900 980 980 
(Adjusted) R² 0.517 0.516 0.695 0.697 0.191 0.189 0.112 0.118 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
These regressions reveal that the positive correlation between finding a job via newspaper 
adverts and wages is solely driven by the female share of the population. Furthermore, males 
benefit from being more conscientious and internally-oriented, whereas no significant 
correlation between females’ personality and wages exists. Regarding job satisfaction, 
females are significantly more satisfied after having found a job through employment offices, 
although this effect is based on a small share of the sample (n=82). Openness is related to 
males’ satisfaction, agreeableness to females’. An internal locus of control is positively 
related to both genders’ job satisfaction. Reciprocity again has no effect on post-hire 
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outcomes. Additional regression analyses which included interaction effects between gender 
and personality traits did not reveal significant interactions. This implies that gender 
differences are less meaningful than assumed in the relationship between personality traits 
and post-hire outcomes – at least shortly after a job change. However, this does not exclude 
potential gender differences that might increase with tenure. 
Table 38: Wages and job satisfaction regressions for job-to-job changers 
 DV: Wages Job Satisfaction 
Correction term included no yes no yes 
          
Source         
Newspaper (1=yes) 0.015 0.042 -0.025 0.249 
  (0.035) (0.118) (0.158) (0.518) 
Internet (1=yes) 0.044 -0.172 -0.263 -0.097 
  (0.044) (0.130) (0.178) (0.565) 
     
Five-Factor Model         
Openness -0.020 -0.015 0.108 0.112 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.069) (0.070) 
Conscientiousness 0.024 0.027 0.018 0.019 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.068) (0.068) 
Extraversion -0.026 -0.032 -0.046 -0.040 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.067) (0.070) 
Agreeableness -0.039* -0.043* 0.159* 0.169* 
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.069) (0.070) 
Neuroticism -0.012 -0.010 -0.066 -0.054 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.071) (0.072) 
     
Locus of Control 0.049** 0.049** 0.238*** 0.232** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.074) (0.076) 
Positive Reciprocity -0.007 -0.007 0.004 -0.007 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.069) (0.070) 
Negative Reciprocity -0.001 -0.001 0.033 0.029 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.067) (0.068) 
     
Correction Term         
λ1 - social capital - -0.158 - -0.589 
    0.095   0.401 
λ2 – newspapers - -0.135 - -0.678 
    0.105   0.468 
λ4 – internet - 0.049 - -0.602 
    0.099   0.444 
Observations 1,127 1,127 1,127 1,127 
(Adjusted) R² 0.697 0.698 0.135 0.137 
Notes: Jackknife clustered standard errors based on 1,426 repetitions in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 
0.1 percent, respectively. 
A last set of analyses (see Table 38) has been conducted based on the more homogeneous 
sub-sample of job-to-job changers who reported that they changed to a new employer 
(without a break) and with no registered unemployment spell in the respective year. This 
subsample might differ from the whole sample as job-to-job changers could dispose of a more 
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valuable social network. For example, in case of job-to-job change, ties to co-workers or 
business partners might be more intimate than after a break. Furthermore, job-to-job changers 
are likely to have less time for job search activities, which might increase usage and benefits 
of informal search channels. In this analysis, search via employment agencies had to be 
excluded as there very too few observations in this category to successfully estimate the 
correction term. All source coefficients and correction terms are insignificant. Regarding 
personality traits, the results show a significant negative correlation between agreeableness 
and wages, whereas there is a positive correlation with job satisfaction. Locus of control is 
positively related to wages and job satisfaction. 
Apart from separate gender regressions, further robustness checks have been implemented. 
For instance, as the model contains branch, occupation and firm size variables as controls it 
might be over-specified. If personality traits were responsible for the selection into certain 
jobs, which – in turn – are related to income or satisfaction, the personality effect might be 
captured in the control variables. Hence, branch, occupation, and firm size variables have 
been excluded (stepwise and altogether) to avoid this effect. The robustness checks confirm 
the previous findings for both dependent variables. Additionally, all regressions were run 
while including the personality traits separately in order to control for potential overlap of the 
measures but this procedure did not yield other results. 
5.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, the main findings of the empirical analyses are summarised and interpreted. 
Additionally, some limitations, such as non-linearities and data problems are described. The 
chapter concludes by elaborating upon practical implications of the findings. 
5.4.1 Interpretation 
The empirical estimates are only partially able to confirm the hypotheses formulated in 
chapter 5.2.5. Therefore, the results regarding the relationship between post-hire outcomes 
and source coefficients respectively personality traits are further discussed.  
First, wage regressions revealed that finding a job via social ties does not increase wages. On 
the contrary, including correction terms resulted in a significant positive coefficient of 
newspaper adverts and negative (but insignificant at the 5 percent level) coefficients 
representing employment offices and internet adverts. Hence, these findings indicate 
considerable self-selection into sources which is particularly meaningful in case of newspaper 
adverts. This is especially unexpected as newspaper adverts might be considered as a rather 
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old-fashioned search channel. However, even controlled for a large variety of job related 
characteristics, newspaper adverts appear to attract a distinct kind of job seekers. Relatively 
higher costs of newspaper advertisements (especially when other cheaper channels are 
available) might be responsible for a selection of jobs offered via this channel. Although also 
jobs for untrained workers are offered in print media, this effect (when controlled for job 
characteristics) might be driven by companies searching for highly educated and experienced 
job seekers for upper positions. On the other hand, firms might use newspaper adverts (a 
channel with considerable costs) in order to find employees for jobs that are difficult to be 
filled, for example because only few job seekers might be willing to work in this job. Firms 
might try to address a larger population of job seekers in order to fill jobs with unpleasant or 
undesirable attributes like high risk of work accidents, inconvenient working times or with a 
lot of stressors (e.g. noise, smell). In these jobs, employees earn usually higher wages due to 
compensating wage differentials.
75
  
Further regression results showed negative correlations between formal channels and job 
satisfaction, however, statistically significant on the 5 percent level only for newspaper 
adverts. Including correction terms into the regressions revealed that selection into source 
usage explains source differences in job satisfaction. This implies that information benefits 
are less meaningful than expected. Individuals adjust their job search strategy according to 
their preferences, for instance, it appears reasonable that individuals, who prefer to work for 
large firms, are more likely to search (or are found by the firms) via formal channels.
76
 
Having found this job, employees do not report higher job satisfaction due to more ex-ante 
information and the satisfaction effect is probably captured in the job-related coefficients. 
Apart from applying a two-stage estimator to measure post-hire outcomes of different job 
search channels, the focus of this article lies on examining the role of personality traits in 
these two stages. On the first stage, some character traits appear to be related to job finding 
via certain channels. For example, as ex-ante hypothesised, individuals who found their job 
via employment offices are less conscientious than other job searchers, whereas internet job 
seekers are less extraverted. Furthermore, an internal locus of control is related to job finding. 
This stands in line with the argument that individuals who are convinced that their own effort 
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 The idea of compensating wage differentials can be traced back to Adam Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations’ 
published in 1776, in which he defined “agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves” 
(Smith, 1848: 74) as a potential source of wage differentials. Grund (2001) provided empirical evidence for the 
existence of compensating wage differentials in case of high risk jobs in Germany. 
76
 Due to a lack of resources, small firms cannot afford to search via multiple (costly) channels which makes it 
more attractive to search via personal contacts (Carroll et al., 1999). 
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determines their outcomes are more likely to search via formal channels. More surprisingly, 
formal channels are more likely to be used by individuals open to experience. Formal means 
might create more unknown situations (as no direct ex-ante contact existed before the 
application) which seems to deter less open individuals. Hence, the hypotheses on the 
selection process could be widely confirmed. 
On the second stage, the estimation of post-hire outcomes, results on personality traits are 
mixed. In the wage regressions LOC is the only variable that has a significant correlation with 
earnings. As hypothesised, individuals with an internal orientation are more convinced of 
their personal impact on outcomes. Although it is controlled for various other determinants of 
career success, an internal orientation is still able to explain wage differences. This might be 
caused by the relation between LOC and job search which does not only affect the decision of 
channel usage, but also reservation wages and search intensity (Caliendo et al., 2010). A 
strong belief in the success of one’s search effort increases search effort and raises the 
reservation wage, which – finally – increases starting wages in new jobs. 
However, other relations that have been frequently found in the literature could not be 
confirmed by the data. For example, high levels of agreeableness have often shown a negative 
correlation with wages (Heineck, 2011) which could not be confirmed in this analysis. This 
finding is robust to other specifications (gender separation, robustness checks). However, 
compared to the related literature, this study focusses on individuals only in the first year after 
a job chance. Being too agreeable might have a negative effect on career prospects with 
increasing tenure, which is not part of this analysis. A similar explanation can explain the 
insignificant correlation between conscientiousness and wages. Due to asymmetric 
information, conscientiousness is mainly invisible for employers. Employers, therefore, do 
not pay higher wages for new hires scoring high in conscientiousness, yet, career effects 
might occur in the long run when information asymmetries play a minor role. 
In all analyses, measures of reciprocity have not shown any significant correlation to either 
channel selection or post-hire outcomes. Two arguments could explain this result: Firstly, 
reciprocity might not be related to post-hire outcomes directly after the job change but after 
certain tenure. Secondly, it is rather questionable if reciprocity is related to post-hire outcomes 
in general. Reciprocity appears to represent a general habit towards the behaviour of others. 
This general attitude seems to have no meaning in the working environment. 
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In additional regressions, job finding channels have been interacted with personality traits in 
order to investigate whether certain personality dimensions are particularly beneficial in case 
the job was found through a given channel. Most interaction coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. Scoring high on internal locus of control, however, is negatively related to 
wages for those who found a job via employment agencies. Individuals who are more open to 
experience report higher job satisfaction when they found their job through newspaper adverts 
or employment agencies. This shows that labour market benefits of personality traits do not 
differ much dependent on the source the job has been found through. Personality traits are 
rather universally applicable non-cognitive skills. 
5.4.2 Limitations 
Some shortcomings in the study design and the data limit the validity of these analyses. 
Unfortunately, the sample had to be restricted to individuals that completed the whole set of 
personality questions and reported a job change in the period under investigation. As a result, 
the earnings respectively the job satisfaction differential (ΔW = Wt – Wt-1; ΔJS = JSt – JSt-1) 
between the current and the previous job could not be used as the dependent variable. This 
might have been beneficial, because increases in wages and job satisfaction would have been 
analysed directly. As this approach requires data from two consecutive periods per 
observation, this would have reduced the sample size even more. A further reduction of the 
sample size would have limited the significance of the findings too much. In addition, in order 
to avoid a further reduction of the sample size, only the first year after the job change is 
investigated. Hence, it is not possible to investigate the long-term effects of job search via 
certain channels respectively personality traits and post-hire outcomes. 
A further constraint is that only linear relationships between personality measures and post-
hire outcomes have been considered. LaHuis et al. (2005), for instance, discussed the role of 
non-linear personality effects. They argued that not all levels of a certain personality trait 
might have the same effect on wages. For example, a minimum level of agreeableness might 
be helpful to be successful in everyday work-relations, whereas a too high degree of 
agreeableness means that an individual is not able to focus on his/her own goals but tries to 
help others to the point of self-sacrifice. So far, few researchers have analysed non-linear 
effects of personality. Benson and Campbell (2007) found an inverted u-shaped relation 
between derailing/dark side personality traits (e.g. ego-centred, intimidating, and 
manipulating) and ratings of leaders. These negative facets of personality cannot be directly 
related to the Big Five taxonomy. Nevertheless, they provide evidence that personality and 
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leadership might be related in a non-linear way. However, as the underlying study shows, 
personality traits are rather responsible for channel selection than for determining post-hire 
outcomes, non-linear terms have not been included. 
Apart from non-linearities, this study as well as the related literature has not analysed 
interactions between certain personality dimensions. Scoring high (or low) in two distinct 
personality measures might serve even more helpful in the labour market. For example, high 
scores in conscientiousness and locus of control could be mutually enforcing as individuals 
are willing to work hard and believe that this work will result in positive outcomes.  
Table 31 revealed the strong correlation between formal source channels and active search. 
The immense importance of active versus passive job search raises the questions if the job 
search model in chapter 5.2.3 describes the complete search process. The decision to search or 
not to search actively can be interpreted as a preceding step before the beginning of the search 
process. This decision is likely to depend on the current employment situation (on-/off-the-job 
search) but might be also affected by personality traits. Especially locus of control could 
largely affect the probability to search actively when individuals believe in the effectiveness 
of their effort. On the contrary, an external orientation might drive individuals into a state of 
resignation in which they give up any search initiative. This might especially be the case if 
long-term unemployment spells had an effect on LOC and other personality traits. By 
affecting the probability to search actively, personality traits might determine search channel 
choice even more strongly.
77
 However, channel selection determinants remain largely robust 
to the exclusion of the active search dummy. 
A shortcoming in the econometric approach is that the two-stage estimator is only used to 
correct for the selection into sources. It is assumed that personality traits and other 
demographic variables explain source selection which is used to correct the wage and job 
satisfaction regressions. This implies that personality only affects source choice but no other 
variables that determine post-hire outcomes. However, Mueser (1979) found that adolescent 
personality influences later occupational status largely by affecting the degree of education. In 
a survey of American eighth graders, LOC affected investments into human capital by 
determining the expected returns of education (Coleman, DeLeire, 2003). Students with an 
internal belief invested more into their human capital as they were convinced that their own 
                                                 
77
 Additional regressions in Table 38 focussed on job-to-job changers without interim unemployment so that 
personality could not be affected by unemployment. The results mainly replicated previous findings. 
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effort is related to their later income. Therefore, the level of education might be affected by 
personality as well, which could not be accounted for. In addition to this, empirical evidence 
has found a correlation between personality and occupational choice and, thus, the choice of 
higher of vocational education. Ham et al. (2009a, 2009b) found that individuals chose their 
jobs according to their personality, e.g. more extravert individuals are more likely to become 
sales representatives than introverts. Since occupations are often connected to wages, 
personality traits can affect wages by determining the occupational choice. 
Unfortunately, data on informal channels is very limited. For instance, it would have been 
interesting to investigate the relationship between personality traits and tie strength between 
the referrer and the referred person. High scores in certain personality dimensions, such as 
agreeableness or extraversion, could increase the number of strong ties within one’s network. 
According to the “strength of weak ties”-hypothesis (Granovetter, 1973), those ties are less 
likely to lead to well-paid or satisficing jobs. Further information about informal search 
channels (e.g. if the information was provided by relatives or friends, frequency of exchange 
etc.) could increase our understanding of how personality and labour market outcomes are 
related. 
5.4.3 Implications for Practice 
This study enhances the understanding of recruiting processes, especially with respect to the 
relation between search channels and personality. Individuals that are found through different 
search channels differ considerably regarding their personality. This finding is particularly 
relevant for companies or jobs with meaningful bonus systems (e.g. sales, production, see 
Heywood, Jirjahn, 2002), as formal channels are more likely to attract employees that score 
high on internal locus of control. Those individuals are easier to be motivated by monetary 
incentives (Bowles et al., 2001), which is likely to be linked to performance.
78
 Bryson et al. 
(2013) found that individual performance pay in Europe is most frequently paid to low-skilled 
employees in the construction and manufacturing sector. Hiring through formal channels 
might be particularly promising for employers in these sectors. Organisations who utilise 
incentive schemes should, furthermore, try to attract individuals who score low in 
neuroticism. Neurotic individuals with inadequate stress responses are more likely to “choke 
under pressure”, meaning that high incentives could be detrimental to performance (Ariely et 
al., 2009). With respect to post-hire outcomes, an internal orientation is related to both wage 
                                                 
78
 See Cable and Judge (1994) for evidence on the relationship between personality and pay preferences of 
college students who were searching for a job. 
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and job satisfaction which supports the assumption that attracting such workers is beneficial 
for an organisation. 
Previous research has linked risk preferences to incentive schemes. Bellemare and Shearer 
(2010) found that more risk tolerant employees sort into jobs with high incentives since 
incentive payments transfer the economic risk at least partially from the employer to the 
employee. Grund and Sliwka (2010) provided further evidence that more risk averse 
employees are less likely to work in jobs with incentive contracts. Risk, as an economic 
preference, has been identified as complementary to personality traits (Becker et al., 2012). 
However, individuals with a strong believe that their effort translates into a desired outcome 
could be willing to bear higher risks. Individuals scoring high in locus of control might 
perceive risks differently because they might believe that risks can be compensated by their 
own effort. Although this relationship has not been investigated empirically, firms could 
attract employees with higher risk tolerance through formal ties.  
The empirical results indicate that openness to experience is positively related to both search 
via internet and job satisfaction. Therefore, firms that intend to find creative and open 
employees should utilise this channel to attract adequate applicants. No correlation was 
detected for neuroticism; hence, firms are not able to adjust their application process to be less 
visible for neurotic individuals. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The objective of the empirical analyses in this chapter was to gain a deeper knowledge of the 
determinants and outcomes of job search via social capital – and the role of personality traits 
in this context. In general, this study aimed at understanding if personality differences explain 
selection into source usage and/or determine post-hire outcomes. The analysis of the 
determinants of job search via certain channels revealed considerable personality differences 
between job searchers via formal and informal channels. The most important hypotheses 
regarding the selection process were supported by the findings. In the second step of the 
analysis, source and personality variables were included in regressions to analyse their 
relationship to wages and job satisfaction. No significant relation could be found between 
post-hire outcomes and recruitment sources. After including four correction terms as proposed 
by Bourguignon et al. (2007), the newspaper coefficient in the wage regression becomes 
significant. Hence, apart from this channel, self-selection might be a lesser concern with 
regard to post-hire outcomes of search channels. Personality variables could explain 
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differences in wages (LOC, agreeableness) and job satisfaction (openness, agreeableness, 
LOC), even when it is controlled for search channels and selection into channel usage. 
The results of this study indicate that selection into job search channels is not only a matter of 
demographic or job-related factors. Differences in personality traits are able to explain why 
some people search via personal contacts and others prefer to utilise formal channels. 
Moreover, personality traits are less able to explain differences in wages; however, a relation 
between personality and job satisfaction could be found. In all steps of the analysis, locus of 
control has proven to be the strongest correlate of channel selection and job success. Hence, 
further studies should implement at least a measure of locus of control in order to control for 
an important determinant of individual behaviour. Future research should investigate the 
relationship between personality traits and the referring person and the long-term effects of 
personality as well as job search channels. For practice, the findings of this study indicate that 
individuals who found their jobs through formal channels are more internally oriented. Those 
employees are more responding to incentive schemes (Bowles et al., 2001), which might be 
relevant for firms in industries or for positions in which incentive schemes are more common 
(e.g. firms with foreign ownership or works councils, see Kurdelbusch, 2002; Heywood, 
Jirjahn, 2014).  
Future research could draw on the theoretical illustrated in Chart 10 in order to investigate this 
complex relationship. Structural equation modelling could serve useful to estimate whether 
the theoretical model accurately describes the selection process into search channels and the 
determination of post-hire outcomes. Furthermore, this approach could directly incorporate 
the personality items instead of using aggregated measures as described in chapter 5.3.1. 
Structural equation modelling could be, thus, a powerful approach in order to investigate the 
job finding process as a whole and multiple stages could be modelled which has not been 
possible in a simpler two-stage model. Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind that “no 
measurement can claim to capture the entire job-search process” (Lin, 2008: 53). Yet, the 
chosen two-stage approach represents an attempt to cover the search process better than 
previous studies. Furthermore, this study has incorporated personality measures in order to 
gain more robust estimates and to elucidate a dimension of individual differences that has 
been widely ignored in the past. Although additional research in this field deems necessary, 
this study can be regarded as a further step bringing personality into economic research. To 
say it with the words of Goldberg (1993: 32): “Once upon a time, we had no personalities. Is 
it not exciting to see their return?” 
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6 Pre-hire and Post-hire Outcomes of Search Activities of Unemployed Job Seekers 
6.1 Introduction 
Unemployment exposes huge monetary and non-monetary costs on individuals, such as 
forgone earnings (Feldstein, 1978), reduction in subjective well-being (Kassenboehmer, 
Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Helliwell, Huang, 2014), and negative effects on psychological and 
physical health (see e.g. McKee-Ryan et al., 2005; Paul, Moser, 2009). Hence, unemployed 
job seekers spend a significant amount of their time on job search activities (Krueger, 
Mueller, 2012). Job search can be conducted via different search channels, which are 
commonly divided into formal and informal channels. Formal channels comprise job search 
via newspaper or internet adverts as well as public and private employment offices. On the 
contrary, individuals could utilise their social ties to friends, relatives, or acquaintances as a 
source of information to find a new job (Zottoli, Wanous, 2000). 
Based on the “strength of weak ties”-hypothesis (Granovetter, 1973), early research for the 
U.S. labour market finds evidence that social ties lead to better jobs as regards to wages and 
job satisfaction (Granovetter, 1995). Wanous (1978) explained the positive effects of social 
ties on post-hire outcomes by more realistic job expectations of applicants as their sources can 
provide the applicants with better information about the respective job. Furthermore, the 
incumbent disposes of information advantages about the skill requirements of the vacancy 
compared to the job seeker. Therefore, pre-screening by the incumbent assures that only high-
skilled and well-fitting applicants receive information about the vacancy because frequent 
recommendation of low-skilled workers could harm the reputation of the recommender 
(Zottoli, Wanous, 2000). In contrast to this, Schwab (1982) denied the existence of any source 
effects and claims that different sources attract a different part of the job seeker population. 
Hence, wage and job satisfaction differences are rather a result of preferences of job searchers 
than of information benefits or pre-screening. 
While the first three chapters of this thesis have investigated relationship between the channel 
the new job has been found through and post-hire outcomes in general, this chapter limits the 
investigation to unemployed job seekers. As visualised in Chart 2, this chapter investigates 
actual job search activities – which might be used simultaneously – and not job finding. 
Therefore, the fourth research question raised in the introduction is addressed. In his 
theoretical model on job search, Burdett (1978) distinguished on and off-the-job search 
(searching while being unemployed) as a search strategy. Unemployment is likely to affect 
everyday life in various ways, e.g. by more time available for job search (especially via 
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formal channels) and a loss of social ties to other employed individuals (Bramoullé, Saint-
Paul, 2010). Unemployment could, therefore, coincide with job search via formal means. Yet, 
analyses in chapter 3 have shown that disadvantaged job seekers can benefit from job search 
via social ties. Those unemployed job seekers who are able to maintain their social network 
might be able to escape more quickly from unemployment and might be better off in terms of 
post-hire outcomes. Thus, the analysis of job search of unemployed job seekers could extend 
our understanding of how social ties translate into monetary and non-monetary benefits.  
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, it is analysed whether job search via 
personal contacts serves as a promising means for escaping unemployment. In contrast to the 
two previous chapters, this analysis exploits rich data of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
on unemployed job seekers. Hence, it is possible to observe search behaviour of unemployed 
job seekers (off-the-job search) and to match this information with job characteristics after 
finding a job. This approach should elucidate the dynamics and outcomes of job search via 
different channels. In a second step it is focussed on those individuals who found a job.  For 
these successful job seekers, post-hire outcomes, i.e. wages, job satisfaction, and job security, 
can be estimated depending on the respective search activities during their unemployment 
spell. Third, this chapter explores whether search activities in unemployment are related to 
finding a job via one of the four channels (social ties, newspapers, employment agencies, and 
internet) which have been investigated throughout this dissertation. 
This chapter is structured as follows: In the next chapter theoretical considerations on the 
particular relevance of social ties for unemployed job seekers are made and connected to the 
existing literature. At the end of this chapter, hypotheses are developed. Chapter 6.3 
introduces the different datasets and methodologies used in order to address the three 
objectives of this chapter. The empirical evidence is presented in chapter 0 and these findings 
are discussed in 6.5. Chapter 6.6 concludes. 
6.2 Theoretical Background and Related Literature 
In chapter 2, different approaches to describe job search of unemployed job seekers have been 
discussed. In this case, the model proposed by Burdett (1978) is particularly relevant because 
on- and off-the-job search are differentiated explicitly. Although costs of off-the-job search 
are probably lower than while being employed (if forgone earnings are considered), search 
effectiveness is likely to differ between the two kinds of job search. Disadvantages of 
unemployed job seekers might derive from human capital depreciation during unemployment 
which is likely to increase with unemployment duration (Mincer, Ofek, 1982; Laureys, 2014). 
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Gibbons and Katz (1991) differentiated unemployed job seekers by the reason for their 
unemployment. They argue that individuals who lose their jobs due to layoffs are worse off 
than individuals who were dismissed due to plant closure because the former employer is 
better informed about the employee quality than other firms on the labour market. As firms, 
which have to dismiss only part of their staff, dispose of a certain room for manoeuvre, they 
are more likely to fire low-skilled workers and to keep high-skilled workers. Hence, being 
fired during a layoff serves as a signal for low quality for other employers resulting in longer 
unemployment duration and lower wages if a new job is found. For Germany, Grund (1999) 
did not find any differences between unemployed job seekers who were affected by layoffs or 
plan closure. He concluded that according to the German legislation 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz – industrial constitution law, §111), work councils have to be 
informed timely and extensively before a planned plant closing. As a result, high-skilled job 
seekers are likely to search and find a new job immediately, whereas, low-skilled job seekers 
are less likely to find a new job before the plant closure. Thus, unemployment might have a 
detrimental effect on the career regardless of the reason for job termination. 
Vishwanath (1989) explained stigmatising from unemployment by statistical discrimination of 
firms. In a labour market with information asymmetries, firms interpret a job seeker’s 
unemployment history as a signal for other – unobservable – factors, i.e. skills or motivation. 
Firms assume that high skilled or motivated job seekers are likely to be employed and, 
therefore, conclude that unemployed job seekers lack these attributes. Lockwood (1991) 
found that the size of the stigma effect varied with the relation between unemployment and 
vacancies. The lower the unemployment rate and the more vacancies were filled, the more 
unemployment served as a negative signal. Biewen and Steffes (2010) investigated this 
relationship empirically and found (weak) evidence for a stigma effect of unemployment. This 
stigma effect was significantly smaller in periods with high unemployment. 
Moreover, Gallie et al. (2003) found evidence for a vicious circle of social exclusion and 
unemployment which explains the stigmatising effect of unemployment. Due to a lack of 
financial resources and the loss of social ties to employed acquaintances, jobless individuals 
are likely to withdraw themselves from social exchange. Social withdrawal, in turn, increases 
the likelihood of staying unemployed. Thus, along with depreciation of human capital, 
unemployment coincides with a loss of social capital which, otherwise, could be helpful in 
finding a job or to increase post-hire outcomes in case a new job is found. 
 
170 Pre-hire and Post-hire Outcomes of Search Activities of Unemployed Job Seekers 
In the light of such difficulties of unemployed job seekers, social capital, which is established 
by the quality and quantity of social relations, is likely to serve helpful in the job search 
process. In general, the two main hypotheses which describe the effectiveness of social ties in 
the job search process – information benefits and pre-screening (see chapter 2.5) – can be 
applied to unemployed job seekers. However, it is likely that the latter argument is 
particularly relevant in case of unemployed job seekers. Information asymmetries have been 
identified as a source for statistical discrimination which leads to stigmatisation of 
unemployed job seekers. Social ties between applicants and employers are likely to reduce 
information asymmetries because social ties exert pressure on both applicants and referees not 
to exploit their room for manoeuvre. As the referee’s reputation is at stake, only those job 
seekers are referred which are particularly fit for the job. Frequent referrals of inadequate job 
seekers are harmful to the referrer’s reputation and, thus, reduce the likelihood that future 
referrals will be considered (Zottoli, Wanous, 2000). Due to the loss of human capital during 
unemployment, referrals of unemployed job seekers are by far more risky for the referrer. 
Therefore, incumbents are only willing to suggest an unemployed job seeker to the employer 
if the probability of a successful referral is sufficiently high. As a result, finding a job via 
social ties might be able to overcome information asymmetries which are particularly 
meaningful in case of unemployed job seekers. While other positive effects of social ties such 
as improved performance due to better P-J or P-O fit remain similar, social ties are 
particularly helpful in alleviating stigma effects of unemployment. 
The advantage of the data used in this chapter is that data on unemployed job seekers contains 
information on current search behaviour. In chapter 3 it has been highlighted that finding a 
job via social ties is most likely not the result of an active search strategy but of unintended 
(or passive) job search. Besides, passive search is probably correlated with off-the-job search 
as unemployed job seekers are more likely to invest time on active search. Hence, search 
behaviour of unemployed job seekers is likely to differ radically from on-the-job searchers. 
Data on channels utilised during the unemployment spell might, therefore, be helpful to 
understand (1) if unemployed job seekers use their ties actively as a means to find a job, (2) if 
active search via social ties increases the probability to find a job via social ties, and (3) how 
searching and finding a job via social ties affects post-hire outcomes. All three aspects of the 
research question include testable hypotheses. Hypotheses in this chapter refer to the actual 
search behaviour instead of finding a job through a certain channel. 
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Chapter 3 has provided impressing evidence on the relationship between active search and 
search channel usage. The vast majority of individuals who found a job via social ties were 
not actively searching for a job. Unemployed job seekers might use social ties – 
simultaneously – with other search activities. However, it is unlikely that social ties represent 
a search channel which is consciously used by job seekers. In line with previous evidence of 
this dissertation, it is assumed that: 
H1 (Source choice): Job search via social ties is mainly unintended and, thus, 
individuals are more likely to search via formal means than via social ties. 
Under the assumption that the first hypothesis is true, two alternative arguments regarding the 
effectiveness in terms finding a job as a pre-hire outcome of social ties derive. On the one 
hand, one can conclude that the most disadvantaged job seekers (e.g. long-term unemployed, 
single parents) are so desperate that they even use their social ties actively to find a job. In this 
scenario, job search via social ties is a means used by those with little chances to find a job. 
On the other hand, in line with the search model provided by Holzer (1988) in which search 
channels differ with regard to costs and effectiveness, social ties might be used by those job 
seekers who dispose of a large network of valuable ties. The active use of social ties might, in 
this case, indicate that the individual believes in the effectiveness of this channel (Bramoullé, 
Saint-Paul, 2010). As these two arguments are mutually exclusive, no clear hypothesis on the 
probability of finding a job can be formulated. 
H2 (Employment Probability): Job search and probability of being employed: no clear 
hypothesis can be formulated. 
With respect to post-hire outcomes, the two previous chapters showed that social ties are 
likely to improve non-monetary outcomes, though, monetary outcomes are negatively 
affected by finding a job via social ties. This is supported by Krug and Rebien (2012) who 
investigated the relationship between social ties and post-hire outcomes of low-skilled 
unemployed job seekers in Germany. Due to the arguments above, it is assumed that 
unemployed job seekers are likely to benefit particularly from social ties, at least regarding 
non-monetary outcomes. Yet, current research and evidence in the previous chapters have 
shown that job search via social ties is probably not related to wages. Therefore, it is 
concluded: 
H3 (Wage): Job search and wages: no testable hypothesis can be formulated. 
H4 (Job satisfaction): Job search via social ties is positively related to job satisfaction. 
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Job quality is multi-dimensional (OECD, 2013) and, thus, difficult to measure. In this chapter, 
job security, both objective and subjective, is interpreted as a proxy for job quality. It is 
assumed that most employees regard job security as a positive attribute of a future job and 
strive for a stable working relationship. In line with the realistic job preview and pre-
screening arguments, job search via social ties should be positively related to job security. 
First, friends or relatives are able to provide realistic ex-ante information on job security 
which enables job seekers to detect insecure jobs. Job seekers who prefer a higher degree of 
job security are less likely to accept such an offer. Second, incumbents who are working for a 
company which offers solely highly insecurity jobs are not likely to promote jobs to their 
friends or relatives. Third, if employers dispose of better ex-ante information about employee 
quality, contracts with a higher level of security (e.g. permanent contracts) might be offered 
more frequently.
79
 These three arguments explain how social ties might help job seekers to 
find a more secure job. 
As mentioned earlier, job security can be measured objectively by differentiating between 
fixed-term (or temporary) and permanent contracts. Fixed-term contracts allow employers to 
dismiss employers (e.g. as a result of poor P-J or P-O fit) more easily because of a lower level 
of legal protection. Dismissals of employees with permanent contracts are more difficult for 
employers due to legal restrictions. Fixed-term contracts are, therefore, considered as a 
determinant of job insecurity. However, limited contracts do not necessarily involve a high 
degree of subjective insecurity since employers might be willing to provide fixed-term 
contracts especially to previously unemployed job seekers in order to learn more about their 
productivity or as an incentive. Employees who are performing well and who believe in the 
continuation of the contract beyond the fixed time are probably less concerned about losing 
their job. On the other hand, employees with permanent contracts can be fired due to poor 
performance, economic downturns, and layoffs. Hence, a subjective measure of job security is 
utilised in this chapter. To summarise this argumentation the following hypothesis is 
formulated 
H5 (Job security): Job search via social ties is negatively related to both objective 
(fixed-term contracts) and subjective (perceived) job insecurity. 
                                                 
79
 This is especially the case when fixed-term contracts are used as a screening device (Portugal, Varejao, 2010). 
Employers who have better ex-ante information on employee quality might not have to rely on fixed-term 
contracts to screen new hires. 
 
173 Pre-hire and Post-hire Outcomes of Search Activities of Unemployed Job Seekers 
6.3 Dataset and Methodology 
The empirical investigation is based on data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), 
an annual representative survey of German households and individuals. The analysis is based 
on the waves four 2005 to 2008 as these years contain detailed information on job search 
behaviour and job search outcomes. More specifically, individuals are included who were 
registered unemployed and actively searching for a new job in the years 2005-2007. 
Information on whether a job has been found and on post-hire outcomes has been taken from 
the respective following year. After the elimination of observations with missing data, the full 
dataset includes 1,348 individuals that report 2,401 unemployment spells.
80
 Further analyses 
reduce the number of observations, e.g. when only successful job seekers are investigated.  
Based on the full sample the two first hypotheses are addressed. First, descriptive evidence 
reveals which search channels are commonly used by unemployed job seekers. Second, it is 
analysed whether job search activities are related to find a job (pre-hire outcome). The 
empirical model estimates the probability of an individual i to be employed in t, conditioned 
on being unemployed in t-1, and can be described as follows: 
Pr(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘) =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝜀,      (𝑘 = 0, 1), (6.1) 
    
with k =  
0 no (unemployed) 
1 yes (employed) 
 
where SearchAct represents various variables describing the search activities in t-1, Control 
comprises control variables measured in t-1 (working time preferences, subjective belief of 
employment probability), Demo includes demographic variables such as age, gender, 
education, family status and health. ε is the error term. The findings can be interpreted as pre-
hire outcomes of job search, i.e. the probability of being employed one year later as a result of 
the usage of certain search channels. 
  
                                                 
80
 Individuals who found a job in the agricultural sector were excluded. Additionally, individuals who escaped 
unemployment by becoming self-employed were excluded as well. Further observations are lost due to missing 
data in the variables “Subjective probability to find a job” and desired working hours. 
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Table 39: Variables for pre-hire outcomes estimations 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Variables in t-1 
    
Job search activities (multiple answers) 
   
Public employment office (1=yes) 2,401 0.610 0.488 
Private employment agency (1=yes) 2,401 0.129 0.335 
Search job adverts (1=yes) 2,401 0.602 0.490 
Search on the internet (1=yes) 2,401 0.393 0.488 
Insert job adverts (1=yes) 2,401 0.473 0.499 
Search via friends/relatives (1=yes) 2,401 0.531 0.499 
Impulse applications (1=yes) 2,401 0.209 0.407 
    
Desired working time 
   
Full-time (1=yes) 2,401 0.490 0.500 
Part-time (1=yes) 2,401 0.234 0.424 
Both (1=yes) 2,401 0.259 0.438 
Does not know yet (1=yes) 2,401 0.016 0.125 
    
Difficulties finding a new job 
   
Easy (1=yes) 2,401 0.032 0.177 
Difficult (1=yes) 2,401 0.641 0.480 
Almost impossible (1=yes) 2,401 0.326 0.469 
    
Variables in t 
    
Employed in t (1=yes) 2,401 0.544 0.498 
    
Gender (1=female) 2,401 0.563 0.496 
Age 2,401 11.423 2.203 
Years of education 2,401 41.603 11.168 
Married (1=yes) 2,401 0.494 0.500 
Children in household (1=yes) 2,401 0.554 0.497 
Immigrant (1=yes) 2,401 0.135 0.342 
    
Total years of unemployment 2,401 4.346 3.841 
East Germany (1=yes) 2,401 0.448 0.497 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 2,401 12.703 4.461 
    
Subjective health 
   
Very good (1=yes) 2,401 0.077 0.266 
Good (1=yes) 2,401 0.379 0.485 
Satisfactory (1=yes) 2,401 0.349 0.477 
Poor (1=yes) 2,401 0.157 0.364 
Bad (1=yes) 2,401 0.037 0.190 
 
Table 39 provides a brief overview of the variables in the pre-hire outcome regressions. The 
dependent variable in the pre-hire regressions is the employment status in t according to the 
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ILO (1982) definition.
81
 Independent variables of interest are search activities of unemployed 
job seekers in t-1. Participants who noted that they were actively searching for a new job in 
the last four weeks were asked: “What have you undertaken within the last four weeks in 
order to find a (different) job?” Participants could mark various formal channels (e.g. public 
and private employment agencies, newspaper or internet adverts), impulse applications, and 
“job search through acquaintances, friends, relatives”.82 61 percent of the job seekers 
contacted public employment agencies, whereas, private employment agencies were used by 
around 13 percent. 60 percent of the unemployed spent time searching job adverts. Job search 
on the internet (39 percent) and insertion of job adverts (47 percent) were used less 
frequently. About half of the job seekers tried to find a job via social ties. One fifth 
approached employers directly. Further control variables describe the kind of job sought (full-
time vs. part-time) and the subjective probability to find an adequate job (easy, difficult, 
almost impossible). Variables of the year after contain employment status (see above; 54 
percent employed), demographic characteristics (as in the previous chapters), an East/West 
dummy and the regional unemployment rate measured on the federal state level, and a 
subjective measure for health (5 categories).  
Apart from finding a job, job quality might depend on search effort and the usage of certain 
search channels. If individuals are able to convey more trustworthy information about their 
quality through informal channels, they might earn higher wages if they utilised friends or 
acquaintances during their search. Furthermore, information benefits might allow a better 
informed decision whether to apply for as well as to accept a certain job offer. Personal 
contacts could provide better information so that ex-ante expectations and ex-post experiences 
are more likely to match. Therefore, job search via social capital could increase job 
satisfaction. The estimated models can be described by 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜂 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝜃
+ 𝜀 
(6.2) 
 
                                                 
81
 The interpretation of the employment status as pre-hire outcome is non-trivial. On the one hand, finding a job 
can be clearly interpreted as a pre-hire outcome. But since the SOEP data provides information on the 
employment status on yearly basis, it cannot be excluded that job seekers were employed for a few months 
between the two waves. Therefore, the correct interpretation of the employment dummy should be: Participant 
found a job and was still employed in the time of the next interview.  
82
 Note that – different to the previous chapters – multiple answers were possible. Whereas previous chapters 
dealt with the effectiveness of the channel the job was found through, in this chapter the actual search activities 
are investigated. 
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with log(wage) as the dependent variable. JobChar summarises job characteristics such as 
firm size, branch, and working hours, whereas Reg comprises a dummy for East Germany and 
a measure of the unemployment rate on the federal state level. The other variables contain the 
same measures as described above. 
The second post-hire outcome regression can be described by 
𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜂 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝜃 + 𝜀 (6.3) 
 
where a single item measure of job satisfaction (11-item Likert scale) serves as the dependent 
variable. 
Furthermore, two measures of job quality are investigated in this chapter – fixed-term 
contracts and a subjective measure of job security. Fixed-term or limited contracts can be 
interpreted as an objective measure of job insecurity since employer-employee relations can 
be terminated more easily. The model can be formalised as 
Pr(𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘) =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝜀,      (𝑘 = 0, 1), (6.4) 
    
with k =  
0 no (permanent contract) 
1 yes (limited contract) 
 
where Limited represents a binary measure which takes the value 1 if the new job has a fixed-
term contract and 0 if the contract is permanent. A logistic regression approach is chosen to 
calculate the relationship between search channels and fixed-term contracts. 
A three-item measure of perceived security is used to estimate whether job search activities 
affect subjective job security. The model is estimated by 
Pr(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘) =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝜀,      (𝑘 = 0, 1), (6.5) 
    
with k =  
1 very concerned 
2 somewhat concerned 
3 not concerned at all 
 
where PerSec stands for a three-item measure of subjective job security. Since these three 
options are of ordinal nature, an ordered logistic regression approach is chosen. The other 
variables contain the previously described measures.  
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As only observations of individuals who found a job in t are used for the regressions, the 
number of observations shrinks to 519. Summary statistics about the reduced data set are 
given in Table 40. First, descriptive statistics on the four dependent variables are given. On 
average, new hires earned 1,368 euros (in prices of 2010) and report a level of job satisfaction 
of 6.7. 44 percent of the newly employed individuals have a fixed-term contract. Only one 
quarter is not concerned at all about losing the current job; whereas 75 percent are at least 
somewhat concerned (one third being very concerned). 
Three variables have been measured in t-1 – job search effort, desired working time and 
perceived difficulties in finding a new job. Most individuals used more than one search 
channel. Public employment offices have been contacted of more than 70 percent of those 
who found a job. Private employment agencies, in turn, are less important with a share of 15 
percent. 76 percent of the successful job seekers were searching job adverts, 58 percent were 
searching for jobs on the internet. Two thirds inserted job adverts. Social ties as a job search 
method have been used by 63 percent. About one third applied directly to employees. Most 
successful job seekers were searching for a full-time job (57 percent), 18 percent were 
searching for a part time job. One quarter of the job seekers were indifferent regarding 
working hours. The vast majority of job seekers reported difficulties in finding a new job (75 
percent) and serious difficulties (21 percent). Only 4 percent of the job seekers considered 
finding a job being easy.  
Demographic and job related characteristics have been taken from the year the new job has 
been found in. Successful job seekers are slightly more likely to be female (52 percent), about 
39 years old with about 12 years of education. Half of the job new hires are married and 60 
percent live with children below 18 in the household. Immigrants account for 13 percent of 
the individuals who found a job. On average, each individual has experienced 3 years of 
unemployment. East German job seekers are overrepresented in the data with 37 percent. The 
average (unweighted) regional unemployment rate is about 12 percent. More than 90 percent 
of the new hires rate their health as at least satisfactory. 75 percent of the job seekers found 
their jobs in small companies with less than 200 employees. The average working time per 
week is 34 hours. 12 percent found their jobs in the public sector. Trade, industry, and service 
each account for around 25 percent of jobs found. New jobs are less often found in 
manufacturing and finance with 12 percent each. 
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Table 40: Variables for post-hire outcomes regressions 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
        
Dependent variables (in t) Variables in t 
        
Gross income (€) 519 1,367.72 854.81 Gender (1=female) 519 0.518 0.500 
Job satisfaction 519 6.686 2.330 Years of education 519 11.860 2.316 
    Age 519 38.609 10.440 
Limited contract (1=yes) 519 0.435 0.496 Married (1=yes) 519 0.499 0.500 
    Children in household (1=yes) 519 0.584 0.493 
Perceived job security    Immigrant (1=yes) 519 0.131 0.338 
Very concerned (1=yes) 519 0.333 0.472 Total years of unemployment 519 2.904 3.024 
Somewhat concerned (1=yes) 519 0.422 0.494  
   
Not concerned at all (1=yes) 519 0.245 0.430 East Germany (1=yes) 519 0.370 0.483 
 
   
4.404 
Variables in t-1 
    
    Subjective health 
   
Job search activities (multiple answers)    Very good (1=yes) 519 0.116 0.320 
Public employment office (1=yes) 519 0.711 0.454 Good (1=yes) 519 0.437 0.497 
Private employment agency (1=yes) 519 0.150 0.358 Satisfactory (1=yes) 519 0.353 0.478 
Search job adverts (1=yes) 519 0.759 0.428 Poor (1=yes) 519 0.081 0.273 
Search on the internet (1=yes) 519 0.578 0.494 Bad (1=yes) 519 0.013 0.115 
Insert job adverts (1=yes) 519 0.655 0.476 
    
Search via friends/relatives (1=yes) 519 0.632 0.483 Firm size 
   
Impulse applications (1=yes) 519 0.368 0.483 less than 20 (1=yes) 519 0.418 0.494 
    20 to 199 (1=yes) 519 0.329 0.470 
Desired working time    200 to 1,999 (1=yes) 519 0.156 0.363 
Full-time (1=yes) 519 0.574 0.495 more than 2,000 (1=yes) 519 0.096 0.295 
Part-time (1=yes) 519 0.183 0.387 
    
Both (1=yes) 519 0.237 0.426 Working hours per week 519 34.294 14.581 
Does not know yet (1=yes) 519 0.006 0.076 Public sector (1=yes) 519 0.118 0.322 
    
    
Difficulties finding a new job    Branch 
   
Easy (1=yes) 519 0.044 0.206 Industry (1=yes) 519 0.239 0.427 
Difficult (1=yes) 519 0.748 0.435 Manufacturing (1=yes) 519 0.129 0.336 
Almost impossible (1=yes) 519 0.208 0.406 Trade (1=yes) 519 0.268 0.443 
    
Finance (1=yes) 519 0.123 0.329 
    
Services (1=yes) 519 0.241 0.428 
 
At last, it is investigated how search effort, i.e. the use of certain search activities, determines 
the source through which the job seeker is finally successful. This regression is assumed to 
provide further evidence on the how unemployed job seekers find their jobs and whether job 
search via social ties is rather unintended (as postulated in chapter 3) or if unemployed job 
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seekers actively use their social ties to escape unemployment. A multinomial logistic 
regression approach is utilised to estimate the probability of finding a job via one of the four 
channels described in chapter 3.3. The specified model can be summarised as 
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐸 = 𝑘) =  𝛼 + 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡−1
′ ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝜀,      (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) (6.6) 
  1 friends/relatives 
with k =  
2 newspaper adverts 
3 (public) employment agencies 
  4 internet adverts 
 
in which SOURCE indicates the channel the job has been found through and all independent 
variables are the same as given above. However, due to missing information on how the 
specific job was found, the number of observations is reduced to 392. Therefore, firm-specific 
variables (branch, size, job classifications) are not considered in this regression.  
Table 41 provides an overview of the variables used in this last regression. Informal and the 
three formal channels together are about equally relevant for unemployed job seekers. Social 
ties helped 48 percent of the job seekers to find a job. 19 percent found a job via newspaper 
adverts. Employment agencies placed 24 percent of the job seekers into jobs. 10 percent 
found their job via internet adverts. These figures are rather comparable to the figures in 
Table 5 (for the whole dataset). For unemployed job seekers, though, employment agencies 
are more likely to be helpful in finding a job. Most variables describing search activities in t-1 
and demographic statistics from t are similar to the figures in the previous table. 
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Table 41: Variables for determinants of job finding regressions 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Dependent variable (in t) 
    
Recruitment source (one answer) 
   
Friends/relatives (1=yes) 392 0.477 0.500 
Newspaper (1=yes) 392 0.189 0.392 
Employment office (1=yes) 392 0.235 0.424 
Internet (1=yes) 392 0.099 0.300 
  
   
Variables in t-1 
    
Job search activities (multiple answers) 
   
Public employment office (1=yes) 392 0.735 0.442 
Private employment agency (1=yes) 392 0.140 0.348 
Search job adverts (1=yes) 392 0.778 0.416 
Search on the internet (1=yes) 392 0.599 0.491 
Insert job adverts (1=yes) 392 0.651 0.477 
Search via friends/relatives (1=yes) 392 0.658 0.475 
Impulse applications (1=yes) 392 0.385 0.487 
  
   
Desired working time 
   
Full-time (1=yes) 392 0.548 0.498 
Part-time (1=yes) 392 0.209 0.407 
Both (1=yes) 392 0.240 0.428 
Does not know yet (1=yes) 392 0.003 0.051 
  
   
Difficulties finding a new job 
   
Easy (1=yes) 392 0.038 0.192 
Difficult (1=yes) 392 0.717 0.451 
Almost impossible (1=yes) 392 0.245 0.431 
    
Variables in t 
  
   
Gender (1=female) 392 0.551 0.498 
Years of education 392 11.830 2.263 
Age 392 39.219 10.858 
Married (1=yes) 392 0.497 0.501 
Children in household (1=yes) 392 0.566 0.496 
Immigrant (1=yes) 392 0.117 0.322 
Total years of unemployment 392 3.028 3.118 
  
   
East Germany (1=yes) 392 0.383 0.487 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 392 11.982 4.445 
  
   
Working hours per week 392 0.128 0.334 
Public sector (1=yes) 392 32.402 14.438 
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6.4 Empirical Evidence 
In this chapter, the results of the regressions mentioned above are presented. The structure 
follows the order of the previous chapter. Therefore, pre-hire outcomes are presented first and 
then post-hire outcomes are displayed. Finally, determinants of finding a job through a certain 
channel are described. 
6.4.1 Pre-hire Outcomes 
In the first regression, the question is investigated whether certain job search activities 
increase the probability of being employed in the following year. Table 42 depicts three 
regression models and marginal effects of the third estimated model. Model (1) solely 
includes search activities in t-1 and reveals that job search via employment agencies is 
negatively related to being employed in t. Impulse applications are positively related to the 
employment probability. All other search activities are not statistically significant. When 
demographic characteristics are introduced in Model (2), the results remain rather stable. 
Solely the employment agency dummy becomes insignificant as well. This indicates that job 
search via employment agencies does not reduce the probability to be employed but that 
mainly individuals who are disadvantaged by their demographic characteristics utilise public 
employment agencies. In the last regression Model (3), further control variables from the year 
of the unemployment spell and from the following year are added. Regarding job search 
activities, the results do not differ in comparison to Model (2). Interestingly, the relationship 
between employment probability and age is u-shaped with a minimum at 42 years. Married 
job seekers are more likely to be employed; whereas, more years of unemployment 
experience are negatively related to being employed in t. Residing in East Germany and being 
in a bad health condition also affect employment probability negatively. The last column 
contains marginal effects of the last model. The coefficients show that impulse applications 
can be regarded as a promising means to improve the employment probability by 12 
percentage points. Only living in East Germany and a bad health condition have stronger 
impact on the employment probability. 
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Table 42: Probability of being employed in t 
DV: Employed in t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Marginal Effects  (3) 
 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
         
Job search activities 
        
Public employment office (1=yes) -0.293** (0.097) -0.138 (0.100) -0.084 (0.102) -0.021 (0.025) 
Private employment agency (1=yes) -0.113 (0.140) -0.131 (0.141) -0.101 (0.142) -0.025 (0.035) 
Search job adverts (1=yes) 0.050 (0.105) 0.085 (0.107) 0.095 (0.108) 0.023 (0.027) 
Search on the internet (1=yes) 0.180 (0.105) 0.064 (0.109) 0.056 (0.109) 0.014 (0.027) 
Insert job adverts (1=yes) 0.099 (0.104) 0.116 (0.105) 0.102 (0.106) 0.025 (0.026) 
Search via friends/relatives (1=yes) 0.041 (0.097) 0.045 (0.098) 0.061 (0.099) 0.015 (0.024) 
Impulse applications (1=yes) 0.503*** (0.116) 0.487*** (0.115) 0.486*** (0.115) 0.120*** (0.029) 
         
Desired working time (ref.: Full-time) 
        
Part-time (1=yes) 
    
-0.037 (0.132) -0.009 (0.033) 
Both (1=yes) 
    
-0.028 (0.109) -0.007 (0.027) 
Does not know yet (1=yes) 
    
0.422 (0.429) 0.101 (0.098) 
         
Difficulties finding a new job (ref.: Easy) 
       
Difficult (1=yes) 
    
-0.459 (0.262) -0.109 (0.059) 
Almost impossible (1=yes) 
    
-0.508 (0.274) -0.122 (0.062) 
         
Gender (1=female) 
  
0.060 (0.095) 0.073 (0.103) 0.018 (0.026) 
Years of education 
  
0.014 (0.021) 0.021 (0.022) 0.005 (0.005) 
Age 
  
-0.108*** (0.033) -0.105** (0.033) -0.026** (0.008) 
Age squared/100 
  
0.129*** (0.039) 0.128** (0.040) 0.032** (0.010) 
Married (1=yes) 
  
0.232* (0.102) 0.237* (0.103) 0.059* (0.025) 
Children in household (1=yes) 
  
0.031 (0.102) 0.007 (0.102) 0.002 (0.025) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 
  
0.042 (0.145) -0.055 (0.148) -0.014 (0.037) 
Total years of unemployment 
  
-0.074*** (0.014) -0.058*** (0.015) -0.014*** (0.004) 
         
East Germany (1=yes) 
    
-0.596** (0.228) -0.148** (0.056) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 
    
0.032 (0.026) 0.008 (0.006) 
         
Subjective health (ref.: Very good) 
        
Good (1=yes) 
    
-0.253 (0.165) -0.061 (0.039) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) 
    
-0.309 (0.174) -0.075 (0.042) 
Poor (1=yes) 
    
-0.349 (0.195) -0.085 (0.047) 
Bad (1=yes) 
    
-0.633* (0.278) -0.156* (0.068) 
         
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.112 (0.090) 1.892** (0.648) 2.166** (0.759) - 
McFadden Pseudo R² 0.022 0.045 0.053 - 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
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6.4.2 Post-hire Outcomes 
Post-hire outcomes cover monthly wages and non-monetary outcomes (job satisfaction, job 
security). Table 43 comprises regression results on determinants of monthly wages. The first 
model contains only recruitment activities. Internet search appears to be positively related to 
wages, all other search activity coefficients are statistically insignificant. In the second model, 
variables from t-1 are included. The internet search coefficient remains the only significant 
search activity variable. Part-time and both part-time and full-time job seekers earn lower 
wages, which is most likely because they work fewer hours after the job was found. 
Individuals with difficulties finding a job have also lower wages. Model (3) adds 
demographic characteristics and other individual information (subjective health). As a result, 
the positive internet coefficient becomes smaller and insignificant. Job seekers interested in 
part-time employment still earn less as well as job seekers with difficulties finding a job. 
Demographic characteristics show that females earn significantly lower wages and an inverted 
u-shaped relationship between wages and age is revealed. Individuals with longer 
unemployment experience earn significantly less. Regional factors and health do not affect 
wages. The fourth model includes firm specific information (firm size, branch) and details of 
the working contract (fixed-term, working hours). Once again, no search activity coefficient is 
significant. Since a measure of the actual working hours is included, the desired working time 
does not affect wages any more. Individuals who considered it difficult to find a job still earn 
considerably lower wages. The gender effect disappears after job and firm-specific variables 
are included which can be interpreted as gender-based labour market segregation.
83
 In this 
regression, wages are not affected by age. Education, though, is positively related to wages. In 
East Germany wages are significantly lower than in West Germany. New hires earn higher 
wages when they work in larger companies or in the industry or manufacturing sector. Longer 
actual working hours increase starting wages. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83
 According to the European Comission (2009) occupational segregation might be caused by “comparative 
biological advantages, under-investment in human capital (schooling or training), differential income roles, 
preferences and prejudices, socialisation and stereotypes, entry barriers and organisational practices”. 
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Table 43: Wage regressions unemployed job seekers 
 DV: Log(Monthly Wage) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  OLS Base OLS Search OLS Demographics OLS Full 
Job search activities 
        
Public employment office (1=yes) 0.170 (0.089) 0.091 (0.088) 0.145 (0.082) 0.081 (0.063) 
Private employment agency (1=yes) 0.123 (0.085) 0.084 (0.076) 0.045 (0.070) 0.030 (0.062) 
Search job adverts (1=yes) -0.103 (0.100) -0.024 (0.096) -0.075 (0.092) 0.003 (0.081) 
Search on the internet (1=yes) 0.227* (0.091) 0.198* (0.083) 0.102 (0.078) -0.020 (0.064) 
Insert job adverts (1=yes) 0.054 (0.090) 0.064 (0.086) 0.093 (0.078) 0.043 (0.064) 
Search via friends/relatives (1=yes) 0.030 (0.083) -0.017 (0.078) -0.073 (0.072) -0.041 (0.059) 
Impulse applications (1=yes) 0.050 (0.082) 0.005 (0.078) 0.031 (0.072) 0.029 (0.059) 
  
        
Desired working time (ref.: full time) 
        
Part-time (1=yes) 
  
-0.641*** (0.094) -0.653*** (0.115) -0.125 (0.099) 
Both (1=yes) 
  
-0.422*** (0.093) -0.315*** (0.082) -0.069 (0.067) 
Does not know yet (1=yes) 
  
-0.495 (0.475) -0.194 (0.329) 0.302 (0.248) 
  
        
Difficulties finding a new job (ref.: easy) 
        
Difficult (1=yes) 
  
-0.131 (0.128) -0.057 (0.110) -0.073 (0.112) 
Almost impossible (1=yes) 
  
-0.540*** (0.152) -0.366** (0.134) -0.307* (0.128) 
  
        
Gender (1=female) 
    
-0.373*** (0.073) 0.004 (0.067) 
Years of education 
    
0.015 (0.013) 0.032** (0.010) 
Age 
    
0.066** (0.025) 0.027 (0.021) 
Age squared/100 
    
-0.078* (0.031) -0.029 (0.026) 
Married (1=yes) 
    
0.022 (0.081) 0.070 (0.061) 
Children in household (1=yes) 
    
-0.054 (0.075) -0.027 (0.058) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 
    
0.042 (0.103) -0.043 (0.078) 
Total years of unemployment 
    
-0.086*** (0.015) -0.056*** (0.012) 
  
        
East Germany (1=yes) 
    
-0.105 (0.134) -0.342** (0.110) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 
    
-0.014 (0.014) 0.001 (0.012) 
  
        
Subjective health (ref.: very good) 
        
Good (1=yes) 
    
0.093 (0.091) 0.046 (0.073) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) 
    
0.074 (0.098) 0.006 (0.080) 
Poor (1=yes) 
    
-0.071 (0.153) -0.091 (0.112) 
Bad (1=yes) 
    
0.166 (0.370) -0.101 (0.288) 
 
        
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
        
20 to 199 (1=yes) 
      
0.133* (0.061) 
200 to 1,999 (1=yes) 
      
0.299*** (0.077) 
more than 2,000 (1=yes) 
      
0.202* (0.103) 
  
        
Limited contract (1=yes) 
      
0.100 (0.056) 
Working hours per week 
      
0.034*** (0.003) 
Public sector (1=yes) 
      
-0.049 (0.112) 
  
        
Branch (ref.: trade) 
        
Industry (1=yes) 
      
0.151* (0.070) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 
      
0.428*** (0.079) 
Finance (1=yes) 
      
0.079 (0.081) 
Services (1=yes) 
      
0.042 (0.090) 
Year dummies yes yes yes Yes 
Constant 6.692*** (0.093) 7.181*** (0.143) 6.268*** (0.462) 4.935*** (0.413) 
R² 0.044 0.186 0.340 0.585 
Δ R² 
 
0.143 0.154 0.245 
Notes: Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
Recruitment source: multiple answers possible. 
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Non-monetary post-hire outcomes can be measured by employee job satisfaction (see Table 
44). Similar to the previous wage regressions, additional variables are included stepwise. 
Model (1) solely includes search activity coefficients, which are statistically insignificant 
apart from internet search. The same result is found for the second model. Furthermore, there 
is a positive relationship between the intention to work part-time and satisfaction in the new 
job. When demographic variables are included in model (3), all search coefficients become 
insignificant. Individuals who prefer to work part-time are more satisfied in their new jobs. 
All demographic and regional coefficients are statistically insignificant. Subjectively 
perceived worse health is generally associated with lower levels of job satisfaction. The last 
model includes further branch and firm coefficients. Again, search activities are not related to 
job satisfaction. Part-time working preference is still positively related to job satisfaction, 
although it is controlled for working hours. Immigrants and individuals with poor health 
report a significantly lower level of job satisfaction. Firm size is unrelated to job satisfaction. 
New hires with a higher income are more satisfied. Higher satisfaction is also reported by 
individuals in the finance sector. 
Table 45 displays regression results on determinants of objective and subjective job security. 
In the first regression model, the probability of finding a job with a fixed-term contract is 
estimated. Again, all search activity coefficients are statistically insignificant. Job seekers 
without preferences regarding their working time are more likely to find a job with limited 
duration. Immigrants are less likely to find a job with a permanent contract. Higher wages and 
working in the public sector are positively related to finding a job with a fixed-term contract. 
Marginal effects given in the second column reveal that finding a job in the public sector and 
(.40) and immigrants (.32) are by far more likely to work in jobs with limited contracts.  
The third model contains an ordered logistic regression with three categories of a subjective 
measure of job security as the dependent variable. Since the second cut-off between 
“somewhat concerned” and “not concerned at all” is not statistically significant, these two 
categories are collapsed together into the category “no or minor concerns” (Model 3). In this 
regression all search activity coefficients are insignificant. Higher education is associated with 
more subjective security. Individuals with longer unemployment durations feel less secure in 
their newly found job.  
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Table 44: Job satisfaction regressions of unemployed job seekers 
DV: Job Satisfaction  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  OLS Base OLS Search OLS Demographics OLS Full 
Job search activities 
        
Public employment office (1=yes) -0.262 (0.239) -0.002 (0.246) -0.007 (0.252) -0.067 (0.247) 
Private employment agency (1=yes) -0.388 (0.324) -0.381 (0.319) -0.340 (0.311) -0.375 (0.310) 
Search job adverts (1=yes) -0.264 (0.283) -0.249 (0.289) -0.222 (0.297) -0.168 (0.286) 
Search on the internet (1=yes) 0.605** (0.228) 0.517* (0.225) 0.364 (0.243) 0.277 (0.243) 
Insert job adverts (1=yes) 0.096 (0.246) 0.065 (0.245) 0.027 (0.238) -0.061 (0.242) 
Search via friends/relatives (1=yes) -0.208 (0.226) -0.219 (0.225) -0.151 (0.222) -0.090 (0.221) 
Impulse applications (1=yes) -0.326 (0.238) -0.225 (0.237) -0.297 (0.235) -0.328 (0.232) 
  
        
Desired working time (ref.: full time) 
        
Part-time (1=yes) 
  
0.984*** (0.252) 0.958** (0.314) 1.208*** (0.343) 
Both (1=yes) 
  
0.267 (0.253) 0.281 (0.262) 0.366 (0.251) 
Does not know yet (1=yes) 
  
1.441* (0.630) 1.067 (0.619) 1.097 (0.823) 
  
        
Difficulties finding a new job (ref.: easy) 
        
Difficult (1=yes) 
  
-0.266 (0.493) -0.129 (0.494) -0.197 (0.494) 
Almost impossible (1=yes) 
  
-0.808 (0.536) -0.450 (0.556) -0.406 (0.556) 
  
        
Gender (1=female) 
    
-0.031 (0.242) 0.126 (0.240) 
Years of education 
    
-0.016 (0.047) -0.053 (0.048) 
Age 
    
-0.026 (0.087) -0.057 (0.089) 
Age squared/100 
    
0.026 (0.105) 0.061 (0.107) 
Married (1=yes) 
    
0.003 (0.248) 0.038 (0.244) 
Children in household (1=yes) 
    
0.184 (0.233) 0.173 (0.235) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 
    
-0.694 (0.360) -0.828* (0.353) 
Total years of unemployment 
    
-0.043 (0.041) 0.003 (0.044) 
  
        
East Germany (1=yes) 
    
-0.051 (0.454) 0.044 (0.460) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 
    
0.010 (0.049) 0.012 (0.048) 
  
        
Subjective health (ref.: very good) 
        
Good (1=yes) 
    
-1.010** (0.375) -1.072** (0.376) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) 
    
-0.988** (0.384) -1.075** (0.385) 
Poor (1=yes) 
    
-1.450** (0.526) -1.316* (0.515) 
Bad (1=yes) 
    
-1.186 (0.771) -1.220 (0.713) 
  
        
Firm size (ref.: less than 20) 
        
20 to 199 (1=yes) 
      
-0.170 (0.253) 
200 to 1,999 (1=yes) 
      
0.487 (0.293) 
more than 2,000 (1=yes) 
      
0.024 (0.399) 
  
        
Log(Monthly Wage) 
      
0.639*** (0.183) 
Limited contract (1=yes) 
      
0.258 (0.226) 
Working hours per week 
      
-0.011 (0.012) 
Public sector (1=yes) 
      
0.056 (0.334) 
  
        
Branch (ref.: trade) 
        
Industry (1=yes) 
      
0.276 (0.298) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 
      
0.377 (0.377) 
Finance (1=yes) 
      
0.682* (0.347) 
Services (1=yes) 
      
0.526 (0.344) 
Year dummies yes Yes yes Yes 
Constant 6.970*** (0.234) 6.929*** (0.496) 8.564*** (1.757) 4.926* (2.053) 
R² 0.024 0.058 0.099 0.154 
Δ R² 
 
0.034 0.041 0.055 
Notes: Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
Recruitment source: multiple answers possible. 
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Table 45: Objective and subjective job security regressions of unemployed job seekers 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 DV: Temporary contract Subj. security Subj. security 
 
Logit Limited Marginal Effects OLogit Security Logit Security Marginal Effects 
Job search activities 
          
Public employment office (1=yes) 0.038 (0.246) 0.009 (0.060) -0.314 (0.231) -0.056 (0.251) -0.012 (0.054) 
Private employment agency (1=yes) -0.332 (0.303) -0.081 (0.074) -0.093 (0.235) -0.112 (0.276) -0.024 (0.059) 
Search job adverts (1=yes) -0.391 (0.281) -0.096 (0.069) -0.087 (0.263) 0.072 (0.285) 0.016 (0.061) 
Search on the internet (1=yes) 0.262 (0.240) 0.064 (0.059) 0.459* (0.222) 0.342 (0.249) 0.074 (0.054) 
Insert job adverts (1=yes) 0.255 (0.238) 0.063 (0.058) -0.145 (0.222) -0.210 (0.259) -0.045 (0.056) 
Search via friends/relatives (1=yes) -0.084 (0.217) -0.021 (0.053) 0.083 (0.209) 0.133 (0.228) 0.029 (0.049) 
Impulse applications (1=yes) -0.045 (0.215) -0.011 (0.053) 0.193 (0.192) 0.112 (0.221) 0.024 (0.048) 
  
          
Desired working time (ref.: full time) 
          
Part-time (1=yes) 0.086 (0.330) 0.021 (0.080) 0.787* (0.353) 0.395 (0.379) 0.080 (0.073) 
Both (1=yes) 0.615* (0.260) 0.152* (0.064) -0.049 (0.235) -0.046 (0.258) -0.010 (0.057) 
Does not know yet (1=yes) -0.001 (1.075) 0.000 (0.256) -0.083 (1.852) -0.766 (1.215) -0.184 (0.303) 
  
          
Difficulties finding a new job (ref.: easy) 
          
Difficult (1=yes) -0.191 (0.481) -0.047 (0.120) -0.520 (0.469) -0.619 (0.622) -0.114 (0.097) 
Almost impossible (1=yes) -0.237 (0.534) -0.059 (0.133) -0.743 (0.527) -0.947 (0.668) -0.187 (0.112) 
  
          
Gender (1=female) -0.272 (0.237) -0.067 (0.058) 0.076 (0.212) 0.186 (0.244) 0.040 (0.053) 
Years of education -0.001 (0.052) 0.000 (0.013) 0.103* (0.042) 0.131* (0.056) 0.028* (0.012) 
Age -0.145 (0.077) -0.036 (0.019) -0.075 (0.083) -0.012 (0.084) -0.003 (0.018) 
Age squared/100 0.178 (0.094) 0.044 (0.023) 0.101 (0.102) 0.023 (0.103) 0.005 (0.022) 
Married (1=yes) -0.297 (0.236) -0.073 (0.058) 0.318 (0.224) 0.430 (0.247) 0.092 (0.053) 
Children in household (1=yes) 0.129 (0.231) 0.032 (0.057) -0.088 (0.208) -0.136 (0.232) -0.029 (0.050) 
Immigrant (1=yes) 1.297*** (0.318) 0.318*** (0.078) -0.075 (0.303) -0.109 (0.336) -0.023 (0.072) 
Total years of unemployment 0.036 (0.042) 0.009 (0.010) -0.098* (0.040) -0.092* (0.042) -0.020* (0.009) 
  
          
East Germany (1=yes) 0.645 (0.483) 0.158 (0.118) -0.447 (0.443) -0.081 (0.486) -0.017 (0.104) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) -0.038 (0.054) -0.009 (0.013) -0.010 (0.050) -0.047 (0.056) -0.010 (0.012) 
  
          
Subjective health (ref.: very good) 
          
Good (1=yes) -0.058 (0.328) -0.014 (0.081) -0.084 (0.290) -0.206 (0.342) -0.044 (0.071) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) 0.058 (0.349) 0.014 (0.086) -0.028 (0.296) 0.061 (0.362) 0.012 (0.073) 
Poor (1=yes) -0.358 (0.482) -0.085 (0.113) -0.492 (0.407) -0.535 (0.466) -0.120 (0.105) 
Bad (1=yes) 0.370 (0.826) 0.092 (0.205) -1.041 (0.869) -0.980 (0.875) -0.230 (0.214) 
  
          
Log(Monthly Wage) 0.445* (0.179) 0.109* (0.044) -0.400* (0.174) -0.284 (0.185) -0.061 (0.040) 
Working hours per week -0.018 (0.010) -0.004 (0.003) 0.008 (0.011) 0.007 (0.010) 0.001 (0.002) 
Public sector (1=yes) 1.638*** (0.331) 0.402*** (0.082) -0.306 (0.266) -0.066 (0.327) -0.014 (0.070) 
  
          
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.383 (1.914) 
    
2.311 (2.103) 
  
Cut1 
    
-4.346 (1.917) 
    
Cut2 
    
-2.232 (1.907) 
    
McFadden Pseudo-R² 0.105 
 
0.089 0.089 
 
Notes: Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
Recruitment source: multiple answers possible. 
6.4.3 Determinants of Job Search Channels 
At last, in this chapter it is investigated how the choice of job search activities affects the 
source through which the new job was found. In Table 46 multinomial logistic regression 
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results shown how job search activities affect the job finding source relative to finding a job 
via friends or relatives. Regarding newspaper adverts, no significant difference could be 
detected. Neither job search activities nor demographic or regional determinants affect the 
probability of finding a job via newspaper adverts in comparison to the reference group. In the 
second column, determinants of finding a job with the help of employment agencies are 
displayed. In comparison to the reference group, job seekers are more likely to find a job via 
employment agencies when they have been actively searching for a job through this channel. 
Search via social ties significantly reduces the probability of finding a job via employment 
agencies. This indicates that friends and employment agencies serve rather as substitutes in 
the job search process. Married job seekers are less likely to find a job via employment 
agencies; whereas, more years of unemployment and finding a job in the public sector are 
positively related to employment offices. Those who found a job via internet adverts are more 
likely to have searched for a job on the internet and to have inserted job adverts. However, 
they are less likely to have searched for a new job via social ties. Other coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. 
Table 46: Determinants of finding a job via certain search channels (unemployed job seekers) 
DV: Recruitment source Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
Ref.: Friends/relatives Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Job search activities 
      
Public employment office (1=yes) 0.258 (0.377) 0.816* (0.367) 0.157 0.564 
Private employment agency (1=yes) 0.145 (0.413) 0.064 (0.423) -0.210 0.569 
Search job adverts (1=yes) 0.263 (0.432) 0.271 (0.376) -0.804 0.677 
Search on the internet (1=yes) 0.546 (0.383) -0.121 (0.338) 3.302*** 0.995 
Insert job adverts (1=yes) 0.308 (0.377) 0.412 (0.331) 2.642*** 0.776 
Search via friends/relatives (1=yes) -0.613 (0.377) -0.960** (0.313) -1.411*** 0.443 
Impulse applications (1=yes) -0.214 (0.321) -0.301 (0.314) -0.092 0.452 
  
      
Gender (1=female) 0.038 (0.312) -0.013 (0.298) -0.622 (0.397) 
Years of education -0.024 (0.072) -0.034 (0.077) 0.130 (0.088) 
Age 0.191 (0.112) 0.129 (0.108) 0.167 (0.177) 
Age squared/100 -0.240 (0.136) -0.121 (0.133) -0.187 (0.218) 
Married (1=yes) -0.266 (0.365) -1.080*** (0.335) -0.836 (0.484) 
Children in HH (1=yes) -0.082 (0.321) -0.095 (0.304) 0.827 (0.465) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.701 (0.530) -0.109 (0.520) 1.050 (0.611) 
Total years of unemployment -0.088 (0.078) 0.126* (0.050) -0.158 (0.126) 
  
      
East Germany (1=yes) -1.211 (0.747) -0.645 (0.712) -0.552 (0.998) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 0.015 (0.083) 0.128 (0.084) 0.052 (0.128) 
Public sector (1=yes) -0.529 (0.404) 0.995* (0.440) 0.557 (0.548) 
  
      
Year dummies yes yes yes 
Constant -3.660 (2.438) -5.052* (2.103) -10.238* (4.991) 
Observations 403 
McFadden Pseudo-R² 0.200 
Notes: Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
Recruitment source: multiple answers possible. 
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Table 47 contains marginal effects of the regression above. Regarding employment agencies, 
two job search activities (search via employment agencies and via social ties) are equally 
strong determinants. Whereas the first increases the probability of finding a job via 
employment agencies by .125, the latter decreases the probability by .128. More important are 
only being married (-.164) and working in the public sector (.183). The last column contains 
marginal effects of determinants of finding a job via internet adverts. Searching on the 
internet and inserting job adverts increases the probability of finding a job by .087 and .068 
respectively. The friends/relative coefficient indicates that search through this channel reduces 
the probability of finding a job via internet adverts by .029, though statistically insignificant. 
Table 47: Marginal effects of finding a job via certain search channels (unemployed job seekers) 
DV: Recruitment source Newspaper Empl. office Internet 
Ref.: Friends/relatives Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Job search activities 
      
Public employment office (1=yes) 0.006 (0.056) 0.125* (0.059) -0.002 0.015 
Private employment agency (1=yes) 0.020 (0.060) 0.006 (0.067) -0.007 0.015 
Search job adverts (1=yes) 0.033 (0.062) 0.040 (0.060) -0.025 0.021 
Search on the internet (1=yes) 0.070 (0.056) -0.061 (0.054) 0.087** 0.029 
Insert job adverts (1=yes) 0.017 (0.055) 0.041 (0.054) 0.068** 0.026 
Search via friends/relatives (1=yes) -0.048 (0.054) -0.128** (0.050) -0.029 0.017 
Impulse applications (1=yes) -0.020 (0.046) -0.041 (0.050) 0.000 0.012 
  
      
Gender (1=female) 0.009 (0.045) 0.000 (0.047) -0.017 (0.014) 
Years of education -0.003 (0.010) -0.006 (0.012) 0.004 (0.003) 
Age 0.023 (0.016) 0.013 (0.017) 0.003 (0.004) 
Age squared/100 -0.030 (0.020) -0.010 (0.021) -0.003 (0.005) 
Married (1=yes) 0.006 (0.053) -0.164** (0.052) -0.015 (0.016) 
Children in HH (1=yes) -0.013 (0.047) -0.018 (0.049) 0.023 (0.018) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.107 (0.078) 0.003 (0.084) 0.033 (0.019) 
Total years of unemployment -0.017 (0.011) 0.025** (0.008) -0.005 (0.004) 
  
      
East Germany (1=yes) -0.154 (0.105) -0.057 (0.111) -0.005 (0.025) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) -0.003 (0.012) 0.020 (0.013) 0.001 (0.003) 
Public sector (1=yes) -0.121* (0.061) 0.183** (0.069) 0.012 (0.014) 
  
      
Year dummies yes yes yes 
Constant -4.341 (2.312) -4.602* (1.932) -9.303* (4.406) 
Observations 403 
Notes: Individually clustered standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. 
Recruitment source: multiple answers possible. 
6.5 Discussion 
Since only few regressions above provide statistically significant results, this leaves plenty of 
room for discussion and interpretation. First, the findings above are discussed in connection 
with the several shortcomings of the analysis. Second, managerial implications of the findings 
are given. 
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6.5.1 Interpretation and Limitations 
The previous chapter has shown that individual job search activities – interpreted as the use of 
different search channels – is in most cases unrelated to both pre- and post-hire outcomes. In 
this first analysis it has been detected that impulse applications in the sense of direct contacts 
and unsolicited walk-ins are positively related to being employed in the following year. All 
other search activities show no significant relation towards this pre-hire outcome. However, 
these results should not be interpreted as evidence that job search activities do not improve 
employment prospects in general. In this chapter, the previous findings are discusses against 
the background of several shortcomings of the used data. 
In general, the search activity variables are likely to be biased due to three reasons. First, 
variables describe solely whether an individuals has undertaken any of the given search 
activities in the last four weeks. Hence, these variables do not cover search intensity. 
Individuals who were just browsing few job offers on the internet are less likely to find a job 
compared to those who regularly and diligently search for new offers. An aggregated source 
measure (number of different search activities)
84
 does not solve this problem since intensity 
differences cannot be covered this way. Furthermore, social desirability might play a role in 
this case. Since individuals are interviewed by a representative of the SOEP, respondents 
might overstate their search effort because unemployed job seekers are expected to search 
actively for a new job. As a result, most job seekers state that they have used multiple search 
channels during the last four weeks. This might be particularly meaningful regarding search 
channels that are easily accessible, such as browsing job adverts or searching for jobs on the 
internet. On the contrary, it appears less likely that individuals overstate their effort regarding 
impulse applications because this channel requires active and planned communication with 
potential employers. As a consequence, search activity coefficients of internet search or job 
adverts are potentially downward biased. 
The missing intensity measure is particularly problematic, when intensity differs 
systematically between individuals. If job seekers are considered as rational and utility 
maximising individuals, job search intensity might differ between individuals with good 
chances of finding a job and individuals who are less likely to find a job. Demotivated job 
seekers who do not believe in finding a job might use a certain search activity but not as 
intense or target-oriented as more motivated job seekers. Hence, a measure of individual 
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 See e.g. Kanfer and Hulin (1985) or Barber et al. (1994). 
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employment prospects
85
 is interacted with each job search activity but did not show any 
significant relations. 
A second approach was applied in order to investigate the potential proxy nature of impulse 
applications. In a separate regression, impulse applications are interacted with each search 
activity. Thereby, two distinct measures of each search channel are created: searching with 
low effort (no impulse applications) and searching with high effort (with impulse 
applications). Interestingly, only one interaction term is negative and statistically significant: 
social ties interacted with impulse applications. A possible interpretation of this finding is that 
job seekers who exert more effort on job search and actively search via social ties are less 
likely to be employed in the following year. This can be understood as additional evidence 
that active and intensive job search via social ties is mainly conducted by disadvantaged job 
seekers. 
Moreover, the regressions cover only a relatively short window of four weeks prior to the 
interview. This serves to ensure that respondents are able to provide reliable answers but also 
limits the job search process to a rather short period. Especially in case of long-term 
unemployed job seekers this might affect the results because job search intensity and channel 
usage might change over time. For example, Barber et al. (1994) found that search intensity 
decreases with unemployment duration and that job seekers shift their search activities from 
formal to informal channels. This is also in line with results of chapter 3 that especially 
disadvantaged job seekers find a job via social ties. As a result, long-term unemployed, who 
might suffer from low education or stigmata, are more likely to search actively via social ties. 
Due to their individual characteristics and lower career chances, the friends/relatives 
coefficient might be downward biased. 
Another problem is the interpretation of the search activity coefficients. Multivariate 
regressions enable a ceteris paribus comparison of the coefficients. Therefore, it can be 
concluded how the use of a certain channel separately affects pre- or post-hire outcomes but 
not how the combination of certain channels is related to search success. Additionally, the use 
of certain search activities does not cover through which channel the job was actually found. 
For example, the use of impulse applications might serve as a proxy for higher search 
                                                 
85
 Unemployed respondents were asked whether they find it “easy”, “difficult” or “almost impossible” to find a 
new job. 
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intensity in general. This could mean that job seekers who search via impulse applications 
also put more effort in other search activities.  
All in all, it can be assumed that search activity coefficients are likely to be underestimated. 
Due to several limitations of the given data, most findings are statistically insignificant; yet, 
several arguments have been provided which explain why search coefficients are likely to be 
downward biased. 
Another interesting result has been detected in the final regression. In chapter 6.4.3 it has been 
analysed whether search activities determine the source the job has been found through. 
Particular focus has been laid upon the relationship between search via friends and relatives 
and finding a job through this channel since most job seekers do not actively search to find a 
job via social ties. The results show that unemployed individuals who actively search via 
social ties are less likely to be successful via formal means compared to social ties. This 
indicates that active search via social ties is actually possible. As Barber et al. (1994) found 
out, job seekers shift their search activities from formal to informal channels with increasing 
unemployment duration. If unemployed job seekers reduce search effort in formal channels 
they are obviously more likely to find a job via social ties. This finding is in line with chapters 
4 and 5, which highlighted that job search via social ties is not necessarily related to higher 
income. All in all, although the findings of this chapter do not appear to show strong and 
reliable results on job search via social ties, most results do not differ from previous findings 
of this dissertation and, therefore, mainly confirm prior research. 
6.5.2 Managerial Implications 
Since this chapter has dealt with job search of unemployed job seekers, managerial 
implications draw on the question how employers should search on the labour market if they 
are willing to hire unemployed job seekers.
86
 First evidence on pre-hire outcomes shows that 
impulse applications increase the probability of being employed. Employers could benefit 
from those job seekers because they seem to invest more effort in job search than other job 
seekers. If search effort and effort in employment are related, employees found via impulse 
applications are likely to be more productive than other job seekers.  
                                                 
86
 This implies that this chapter cannot answer the question whether employers should hire unemployed job 
seekers at all. Yet, employers might be willing or forced to consider hiring unemployed job seekers in an – at 
least largely – competitive labour market in an ageing society. 
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Furthermore, personality traits have not investigated in this chapter. As the previous chapter 
has shown that personality traits are at least partially related to how job seekers found their 
jobs, the same might be possible for search activities. Particularly, impulse applications and 
job search via social ties are more likely to be used by job seekers who are more extraverted 
and open to experience. If firms search for job seekers with these characteristics, they should 
consider searching via informal means.  
For job seekers, the results indicate that an active shift towards job search via social ties is 
possible and increases the probability of finding a new job through this channel. Although 
monetary post-hire outcomes are commonly not affected by finding a job via friends or 
relatives, a positive effect on non-monetary outcomes has been found repeatedly.  
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the relationship between search activities of unemployed job 
seekers and their pre- and post-hire outcomes. To this end, the rich data of the Socio-
Economic Panel on unemployed job seekers has been used. Observations from two 
consecutive years have been used to match data from the time in unemployment and the year 
after. The results show that impulse applications are positively correlated with being 
employed in the following year. It has been argued that this activity might be interpreted as a 
proxy for search intensity. Post-hire outcomes are not determined by certain search activities. 
Hence, the results of this chapter are in line with current research on the effectiveness of 
social ties in the job search process which shows mixed or rather negative relations between 
social ties and monetary outcomes. Furthermore, it has been found that unemployed job 
seekers actively contact their social ties in order to find a job. This has implications for job 
seekers who might benefit from searching via social ties through a higher job satisfaction after 
the job change (see chapter 4).  
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7 Social Capital and Labour Market Success – The Role of Leisure Time Activities 
7.1 Introduction 
So far, in this thesis the role of social ties in the job search process has been investigated. In 
line with current research (see chapter 4.1), it has been detected that social capital does not 
increase starting wages but finding a job via social ties is positively related to job satisfaction. 
Nevertheless, the results suffer from limitations in the underlying data which has been 
mentioned repeatedly in the previous chapters. In this chapter two major shortcomings of the 
previous analyses (and question 5 of the introduction) are addressed: (1) uniformity of social 
ties and (2) the focus on job changers which are described henceforth.  
First, in the discussion parts of the previous chapters it has been frequently criticised that 
social ties – in contrast to formal search channels – could not be differentiated. This might 
cause a severe problem because some ties might be more valuable than others. For example, 
Granovetter (1973) distinguished strong and weak ties
87
 and argued that weak ties are more 
helpful in finding a better job. Although strongly connected individuals have a greater 
incentive to help each other, weak ties grant access to a larger number of non-redundant ties. 
Being connected to individuals who can provide new information is particularly important in 
case of job search. Hence, this chapter aims at untangling the complex relationship between 
social ties, which constitute one’s social capital, and labour market success with a special 
emphasis upon the role of weak ties. Ties, both weak and strong, are formed or maintained 
between to individuals as a consequence of time spent together. Yet, different ways of 
spending one’s time, e.g. with close friends or with weakly tied acquaintances could affect 
social capital accumulation and, thus, labour market success. 
The second shortcoming derives from the focus on job changers. Most analyses, apart from 
turnover regressions (see chapter 4), suffer from a short term perspective because post-hire 
outcomes are measured in the year of the job change.
88
 However, employers might not be 
willing or able to pay higher wages for individuals who entered the firm via social ties.
89
 If 
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 According to the determinants of tie strength (see chapter 2.4), weakly tied individuals spend less time 
together, their relationship is marked by less emotional intensity and intimacy, and individuals act less 
reciprocally. 
88
 In chapter 4.5.2 it has been argued that long-term effects of job changes are difficult to measure. Using wage 
or job satisfaction two (three, four, five) years after the job change as a dependent variable is likely to lead to 
biased estimates since this measure already includes turnover. Those individuals who changed their jobs due to 
low wages or dissatisfaction would not be part of the sample, leaving those who stayed in the job. Job stayers 
could either be satisfied enough to stay or not likely to find another job on the labour market and, therefore, stay. 
89
 In Germany, wage postings are more common compared to free wage bargaining (Brenzel et al., 2014). Wage 
bargaining is more likely in case of higher educated individuals and in tight labour markets. 
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social ties, especially weak ties, are helpful in finding a better job, general career chances 
should be improved which is likely to pay off in future years. It can be assumed that 
individuals who better match the respective job requirements or are simply more able to 
perform well in a certain job are more likely to be promoted. Hence, long-term career success 
might be affected by entering the right company which creates the best P-O or P-J fit. 
Therefore, the analyses are based on a dataset including employees, regardless if they recently 
changed their job or not. 
Unfortunately, the Socio-Economic Panel does not provide more detailed data on the social 
tie the current job was found through. Therefore, this analysis focusses on certain leisure time 
activities or group memberships in which social ties are formed. It is assumed that activities 
differ in terms of the type of social capital they generate. Some activities or group 
memberships might be responsible for forming mainly weak ties, whereas more intimate 
relationships with friends or family members increase the number of strong ties. In 
accordance to Granovetter (1973), it is hypothised that weak ties are more likely to be 
beneficial for one’s career in comparison to strong ties. Activities which generate weak ties 
should, thus, be positively related to post-hire outcomes (wages, job satisfaction, job security).  
The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is threefold. First, so far, this study is 
the first to investigate the joint influence of leisure time activities on labour market success.
90
 
Since time is a limited resource, individuals have to decide how to spend their time on 
alternative activities. Hence, by choosing a certain option, other options cannot be embraced 
in the same intensity. Studies which focus on a single dimension of activities therefore neglect 
that individuals who do not engage in the activity under investigation might spend their time 
with another beneficial activity. Particularly time consuming activities, e.g. volunteering, 
might prevent individuals from being involved in one or more other activities. Furthermore, 
activities might not be independent from one another. Belonging to a voluntary group might 
trigger other joint activities through which social capital could be increased (Warde et al., 
2005). By utilising a broad array of different activities, this effect should be better covered 
than in other leisure time studies. 
Second, this study addresses the problem of endogeneity by exploiting the household data of 
the SOEP. The relation between leisure time activities and labour market success is non-
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 Hermann and Marianna (2011) simultaneously used three different measures for social capital in their study 
(membership in associations, contact with friends, contact with relatives). Other leisure time activities, e.g. 
attending cultural or popular events, are not considered in their analysis. 
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trivial, since it is not clear whether individuals earn higher wages due to their activities or 
whether they engage in certain activities because they dispose of more financial resources. 
This problem is tackled by using household income as a control variable. Unlike other studies 
(e.g. Day, Devlin, 1998), this chapter focusses on households with more than one member, 
otherwise household income and individual income (as the dependent variable) would be 
highly correlated. As the results will show, this approach reduces endogeneity in the 
relationship between activities and income. 
Third, this analysis is based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel which provides more 
than 23,000 observations, including several socio-demographic control variables. 
Furthermore, job stayers and job changers are distinguished in order to detect long-term and 
short-term effects of leisure time activities. Additionally, apart from Seibert et al. (2001), the 
relationship between social capital and non-pecuniary outcomes (job satisfaction) has not 
been investigated. In addition to this, perceived job security is considered as a non-pecuniary 
measure of career success which is related to various other outcomes, such as mental and 
physical health (see e.g. Sverke, Hellgren, 2002; Ferrie et al., 2005; László et al., 2010). 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Chapter 7.2 describes the theoretical 
background of leisure time activities as a means to generate social capital. Additionally, 
empirical findings are summarised which investigate the use of leisure time activities to 
generate social capital and to improve labour market outcomes. In chapter 7.3 the dataset and 
estimation strategy are explained, followed by the empirical findings in chapter 7.4. The 
findings are discussed in chapter 7.5. Chapter 7.6 concludes.  
7.2 Theoretical Background and Related Literature 
7.2.1 Social Capital and Labour Market Success 
Social capital is defined as the “aggregate of the actual or potential resources […] of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalised relationships” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248). More 
specifically, social capital is generated by memberships in different groups which might have 
a rather formal (constitutionalised organisations) or informal (friends, acquaintances) 
character. In analogy to human capital, social capital can be defined as a set of helpful ties 
that facilitates economic activities as it establishes a norm of reciprocity (Diekmann, 2004) 
and creates a resource to enhance options and to gather information (Campbell et al., 1986).
91
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 This chapter draws on the concept of accessible social capital proposed by Lin (2008), see chapter 2.3.2.  
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As a result, social capital ensures reciprocal cooperation in form of a public good for all 
members of the network as well as the generation of individual advantages (Horiuchi et al., 
2013). Such individual advantages are particularly relevant in labour markets with mutual 
asymmetric information for both employers and employees. Network members could be able 
to provide reliable information on job vacancies or could use their own power or further 
contacts to increase promotion perspectives. Those information advantages could increase 
career success, commonly measured as salary and job satisfaction.  
In chapter 2, potential benefits of social ties in the job search process have been explained 
thoroughly. Therefore, this chapter concentrates on describing how social capital might affect 
monetary and non-monetary career outcomes in the long run. First, long-term wage and job 
satisfaction differentials might be a result of information benefits in the job search process. 
Due to Realistic Job Previews (Wanous, 1978) or pre-screening (Zottoli, Wanous, 2000), job 
seekers are able to find a better job or a job that provides a better P-J or P-O fit. Yet, it is 
dubious whether these positive effects are long-lasting in the sense of a permanent wage or 
job satisfaction gap or if this gap is narrowed the longer the work relation lasts. On the 
contrary, previous research in this thesis could not find short-term monetary benefits of job 
search via social ties. It has been argued that employers might not be willing to grant different 
wages to individuals found via different sources, particularly in jobs where wage postings are 
more common than wage bargaining (Brenzel et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, there are arguments why social capital might be helpful in the long term. Apart 
from finding a better job, social capital might also be an important means in climbing the 
internal career ladder of an organisation, which can be explained by two main arguments. 
First, a better P-O or P-J fit is likely to increase promotion perspectives because a better fit 
increases performance and job satisfaction and reduces the intention to quit an organisation 
(Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). Promotions, in turn, are usually connected to an increase in 
remuneration and social status which might be related to job satisfaction. Furthermore, 
promotions serve as a signal of job security as employers do not promote individuals that 
should be dismissed in the near future. Second, empirical evidence suggests that social ties to 
network members with high occupational status are positively related to one’s own career 
chances (Lin et al., 1981a; 1981b). Hence, ties to other people in high positions are likely to 
increase career chances, especially in the case of promotions. Empirical evidence for this is 
provided by Seibert et al. (2001). Analysing a sample of 448 alumni of an U.S. private 
university, the authors found that social capital (measured as the number of people who were 
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helpful during one’s career) was positively related to career success, such as salary, 
promotions, and general career satisfaction. Their structural equation model showed that this 
relationship was mediated by network benefits like access to information, access to resources, 
and direct career sponsorship. 
The concepts and empirical evidence above have elucidated that individuals who dispose of 
more valuable social ties are likely to be more successful in their career. Hence, theoretical 
concepts mainly try to explain why individuals differ with regard to their social capital. Lin 
(2001) argued that such individual differences, which can be understood as inequality, can 
derive from two causes: (1) capital deficits and (2) return deficits. Individuals with capital 
deficits dispose of relatively less social capital (quality and quantity) caused by lower 
investment or fewer opportunities. Return deficits, in turn, mean that two individuals ceteris 
paribus (given a certain amount of social capital) differ regarding their ability to transform 
their social capital into career outcomes. Researchers have repeatedly found that individual 
differences in social capital determine gender or racial inequality (see e.g. Ibarra, 1995; Parks-
Yancy, 2006). Ibarra (1993) proposed a conceptual model of organisational networks of 
females and minorities. Homophily, the tendency of being surrounded by peers similar to 
oneself, creates an access boundary for minorities and females to more valuable social 
networks. To overcome such boundaries, Burt (1998) stressed that females and members of 
minorities have to gain legitimacy in social networks, e.g. by establishing a social tie to a core 
agent of a network.
92
 
Social capital is formed via activities which connect different individuals. Social exchange 
during leisure time activities is essential in order to maintain existing ties. Through interaction 
with others who have not been know before, new ties are created and the accessible capital 
(the stock of social capital) is increased. Glaeser et al. (2002) described a theoretical model in 
which individuals deliberately invest into their social capital by joining and staying in 
different organisations. In this chapter, the focus is shifted from membership in organisations 
to all types of leisure time activities which are able to generate social ties and could be 
understood as investment into social capital. The next chapter briefly summarises theoretical 
approaches which explain social capital formation via leisure time activities. 
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Current research on the relationship between career success and social capital perveices immigrants as a 
disadvantaged group with limited access to financial resources or a lack of human capital, see e.g. Aguilera and 
Massey (2003), Behtoui (2008), and Behtoui and Neergaard (2010). 
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7.2.2 Leisure Time Activities and Social Capital 
Recently, researchers have identified leisure time activities as sources of social capital 
generation;
93
 however, most studies focus on group membership in leisure time groups while 
ignoring activities which involve a lower degree of organisation and provide mainly 
theoretical considerations on the social outcomes of social capital for the community (e.g. 
Arai, Pedlar, 2003; Blackshaw, Long, 2005; Glover, Hemingway, 2005). Theoretical literature 
on the generation of social capital is rather scarce. Adler and Kwon (2002) found that 
researchers agree on the notion that social capital is generated in social relations between 
individuals. However, it remains rather dubious under which conditions social interaction 
transforms into a social tie. Granovetter (1973) named amount of time spend together, 
emotional intensity, intimacy, and reciprocal behaviour as determinants of tie strength. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear how much interaction is necessary in order to constitute a (weak) 
tie and when a weak tie turns into a strong tie. It seems reasonable that little interaction is 
required to form a tie (accessible capital) but not every weak tie might be mobilised if needed. 
Furthermore, the potential of mobilised capital might differ with regard to the intended 
purpose. Individuals who dispose of a given social network might find it easier to mobilise 
their ties for receiving simple (more general) information but less networks members might be 
willing or able to provide information on job vacancies.
94
 Hence, a certain tie strength might 
be necessary in order to constitute a beneficial (weak) tie. On the contrary, too many strong 
ties might be less helpful because of redundant information and network ties (Granovetter, 
1973). In addition, individuals (in particular full-time employees) have limited time resources 
to allocate to certain leisure time activities. Thus, spending too much time on a certain activity 
might prevent individuals to engage in other activities which could offer new ties. Hence, an 
inverted u-shaped relationship can be assumed for the relationship between socialising 
activities and network benefits. A certain amount of investment in leisure time activities could 
be necessary in order to generate enough helpful ties, yet, investment might have decreasing 
or even negative marginal returns at some point of the payoff function. 
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 Kando and Summers (1971) drew on multiple aspects of how leisure and work might affect each other. For 
example, the authors stated that leisure time activities are affected by social class (e.g. working class vs. 
managers). Furthermore, they discussed whether leisure activities are likely to be complimentary to or 
compensating for work activities (e.g. if individuals with physical jobs enjoy physical activities in their leisure 
time). This chapter, though, draws on the potential socialising effects of leisure time activities. 
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 However, in their analysis of determinants of helping behaviour, Latané and Darley (1970) provided 
experimental evidence that bystanders are more likely and more quickly to help a person in need when the 
bystander and the victim shortly met before the experiment.  
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Leisure time activities might differ in terms of their potential to generate social capital. Van 
Ingen and Van Eijck (2009) mentioned two main characteristics of leisure time activities 
which determine the effectiveness in social capital generation. First, the type of company 
during the activities is considered. In their article household members are differentiated from 
non-household members (labelled “other companions”). Other companions are likely to 
enlarge an existing network and confront the individual with new ideas and information. 
Hence, the distinction of companions is closely related to the “strength of weak ties”-
hypothesis (Granovetter, 1973). Second, the type of activities itself influences the amount of 
social capital created. It is argued that passive activities (e.g. watching television) do not 
enhance social capital, whereas activities which encourage and enable interaction between 
individuals are more helpful in establishing social ties. A similar distinction has been 
suggested by Putnam (2000) who differentiated consumptive activities like watching 
television from productive activities.
95
 Consumptive activities are expected to have no or a 
negative impact on social capital because of reduced social interaction whereas productive 
activities enhance individual skills and/or social capital. 
In the following subchapters, nine activities covered in the SOEP data and their potential 
effects on social capital generation are described. Particular attention is paid to the potential of 
creating strong or weak ties. If single activities are similar to others – e.g. attending cultural 
and popular events, the hypothised relation between engaging in such activity and social 
capital is jointly described in one chapter. The activities under investigation broadly cover the 
activities and organisations described in “Bowling Alone” (Putnam, 2000), from political and 
civic communities to informal connections. At the end of each chapter, hypothesis regarding 
the potential correlation between leisure time activities and post-hire outcomes (wages, job 
satisfaction, subjective and objective job security) are formulated. The hypotheses are formed 
under the premise that weak ties are more helpful in one’s career as hypothesised by 
Granovetter (1973). 
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 Van Ingen and Van Eijck (2009: 198) suggested the following definition for consumptive respectively 
productive activities: “Productive activities are characterized by an active dedication of the participant and 
working (together) towards a certain goal. This goal can be instrumental, but also expressive or creative. 
Consumptive activities are a passive form of spending time, characterized by the ’utilization’ of certain goods 
(consumption in its narrow meaning), but also of experiences.” This definition differs from the terminology used 
in gerontology. Klumb (2004), for example, distinguished productive from consumptive behaviour by applying 
the third-party criterion (Reid, 1934), i.e. that the activity can be carried out by a third person and still provides 
the same amount of utility. 
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7.2.2.1 Attending cultural and popular events 
The first two leisure activities are cultural and popular events. While the first one comprises 
visits of concerts, theatre plays, and talks or lectures, the latter contains going to the cinema, 
pop-music concerts, discos, or sports events. Theoretical conceptualisations or empirical 
evidence regarding the labour market effects of these two activities do not exist. Only Van 
Ingen and Van Eijck (2009), as mentioned above, distinguished productive and consumptive 
activities and find a positive relationship between productive activities on their measures of 
social capital (civic engagement and helping). However, the study does not consider what 
kind of social capital has been created, in particular whether strong or weak ties are 
established or maintained. Evidence regarding single activities is existent for visits of 
museums. Based on qualitative research of visitors of the Kunsthistorisches Museum in 
Vienna, Roberson (2011: 78) argued that museums “provide a safe and beautiful space where 
people can spend free time and engage in personal and social contemplation” which is used 
not only as a means to spend free time but also for self-development and learning. Visitors of 
museums commonly belong to a distinct sector of the population (Gurt, Torres, 2007) and are 
in general higher educated (Smithsonian Institution, 2001) so that helpful ties could be formed 
between homogeneous individuals. Still, due to little interaction between visitors of cultural 
events – apart from friends or relatives who are attending such an event together – the 
generation of social capital is rather small.  
Apart from social capital, cultural events or musical activities could increase the so-called 
cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) which includes education (mainly accumulated via social 
learning) that cannot be exploited in the economic sense. Cultural capital of a society can be 
understood as a cultural “ecosystem” in which actors behave in certain ways (Throsby, 1999). 
Individuals who acquire or enhance their cultural capital, e.g. by attending cultural events or 
other cultural activities, might be able to learn social behaviour that opens the gates to higher 
society classes with access to more valuable social capital.  
Popular entertainment is more likely to be understood as a consumptive activity. 
Nevertheless, individuals are able to create and maintain ties to others, yet, these ties are more 
likely to be strong ties. Individuals are usually attending such events with others to whom 
they are closely connected. Therefore, it is assumed that popular entertainment activities are 
not able to generate beneficial weak ties but to maintain strong ties. Under the assumption that 
weak ties are more likely to be linked to career success, it is assumed that: 
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H1: The frequency of attending cultural events is positively related to post-hire 
outcomes. 
H2: The frequency of attending popular events is negatively related to post-hire 
outcomes. 
7.2.2.2 Artistic and Musical Activities 
Individuals who engage in artistic or musical activities are able to enrich their lives in 
multiple ways. Most research deals with the effect of childhood musical activities on child 
development, such as improved reading skills (Standley, 2008) or communication (Kraus, 
Slater, 2015) because playing musical instruments permanently  affects the anatomy and 
function of the brain (Skoe, Kraus, 2012).
96
 Several studies report a positive relation between 
musical education and IQ (Hille et al., 2011). Schellenberg (2004) found that children 
(N=144) showed a larger increase in IQ when they received music lessons compared to two 
control groups (drama lessons, no lessons). Hence, it is not surprising that students who were 
active in music studies performed better in non-musical courses, too (Cabanac et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, individuals who spend their time with musical or artistic activities are likely to 
interact with other individuals of their drama group, music school, band or other association. 
However, most of these groups are rather small or are even carried out alone so that ties can 
be characterised as strong rather than weak (if ties are established at all). Even when 
individuals are part of an artistic or musical group, both activities require hours of single 
learning (e.g. playing an instrument, learning the text of a drama). As a result, the effect on 
social capital (and thus labour market success) should be rather small or equal to zero. 
H3: No testable hypothesis can be formed. 
7.2.2.3 Meeting and helping friends 
Two variables in the dataset describe the frequency of interaction with friends: meeting 
respectively helping friends. Meeting friends describes how often individuals are in direct 
contact with friends. According to Granovetter (1973), such interaction should rather establish 
strong ties. However, Burt (1992) argued that strong ties could help to bridge structural holes 
to other networks which provide access to further ties. These structural holes could be 
spanned by frequently meeting friends or other individuals. Helping, in turn, is more likely 
                                                 
96
 Kamiyama et al. (2010) found that musical education improved working memory which might explain higher 
IQ. 
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between individuals who are closely related.
97
 An individual who is helping someone usually 
invests time on a certain activity without being paid. Harrison et al. (2011) stated that 
cooperative behaviour which involves bearing costs for others is positively related to tie 
strength.
98
 Therefore, frequent helping should serve as a proxy for strong ties (even more than 
just meeting others) which should not be positively related to career success – even a negative 
relation could emerge from excessive helping. Hermann and Marianna (2011) found support 
for the “strength of weak ties”-hypothesis by estimating income effects of frequency of 
contact with friends (weak and strong ties) and relatives (strong ties). Therefore, two 
corresponding hypotheses can be formulated: 
H4: The frequency of meeting friends is positively related to post-hire outcomes. 
H5: The frequency of helping friends is negatively related to post-hire outcomes. 
7.2.2.4 Volunteering in Charity Organisations and Engagement in Citizens’ Groups 
Charitable organisations serve a non-profit purpose and their “activity is dedicated to the 
altruistic advancement of the general public in material, spiritual or moral respects” (Section 
52(1) of the Fiscal Code of Germany, 2014). Volunteers offer their time and skills to a non-
profit organisation and exercise a planned activity in the name of the organisation (Rodell, 
2013). Since volunteering is time-consuming but usually not paid (at least not at market 
prices), Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) described a consumption and an investment model of 
volunteer work which both predict a negative relationship between volunteering hours and 
wage. Investment in this case is understood as a means to gain on-the-job experience which 
should prepare individuals for the labour market or increase their human capital. On the 
contrary, individuals who are already integrated into the labour market do not need to 
volunteer and, thus, reduce their volunteer time. The consumption argument interprets 
volunteering as one leisure time activity among others that increases individual utility. 
Individuals who are working in well-paid jobs and who regard volunteering as a pure 
consumption good reduce their volunteering time since opportunity costs increase along with 
wages. Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) found in their study evidence for a negative wage 
elasticity. Furthermore, researchers have stressed that volunteering is a source of 
meaningfulness (Clary et al., 1998). However, not every employee strives for the same 
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 In contrast to pure helping behaviour, volunteering entails “more commitment than spontaneous assistance but 
narrower in scope than the care provided for family and friends” (Wilson, 2000: 215). 
98
 In this study, members of an existing social group were exposed to physical discomfort through which they 
could earn money for themselves and other members. Individuals were willing to endure higher levels of 
discomfort for others when the relationship between them was reciprocal. 
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amount of meaning through volunteering. Rodell (2013) provided empirical evidence that 
individuals who do not find meaning in their work domain volunteer in order to compensate 
for this lack.
99
 Bauer et al. (2013) investigated determinants of volunteering and donations. 
They found that both kinds of charitable actions were positively correlated, though, 
individuals with higher opportunity costs (full-time employees, individuals with young 
children) were less likely to work in volunteer associations while there was no reduction in 
monetary donations.
100
 
Whereas these arguments propose a negative correlation between wages and volunteering, 
positive effects of non-profit labour might be explained by social capital theory. Working in 
charitable organisations brings individuals into contact with other volunteers, members of 
other organisations or beneficiaries of the organisation. Evidence shows that one motif to join 
a voluntary organisation is to make friends and, hence, to increase one’s social capital 
(Prouteau, Wolff, 2008). Social exchange of this kind could eventually yield in valuable ties. 
Apart from such unintended career effects, volunteers might be deliberately motivated to join 
an organisation in order to increase one’s career success by generating valuable contacts or 
boosting one’s résumé.101 Polidano et al. (2009) mentioned further channels through which 
volunteering could improve labour market outcomes. First, volunteering could serve as a 
signal (Spence, 1973) which conveys unobservable characteristics to new employers who 
cannot assess these characteristics due to asymmetric information. Second, psychological 
well-being might be affected by volunteering because social participation is supposed to 
increase inclusion and recognition while reducing anxiety and self-preoccupation (Moen et 
al., 1992). 
Empirical evidence on labour market returns of volunteering is rather mixed. For example, 
Prouteau and Wolff (2006) found a positive correlation between volunteering and wages in 
the public sector but a negative correlation in the private sector. Hence, the authors concluded 
that the consumption motive dominates the career motive in case of volunteering. Day and 
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 Rodell refered to the literature of spill-over effects between the work and the family domain (Lambert, 1990; 
Edwards, Rothbard, 2000) in order to explain spill-over effects between paid-work and volunteer-work domains. 
100
 Brown and Taylor (2015) investigated personality traits as another explanation for differences in 
volunteering. They found that higher degrees of conscientiousness and neuroticism were negatively related to 
donations of time and money, whereas openness to experience proved a strong positive correlate of charitable 
behaviour. 
101
 This dimension is covered in the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI) which has been designed to measure 
intentions for volunteering (Clary et al., 1998). Five additional factors describe motives, such as protection 
seeking, expression of values, social pressure/desire for social interaction, gaining a deeper understanding of 
unfamiliar tasks or oneself, and self-enhancement. 
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Devlin (1998), in turn, detected a positive relationship between volunteering and wages which 
they interpreted as proof for the investment motive. Hackl et al. (2007) investigated a sample 
of 421 Austrian volunteers and non-volunteers and control for a potential selection into 
volunteering. By doing so, the authors found a strong positive correlation between 
volunteering and wages. In line with this, Cozzi et al. (2013) revealed a strong positive effect 
of volunteering
102
 on wages. While wage effects are rather small in the pooled OLS sample, 
the introduction of rainfall as an instrument revealed much larger returns of volunteering. The 
authors concluded a negative sorting into volunteering, meaning that less able individuals 
(with lower wages) were more likely to work in non-profit organisations. This might be 
explained by higher opportunity costs of volunteering of more high-income individuals.  
Ruiter and De Graf (2009) provided the most thorough and robust evidence on labour market 
benefits of volunteering. Based on data from the “Family Survey of the Dutch Population” 
from 2000 (FSDP2000), the authors investigated the relationship of memberships in voluntary 
associations respectively volunteering in these associations on occupational status,
103
 wages, 
and the probability of starting a new job. Voluntary associations comprised all kinds of 
political, musical, religious, sports or welfare organisation. The data was gathered in face-to-
face interviews in which participants and their partners were questioned about their 
membership(s) in voluntary associations during their life course. Therefore, it has been 
possible to reduce endogeneity biases.
104
 The results showed that pure membership in a 
voluntary association increased the probability of starting a new job and that this job was 
related to higher wage and occupational status. Actual volunteering, though, is not related to 
these three measures. The opposite has been detected for job starters (who found their first 
job), which means that actual volunteering but not membership per se is positively correlated 
with occupational status. Furthermore, the authors found partial support for their hypothesis 
that associations with higher status provide more benefits for their members. The study 
provides ample evidence on the positive effects of membership and volunteering in 
associations. However, the composite measure for membership (which comprises all kinds of 
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 Volunteering in this study was measured as a bivariate dummy variable which took the value 1 if the 
respondent has participated in any kind of volunteering in the respective year or in the years before. Therefore, 
the volunteering dummy did not only cover recent experience but also experience in the past. This implies that 
the depreciation rate of volunteering is 0 and that volunteering more than once does not increase the volunteering 
effect. 
103
 Jobs were coded according to the International Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) proposed by Ganzeboom 
et al. (1992) who assigned a prestige value to 271 job categories. 
104
 In this case, it could be ruled out that participants joined a certain association after a new job was found (e.g. 
because of a higher obtained status or work contacts).  
 
206 Social Capital and Labour Market Success – The Role of Leisure Time Activities 
charitable and other organisations) does not consider heterogeneous effects for these 
organisations. As argued above, associations generally differ in their potential to establish 
weak ties and, thus, in their effectiveness in the labour market. Nevertheless, most voluntary 
associations are likely to provide room to form weak ties which could serve helpful during job 
search or one’s career. 
Furthermore, membership in a citizens’ group, which may be a political party or other kind of 
local organisation, is distinguished from pure volunteering. The main difference between 
these activities, however, is not the way individuals might get into contact with each other but 
the purpose of the organisation. While volunteer groups aim to provide help for others, 
citizens’ groups or political party rather focus on their influence in (local) politics or the 
welfare of their members. Potential altruistic behaviour is not excluded since political parties 
or other organisations might, at least partially, invest their time and effort in order to improve 
overall welfare. Regardless of the purpose of the organisation, citizens’ groups should be able 
to bring people together from different backgrounds or from different organisations. As a 
result, a similar effect like for volunteering is assumed for memberships in citizens’ groups.  
Thus, the following hypotheses are formed: 
H6: The frequency of volunteering is positively related to post-hire outcomes. 
H7: The frequency of attending citizens’ groups is positively related to post-hire 
outcomes. 
7.2.2.5 Sports Activities 
Whereas some studies consider sports activities as charitable behaviour,
105
 it is rather 
questionable if pure membership in a sports club has similar effects compared to memberships 
in traditional welfare organisations. This is particularly the case when membership in a sports 
club does not involve any charitable behaviour but solely sporting activities. Hence, it is not 
the contact to other organisations or local politicians through which social ties are established 
but interaction between club members or health effects. Both channels are discussed briefly.  
Medical literature has repeatedly found that physical activity improves general health or 
alleviates several diseases (Powell et al., 2011) and improves mental health (Biddle, Asare, 
2011). Based on SOEP data, Lechner (2009) showed that sports activities have a long-term 
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 Membership in sports clubs can be interpreted as charitable behaviour if the individual is working as a trainer 
or representative for the sports club. For example, Hackl et al. (2007) and Ruiter and De Graf (2009) used 
membership in organisations (e.g. sports clubs) for their volunteering dummy.  
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effect on both monetary and non-monetary labour market outcomes. Investigating a sample of 
80,000 employees, Lechner and Downward (2013) found sizeable labour market benefits of 
sports activities, especially for individuals who engage in team sports.
106
 
The social dimension of sports is well recognised in sociological research. Downward and 
Rasciute (2012) proposed a theoretical concept in which the membership in sports clubs 
increases individual social capital (as well as human capital) which affects the degree of 
social inclusion respectively exclusion (Silver, 1994). Moreover, this model is not free from 
endogeneity since more integrated individuals are more likely to find a sports club. For the 
career effects of sports activities it is important whether such activities generate weak or 
strong ties (Granovetter, 1973). Downward and Riordan (2007) found that sports activities 
connect rather similar individuals (homophily).
107
 According to the authors, individuals doing 
sports together do not increase their social capital but social capital determines whether two or 
more individuals are doing sports together. As a result, existing social ties are strengthened 
through joint activities, which is a clear sign for strong ties. 
H8: The frequency of sports activities is negatively related to post-hire outcomes. 
7.2.2.6 Attending Church or Religious Events 
Individuals express their religious beliefs by attending church or other religious events. Little 
attention, though, has been paid to labour market effects of religious events. Drawing on 
Coleman’s approach to social capital, priest, sociologist, and novelist Andrew Greely 
concluded that “religion is (at least potentially) a powerful and enduring source of social 
capital (…), and indeed of social capital that has socially and ethically desirable effects” 
(Greeley, 1997: 392f.). Labour market outcomes might be affected by the religion itself (and 
the frequency of attending religious ceremonies might represent a proxy for the intensity of 
one’s belief) or by the formation of social capital within religious groups. Regarding the first 
issue, religion might determine labour market success in various ways. Religions often shape 
the understanding of gender roles (Lehrer, 1995), i.e. whether female labour force 
participation is appropriate or not. For the case of Germany, where Roman Catholics and 
Protestants each account for around 30 percent of the population (Statistische Ämter des 
Bundes und der Länder, 2014), Heineck (2004) showed that women who were frequently 
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 Later regressions contain a measure for subjective physical health in order to control for this channel. 
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 Nichols et al. (2013) argued that sports clubs hesitate to recruit volunteers outside the club due to a desire for 
similarity. Homophily does not only cover demographic characteristics but mainly degree of shared values. This 
might be particularly relevant in organisations which express and, thus, require certain common values.  
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involved in religious activities or females whose husbands displayed a strong religious belief 
were less likely to join the labour force. More recently, though, Fischer and Pastore (2015) 
replicated this result for the period of 1981-1996 but did not find a relation between religion 
and labour market entry of females between 1997 and 2013. Since this study concentrates on 
full-time employed individuals, labour market success cannot be affected through this 
channel. 
Other studies investigate the impact of religion on labour market success. Ewing (2000) 
proposed two alternative explanation for a catholic wage premium which has been detected 
repeatedly in the US. First, being raised in a Catholic community might increase human 
capital, e.g. by attending catholic schools.
108
 Second, employees who were raised in Catholic 
families and attended Catholic schools signal soft-skills which are associated to Catholic 
belief (e.g. discipline, honesty etc.). The author found a positive wage premium for Catholics. 
However, the study solely uses a dummy variable to identify the respondents’ religion in 
childhood and youth but not in the year under investigation. Furthermore, the degree of 
religiousness differs between individuals and the effects of religions might be biased.
109
  
Additionally, religious events are likely to enhance social capital of attendants. Individuals 
who are regularly attending religious events are likely to interact with other people and to 
establish new ties. Religious groups, in particular the two large Christian religions, commonly 
gather enough people in order to create new ties. Apart from pure religious service, churches 
provide room for additional gatherings, social groups or other communities and individuals 
who are attending religious events eventually are more likely to be a member of such groups. 
Individuals are, thus, able to create and maintain strong and weak ties by church visits and 
being part of other church related events. Bradley (1995), replicating findings of Ellison and 
George (1994), found that individuals who frequently attended religious events disposed, in 
average, of larger social networks, more direct and indirect (telephone) contact, and perceived 
their relationships as more helpful compared to less frequent attendants. Therefore, it is 
hypothesised: 
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 Neal (1997) found that the catholic schools increased education attainment of minorities in urban areas, while 
positive effects were considerably smaller for urban whites or suburban students. 
109
 This might be especially the case if religiousness and the relation between religiousness in youth and 
adulthood differ between religions. If individuals who were raised Catholic are more likely to remain active 
members of the religious society than individuals of other religions, the wage effect of other religions might be 
underestimated. Hence, the wage premium of Catholics could be overestimated.  
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H9: The frequency of attending religious events is positively related to post-hire 
outcomes.  
Table 48, additionally, contains hypotheses on the most probable kind of ties which are 
formed in this activity. Strong ties are established in intimate and close relationships between 
people that meet regularly (Granovetter, 1973). As a result, meeting and helping friends 
should rather improve or maintain strong ties. A similar logic applies in case of attending 
cultural or popular events. Since individuals do not go to such events alone, but most likely 
with friends, these activities rather strengthen strong ties. Sports activities might establish 
both strong and weak ties, depending on the kind of activity (team sports vs. individual 
activities). Artistic or musical activities are usually performed in small groups or alone, which 
makes it more probable that strong ties are maintained or formed. Volunteer work or 
engagement in other local groups is likely to build connections between a large number of 
different individuals. Religious events or communities could help establishing both strong and 
weak ties. In line with Granovetter (1973) it is hypothesised that weak ties are more helpful in 
generating labour market benefits than strong ties. Thus, activities which mainly provide 
weak ties should be more beneficial for employees. 
Table 48: Description of leisure time variables 
Variable name Variable description Hypothesised tie strength 
Attending cultural events 
Respondent attends cultural events, such as concerts, 
theatre plays, lectures, etc. 
Strong ties 
Attending popular entertainment events 
Respondent goes to the movies, pop music concerts, 
dancing, disco, sports events 
Strong ties 
Active sporting activities Respondent does sports himself/herself Strong and weak ties 
Artistic or musical activities 
Respondent plays music or sings, dances, acts, paints, 
photographs 
Strong ties 
Meeting friends, relatives, neighbours Respondent meets friends, relatives neighbours Strong ties 
Helping friends, relatives, neighbours Respondent helps out friends, relatives neighbours Strong ties 
Volunteer work (clubs/social services) 
Respondent volunteers in clubs (e.g. sports) or social 
services 
Weak ties 
Involvement citizens'/political group 
Respondent is involved in a citizens’ group, political 
party or in a local government 
Weak ties 
Attending church, religious events Respondent attends church or other religious events Strong and weak ties 
 
7.3 Dataset and Methodology 
The empirical investigation is based on data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
and limited to the waves 2005-2011 because information on free time activities is available in 
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the four odd years. Leisure time activities are assumed to be rather stable; therefore, this 
information is also used in the even years. Since leisure time activities are likely to depend on 
the amount of disposable free time, only full-time employees are considered. It seems 
reasonable that unemployed or part-time employees have different leisure time usage patterns 
compared to full-time employees. Furthermore, single households are excluded in order to 
control for household income as a determinant of leisure time activities.
110
 As a result, the 
dataset includes 23,524 observations of 7,226 individuals. Further analyses focus on job 
changers, hence, the number of individuals decreases to 1,116 which account for 1,444 job 
changes in the observation period. 
Three dependent variables are used in this chapter. First, monetary outcomes of leisure time 
activities are estimated by using the logarithmised monthly gross labour income (in prices of 
2010) as the dependent variable. Second, job satisfaction, measured by an 11-item Likert 
scale is utilised as the dependent variable. The last dependent variable is a subjective measure 
for perceived job security.  Respondents were asked whether they are either “very concerned”, 
“somewhat concerned”, or “not concerned at all” about losing the current job. 
The independent variables of interest describe nine different free time activities that could 
generate or maintain social capital through mutual exchange. Leisure time activities are 
available in the waves 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011 of the SOEP.
111
 Since leisure time 
activities seem to be rather stable over time (little within variation even with one year gap in 
between), leisure time activities are used in the respective following year (2006, 2008, 2010). 
Summary statistics show that this assumption is not too strong and that the between variance 
is much larger than the within variance. These measures include activities such as attending 
cultural events (concerts, theatre), popular events (cinema, pop concerts, disco), and sports or 
musical activities (see Table 48). Furthermore, the frequency of contacts to friends and 
relatives is measured as active helping or meeting friends. Participation in voluntary work or 
political or civil organisations is included as well. Finally, the data contains information on 
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 Household income has been identified as an important determinant of leisure time activities. Since leisure 
time activities usually require financial resources, ignoring this endogeneity would lead to biased estimates. In 
order to demonstrate this effect, regressions with both household income and without are provided in the next 
chapter. Naturally, in single households income from labour and household income are highly correlated so that 
single households have to be excluded from the regressions. 
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 The 2008 wave of the SOEP contains even more leisure time activities. However, the questions differ in terms 
of wording and content so that the variables are not identical. For example, in an additional question participants 
were asked about their frequency of visiting restaurants or bars. It is most likely that this variable includes a form 
of interaction between individuals since most people go to such places with or in order to meet other people. 
Furthermore, participants had a fifth response option of “daily”.  
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the frequency of attending religious ceremonies. For all activity variables, frequency is given 
as “every week”, “every month”, “less frequent”, or “never”. In all estimations, the latter 
serves as the base outcome in order to measure the positive or negative effect of engaging in 
this activity more frequently.  
Apart from socio-demographic control variables (which have been used in the previous 
chapters), logarithmised household income is included in order to reduce potential 
endogeneity. A similar approach has been applied by Ateca-Amestoy et al. (2008) who used 
both household income and capacity to spend money for leisure time activities in their life 
satisfaction regression. Since household income comprises income from work, single 
households are excluded from this analysis due to a high correlation between household 
income and work income in single households.  
The estimation strategy exploits the rich data on the individual and the household level. As 
mentioned above, three individual labour market outcomes are chosen as dependent variables: 
wages, job satisfaction, and subjective job security. The estimated wage model based on an 
OLS regression can be described as follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼 + 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐻𝐻𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝜁 + 𝜂 (7.1) 
where Act represents variables with information on the frequency of free time activities 
related to social capital, DemChar includes demographic characteristics such as age, gender, 
education, family status and health, HHChar stands for household characteristics like 
household income and household size, JobChar contains information on branch, occupation 
and firm size. Additional regional (Reg) control variables are an East/West dummy and the 
unemployment rate on the federal state level. ζ is the error term.  
The job satisfaction model is estimated accordingly. As argued above, OLS regressions are 
used for reasons of simplicity and easier interpretation of the findings (see chapter 4.3). The 
model can be described by 
𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐻𝐻𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 +  𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝜁 + 𝜂 (7.2) 
where independent variables are the same as described above. 
To account for the nature of the dependent variable, both multinomial as well as ordered 
logistic regression models are applied to estimate the relationship between social capital and 
perceived job security (JobSec). The estimated model can be formalised as follows: 
Pr(𝐽𝑜𝑏𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘) =  𝛼 + 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛽 + 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛾 + 𝐻𝐻𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝛿 + 𝐽𝑜𝑏𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
′ ∙ 𝜖 + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝜁 + 𝜂 (7.3) 
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with 
 
k =  
1 very concerned 
2 somewhat concerned 
3 not concerned at all (base outcome) 
 
where except JobChar all variables are defined as above. In this estimation, JobChar contains 
an additional variable on the unemployment rate on the state level. This variable serves as an 
objective measure for job security so that the direct relationship between social capital and 
subjective job security can be estimated.  
Table 49 provides an overview of the variables used in this chapter. First, dependent variables 
are summarised. Participants averagely earned 3,000 euros (in prices of 2010) and reported a 
level of job satisfaction of 6.96, which is similar compared to the previous analyses. Different 
patterns in leisure time activities can be observed. Few individuals (less than 1 percent) visit 
cultural or popular entertainment events every week. Most individuals attend this kind of 
events less than every month. About one third are engaged in weekly sport activities, 9 
percent exercise sports at least on a monthly basis. Around half of the respondents are less 
frequently (24 percent) or never (31 percent) involved in sports activities. Only 15 percent of 
the respondents engage in musical or artistic activities once per week (8 percent) or once per 
month (7 percent) while the rest does not regularly participate in such activities. The vast 
majority of respondents meet their friends regularly, 38 percent every week, 42 percent every 
month. Virtually no individual never meets friends. Individuals are less frequently helping 
than just meeting friends or acquaintances. About 10 percent help others every week, 35 
percent every month. Hence, more than half of the sample helps other people less than once 
per month. 20 percent engage in voluntary work, 10 percent each weekly or monthly. Two out 
of three do not perform any voluntary work. Involvement in citizens’ groups is not common, 
since 90 percent of the individuals never engage in such activities. More than half of the 
respondents do not attend religious events at all, whereas, one third participates in such events 
less frequently than once per month. About 14 percent attend church or other religious feasts 
at least once per month or once per week.  
Demographic variables reveal details on sample composition. The sample contains 31 percent 
females
112
 and the average age of respondents is 44 years with 12.8 years of education. 73 
                                                 
112
 This share is considerably smaller compared to previous regressions. Since the analyses concentrate on full-
time employees who are living in non-single households, this results is not surprising. Evidence for Germany 
shows that female labour market participation is lower than male participation and that females are more likely 
to work in part-time jobs (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2015). 
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percent are married and 54 percent live with at least one child in the household. Average 
household income accounts for 3,300 euros and the average household consists of 3 members. 
Non-German natives make up 9 percent of the sample and respondents were 0.4 years of their 
lives unemployed. Most individuals report that their health is in a good (49 percent) or 
satisfactory (33 percent) condition. 42 percent of the individuals are not concerned about 
losing their job; whereas, 44 percent are somewhat and 15 percent are very concerned.  
Job-related variables show that about one third of the individuals each work in the industry or 
service sector. Regarding firm size, individuals are rather equally distributed across the four 
categories. Respondents are working in all nine job categories, with professionals (level 2), 
technicians (3) and craft and related trade-workers (6) being the most important. 8 percent of 
the individuals are working in the highest job positions, elementary occupations account for 5 
percent of the observations. One quarter works in the public sector. The average weekly 
working time is 44 hours (including overtime). Only 4.5 percent of the individuals dispose of 
a limited contract, which is considerably less than in chapter 3 (18 percent) in which it has 
been focussed on job changers. The unweighted average regional unemployment rate is 10.13 
percent. 28 percent of the individuals in the dataset live in East Germany.  
In addition to the estimates for the whole sample, chapter 7.4.2 provides information on the 
outcomes of leisure time activities of job changers which reduces the sample size to 1,444 
observations. Since job changers account for a specific part of the employee population, they 
differ regarding several characteristics compared the whole sample (Table 50). The 
differences described here do not incorporate statistical tests between the samples and are 
entirely descriptive. Slight differences between the two samples are prevalent in terms of 
wages and job satisfaction. Job changers’ average income is more than 600 euros lower than 
income of respondents in the whole sample, yet, they report a higher level of job satisfaction. 
Regarding leisure time activities, job changers do not differ substantially from individuals in 
the whole sample. Solely meeting friends appears to be more frequent among job changers. 
Considerable differences, though, can be observed concerning demographic characteristics. 
Job changers are about 8 years younger and the share of females is higher among them. In line 
with this, job changers are less likely to be married and report shorter overall unemployment 
spells. Additionally, job changers are more likely to be of very good and good health 
compared all employees. With respect to job characteristics, differences between the two 
samples are rather small. Only the probability of having a fixed-term contract is considerably 
higher in case of job changers in comparison to the whole sample. 
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Table 49: Variable overview full sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
        
Gross Income 23,524 3,303.46 1,884.08 Demographic variables 
   
Job Satisfaction 23,524 6.960 1.885   
   
  
   
Gender (1=female) 23,524 0.310 0.463 
Leisure Time Activities 
   
Age 23,524 43.759 9.975 
  
   
Years of education 23,524 12.761 2.703 
Attending cultural events 
   
Married (1=yes) 23,524 0.730 0.444 
Every week (1=yes) 23,524 0.009 0.096 Children in household (1=yes) 23,524 0.535 0.499 
Every month (1=yes) 23,524 0.127 0.333 Household income 23,524 3,327.23 1,633.95 
Less frequently (1=yes) 23,524 0.622 0.485 Household size 23,524 3.047 1.051 
Never (1=yes) 23,524 0.241 0.428 Immigrant (1=yes) 23,524 0.088 0.283 
  
   
Total years of unemployment 23,524 0.387 1.030 
Attending popular entertainment events 
   
  
   
Every week (1=yes) 23,524 0.050 0.217 Subjective Health 
   
Every month (1=yes) 23,524 0.197 0.398 Very good (1=yes) 23,524 0.084 0.277 
Less frequently (1=yes) 23,524 0.594 0.491 Good (1=yes) 23,524 0.485 0.500 
Never (1=yes) 23,524 0.160 0.366 Satisfactory (1=yes) 23,524 0.326 0.469 
  
   
Poor (1=yes) 23,524 0.095 0.293 
Active sporting activities 
   
Bad (1=yes) 23,524 0.010 0.100 
Every week (1=yes) 23,524 0.364 0.481   
   
Every month (1=yes) 23,524 0.093 0.290 Perceived job security 
   
Less frequently (1=yes) 23,524 0.235 0.424 Very concerned (1=yes) 23,524 0.148 0.356 
Never (1=yes) 23,524 0.308 0.462 Somewhat concerned (1=yes) 23,524 0.436 0.496 
  
   
Not concerned at all (1=yes) 23,524 0.415 0.493 
Artistic or musical activities 
   
  
   
Every week (1=yes) 23,524 0.081 0.273 Job-related variables 
   
Every month (1=yes) 23,524 0.072 0.259   
   
Less frequently (1=yes) 23,524 0.313 0.464 Branch 
   
Never (1=yes) 23,524 0.534 0.499 Industry (1=yes) 23,524 0.329 0.470 
  
   
Manufacturing (1=yes) 23,524 0.070 0.255 
Meeting friends, relatives, neighbours 
   
Trade (1=yes) 23,524 0.177 0.382 
Every week (1=yes) 23,524 0.379 0.485 Finance (1=yes) 23,524 0.127 0.333 
Every month (1=yes) 23,524 0.419 0.493 Services (1=yes) 23,524 0.296 0.457 
Less frequently (1=yes) 23,524 0.191 0.393   
   
Never (1=yes) 23,524 0.010 0.100 Firm size  
   
  
   
less than 20 (1=yes) 23,524 0.221 0.415 
Helping friends, relatives ,neighbours 
   
20 to 199 (1=yes) 23,524 0.291 0.454 
Every week (1=yes) 23,524 0.098 0.297 200 to 1999 (1=yes) 23,524 0.242 0.429 
Every month (1=yes) 23,524 0.352 0.478 more than 2000 (1=yes) 23,524 0.246 0.431 
Less frequently (1=yes) 23,524 0.503 0.500   
   
Never (1=yes) 23,524 0.047 0.212 ISCO job classification 
   
  
   
Legisl., sen. officials, managers (1=yes) 23,524 0.077 0.267 
Volunteer work (clubs/social services) 
   
Professionals (1=yes) 23,524 0.200 0.400 
Every week (1=yes) 23,524 0.107 0.309 Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 23,524 0.236 0.425 
Every month (1=yes) 23,524 0.101 0.301 Clerks (1=yes) 23,524 0.101 0.302 
Less frequently (1=yes) 23,524 0.138 0.345 Service workers (1=yes) 23,524 0.067 0.251 
Never (1=yes) 23,524 0.654 0.476 Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 23,524 0.181 0.385 
  
   
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 23,524 0.091 0.287 
Involvement citizens'/political group 
   
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 23,524 0.046 0.210 
Every week (1=yes) 23,524 0.013 0.113   
   
Every month (1=yes) 23,524 0.020 0.141 Public sector (1=yes) 23,524 0.260 0.439 
Less frequently (1=yes) 23,524 0.066 0.248 Working hours per week 23,524 44.114 7.574 
Never (1=yes) 23,524 0.901 0.299 Limited contract (1=yes) 23,524 0.045 0.207 
  
   
  
   
Attending church, religious events 
   
Regional variables 
   
Every week (1=yes) 23,524 0.058 0.234   
   
Every month (1=yes) 23,524 0.077 0.267 Regional unemployment rate (in %) 23,524 10.13 4.22 
Less frequently (1=yes) 23,524 0.313 0.464 East Germany (1=yes) 23,524 0.277 0.447 
Never (1=yes) 23,524 0.552 0.497 
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Table 50: Variable overview job changers 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
        
Gross Income 1,444 2,666.73 1,596.89 Demographic variables 
   
Job Satisfaction 1,444 7.226 1.977 
    
    
Gender (1=female) 1,444 0.368 0.483 
Leisure Time Activities 
   
Age 1,444 35.668 9.883 
    
Years of education 1,444 13.258 2.823 
Attending cultural events 
   
Married (1=yes) 1,444 0.518 0.500 
Every week (1=yes) 1,444 0.011 0.105 Children in household (1=yes) 1,444 0.502 0.500 
Every month (1=yes) 1,444 0.109 0.312 Household income 1,444 3,101.40 1,557.79 
Less frequently (1=yes) 1,444 0.632 0.483 Household size 1,444 2.999 1.057 
Never (1=yes) 1,444 0.248 0.432 Immigrant (1=yes) 1,444 0.085 0.279 
  
   
Total years of unemployment 1,444 0.544 1.160 
Attending popular entertainment events 
       
Every week (1=yes) 1,444 0.073 0.261 Subjective Health 
   
Every month (1=yes) 1,444 0.286 0.452 Very good (1=yes) 1,444 0.130 0.336 
Less frequently (1=yes) 1,444 0.525 0.500 Good (1=yes) 1,444 0.535 0.499 
Never (1=yes) 1,444 0.116 0.320 Satisfactory (1=yes) 1,444 0.260 0.439 
  
   
Poor (1=yes) 1,444 0.070 0.255 
Active sporting activities 
   
Bad (1=yes) 1,444 0.006 0.074 
Every week (1=yes) 1,444 0.371 0.483 
    
Every month (1=yes) 1,444 0.105 0.306 Perceived job security 
   
Less frequently (1=yes) 1,444 0.244 0.430 Very concerned (1=yes) 1,444 0.170 0.376 
Never (1=yes) 1,444 0.280 0.449 Somewhat concerned (1=yes) 1,444 0.443 0.497 
  
   
Not concerned at all (1=yes) 1,444 0.386 0.487 
Artistic or musical activities 
       
Every week (1=yes) 1,444 0.091 0.288 Job-related variables 
   
Every month (1=yes) 1,444 0.086 0.280 
    
Less frequently (1=yes) 1,444 0.310 0.463 Branch 
   
Never (1=yes) 1,444 0.512 0.500 Industry (1=yes) 1,444 0.277 0.448 
  
   
Manufacturing (1=yes) 1,444 0.077 0.266 
Meeting friends, relatives, neighbours 
   
Trade (1=yes) 1,444 0.198 0.399 
Every week (1=yes) 1,444 0.506 0.500 Finance (1=yes) 1,444 0.157 0.363 
Every month (1=yes) 1,444 0.342 0.475 Services (1=yes) 1,444 0.292 0.455 
Less frequently (1=yes) 1,444 0.142 0.349   
   
Never (1=yes) 1,444 0.010 0.101 Firm size  
   
  
   
less than 20 (1=yes) 1,444 0.276 0.447 
Helping friends, relatives ,neighbours 
   
20 to 199 (1=yes) 1,444 0.323 0.468 
Every week (1=yes) 1,444 0.110 0.313 200 to 1999 (1=yes) 1,444 0.219 0.414 
Every month (1=yes) 1,444 0.375 0.484 more than 2000 (1=yes) 1,444 0.183 0.387 
Less frequently (1=yes) 1,444 0.461 0.499   
   
Never (1=yes) 1,444 0.055 0.227 ISCO job classification 
   
  
   
Legisl., sen. officials, managers (1=yes) 1,444 0.059 0.235 
Volunteer work (clubs/social services) 
   
Professionals (1=yes) 1,444 0.240 0.427 
Every week (1=yes) 1,444 0.088 0.283 Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 1,444 0.247 0.431 
Every month (1=yes) 1,444 0.078 0.268 Clerks (1=yes) 1,444 0.087 0.282 
Less frequently (1=yes) 1,444 0.136 0.343 Service workers (1=yes) 1,444 0.083 0.276 
Never (1=yes) 1,444 0.698 0.459 Craft and related trade workers (1=yes) 1,444 0.158 0.365 
  
   
Plant and machine operators (1=yes) 1,444 0.071 0.257 
Involvement citizens'/political group 
   
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 1,444 0.055 0.229 
Every week (1=yes) 1,444 0.007 0.083   
   
Every month (1=yes) 1,444 0.008 0.087 Public sector (1=yes) 1,444 0.183 0.387 
Less frequently (1=yes) 1,444 0.045 0.207 Working hours per week 1,444 44.307 7.976 
Never (1=yes) 1,444 0.940 0.237 Limited contract (1=yes) 1,444 0.305 0.460 
  
       
Attending church, religious events 
   
Regional variables 
   
Every week (1=yes) 1,444 0.046 0.210 
 
   
Every month (1=yes) 1,444 0.048 0.215 Regional unemployment rate (in %) 1,444 9.802 4.157 
Less frequently (1=yes) 1,444 0.274 0.446 East Germany (1=yes) 1,444 0.27 0.44 
Never (1=yes) 1,444 0.631 0.483 
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7.4 Empirical Evidence 
In this chapter, the empirical results will be presented, first for the whole pooled sample, 
second for job changers only.  
7.4.1 Leisure Time Activities and Career Success 
Table 51 displays four regression models in which the logarithmised monthly wage income 
serves as the dependent variable. The first model contains solely leisure time activities and the 
two household variables (household size and household income). The results show that a 
higher frequency of attending cultural events is associated to higher wages. On the contrary, 
popular entertainment is negatively correlated with wage income. Individuals who are 
actively engaged in sports earn higher wages; whereas, helping friends is negatively related to 
earnings. Individuals who are volunteering or engaging in citizens’ groups also earn higher 
wages. Finally, attending religious events seems to be positively correlated with wages as 
well. Since individual labour income is part of the total household income, a high correlation 
between these two measures is detected. 
In Model (2), individual demographic characteristics and a measure for subjective health are 
added. As a consequence, the cultural events and volunteering coefficients become 
insignificant. Popular entertainment events are still negatively related to wages, though the 
coefficient becomes smaller and is only significant for individuals who attend such events 
every week. Similarly, the coefficients of active sports become smaller but are still positive 
and statistically significant. Individuals who help friends regularly earn substantially lower 
wages. Frequent visits to religious events are positively related to wages. All demographic 
variables show the expected relationship frequently found in Mincerian wage regressions, i.e. 
an inversed u-shaped relation between wages and age, a positive relation between wages and 
education, and a considerable gender wage gap. Subjective health status is unrelated to wages. 
In the third model, job-related variables are introduced. The results show that job 
characteristics, such as branch, firm size, and occupation are statistically significantly related 
to wages and, consequently, leisure time coefficients become smaller and most of them 
insignificant. Controlling for a large variety of socio-demographic and job-related 
characteristics, individuals who regularly attend cultural events earn higher wages. 
Furthermore, active sports minimum once per weeks are associated to higher earnings. 
Surprisingly, weekly engagement in volunteer groups is related to lower wages. Individuals 
who are less frequently active in citizens’ groups also earn lower wages. Meeting and helping 
friends as well as attending religious events are not related to wages in this specification. All 
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socio-demographic coefficients are similar to the ones in Model (2). Job-related coefficients 
show the expected correlations, i.e. individuals in larger firms higher and in higher positions 
earn higher wages. Individuals with a limited contract also earn lower wages. Wages increase 
with working hours. Employees in East Germany earn lower wages and a higher regional 
unemployment is negatively correlated with wages as well.  
The last model displays how the coefficients change if it is not controlled for household size 
and household income. As expected, the household income variable reduces endogeneity in 
the regression. This is particularly visible in case of cultural events since higher income 
households are more likely to attend such events. Therefore, coefficients are likely to be over-
estimated if the household income variable is omitted. Similar results are found for the 
popular entertainment coefficients. Helping friends and volunteering is also negatively related 
to wages which indicates that households with lower incomes are more engaged in helping 
friends. The negative coefficient of weekly volunteer work becomes even larger and is highly 
significant. All other coefficients remain similar compared to Model (3). 
In order to investigate whether the relationship between leisure time activities and wages 
differs for different points in the wage distribution, quantile regressions were run and results 
are displayed in Table 52. Regression results reveal that wage effects of leisure time activities 
differ between income groups. Attending cultural events, which has been identified as a 
strong predictor of wages is positively related to only for the upper quantiles (.75 and .9) of 
the wage distribution. The native wage effect of attending popular entertainment events once 
per week is statistically significant only for the .1-quantile of the wage distribution. Being 
actively engaged in sports, at least once per week, is positively related to wages for all but the 
.9-quantile group. The frequency of meeting friends or relatives is positively related to wages 
in all quantiles, however, statistically insignificant. Helping friends, as an indicator for strong 
ties, is negatively related to wages, statistically significant only for the .5 and .75-quantiles. 
Individuals who volunteer at least once per week earn lower wages, statistically significant for 
the .25, .5, and .75-quantiles. Individuals in the two highest wage quantiles benefit from being 
active in citizens’ groups at least once per week. 
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Table 51: Wage regressions – Effectiveness of leisure time activities 
 DV: Log(Wage) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  OLS Base OLS Demographics OLS Full Model OLS Without Household 
Cultural events 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.169*** (0.040) 0.062 (0.037) 0.071* (0.036) 0.131*** (0.040) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.091*** (0.016) 0.022 (0.014) 0.021 (0.012) 0.075*** (0.013) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.045*** (0.010) 0.011 (0.009) 0.015* (0.007) 0.038*** (0.008) 
  
        
Popular entertainment 
        
Every week (1=yes) -0.151*** (0.024) -0.047* (0.019) -0.027 (0.018) 0.001 (0.019) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.072*** (0.015) -0.004 (0.013) 0.004 (0.011) 0.026* (0.013) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.013 (0.011) -0.002 (0.010) 0.014 (0.009) 0.026* (0.010) 
  
        
Active sports 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.074*** (0.011) 0.047*** (0.010) 0.018* (0.008) 0.045*** (0.009) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.056*** (0.014) 0.040** (0.013) 0.010 (0.011) 0.025* (0.012) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.026* (0.010) 0.021* (0.009) 0.007 (0.008) 0.016 (0.009) 
  
        
Artistic/musical activities 
        
Every week (1=yes) -0.012 (0.016) -0.012 (0.013) -0.007 (0.012) -0.022 (0.013) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.025 (0.016) -0.002 (0.013) -0.002 (0.012) -0.001 (0.013) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.017 (0.009) -0.012 (0.008) -0.008 (0.007) -0.015* (0.007) 
  
        
Meeting friends, relatives, neighbours 
        
Every week (1=yes) -0.002 (0.042) 0.055 (0.038) 0.039 (0.032) 0.088* (0.039) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.010 (0.042) 0.025 (0.038) 0.032 (0.032) 0.075 (0.039) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.011 (0.042) 0.009 (0.038) 0.019 (0.032) 0.051 (0.038) 
  
        
Helping friends, relatives, neighbours 
        
Every week (1=yes) -0.080*** (0.024) -0.072*** (0.021) -0.023 (0.018) -0.059** (0.020) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.050* (0.021) -0.058** (0.019) -0.026 (0.017) -0.060*** (0.018) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.024 (0.020) -0.033 (0.018) -0.018 (0.016) -0.040* (0.017) 
  
        
Volunteer work 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.040** (0.014) -0.013 (0.013) -0.030** (0.011) -0.040** (0.012) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.033* (0.014) -0.002 (0.013) -0.003 (0.011) -0.005 (0.012) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.034** (0.012) 0.014 (0.010) 0.012 (0.009) 0.010 (0.010) 
  
        
Citizens'/political groups 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.143*** (0.033) 0.052 (0.035) 0.046 (0.031) 0.063 (0.036) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.039 (0.030) 0.016 (0.025) 0.032 (0.022) 0.043 (0.024) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.016 (0.016) -0.044** (0.014) -0.030* (0.013) -0.030 (0.014) 
  
        
Attending religious events 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.101*** (0.018) 0.069*** (0.016) 0.014 (0.014) -0.018 (0.016) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.035* (0.017) 0.031* (0.014) -0.014 (0.012) -0.021 (0.013) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.040*** (0.009) 0.037*** (0.008) -0.008 (0.007) -0.011 (0.008) 
  
        
Gender (1=female) 
  
-0.259*** (0.009) -0.194*** (0.009) -0.191*** (0.010) 
Age  
  
0.057*** (0.003) 0.047*** (0.003) 0.050*** (0.003) 
Age squared/100 
  
-0.058*** (0.004) -0.046*** (0.003) -0.048*** (0.004) 
Years of education 
  
0.035*** (0.002) 0.024*** (0.002) 0.036*** (0.002) 
Married (1=yes) 
  
0.024* (0.010) 0.022** (0.008) 0.041*** (0.009) 
Child in HH (1=yes) 
  
0.100*** (0.010) 0.080*** (0.009) 0.035*** (0.008) 
Log(Household income) 0.677*** (0.013) 0.563*** (0.013) 0.418*** (0.012) 
  
Household size 0.001 (0.004) -0.057*** (0.005) -0.038*** (0.005) 
  
Immigrant (1=yes) 
  
0.046*** (0.014) 0.010 (0.013) -0.010 (0.014) 
Total years of unemployment 
  
-0.050*** (0.005) -0.037*** (0.004) -0.048*** (0.004) 
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Table 51: Wage regressions – Effectiveness of leisure time activities (continued) 
 DV: Log(Wage) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  OLS Base OLS Demographics OLS Full Model OLS Without Household 
Subjective health 
        
Good (1=yes) 
  
-0.013 (0.011) -0.001 (0.009) -(0.009) (0.010) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) 
  
-0.010 (0.012) -0.004 (0.010) -0.021 (0.011) 
Poor (1=yes) 
  
-0.021 (0.014) -0.023 (0.012) -0.045*** (0.013) 
Bad (1=yes) 
  
0.011 (0.026) -0.004 (0.024) -0.061* (0.028) 
  
        
Branch (reference: trade) 
        
Industry (1=yes) 
    
0.113*** (0.011) 0.135*** (0.012) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 
    
0.101*** (0.015) 0.116*** (0.017) 
Finance (1=yes) 
    
0.126*** (0.014) 0.168*** (0.016) 
Services (1=yes) 
    
0.035** (0.013) 0.060*** (0.014) 
  
        
Firm size (reference: less than 20) 
        
20 to 199 (1=yes) 
    
0.078*** (0.011) 0.090*** (0.012) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 
    
0.136*** (0.011) 0.160*** (0.013) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 
    
0.177*** (0.011) 0.220*** (0.013) 
  
        
Limited contract (1=yes) 
    
-0.172*** (0.016) -0.204*** (0.017) 
Working hours per week 
    
0.008*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001) 
Public sector (1=yes) 
    
0.002 (0.010) 0.000 (0.011) 
  
        
ISCO job class. (reference: legislators, senior officials, managers) 
      
Professionals (1=yes) 
    
-0.016 (0.016) -0.037 (0.020) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 
    
-0.085*** (0.016) -0.130*** (0.019) 
Clerks (1=yes) 
    
-0.152*** (0.019) -0.208*** (0.021) 
Service workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.252*** (0.021) -0.331*** (0.024) 
Craft &related trade workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.202*** (0.017) -0.285*** (0.020) 
Plant & machine operators (1=yes) 
    
-0.238*** (0.018) -0.323*** (0.022) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 
    
-0.296*** (0.021) -0.397*** (0.025) 
  
        
East Germany (1=yes) 
    
-0.178*** (0.016) -0.247*** (0.018) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 
    
-0.004** (0.002) -0.004* (0.002) 
  
        
Year dummies Yes yes yes yes 
Constant 2.469*** (0.116) 1.841*** (0.119) 2.993*** (0.115) 5.906*** (0.088) 
(Adjusted) R² 0.367 0.519 0.618 0.540 
Δ Adjusted R² 
 
0.153 0.098 -0.077 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Estimations 
based on 23,524 observations. 
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Table 52: Median wage regressions – Effectiveness of leisure time activities 
 DV: Log(Wage) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
  0.1-Quantile 0.25-Quantile 0.5-Quantile 0.75-Quantile 0.9-Quantile 
Cultural events 
          
Every week (1=yes) 0.036 (0.040) 0.014 (0.025) 0.027 (0.023) 0.062* (0.025) 0.105** (0.035) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.002 (0.015) 0.015 (0.010) 0.019* (0.009) 0.032*** (0.009) 0.040** (0.013) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.020 (0.010) 0.022*** (0.006) 0.010 (0.006) 0.014* (0.006) 0.018 (0.009) 
  
          
Popular entertainment 
          
Every week (1=yes) -0.055** (0.021) -0.020 (0.013) -0.010 (0.012) -0.023 (0.013) -0.001 (0.018) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.012 (0.015) -0.001 (0.009) 0.008 (0.008) -0.004 (0.009) 0.010 (0.013) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.001 (0.012) 0.012 (0.007) 0.022*** (0.007) 0.012 (0.007) 0.008 (0.010) 
  
          
Active sports 
          
Every week (1=yes) 0.033*** (0.010) 0.026*** (0.006) 0.011* (0.006) 0.013* (0.006) 0.003 (0.009) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.005 (0.015) 0.015 (0.009) 0.007 (0.008) 0.002 (0.009) 0.012 (0.013) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.020 (0.011) 0.018** (0.007) 0.008 (0.006) -0.004 (0.007) -0.018 (0.009) 
  
          
Artistic/musical activities 
          
Every week (1=yes) -0.005 (0.015) -0.009 (0.009) -0.012 (0.008) -0.018* (0.009) -0.002 (0.013) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.009 (0.015) -0.003 (0.010) -0.015 (0.009) -0.015 (0.009) 0.011 (0.013) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.003 (0.009) -0.006 (0.006) -0.011* (0.005) -0.014** (0.005) 0.000 (0.008) 
  
          
Meeting friends, relatives, neighbours 
          
Every week (1=yes) 0.057 (0.039) -0.001 (0.024) 0.017 (0.022) 0.040 (0.024) 0.051 (0.034) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.054 (0.039) -0.001 (0.024) 0.009 (0.022) 0.027 (0.024) 0.043 (0.034) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.045 (0.039) -0.006 (0.024) -0.001 (0.022) 0.018 (0.024) 0.042 (0.034) 
  
          
Helping friends, relatives, neighbours 
          
Every week (1=yes) -0.005 (0.022) -0.003 (0.014) -0.022 (0.012) -0.017 (0.014) -0.024 (0.020) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.023 (0.019) -0.013 (0.012) -0.029** (0.011) -0.027* (0.012) -0.028 (0.017) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.001 (0.019) -0.005 (0.012) -0.021 (0.010) -0.022* (0.011) -0.025 (0.016) 
  
          
Volunteer work 
          
Every week (1=yes) -0.023 (0.014) -0.021* (0.009) -0.025*** (0.008) -0.021** (0.008) -0.012 (0.012) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.011 (0.013) -0.009 (0.008) -0.004 (0.008) 0.005 (0.008) -0.002 (0.012) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.018 (0.012) 0.013 (0.007) 0.006 (0.007) 0.014 (0.007) 0.004 (0.010) 
  
          
Citizens'/political groups 
          
Every week (1=yes) 0.001 (0.034) 0.013 (0.021) 0.023 (0.019) 0.044* (0.021) 0.062* (0.030) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.046 (0.027) 0.041* (0.017) 0.028 (0.015) 0.021 (0.017) 0.004 (0.024) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.046** (0.016) -0.016 (0.010) -0.019* (0.009) -0.017 (0.010) -0.003 (0.014) 
  
          
Attending religious events 
          
Every week (1=yes) 0.017 (0.017) 0.000 (0.011) 0.002 (0.010) -0.010 (0.010) 0.008 (0.015) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.017 (0.015) -0.020* (0.009) -0.011 (0.008) -0.016 (0.009) -0.003 (0.013) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.005 (0.009) -0.006 (0.006) -0.004 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005) 0.011 (0.008) 
  
          
Log(Household income) 0.355*** (0.011) 0.354*** (0.007) 0.392*** (0.006) 0.423*** (0.007) 0.455*** (0.010) 
Househould size -0.047*** (0.005) -0.039*** (0.003) -0.033*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.003) -0.022*** (0.004) 
(Adjusted) R-squared / overall 0.3791 0.401 0.418 0.434 0.436 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Estimations 
based on 23,524 observations. Also controlled for all other variables given in Table 51. 
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In analogy to the regression above, Table 53 depicts four regression models. In Model (1) to 
(3) variables are introduced stepwise, the fourth model contains a control regression without 
household variables. In Model (1), individuals who attend cultural events, exercise sports, and 
participate in religious events reveal higher job satisfaction. Additionally, the second model 
contains individual socio-demographic variables and, as a result, all activity coefficients 
become statistically insignificant. Apart from household income, subjective health and 
perceived job security are two major determinants of job satisfaction. Other demographic 
characteristics are insignificant, solely individuals with longer unemployment experience 
report lower job satisfaction. Model (3) then introduces further job-related variables but the 
results remain stable – only religious events seem to be related to job satisfaction. Socio-
demographic characteristics do not have a large influence on job satisfaction. As in the 
previous regression, health and job security are main determinants of job satisfaction. 
Furthermore, individuals in higher positions are more satisfied. Surprisingly, individuals with 
limited contracts are also more satisfied with their jobs but the negative effect of fixed-term 
contracts might be also covered by the job security variable. Employees in East Germany are 
less satisfied with their jobs. In regions with higher unemployment rate, employees report 
higher job satisfaction. The control Model (4), in which household variables are excluded, 
does not reveal meaningful differences between the two last regressions. 
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Table 53: Job satisfaction regressions - Effectiveness of leisure time activities 
 DV: Job Satisfaction Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  OLS Base OLS Demographics OLS Full Model OLS Without Household 
Cultural events 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.373* (0.173) 0.144 (0.155) 0.136 (0.158) 0.157 (0.158) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.221*** (0.064) 0.094 (0.059) 0.089 (0.059) 0.107 (0.059) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.090* (0.046) 0.023 (0.041) 0.021 (0.041) 0.028 (0.041) 
  
        
Popular entertainment 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.133 (0.088) -0.008 (0.081) -0.008 (0.080) 0.006 (0.080) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.104 (0.066) -0.051 (0.059) -0.053 (0.059) -0.047 (0.059) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.019 (0.054) -0.060 (0.048) -0.062 (0.047) -0.059 (0.047) 
  
        
Active sports 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.154** (0.049) -0.047 (0.043) -0.046 (0.043) -0.037 (0.043) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.120* (0.061) -0.026 (0.055) -0.023 (0.055) -0.018 (0.055) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.020 (0.048) -0.057 (0.043) -0.055 (0.043) -0.052 (0.043) 
  
        
Artistic/musical activities 
        
Every week (1=yes) -0.058 (0.066) -0.096 (0.059) -0.097 (0.059) -0.104 (0.059) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.073 (0.061) -0.061 (0.055) -0.056 (0.055) -0.054 (0.055) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.066 (0.039) -0.049 (0.035) -0.045 (0.035) -0.0475 (0.035) 
  
        
Meeting friends, relatives, neighbours 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.127 (0.200) -0.044 (0.176) -0.043 (0.175) -0.028 (0.176) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.032 (0.199) -0.081 (0.174) -0.087 (0.174) -0.072 (0.175) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.246 (0.199) -0.204 (0.174) -0.206 (0.174) -0.195 (0.175) 
  
        
Helping friends, relatives, neighbours 
        
Every week (1=yes) -0.021 (0.103) 0.102 (0.093) 0.102 (0.093) 0.091 (0.093) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.047 (0.090) 0.105 (0.081) 0.109 (0.080) 0.097 (0.080) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.026 (0.087) 0.025 (0.077) 0.031 (0.077) 0.023 (0.077) 
  
        
Volunteer work 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.004 (0.066) 0.029 (0.059) 0.031 (0.059) 0.027 (0.059) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.025 (0.062) 0.022 (0.055) 0.024 (0.055) 0.025 (0.055) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.052 (0.051) -0.021 (0.045) -0.019 (0.045) -0.019 (0.045) 
  
        
Citizens'/political groups 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.057 (0.151) -0.043 (0.141) -0.044 (0.141) -0.042 (0.141) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.050 (0.121) -0.033 (0.109) -0.035 (0.108) -0.029 (0.109) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.084 (0.067) 0.087 (0.060) 0.089 (0.060) 0.090 (0.060) 
  
        
Attending religious events 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.137 (0.089) 0.057 (0.080) 0.072 (0.080) 0.069 (0.080) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.182** (0.064) 0.109 (0.058) 0.121* (0.059) 0.125* (0.058) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.037 (0.040) 0.028 (0.035) 0.033 (0.036) 0.036 (0.036) 
  
        
Gender (1=female) 
  
-0.002 (0.038) -0.002 (0.043) -0.006 (0.043) 
Age  
  
-0.011 (0.013) -0.003 (0.014) -0.001 (0.014) 
Age squared/100 
  
0.011 (0.015) 0.003 (0.016) 0.001 (0.016) 
Years of education 
  
-0.010 (0.007) -0.013 (0.009) -0.008 (0.008) 
Married (1=yes) 
  
-0.010 (0.042) -0.015 (0.042) -0.003 (0.042) 
Child in HH (1=yes) 
  
0.064 (0.042) 0.055 (0.043) 0.066 (0.035) 
Log(Household income) 0.351*** (0.047) 0.152*** (0.047) 0.153*** (0.048) 
  
Househould size 0.040* (0.018) 0.007 (0.021) 0.009 (0.021) 
  
Immigrant (1=yes) 
  
0.068 (0.062) 0.076 (0.063) 0.072 (0.063) 
Total years of unemployment 
  
-0.039** (0.015) -0.042** (0.015) -0.045** (0.015) 
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Table 53: Job satisfaction regressions – Effectiveness of leisure time activities (continued) 
 DV: Job Satisfaction Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  OLS Base OLS Demographics OLS Full Model OLS Without Household 
Subjective health (ref.: very good) 
        
Good (1=yes) 
  
-0.491*** (0.048) -0.494*** (0.048) -0.497*** (0.048) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) 
  
-1.190*** (0.054) -1.199*** (0.054) -1.205*** (0.054) 
Poor (1=yes) 
  
-1.891*** (0.071) -1.893*** (0.071) -1.901*** (0.071) 
Bad (1=yes) 
  
-2.311*** (0.184) -2.293*** (0.182) -2.315*** (0.183) 
  
        
Perceived job security (ref.: not concerned at all) 
       
Very concerned (1=yes) 
  
-1.337*** (0.052) -1.353*** (0.054) -1.364*** (0.053) 
Somewhat concerned (1=yes) 
  
-0.558*** (0.030) -0.564*** (0.031) -0.568*** (0.031) 
  
        
Branch (reference: trade) 
        
Industry (1=yes) 
    
0.019 (0.069) 0.017 (0.069) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 
    
-0.192*** (0.052) -0.201*** (0.053) 
Finance (1=yes) 
    
-0.075 (0.056) -0.068 (0.056) 
Services (1=yes) 
    
-0.055 (0.060) -0.055 (0.060) 
  
        
Firm size (reference: less than 20) 
        
20 to 199 (1=yes) 
    
-0.137** (0.047) -0.133** (0.047) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 
    
-0.103* (0.050) -0.095 (0.050) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 
    
-0.107* (0.051) -0.092 (0.051) 
  
        
Limited contract (1=yes) 
    
0.272*** (0.072) 0.262*** (0.072) 
Working hours per week 
    
-0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
Civil servant (1=yes) 
    
0.010 (0.052) 0.008 (0.052) 
  
        
ISCO job class. (reference: legislators, senior officials, managers) 
      
Professionals (1=yes) 
    
-0.166* (0.068) -0.173* (0.069) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) 
    
-0.150* (0.065) -0.166* (0.066) 
Clerks (1=yes) 
    
-0.169* (0.075) -0.189* (0.075) 
Service workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.101 (0.091) -0.131 (0.092) 
Craft & related trade workers (1=yes) 
    
-0.180* (0.072) -0.208** (0.072) 
Plant & machine operators (1=yes) 
    
-0.091 (0.083) -0.119 (0.083) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) 
    
-0.284** (0.095) -0.319*** (0.095) 
  
        
East Germany (1=yes) 
    
-0.199* (0.080) -0.220** (0.080) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 
    
0.028*** (0.009) 0.028** (0.009) 
  
        
Year dummies Yes yes Yes yes 
Constant 3.843*** (0.421) 7.498*** (0.455) 7.478*** (0.494) 8.614*** (0.368) 
(Adjusted) R-squared / overall 0.026 0.172 0.176 0.175 
Δ Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.146 0.004 -0.001 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Estimations 
based on 23,524 observations. 
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As the last table of this section, Table 54 comprises results of the job security regressions. 
Since the data provides three ordinal categories of perceived job security, an ordered logistic 
regression approach is applied first. However, the estimation shows that the first cutting point 
is not statistically significant and, hence, the two first categories are pooled together. 
Therefore, a new dummy variable is created which takes the value “0” if an individual is 
“very concerned” and “somewhat” and “1” if the individual is “not concerned at all”. Hence, 
positive coefficients show that certain activities increase the probability to work in a job with 
high perceived job security. Since the newly generated variable is bivariate, a logistic 
regression approach is applied. 
Model (2) shows the base model with solely leisure time coefficients and household variables. 
The third column contains the fully specified model of which the marginal effects are shown 
in the last column. In the base model, employees who regularly attend cultural events report a 
higher level of job security, whereas the opposite can be observed for popular events. Active 
sports on a weekly basis are positively related to job security. Individuals who help friends or 
neighbours frequently work in less secure jobs. Volunteering, working in citizens’ groups, and 
attending religious events show a positive correlation with job security. When further 
demographic and job-related control variables are introduced in Model (3), the cultural events 
and sports coefficients become insignificant. Employees who meet friends at least once per 
week report higher job security while helping others is negatively related to security. Those 
who actively work in citizens’ groups every week feel safer in their current jobs.  
Demographic characteristics reveal that females and immigrants report lower levels of job 
security. Furthermore, the relationship between age and security is u-shaped. Health is 
negatively related to job security. Jobs in the finance and service industry are perceived as 
more secure. Medium sized companies seem to provide less safe jobs. Employees with a 
fixed-term contract feel less job security, whereas working hours and a job in the public sector 
increase job security. East German employees are generally less likely to perceive their jobs 
as secure.  
Marginal effects show that engaging in citizens’ groups increases the probability to be 
employed in a secure job (compared to jobs in which individuals are somewhat concerned or 
concerned about their jobs) by .12. Meeting friends every week increases this probability by 
.09. Individuals who are regularly helping others are less likely to work in a secure job by .14 
and .07 (every week respectively every month).   
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Table 54: Perceived job security regressions – Effectiveness of leisure time activities 
  DV: Perceived Job Security Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (3) 
 
Ordered Logit Logit Base Logit Full Logit Full – ME 
Cultural events 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.121 (0.172) 0.456* (0.187) -0.038 (0.186) -0.009 (0.044) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.123 (0.071) 0.306*** (0.076) 0.049 (0.078) 0.012 (0.019) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.088 (0.048) 0.141** (0.051) 0.025 (0.052) 0.006 (0.013) 
  
        
Popular entertainment 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.003 (0.104) -0.289** (0.105) -0.130 (0.111) -0.032 (0.027) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.085 (0.072) -0.230** (0.073) -0.075 (0.078) -0.018 (0.019) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.029 (0.059) -0.228*** (0.058) -0.126* (0.062) -0.030* (0.015) 
  
        
Active sports 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.069 (0.051) 0.219*** (0.054) 0.056 (0.056) 0.013 (0.014) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.073 (0.066) 0.107 (0.072) 0.043 (0.075) 0.010 (0.018) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.048 (0.049) -0.050 (0.053) -0.077 (0.055) -0.018 (0.013) 
  
        
Artistic/musical activities 
        
Every week (1=yes) -0.047 (0.073) 0.056 (0.080) -0.075 (0.081) -0.018 (0.019) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.106 (0.069) -0.084 (0.077) -0.119 (0.079) -0.029 (0.019) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.030 (0.041) 0.003 (0.044) -0.032 (0.046) -0.008 (0.011) 
  
        
Meeting friends, relatives, neighbours 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.353 (0.188) 0.274 (0.181) 0.381* (0.188) 0.092* (0.044) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.112 (0.186) -0.003 (0.179) 0.095 (0.186) 0.022 (0.043) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.071 (0.185) -0.132 (0.179) -0.081 (0.185) -0.019 (0.043) 
  
        
Helping friends, relatives, neighbours 
        
Every week (1=yes) -0.580*** (0.104) -0.695*** (0.108) -0.605*** (0.112) -0.143*** (0.027) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.297*** (0.092) -0.418*** (0.092) -0.302** (0.096) -0.074** (0.024) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.154 (0.087) -0.221* (0.087) -0.148 (0.091) -0.036 (0.023) 
  
        
Volunteer work 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.061 (0.073) 0.223** (0.074) 0.129 (0.076) 0.031 (0.019) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.071 (0.064) -0.032 (0.070) -0.118 (0.072) -0.028 (0.017) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.010 (0.053) 0.028 (0.059) -0.047 (0.061) -0.011 (0.015) 
  
        
Citizens'/political groups 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.479* (0.188) 0.756*** (0.178) 0.474* (0.191) 0.117* (0.048) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.231 (0.147) 0.364** (0.141) 0.228 (0.160) 0.056 (0.040) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.054 (0.073) 0.161* (0.078) 0.077 (0.079) 0.019 (0.019) 
  
        
Attending religious events 
        
Every week (1=yes) 0.082 (0.096) 0.343*** (0.097) 0.090 (0.103) 0.022 (0.025) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.040 (0.072) 0.052 (0.080) -0.109 (0.083) -0.026 (0.020) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.046 (0.044) 0.052 (0.046) -0.067 (0.049) -0.016 (0.012) 
  
        
Gender (1=female) -0.200*** (0.051) 
  
-0.184*** (0.057) -0.044*** (0.014) 
Age  -0.131*** (0.016) 
  
-0.152*** (0.017) -0.037*** (0.004) 
Age squared/100 0.170*** (0.018) 
  
0.197*** (0.020) 0.047*** (0.005) 
Years of education 0.026* (0.011) 
  
0.022 (0.012) 0.005 (0.003) 
Married (1=yes) -0.008 (0.050) 
  
-0.005 (0.056) -0.001 (0.014) 
Child in HH (1=yes) 0.124* (0.049) 
  
0.168** (0.056) 0.040** (0.013) 
Log(Household income) 0.406*** (0.055) 0.856*** (0.056) 0.387*** (0.061) 0.093*** (0.015) 
Househould size -0.061* (0.025) -0.128*** (0.021) -0.074** (0.028) -0.018** (0.007) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.429*** (0.077) 
  
-0.369*** (0.087) -0.089*** (0.021) 
Total years of unemployment -0.040 (0.021) 
  
-0.049 (0.026) -0.012 (0.006) 
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Table 54: Perceived job security regressions – Effectiveness of leisure time activities (continued) 
  DV: Perceived Job Security Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (3) 
 
Ordered Logit Logit Base Logit Full Logit Full – ME 
Subjective health 
        
Good (1=yes) -0.415*** (0.061) 
  
-0.462*** (0.065) -0.115*** (0.016) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) -0.795*** (0.067) 
  
-0.818*** (0.072) -0.199*** (0.017) 
Poor (1=yes) -1.038*** (0.084) 
  
-0.896*** (0.087) -0.217*** (0.021) 
Bad (1=yes) -1.334*** (0.187) 
  
-1.040*** (0.179) -0.248*** (0.039) 
  
        
Branch (reference: trade) 
        
Industry (1=yes) 0.041 (0.080) 
  
0.007 (0.095) 0.002 (0.022) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 0.139* (0.062) 
  
0.128 (0.071) 0.029 (0.016) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.236*** (0.068) 
  
0.223** (0.077) 0.052** (0.018) 
Services (1=yes) 0.667*** (0.073) 
  
0.684*** (0.080) 0.166*** (0.019) 
  
        
Firm size (reference: less than 20) 
        
20 to 199 (1=yes) -0.194*** (0.056) 
  
-0.150* (0.062) -0.036* (0.015) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) -0.201*** (0.060) 
  
-0.216*** (0.068) -0.052*** (0.016) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) -0.031 (0.063) 
  
0.024 (0.069) 0.006 (0.017) 
  
        
Limited contract (1=yes) -1.021*** (0.083) 
  
-0.933*** (0.096) -0.224*** (0.023) 
Working hours per week 0.010*** (0.003) 
  
0.013*** (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Civil servant (1=yes) 0.655*** (0.064) 
  
0.677*** (0.069) 0.163*** (0.017) 
  
        
ISCO job class. (reference: legislators, senior officials, managers) 
      
Professionals (1=yes) -0.006 (0.086) 
  
0.011 (0.094) 0.003 (0.023) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) -0.158 (0.083) 
  
-0.147 (0.091) -0.036 (0.022) 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.299** (0.095) 
  
-0.283** (0.105) -0.068** (0.025) 
Service workers (1=yes) -0.005 (0.105) 
  
-0.002 (0.114) 0.000 (0.028) 
Craft & related trade workers (1=yes) -0.262** (0.091) 
  
-0.277** (0.101) -0.067** (0.024) 
Plant & machine operators (1=yes) -0.343*** (0.103) 
  
-0.342** (0.113) -0.082** (0.027) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.138 (0.114) 
  
-0.128 (0.127) -0.031 (0.031) 
  
        
East Germany (1=yes) -0.651*** (0.098) 
  
-0.812*** (0.109) -0.195*** (0.026) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) 0.008 (0.011) 
  
0.019 (0.012) 0.005 (0.003) 
  
        
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant 
  
-6.987*** (0.473) -1.050 (0.633) 
  
McFadden Pseudo-R² 0.097 0.047 0.126 
 
Cut 1 -0.780 (0.576) 
      
Cut 2 1.625** (0.576) 
      
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Estimations 
based on 23,524 observations. 
In addition to these analyses, separate regressions – displayed in Table 55 – were run in order 
to investigate gender differences in the effectiveness of leisure time activities. Wage 
regressions reveal that especially men benefit from attending cultural events while no 
significant correlation has been detected for females. Helping friends is negatively related to 
wages, yet, coefficients are larger and at least partially significant for men in comparison to 
women. Negative wage effects of volunteering are only significant for males. Interestingly, 
females benefit from volunteering in terms of job satisfaction while this correlation is 
negative but insignificant for men. Females are less satisfied with their job when they engage 
in citizens’ groups at least once per month. All other coefficients in the job satisfaction 
regressions are insignificant. The last two columns contain regression results with perceived 
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job security as the dependent variable. Females who attend popular events weekly report 
significantly lower job security. A negative correlation for both genders is found for 
individuals helping others at least once per week.  Women who participate in citizens’ groups 
on a weekly basis report higher job security.  
Table 55: Effectiveness of leisure time activities, separated by gender 
DV: Log(Wage) Job Satisfaction Perceived job security 
Gender Males Females Males Females Males Females 
Cultural events 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.092* 0.024 0.309 -0.180 -0.147 0.255 
Every month (1=yes) 0.027 0.000 0.084 0.132 -0.025 0.196 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.022** 0.000 0.018 0.035 0.002 0.080 
  
      
Popular entertainment 
      
Every week (1=yes) -0.034 0.008 0.045 -0.149 -0.022 -0.512* 
Every month (1=yes) -0.001 0.014 -0.029 -0.104 -0.008 -0.246 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.012 0.016 -0.080 -0.022 -0.124 -0.136 
  
      
Active sports 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.018 0.008 -0.066 0.003 0.064 0.031 
Every month (1=yes) 0.001 0.028 0.002 -0.078 -0.012 0.142 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.014 -0.012 -0.040 -0.079 -0.071 -0.091 
  
      
Artistic/musical activities 
      
Every week (1=yes) -0.005 -0.006 -0.133 -0.039 -0.080 0.006 
Every month (1=yes) 0.001 -0.006 -0.056 -0.063 -0.153 -0.016 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.004 -0.015 -0.066 -0.008 0.007 -0.070 
  
      
Meeting friends, relatives, neighbours 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.053 0.014 -0.017 -0.171 0.306 0.672 
Every month (1=yes) 0.041 0.019 -0.060 -0.213 0.036 0.339 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.034 -0.009 -0.166 -0.355 -0.113 0.071 
  
      
Helping friends, relatives, neighbours 
      
Every week (1=yes) -0.036 -0.022 0.139 0.056 -0.642*** -0.523** 
Every month (1=yes) -0.042* -0.010 0.175 -0.023 -0.308* -0.289 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.030 -0.010 0.113 -0.129 -0.194 -0.047 
  
      
Volunteer work 
      
Every week (1=yes) -0.029* -0.034 -0.043 0.314** 0.110 0.177 
Every month (1=yes) -0.008 0.007 -0.003 0.108 -0.177* 0.000 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.020* -0.002 -0.030 -0.009 -0.044 -0.092 
  
      
Citizens'/political groups 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.065 0.038 -0.010 -0.116 0.290 1.671*** 
Every month (1=yes) 0.042 0.010 0.136 -0.588** 0.273 0.043 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.028* -0.007 0.080 0.162 0.025 0.145 
  
      
Attending religious events 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.003 0.045 0.075 0.057 0.092 0.168 
Every month (1=yes) -0.015 -0.021 0.100 0.129 -0.084 -0.187 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.017* 0.006 0.021 0.071 -0.096 -0.011 
  
      
Log(Household income) 0.486*** 0.331*** 0.189** 0.103 0.349*** 0.447*** 
Househould size -0.031*** -0.068*** 0.005 0.034 -0.084* -0.022 
Observations 16,228 7,296 16,228 7,296 16,228 7,296 
(Pseudo-)R² 
 
0.548 0.184 0.171 0.136 0.126 
Notes: Robust standard errors estimated but not displayed in the table. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, 
respectively. Estimations based on 23,524 observations. Also controlled for all other variables given in Table 51.  
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7.4.2 Leisure Time Activities and Post-hire Outcomes of Job Changers 
As argued in the previous chapters of this thesis, social capital – and therefore activities that 
generate social capital – should be particularly helpful for job seekers, which is investigated in 
this chapter. Table 56 displays evidence on the determinants of wages, job satisfaction, and 
perceived job security of job changers. In the first column, determinants of logarithmised 
monthly earnings are shown. Apart from weekly attending popular events, none of the leisure 
time activities is related to wages. Attending popular events at least once a week is negatively 
related to wages. All other control variables in this Mincerian wage regression are similar to 
previous findings (e.g. in chapter 7.4.1). In the job satisfaction regression only monthly sports 
activities are negatively related to satisfaction. The last regression does not yield any 
statistically significant leisure time coefficients. In consideration of the number of 
observations regarding job changers, no further quantile regressions or subgroup analyses are 
conducted. 
When the regressions are rerun without household variables, the results remain very similar, 
indicating that endogeneity is a minor problem in case of individuals who just have found a 
new job. 
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Table 56: Post-hire outcomes of leisure time activities of job changers 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
DV: Log(Wage) Job Satisfaction Job Security 
Cultural events 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.080 (0.093) -0.052 (0.438) 0.092 (0.487) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.041 (0.047) 0.085 (0.241) -0.053 (0.261) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.001 (0.029) 0.163 (0.149) -0.032 (0.170) 
  
      
Popular entertainment 
      
Every week (1=yes) -0.136* (0.063) 0.060 (0.288) -0.517 (0.356) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.044 (0.043) -0.047 (0.230) 0.159 (0.288) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.015 (0.037) -0.192 (0.200) 0.012 (0.255) 
  
      
Active sports 
      
Every week (1=yes) -0.017 (0.030) -0.143 (0.154) 0.190 (0.172) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.010 (0.044) -0.467* (0.227) 0.094 (0.249) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.038 (0.031) -0.001 (0.156) 0.146 (0.188) 
  
      
Artistic/musical activities 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.029 (0.037) 0.110 (0.186) 0.001 (0.245) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.002 (0.046) -0.206 (0.189) -0.174 (0.243) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.008 (0.028) -0.046 (0.132) 0.022 (0.153) 
  
      
Meeting friends, relatives, neighbours 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.228 (0.170) 0.051 (0.571) 0.901 (0.775) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.203 (0.169) 0.170 (0.569) 0.533 (0.775) 
Less frequent (1=yes) 0.202 (0.170) 0.037 (0.577) 0.511 (0.789) 
  
      
Helping friends, relatives, neighbours 
      
Every week (1=yes) -0.056 (0.058) 0.177 (0.265) -0.570 (0.365) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.015 (0.050) -0.012 (0.233) -0.330 (0.327) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.012 (0.048) -0.247 (0.221) -0.126 (0.322) 
  
      
Volunteer work 
      
Every week (1=yes) -0.050 (0.041) -0.0791 (0.174) 0.016 (0.253) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.046 (0.045) -0.018 (0.213) 0.010 (0.241) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.019 (0.036) -0.153 (0.166) -0.039 (0.201) 
  
      
Citizens'/political groups 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.123 (0.111) 0.228 (0.619) 0.808 (0.668) 
Every month (1=yes) 0.148 (0.156) 0.009 (0.268) -0.041 (0.677) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.173 (0.071) 0.336 (0.227) 0.007 (0.318) 
  
      
Attending religious events 
      
Every week (1=yes) 0.072 (0.050) -0.133 (0.263) 0.158 (0.323) 
Every month (1=yes) -0.057 (0.063) 0.093 (0.258) 0.001 (0.287) 
Less frequent (1=yes) -0.012 (0.027) 0.052 (0.127) -0.243 (0.156) 
  
      
Gender (1=female) -0.206*** (0.029) -0.015 (0.137) -0.549*** (0.159) 
Age  0.075*** (0.010) 0.000 (0.043) -0.003 (0.051) 
Age squared/100 -0.081*** (0.012) -0.022 (0.055) -0.005 (0.064) 
Years of education 0.028*** (0.006) -0.031 (0.029) 0.054 (0.033) 
Married (1=yes) 0.078** (0.026) 0.049 (0.130) 0.119 (0.153) 
Child in HH (1=yes) 0.01812 (0.033) 0.033 (0.149) 0.134 (0.178) 
Log(Household income) 0.410*** (0.035) -0.054 (0.162) 0.064 (0.180) 
Househould size -0.058*** (0.016) 0.018 (0.075) -0.039 (0.087) 
Immigrant (1=yes) -0.098* (0.040) 0.135 (0.200) -0.589* (0.252) 
Total years of unemployment -0.031* (0.010) -0.012 (0.044) 0.053 (0.074) 
 
  
 
230 Social Capital and Labour Market Success – The Role of Leisure Time Activities 
Table 56: Post-hire outcomes of leisure time activities of job changers (continued) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
DV: Log(Wage) Job Satisfaction Job Security 
Subjective health 
      
Good (1=yes) -0.051 (0.034) -0.237 (0.159) -0.590*** (0.179) 
Satisfactory (1=yes) -0.062 (0.039) -0.805*** (0.184) -0.876*** (0.203) 
Poor (1=yes) -0.161* (0.055) -1.52*** (0.280) -0.735* (0.289) 
Bad (1=yes) -0.066 (0.069) -0.952 (0.766) 1.775 (1.168) 
  
      
Perceived job security (ref.: not concerned at all) 
     
Very concerned (1=yes) 
  
-1.316*** (0.176) 
  
Somewhat concerned (1=yes) 
  
-0.530*** (0.108) 
  
  
      
Branch (reference: trade) 
      
Industry (1=yes) 0.100** (0.035) -0.113 (0.227) -0.005 (0.277) 
Manufacturing (1=yes) 0.077 (0.041) -0.244 (0.171) 0.014 (0.206) 
Finance (1=yes) 0.096* (0.039) 0.112 (0.166) -0.129 (0.212) 
Services (1=yes) 0.030 (0.042) 0.010 (0.190) 0.438 (0.227) 
  
      
Firm size (reference: less than 20) 
      
20 to 199 (1=yes) 0.092*** (0.028) 0.115 (0.140) 0.026 (0.165) 
200 to 1999 (1=yes) 0.138*** (0.032) 0.114 (0.156) 0.018 (0.192) 
more than 2000 (1=yes) 0.130*** (0.039) 0.104 (0.180) 0.370 (0.197) 
  
      
Limited contract (1=yes) -0.153*** (0.027) 0.110 (0.122) -0.722*** (0.148) 
Working hours per week 0.009*** (0.002) -0.007 (0.007) -0.005 (0.009) 
Civil servant (1=yes) 0.023 (0.040) 0.443* (0.178) 0.385 (0.210) 
  
      
ISCO job classification (ref.: legislators, senior officials and managers) 
    
Professionals (1=yes) -0.102* (0.046) -0.412 (0.224) -0.194 (0.296) 
Technicians & associate prof. (1=yes) -0.171*** (0.043) -0.063 (0.220) -0.048 (0.292) 
Clerks (1=yes) -0.177*** (0.055) -0.424 (0.288) 0.037 (0.347) 
Service workers (1=yes) -0.339*** (0.059) -0.133 (0.287) 0.073 (0.361) 
Craft & related trade workers (1=yes) -0.216*** (0.050) -0.381 (0.266) -0.565 (0.337) 
Plant & machine operators (1=yes) -0.272*** (0.053) 0.078 (0.292) -0.049 (0.376) 
Elementary occupations (1=yes) -0.398*** (0.067) -0.973** (0.329) -0.639 (0.426) 
  
      
East Germany (1=yes) -0.087 (0.055) -0.277 (0.246) -0.214 (0.310) 
Regional unemployment rate (in %) -0.013* (0.006) 0.046 (0.029) -0.017 (0.035) 
  
      
Year dummies yes yes yes 
Constant 2.489*** (0.379) 9.158*** (1.707) -1.065 (1.866) 
(Adjusted) R² / McFadden Pseudo-R²  0.593 0.171 0.094 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote levels of significance at 5, 1, or 0.1 percent, respectively. Estimations 
based on 1,444 observations. 
7.5 Discussion 
In this chapter, the empirical findings of the regression analyses are discussed. First, the 
findings regarding the estimated leisure time coefficients are interpreted in order to explain 
why certain activities could serve helpful in the labour market while others do not. Findings 
of additional robustness analyses are described in chapter 7.5.2. Chapter 7.5.3 mentions some 
limitations of the analyses of this chapter. 
7.5.1 Interpretation of the Empirical Results 
The empirical results presented in the last chapter show that leisure time activities are related 
to career success, however, not as strongly as suggested in the theoretical and empirical 
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literature. In particular, leisure time activities do not seem to be related to short-term career 
success in the sense of post-hire outcomes after a job change but to long-term career success, 
especially in terms of wages. The results have shown that individuals who attend cultural 
events regularly earn higher wages – a finding which is still significant when it is controlled 
for household income and job categories (which can be interpreted as a status measure). Still, 
the comparison to the control model without household income shows that endogeneity is a 
severe problem for this measure which might not be entirely eliminated by including the 
household variables. Further factors, e.g. parental background, could also affect both the 
frequency of attending cultural events as well as wages. However, the strong and positive 
coefficients for weekly visits of museums or other cultural events could imply that these 
activities provide benefits for the individual. Individuals who attend such events at least once 
per week are likely to create or maintain a large number of weak ties. The ties formed at these 
occasions are likely to be particularly helpful throughout one’s career because of the selection 
into these activities. Additional multinomial logistic regression results show that individuals 
who attend cultural events at least once per week have higher education, are in better health, 
are less likely to work in small firms, and work in higher positions according to the ISCO 
classification. Frequent interaction with other employees with these attributes could, hence, 
enhance social capital and career chances. 
Another important result of the wage regressions is that individuals who actively engage in 
sports activities at least once per week earn higher wages. This effect is even larger and also 
significant for ‘sports at least once a month’ when household variables are not included. 
Findings from sociology imply that sports involvement is determined by social class. Already 
Bourdieu (1978) raised the question how socio-demographic factors determine sports 
participation and, in particular, the choice of sports activities. For the French society, he found 
that class is positively related to sports like skiing or tennis but negatively related to so-called 
‘prole’ sports like boxing, rugby, bodybuilding, and football. Wilson (2002) detected that 
education (which he interprets as a proxy for cultural capital) and economic capital (income) 
were positively related to sports activities in general, yet, education was negatively related to 
‘prole’ sports. Hence, sports activities are particularly helpful for upper class members 
because individuals are connected who dispose of more valuable resources and ties.  
Furthermore, more educated and wealthier individuals were more likely to engage in sports at 
all. Therefore, people who are very active in sports should be able to generate helpful social 
ties that enhance general career success. Hence, the results stand in contrast to Putnam (2000) 
who argued that the emergence of “new” sport activities, like running, skating or fitness, is 
 
232 Social Capital and Labour Market Success – The Role of Leisure Time Activities 
negatively related to social capital. These sports are assumed to be less social compared to 
“traditional” team sports, yet, the empirical evidence still shows positive effects for sports 
activities. However, team sports and single sports are not distinguished in the data. 
The most surprising finding of this analysis is the negative coefficient of volunteering (once 
per week) and the insignificant coefficients for monthly or less frequent volunteering. 
Theoretical considerations and previous empirical evidence has suggested a clear advantage 
for volunteers in the labour market (see chapter 7.2.2.4). One explanation for this finding 
could be a measurement error in volunteering in the data. While the given frequencies should 
be sufficient to describe most leisure time activities, volunteering is not likely to be done on a 
monthly or on an even more infrequent basis. Most active volunteers offer their time at least 
once per week
113
 so that more detailed information on the time spent for volunteering is 
essential. Additional analyses of subgroups by education (according to ISCED categories, see 
chapter 4.4.3.3) shows that individuals with lower levels of education – in this case middle 
vocational education – experience a negative effect of volunteering on wages. For all other 
subgroups the volunteering coefficients are statistically insignificant. This can be understood 
as a hint for the segregation of the volunteer labour market, meaning that individuals with 
higher education are more likely to volunteer in organisations which require higher levels of 
human capital.  
Furthermore, no correlation between the measure for religious involvement and labour market 
success has been found. This seems puzzling since theoretical considerations and empirical 
evidence (mainly in the U.S.) have found strong indications for a positive effect of religion on 
social capital. One reason for this finding could be a measurement error, yielding from the 
unclear relationship between religious activities and volunteering. Seifert et al. (2012) showed 
that the second largest group of volunteers are working for religious organisations. Among 
females, religious associations are even the most important providers for volunteer work. In 
line with this, Becker and Dhingra (2001) found a strong correlation between church 
attendance and volunteering.Therefore, the real effect of religious involvement might be 
covered in both variables. Furthermore, Coleman (2003) argued that religious associations 
mainly provide direct short-term support for their members in need which is limited in scope. 
These associations, therefore, mainly address disadvantaged members so that the potential to 
generate beneficial ties is limited. Religious social capita, Coleman (2003: 41) concluded, “is 
                                                 
113
 The average monthly time spent on volunteering is 15.4 hours for individuals with lower and medium 
qualification, 18.2 hours for highly qualified volunteers (Seifert et al., 2012). 
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more open to the disadvantaged in our society than other forms of social capital”. Hence, the 
findings may show that religious social capital – even though it was created by weak ties – 
does not provide labour market benefits. 
Previous research in this thesis has shown that job search via social ties is not or even 
negatively related to wages but positively with job satisfaction. This has been interpreted as a 
trade-off between wages and working conditions that match the job seeker’s preferences 
better than a randomly drawn job from the job offer distribution (see chapter 2.5.3). In this 
chapter, one single correlation (attending religious events once per month) between leisure 
time and job satisfaction is statistically significant.  
Ateca-Amestoy et al. (2008) argued that the relationship between leisure time activities and 
job satisfaction could be influenced by two opposing effects. On the one hand, individuals 
with higher income are able to afford more leisure time activities. On the other hand, higher 
income is usually related to longer working hours which leave less time for non-work 
activities. This imbalance of work and non-work life (commonly referred to as work-life 
balance) is likely to affect both job and life satisfaction (Haar et al., 2014). Furthermore, life 
and job satisfaction seem to be directly related, which has been repeatedly found in the 
literature (see e.g. Tait et al., 1989; Judge, Watanabe, 1993).
114
 A direct relationship between 
leisure time activities and satisfaction with the work domain has not been found in the 
analyses which might be explained by the complex and interdependent relationship between 
these measures. As part of the robustness analyses, a measure of general life satisfaction has 
been included and the results are qualitatively the same.  
Statistically significant correlations, though, have been found in the job security regressions. 
Interestingly, both popular entertainment activities and helping friends are negatively related 
to job security. First, this could be interpreted as evidence that strong ties are less valuable in 
the labour market – here in terms of non-monetary payoffs. However, this finding could also 
be interpreted in the light of the compensation hypothesis (Piotrkowski, 1979).
115
 Individuals 
who suffer high levels of insecurity could try to compensate this instability by attending 
popular events and forming close ties to friends. Particularly finding stability in interpersonal 
relationships could compensate for negative feelings that derive from job insecurity. Even 
                                                 
114
 Van Praag et al. (2003) developed a theoretical model in which overall life satisfaction is related to domain 
satisfactions, i.e. health, financial situation, and job. The authors understand life satisfaction as an aggregate 
which comprises different domains of life. 
115
 Staines (1980) concluded that the spillover approach has received more support in the literature than the 
compensation hypothesis. 
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after controlling for job satisfaction in an additional regression this finding remains stable, 
which seems puzzling in the light of the strong positive correlation between job satisfaction 
and job security. This means that for a given level of job satisfaction helping friends and job 
security are still negatively related. Hence, the compensation motive does not appear 
convincing to explain this negative correlation. The frequency of helping others is likely to be 
based on strong ties
116
 which might be less helpful in getting a job. In contrast to other 
studies, this chapters has investigated the simultaneous correlation between multiple leisure 
time activities and labour market outcomes. As a result, the coefficients describe the negative 
effect of helping others while keeping general interaction with others constant. While 
interaction with friends or relatives is (partially) positively related to job security, even 
stronger ties through helping do not increase this correlation. Therefore, the two different 
variables – meeting respectively helping others – should be jointly interpreted. 
In further regressions, the dataset has been restricted to job changers and the results are 
interesting for two reasons. First, this narrowed perspective allows an investigation of short-
term effects of social capital generating activities. Second, while the previous analyses might 
still be biased due to reversed causality, individuals are less likely to change their whole 
leisure time activities after a job change. In contrast, the analyses have shown that leisure time 
activities are rather stable so that post-hire outcomes of job changes can rather be interpreted 
as consequences of leisure time activities than as causes. As a result, most coefficients 
become statistically insignificant. Wage regressions show only one statistically significant 
leisure time activity coefficient: Individuals who are attending popular events at least once per 
week earn significantly lower wages of around 15 percent. This can be understood as proof of 
the strength of weak ties hypothesis because people mainly attend these events with persons 
they are closely related to. However, this statistically significant and economically meaningful 
effect appears too large to be caused by strong ties. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
individuals who attend such events might dispose of unobserved characteristics that are 
negatively related to wages. Furthermore, it has to be considered that the number of leisure 
time activities is restricted by time constraints. Individuals who are frequently attending such 
events are not able to spend their time on other activities which might be positively related to 
wages. Most popular events take place in the late evening until late in the night which reduces 
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the time available for other activities during the day. Interacting the frequency of attending 
popular events and age did not yield any statistically significant results.  
Another statistically significant coefficient is found in the job satisfaction regression for 
individuals who engage in active sports at least once per month. For these participants a 
negative correlation between sports engagement and job satisfaction has been detected. Since 
this finding is against the expectation formulated in chapter 7.2.2.5, additional regressions 
were run in order to investigate this further. Particularly for individuals who found a new job, 
reversed causality can explain this finding. Individuals who state that they practice sports on a 
monthly basis might be dissatisfied because they would like to do sports more frequently. 
Starting a new job might limit their time to engage in sports activities which might lead to 
lower job satisfaction. In order to investigate this potential channel, another regression was 
run in which actual weekly working time and sports activities were interacted. The results 
show that, although all interaction coefficients are statistically insignificant, all activity 
coefficients become insignificant as well. 
7.5.2 Robustness Analyses 
While some robustness checks, mainly interaction effects or subgroup analyses, have been 
described above, some general robustness analyses have been conducted in order to 
investigate how far the findings change if core assumptions are relaxed or different estimation 
approaches are utilised.  
At first, it has been argued that patterns of leisure time activities are rather constant and do not 
change substantially over time. Hence, information of years in which the frequency of leisure 
time activities has been part of the SOEP questionnaire has been used in years without 
observations. A robustness analyses has been applied to estimate the same regression models 
without these information and the results are broadly identical.  
In an additional analysis, panel estimators have been applied. Fixed effects are able to 
eliminate biases due to unobserved and time-invariant factors. This might be useful to reduce 
potential biases in factors which both determine labour market outcomes and the frequency of 
leisure time activities. For example, labour market success is likely to be affected by intrinsic 
motivation which might also be related to the probability of becoming a member of formal 
organisations. Other individual factors, like sociability, could be related to the frequency of 
social exchange with individuals and in the labour market. Using fixed-effects regressions 
might reduce such bias. Since leisure time variables are only available for four years (see 
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chapter 7.3), the analysis has been restricted to these waves. However, for the leisure time 
variable the between variation exceeds the within variation. Individuals differ with regard to 
their leisure time behaviour but activities are rather time-invariant. This can be interpreted as 
proof of the assumption in chapter 7.3. Due to the small within variation, a common within 
estimator might cause an efficiency loss (Cameron, Trivedi, 2010). Hence, a between 
estimator has been applied which broadly replicates earlier OLS findings.  
Furthermore, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach (Zellner, 1962; Zellner, 
Huang, 1962; Zellner, 1963) has been applied since both variables are determined by (mainly) 
similar coefficients and individual error terms might be correlated across estimations 
(Cameron, Trivedi, 2010). Yet, as in previous chapters, error terms are solely slightly 
correlated and the estimated coefficients do not differ much from the coefficients gained by 
OLS estimates. 
As mentioned earlier, endogeneity is always an issue when outcomes of leisure time activities 
are analysed. Albeit some of the endogeneity concerns should be alleviated by using 
household income as a control variable, it is still questionable whether leisure time activities 
are beneficial for individuals. On the contrary, job changes in the past might have induced 
changes in salary which could have resulted in a change in leisure time activities. Therefore, 
two additional dummy variables have been included in the regressions which indicate whether 
an individual has changed his/her job in the two previous years. Although the job change 
coefficients are statistically significant in the wage regression (insignificant in the job 
satisfaction and job security regressions), leisure time coefficients remain unchanged. In 
additional regressions leisure time variables have been interacted with household income to 
allow for heterogeneous effects of household income in relation with leisure time activities. 
However, an R² of .9974 in the wage regression indicates that the model is overfit when 
interaction terms are included and, therefore, results are not displayed here. 
In the descriptive statistics it has been mentioned that only few individuals stated that they 
“never” meet friends or relatives. Since this chapter deals with the outcomes of social capital, 
a concept that includes social relations to friends or relatives, results might be biased if 
individuals who show some degree of social withdrawal are part of the dataset. Therefore, 
these observations are excluded in order to gain estimates based on individuals who report at 
least a certain degree of sociability. As a result, in all regressions based on the whole sample, 
the frequency of meeting friends or relatives is positively related to wages, job satisfaction, 
and perceived job security. This strengthens the hypothesis that weak ties (meeting friends) 
 
237 Social Capital and Labour Market Success – The Role of Leisure Time Activities 
are more helpful in one’s career in comparison to strong ties (helping friends). All other 
coefficients are qualitatively unchanged. Moreover, regression results regarding job changers 
do not show any changes if observations without contact to friends or relatives are excluded. 
Finally, over-specification could be a problem since several variables are included which 
control for potential selection into jobs. However, it could be argued that social ties provide 
better jobs in terms of monetary and non-monetary payoffs because jobs in higher positions 
are systematically given to individuals who dispose of large social networks. Hence, 
controlling for job categories (in this case the rather nine broad ISCO main categories) might 
contain this selection effect. In order to investigate this relationship, all regressions are run 
without ISCO control dummies and the results are the same.  
7.5.3 Limitations 
One major limitation in the job seeker regressions is the relatively small sample size. 
Although the number of 1,444 observations does not appear considerably small, this might be 
misleading since the variables of interest are nine categorical variables with four items each. 
This leaves around 40 observations for each item which might explain why standard errors of 
the coefficients are relatively large and leave only few statistically significant coefficients.  
The reader should keep in mind that – in distinction to other studies – this chapter has 
focussed on two or more person households. As a result, individuals already dispose of one or 
more strong ties within the household and the findings do not apply to single households.  
The measurement of leisure time activities as available in the SOEP data causes several 
problems which are shortly reviewed here. Theoretical argumentation in chapter 7.2.2 has 
shown that most leisure time activities are able to create opportunities to form both strong and 
weak ties. This lack of clearness is, at least partially, found in the estimated coefficients. Two 
further aspects which are inherent in any kind of social ties but could not be observed are 
discussed in the following. 
First, this study has drawn on the concept of accessible social capital in contrast to the amount 
of mobilised capital in order to improve one’s career (see Lin, 2008). As a result, individual 
differences in the access to social capital could have been measured, return deficits (Lin, 
2001), though, could not be accounted for. If individuals with similar patterns of leisure time 
activities and, thus, similar amount and quality of social ties, might differ in their ability to 
utilise their existing capital. If this ability is affected by unobserved characteristics, e.g. 
personality traits such as extraversion, the leisure time coefficients might be biased. Yet, 
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research in chapter 5 has shown that personality traits play a rather minor role in determining 
the use of social capital in the job search process. 
The second aspect is that the activities under investigation mainly cover non-work 
relationships. Therefore, work-relationships between supervisor and subordinate or between 
employees from two different companies have been entirely neglected. Due to the nature of 
these ties, which are formed and maintained solely in the work environment, it is unlikely that 
they are expressed in variables that measure leisure time activities. Work-ties are likely to be 
extraordinarily helpful since the P-O or P-J fit can be better estimated by individuals who 
have access to this information. Antoninis (2006), for example, showed that individuals who 
were referred by others who have direct experience of their expertise were particularly 
beneficial in finding a better paid job. Hence, the reader has to keep in mind that this study 
solely provides evidence for ties that are generated or maintained in the private domain. In the 
labour market, especially vertical ties to supervisors could be helpful compared to horizontal 
ties, e.g. between co-workers. Horizontal ties are formed between members of a network who 
are in a similar position, while, vertical ties are formed between individuals of different 
hierarchy levels. Breuer et al. (2013), for example, showed that vertical social ties affect 
subjective performance evaluations in favour of the related subordinate. In many companies, 
the evaluations are linked to monetary bonuses or could increase promotion perspectives. 
Hence, activities through which vertical ties can be formed could account for positive labour 
market effects.   
Furthermore, the use of observed frequency of leisure time activities could be criticised. 
Lloyd and Auld (2002) argued that researchers mainly use place-centred indicators (frequency 
of leisure time activities) and ignore person-centred criteria (e.g. subjective perception of 
leisure time activities) in predicting life satisfaction. In this case, additional information on 
how far effort (time allocated to a certain activity) and outcome (labour market success) are 
perceived as helpful by the individual. However, this approach might overestimate the degree 
to which an individual actually allocates one’s leisure time in order to maximise labour 
market outcomes. Thus, place-centred indicators like the ones in this study should provide 
sufficient information in order to estimate robust coefficients. 
In all regressions in this chapter, household income has been used as a control variable in 
order to reduce potential endogeneity. However, as most significant correlations between 
leisure time activities and post-hire outcomes have been found in the wage regressions, it is 
rather questionable whether this approach has eliminated endogeneity sufficiently. Thus, it 
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would be helpful to estimate the probability to engage in each activity for all individuals, 
determined by demographic factor and household income (as an exclusionary restriction). In a 
second step, the estimated probabilities could be utilised in order to estimate unbiased leisure 
time coefficients. However, since leisure time activities do not constitute a discrete choice 
between alternatives, a two stage estimator – for example in the form of the Bourguignon et 
al. (2007) estimator used in chapter 5 – cannot be applied. Agresti and Liu (2001) suggested 
marginal logit models that explicit allow for and model dependence between choices.
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However, to the best of my knowledge, this approach has not been applied yet in order to 
estimate choice probabilities in a two-stage model.  
Finally, one further limitation addresses the lack of theoretical foundation of leisure time 
activities which complicates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients.  First, leisure time 
variables can be either interpreted as stock or as flow measures (Glaeser et al., 2002).  While 
stock measures remain unchanged if no further investment is made, flow measures require 
constant investment in order to maintain a certain level. Literature on leisure time activities 
lacks a consensus whether certain activities are rather stock or flow measures. For instance, 
Glaeser et al. (2002) argued that membership in organisations should rather be interpreted as a 
stock variable because joining an organisation is more difficult than staying within once you 
are in. This argument, though, is less likely to hold for friendships which need frequent 
interaction in order to be maintained. Hence, leisure time variables have to be interpreted 
according to their stock of flow character. While organisational memberships might be 
beneficial even with investing much further time, other leisure time activities have to be 
undertaken regularly in order to generate any benefits.  
7.6 Conclusion 
The analyses in this chapter have shown that leisure time activities are weakly related to 
labour market outcomes; yet, more statistically significant coefficients have been found for 
the whole sample compared to the restricted sample of job seekers. Part of this can be 
explained by the relatively small sample size in case of job seekers. Nevertheless, the analyses 
have revealed that reversed causality, respectively strong interdependence between leisure 
time activities and (monetary) labour market outcomes, affects the results. As a matter of fact, 
the findings are relatively weak and leave room for alternative interpretations. Therefore, all 
conclusions have to be taken with care.  
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However, this study has enhanced the existing literature by two major aspects: First, it has 
been shown that including a measure for household income eliminates part of the reversed 
causality in the wage regressions. For further research it is, therefore, suggested to utilise this 
approach because coefficients might be biased upwards. Second, this chapter has shown that 
the effect of leisure time activities on wages has to be jointly estimated. Since total leisure 
time which can be allocated to certain activities is limited, coefficients might be biased when 
this relationship is neglected. This might explain why, in contrast to other studies (e.g. Hackl 
et al., 2007; Ruiter, De Graf, 2009), no positive correlation between volunteering and labour 
market outcomes has been detected.  
Further research could investigate the relationship between leisure time activities and career 
success by using a more specific measure for leisure time activities: First, more detailed 
information on the frequency of certain leisure time activities (e.g. meeting friends) should be 
provided. For some activities it might not be enough to have a rather broad measure on a 
weekly basis. Second, some leisure time activities for which it is not clear whether they 
provide strong or weak ties should be divided into distinct measures. For example, 
participants could be asked how often they meet close friends or family members and how 
often they meet rather weakly connected acquaintances. This way, results on leisure time 
activities could be more pronounced and better suited to investigate the “strength of weak 
ties”-hypothesis (Granovetter, 1973). 
Particularly surprising findings of this study refer to the labour market effects of volunteering 
which has been perceived as a source for labour market effects in previous studies. Further 
studies could address the question which types of volunteering can provide labour market 
benefits and which do not. For example, volunteering in the same profession as the current (or 
future) job could be helpful to generate ties.  
A final question addresses the role of social ties in self-employment in comparison to 
employed workers. The economic literature has just begun to investigate the importance of 
social ties for entrepreneurs (Bauernschuster et al., 2010), yet, future research could aim at 
investing both kinds of work jointly. 
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8 Concluding Remarks 
8.1 Summary of Empirical Findings 
This thesis has provided a large number of analyses of the determinants and effectiveness of 
social ties in the job search process, especially in determining post-hire outcomes, such as 
wages, job satisfaction, and turnover. In chapter 2, theoretical arguments have been 
summarised which explain why social ties could be helpful for job seekers. Apart from pre-
screening and Realistic Job Previews, classic job search theory has been utilised in order to 
explain potential positive effects of job search via social ties. Counter arguments based on the 
Individual Differences hypothesis question this positive effect of social capital. This chapter 
has revealed that labour market effects of social capital are still not fully understood. 
Empirical analyses in the chapters 3 to 7 have addressed the five questions raised in the 
introduction. All analyses of this thesis are undertaken with data from the Socio-Economic 
Panel, a large representative survey for German households and individuals. Empirical 
investigations have exploited the data in various ways in order to generate new insights into 
the effectiveness of social ties. 
The third chapter focussed on determinants of source choice (question 1) and, thus, has built 
the foundation for all further analyses. The analyses have detected that source choice is non-
random but determined by demographic and job-related characteristics. Hence, this chapter 
suggested that correction for this selection effect is necessary in order to gain reliable 
coefficients.  
The second question in the introduction expressed doubts about potential benefits of social 
capital, particularly regarding monetary outcomes, in the context of the German labour 
market. In the fourth chapter, several analyses investigating post-hire outcomes of social ties 
showed that individuals do not benefit from their ties in terms of monetary outcomes. 
Nevertheless, OLS estimates revealed that individuals who found their job via social ties were 
more satisfied with their current job. Little evidence has been found for a positive effect on 
turnover. It seems puzzling that employees are more satisfied with their new job, yet, they are 
not less likely to quit the new job. This has been interpreted as some kind of a socialisation 
benefit of new hires who are more satisfied due to better ex-ante information. 
Question 3 of the introduction has highlighted the importance of individual personality in 
explaining social capital generation, job search behaviour, and labour market outcomes. 
Therefore, chapter 5 expanded previous analyses by adding personality traits and by 
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incorporating a two-step approach of Bourguignon et al. (2007) in order to address the 
selection problem that has been revealed in chapter 3. Personality traits were introduced in 
order to capture part of the unobserved characteristics that determine both source choice and 
post-hire outcomes. Empirical results of this chapter illustrate that locus of control, the degree 
to which someone believes to have an impact on one’s life, has a strong influence on both job 
search via formal channels and post-hire outcomes. Regressions without correction terms 
merely replicate findings of chapter 4. However, when correction terms are included, all wage 
and job satisfaction coefficients become insignificant. This indicates that selection into search 
channels should be considered in order to gain more robust estimates. Furthermore, locus of 
control has proven to be an important factor in determining wages and job satisfaction, even 
when it is controlled for personality traits in the selection regression. 
The two last chapters address two major shortcomings of the previous analyses. In chapter 6, 
the dataset is restricted to unemployed job seekers who differ in many regards from job-to-job 
changers as hypothesised in question 4. Unemployed job seekers were asked about their 
search effort and the channels used in order to find a job and this information has been 
matched with data from the following year (e.g. “being employed”). While previous chapters 
could only investigate how individuals found their current job, this chapter has provided 
additional evidence on the use of (multiple) search channels during job search. Important 
findings of this chapter are that unemployed job seekers actively use their social ties in order 
to find a job (which has not been found for on-the-job searchers) and that impulse applications 
are positively related to the probability of being employed in the next year. Regarding post-
hire outcomes, no search channel has been identified as more helpful than others.  
The previous chapter (7) has addressed the lack of differentiation between strong and weak 
ties (Granovetter, 1973). The lack of information regarding tie strength has been addressed in 
all previous chapters and in question 5 in the introduction. In this chapter, however, 
information on leisure time activities has been exploited in order to identify whether 
individuals dispose of many strong or weak ties. In terms of monetary post-hire outcomes, 
OLS results yielded some evidence that weak ties are positively related to wages. Regarding 
job satisfaction, this relationship could not be confirmed. A subjective measure of job 
security, though, is positively related to leisure time activities which are more likely to 
generate weak ties.  
All in all, this thesis has enhanced the existing research in the following aspects. First, this 
thesis has highlighted that source choice is non-random but determined by demographic 
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factors and personality traits. Second, evidence has been generated that social ties do not per 
se help job seekers to find a better job. On the contrary, most regressions reveal a negative 
relationship between wages and job search via social ties, though, not statistically significant. 
Third, this thesis has shown that job seekers who found a job via social ties report higher job 
satisfaction. Fourth, this has been the first study based on a representative sample of 
employees which investigated turnover as a post-hire outcome of job search. Fifth, in chapter 
5 a new approach to reduce selectivity biases has been applied, which has not been done 
before in the literature. Sixth, in a detailed analysis of unemployed job seekers it has been 
detected that unemployed job seekers actively utilise their social ties to search for jobs, 
however, this did not significantly affect post-hire outcomes. Seventh, the last chapter has 
added several methodological aspects to the investigation of leisure time activities, in 
particular to address endogeneity problems.  
8.2 Limitations 
Despite the scientific progress described above, all analyses are subject to restrictions caused 
by the nature of a large scale survey like the SOEP. One major shortcoming is that the SOEP 
variable “job search via social ties” did not distinguish different kinds of ties. Especially 
strong and weak ties could not be identified. This limitation has been addressed in chapter 7, 
however, a clear assignment of leisure time activities in activities generating merely strong 
respectively weak ties is restricted. Moreover, vertical or horizontal ties should be 
differentiated since ties to supervisors could be more helpful than to co-workers (Breuer et al., 
2013). 
One shortcoming of all job change analyses is that it has not been controlled for the reason 
why an individual was searching for a new job,
118
 in particular why an individual left the 
previous job. Individuals who were dismissed due to different reasons (single dismissal in 
comparison to mass layoffs) might differ from individuals who left the previous job in order 
to find a better job. Grund (1999), however, did not find a (monetary) stigma effect 
comparing dismissed employees with employees affected by layoffs. Nevertheless, this does 
not exclude a potential wage differences due to voluntary and involuntary turnover. Chadi and 
Hetschko (2015) investigated how job changes affect job satisfaction. They found that 
voluntary job changes were associated with an increase in life satisfaction; however, this 
effect diminished over time. Involuntary turnover had no effect on life satisfaction. The lack 
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of information on the reasons for termination of the previous job could distort the findings if 
this reason is correlated with search effort or search channel choice. Job changers who 
decided to leave the former employer voluntarily might have used their social ties in a 
different way (e.g. rather passive than active) compared to employees who were subject to a 
mass layoff. However, most of this effect should be covered in the active/passive search 
dummy or in the on-/off-the job search dummy.  
Unfortunately, a representative dataset like the SOEP does not contain a reliable measure for 
job performance. A performance measure could be used in order to estimate whether 
individuals who found a job via informal means perform better in their new job. If this 
relation is positive, this could be understood as proof of the job matching theories described in 
chapter 2.2. However, the turnover variable used in chapter 4 can be understood as proxy for 
performance.
119
 In a meta-analysis, Zimmerman and Darnold (2009) found that job 
performance (both estimated by supervisor- and self-ratings) were correlated with an 
individual’s intention to turnover. At least weak evidence on a reduction in turnover is 
presented in chapter 4. It is probably a too far-reaching interpretation that social capital is 
positively related to job performance. Yet, no negative correlation can be concluded which 
shows that those found via social ties are at least as good in their job as those recruited via 
formal ties. This attenuates the argument that social ties could place individuals into jobs they 
are not qualified for. Still, other determinants of turnover which do not lie in the respective 
person or the respective job have not been included into the analyses. Gregory-Smith and 
Main (2015) revealed that social comparisons (e.g. of wages) between managers can be a 
source for turnover when managers feel underpaid in comparison with their colleagues. It 
seems plausible that this effect is also possible between other employees outside the 
management. Social ties between new hires and incumbents could serve as a two-sided sword 
in this case. Connected individuals could receive detailed information on wage dispersions 
from their peers. Nevertheless, social ties could prevent individuals from leaving the 
respective firm because wage dispersions between closely connected individuals could be 
interpreted as fairer than dispersions between individuals who are not close. Future research 
could investigate which of these two opposing effects is dominating. 
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Last, the findings of this study investigate the effectiveness of social capital in Germany as a 
specific country. As described above, collective wage bargaining and wage posting are 
common wage setting mechanisms which leave less room for wage dispersions between 
employees recruited through different channels. In a cross-country analysis, Hermann and 
Marianna (2011) found evidence for a heterogeneous relationship between social capital and 
wages for country groups. In post-socialist countries social capital was positively related to 
wages while this correlation almost disappeared in Nordic countries. This implies that labour 
market regulations and social forces affect the way social capital can transform into labour 
market benefits. However, this limits the transferability of the findings on other countries. 
8.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
This dissertation should be understood as a first step to investigate the use and the 
effectiveness of social capital in the job search process. All in all, this thesis has found ample 
evidence for Esser’s perception that “social Capital is a special case of capital.” (Esser, 2008: 
23) which leaves plenty of room for future research – both theoretical and empirical. 
The literature review in chapter 2 has shown that so far no comprehensive theoretical model 
of job search via social ties exists which could explain the findings of this thesis. As a result, 
future researchers could formulate a model which describes the trade-off between monetary 
and non-monetary benefits of job search that has frequently been found in the analyses. Job 
seekers who utilise their social ties to find a new job might limit the number of considered 
alternatives which reduces the probability of finding a job with higher wages. Nevertheless, 
individuals find a job which provides a higher level of job satisfaction. A theoretical model 
should, therefore, regard job seekers as utility maximisers instead of income maximisers.  
Researchers have up to now neglected how the recruitment of an employee through informal 
means affects the referrer. In his theoretical model, Winter (1997) argued that the referrer 
gains the job seeker’s gratitude which increases the referrer’s utility. In addition, it is also 
conceivable that employing a friend or relative positively affects performance and satisfaction 
of the incumbent. Incumbents could feel that their judgement on other employees is 
recognised and appreciated. Conducting a field experiment with 300 employees, Bradler et al. 
(2014) showed that recognition was positively related to performance. Yet, the increase in 
performance was mainly caused by those who did not receive recognition which the authors 
explained by the employees’ preference for conformity. In the context of job search, this 
could mean that other incumbents apart from the referrer are affected as well if they strive to 
receive the same amount of recognition by suggesting other fitting job seekers. Moreover, 
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referrers who recently brought a new employee into the firm should be less likely to leave the 
firm subsequently so that referrals could decrease turnover.  
Firms which make use of work teams could use their employees to find new members for 
existing teams. Under the assumption that social ties are mainly formed between similar 
individuals, this should affect team member diversity. A growing literature investigates the 
relationship between team heterogeneity and team performance and results are rather mixed 
(Haas, 2010). Diversity is regarded as a source for creativity and satisfaction but also as a 
source for conflict and a lack of social integration (Stahl et al., 2010). Team member 
similarity could affect how information in teams are shared (Gruenfeld et al., 1996; 
Wittenbaum, Stasser, 1996). If new hires and the referrer work together in a small team, 
information flow and social integration might be improved, which should be positively related 
to team performance. Future research could, therefore, investigate how team performance of 
work group is affected if new team members were recruited by informal means.  
Research on labour market outcomes of social capital could also investigate how job search 
via social ties affects the willingness to apply for a certain job. Rynes et al. (1980) argued that 
apart from wages and other characteristics of a certain job, the applicant’s decision to apply or 
to accept a job offer is affected by the HR staff and administrative practices and procedures. 
This process, however, could be different in case an individual is hired via informal means. 
Another important factor in the hiring process is perceived trustworthiness of information 
provided in the process. Acarlar and Bilgiç (2013) found that the perceived credibility of job 
adverts affected the willingness to apply for a certain job. In chapter 2.5.1 is has been argued 
that information on job characteristics conveyed via social ties might be perceived as more 
accurate and trustworthy (Rees, 1966). This increased credibility might derive from similarity 
between the referrer and the job seeker (Simons et al., 1970). Researchers could investigate 
how the hiring process itself differs when job seekers are found through different channels 
and how these procedural differences affect the attractiveness of a job and the willingness to 
apply for this job. 
This argumentation shows that referral hiring should be interpreted in the broader context of 
the respective recruitment strategy. Research in this field should incorporate the referrer and 
the organisation as a whole in order to find out how employee hiring strategies affect firm 
performance or the performance of the referrer or other co-workers. 
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All chapters of this thesis utilised post-hire outcomes (chapter 6 also pre-hire outcomes) of 
job search via different channels as a comparative measure for source effectiveness. As a 
result, efficiency of certain channels could not be investigated. However, it has been argued 
that social ties yield applicants who are more satisfied with their current job but who do not 
receive higher wages. Furthermore, there are no reasons why the application and selection 
process should be more expensive for firms when employees are hired via social ties. On the 
contrary, firms could even save money by using their employees because the use of formal 
channels is usually not free of charge. Furthermore, the selection process might be faster and 
more efficient if employers can rely on the pre-screening abilities of their employees. Thus, it 
is most likely that social ties can be an efficient search channel, however, this has not been 
investigated and could be subject of future research projects. 
With reference to current changes in society and expected changes in the labour market, it 
might be of interest how the large number of migrants – mainly as political refugees, affects 
the use of social ties as a job search instrument. Beaman (2012) showed that political refugees 
who have been randomly distributed across the USA benefit from a large network of tenured 
network members, whereas a larger number of new network members reduces network 
effectiveness. For the Italian labour market, Colussi (2015) found that socially connected 
immigrants benefit in terms of labour market outcomes if their peers are employed. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear how a large inflow of migrants (particularly from the most-
affected middle-eastern countries like Syria) can be absorbed into existing social networks. 
Future research could, hence, investigate how an immigration shock (in the economic sense) 
affects social networking of immigrants from a certain country/region or of immigrants in 
general. 
This thesis confirmed that hiring via informal means is not necessarily related to individual 
outcomes like wages but at least partially to non-monetary outcomes like job satisfaction. Yet, 
firms could benefit from using their employees or other ties to attract and select applicants. 
Social ties, thus, can serve as a powerful tool to face the problem of information asymmetries 
in the labour market – to reveal useful information on otherwise – to say it with the words of 
Ben-Porath (1980) – “faceless” applicants. 
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Table 57: SOEP questions for the five-factor model 
Question 
I see myself as someone who ... 
Score 
1 = does not apply to me at all 
7 = does apply to me perfectly 
Dimension 
– does a thorough job 1-7 Conscientiousness 
– is communicative, talkative 1-7 Extraversion 
– is sometimes somewhat rude to others 1-7* Agreeableness 
– is original, comes up with new ideas 1-7 Openness 
– worries a lot 1-7 Neuroticism 
– has a forgiving nature 1-7 Agreeableness 
– tends to be lazy 1-7* Conscientiousness 
– is outgoing, sociable 1-7 Extraversion 
– values artistic experiences 1-7 Openness 
– gets nervous easily 1-7 Neuroticism 
– does things effectively and efficiently 1-7 Conscientiousness 
– is reserved 1-7* Extraversion 
– is considerate and kind to others 1-7 Agreeableness 
– has an active imagination 1-7 Openness 
– is relaxed, handles stress well 1-7* Neuroticism 
Note: * indicates reversed items. 
 
 
Table 58: SOEP questions for locus of control 
Question 
The following statements apply to different attitudes towards life and the 
future. To what degree to you personally agree with the following statements? 
Score 
1 = disagree completely 
7 = agree completely 
How my life goes depends on me. 1-7 
Compared to other people, I have not achieved what I deserve. 1-7* 
What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck. 1-7* 
If a person is socially or politically active, he/she can have an effect on social 
conditions. 
1-7 
I frequently have the experience that other people have a controlling influence 
over my life. 
1-7* 
One has to work hard in order to succeed. 1-7 
If I run up against difficulties in life, I often doubt my own abilities. 1-7 
The opportunities that I have in life are determined by the social conditions. 1-7* 
Inborn abilities are more important than any efforts one can make. 1-7* 
I have little control over the things that happen in my life. 1-7* 
Notes: Higher values appeal to internal locus of control. * indicates reversed items. 
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Table 59: SOEP questions for positive and negative reciprocity 
Question 
To what degree do the following statements apply to you 
personally? 
Score 
1 = does not apply to me at all 
7 = does apply to me perfectly 
Dimension 
Positive reciprocity   
If someone does me a favour, I am prepared to return it. 1-7 Positive 
If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as 
possible, no matter what the cost. 
1-7 Negative 
If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the 
same to him/her. 
1-7 Negative 
I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to 
me before. 
1-7 Positive 
If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back. 1-7 Negative 
I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who 
helped me before. 
1-7 Positive 
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